The teleological argument, also known as the argument from design, argues that certain features of the natural world appear designed and are best explained by an intelligent designer. There are three main forms this argument takes: analogical, deductive, and abductive. The analogical form argues from similarities between natural objects and human artifacts. The deductive form argues that design-like properties could not arise without an intentional designer. The abductive form argues that a designer is the best explanation for why things appear designed. However, each form is subject to objections regarding analogies, reliance on inductive arguments, and alternative natural explanations.

1. 1-29
teleological argument

2. teleological argument
 is an a posteriori argument in that it starts with our
experience of the world, especially those things
which strike us as having been designed, and
works from there
 ‘teleological’ derived from the greek word telos
which means “end”
 also called the “argument from design”
 presumes there is some purpose that is
demonstrated in the world
 this Purpose necessitates a Designer

3. design inference patterns
 [Q] p. 87, first statement by cleanthes
articulates the basic idea
 there are a variety of different forms the
argument can take
 analogical design arguments
 deductive design arguments
 abductive design arguments

4. analogical design argument
 (1) entity e within nature (or the cosmos, or nature itself) is like
specified human artifact a (e.g., a machine) in relevant respects R.
(2) a has R precisely because it is a product of deliberate design by
intelligent human agency.
(3) like effects typically have like causes (or like explanations, like
existence requirements, etc.)
therefore:
(4) it is (highly) probable that e has R precisely because it too is a
product of deliberate design by intelligent, relevantly human-like
agency.
 relevant respects and properties R are referred to variously as teleological
properties or as marks or signs of design, and objects having such
properties are sometimes referred to as teleological objects

5. objections to analogical argument
 there is not enough similarity for the analogy to
work
 cannot argue from the parts to the whole
 we learn about artifacts requiring a designer based upon
multiple experiences which we are able to compare, but
there is only one universe, and, hence, we are unable to
compare one against our experience of several
 most importantly, we all recognize human artifacts as
different from other objects “in the wild,” and this is the
very thing that demonstrates that they are, in fact, artifacts

6. continued:
 our attempt at this reasoning results in a god who is very un-
Godlike; the analogy is strongest when God is most like us
 remove infinity (cause should be proportionate to the effects, and the
effects are clearly finite)
 remove perfection (our experience, the thing we use to get to the idea of
design, see flaws and imperfection everywhere. if we assume our
understanding of our experience to be flawed, then we have no reason for
believing we can ever make the leap necessary for this argument to work)
 remove unity (there is no reason there must be only one designer)
 remove immortality (men are mortal and must, necessarily, reproduce to
continue the species)
 might as well make “god” completely human-like, and then we have no
reason for worship at all

7. deductive design argument
 (1) some things in nature (or nature itself, the cosmos) are
design-like (exhibit a cognition-resonating, intention-shaped
character R)
(2) design-like properties (R) are not producible by
(unguided) natural means—i.e., any phenomenon exhibiting
such Rs must be a product of intentional design.
therefore:
(3) some things in nature (or nature itself, the cosmos) are
products of intentional design. and of course, the capacity for
intentional design requires agency of some type.
 though paley’s argument appears inductive (and parts are),
this is a better presentation of the form

8. objections to deductive argument
 there is not really a problem with the first
premise. indeed, many things do appear to
be design-like
 problem is in the second premise; it relies
on an unstated inductive argument
 this argument is susceptible to all the problems
of the first inductive argument

9. abductive design argument
 the surprising fact, C, is observed:
but if A were true, C would be a matter of
course,
hence:
there is reason to suspect that A is true.
 a Designer is seen as the best explanation
to the question of why things appear
designed

10. objections to abductive argument
 always reasons to the best explanation, and this
means it beats out its competitors in terms of
explanatory value (e.g. predictive value,
conciseness, simplicity, etc)
 there are other explanations which seem to make more
sense given all the information
 one possible explanation is that our species is predisposed
to see regularities and “design,” and this is why we see
faces in clouds, etc
 most troubling would be a supernatural explanation for
what started out as an explicitly natural question