Running head VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE REALM1VISIBLE AND INVISI.docx

Running head: VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE REALM 1
VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE REALM 2
Visible and Invisible Realm
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Visible and Invisible Realm
Socrates provided the affinity argument, which was intended to
support the idea that the soul is immortal. Through this
analysis, the concepts of the changing and intangible nature of
the soul are analyzed in relation to the ever-changing nature of
the body. However, there are different views concerning the
arguments made by Socrates, paying close attention to why the
affinity argument is considered weak amongst the philosophers.
Elton (1997) and Apolloni (1996) provide different viewpoints
of Socrates affinity argument, specifically on the difference
between the visible and invisible realms, basing on the Phaedo
and Plato’s claims.
The Views of Apolloni
Apolloni (1996) considers the affinity argument as a week claim
made by Plato and not Socrates. In the article, the author argues
that although the soul may not be a physical object like the
body, it should not be perceived as being incomposite. He
claims that since it is possible to disperse the soul, then the soul
is not immortal and, therefore, it can be dispersed. However, the

soul cannot be dispersed in the same as the body, which is a
physical and tangible object.
Apolloni (1996) has his arguments based on the idea that the
soul is invisible, while the body is visible. He argues that while
the body continually undergoes change, the invisible nature of
the soul ensures that it remains constant. However, the two are
interconnected in that it is through the body that the soul is able
to perceive. Moreover, the author believes that the invisible
nature of the soul can also be attributed to its divine nature.
This writer also presents the thoughts of Plato concerning the
intellect as another invisible part of the soul (Apolloni, 1996).
He, therefore, is convinced that Plato’s views of the Affinity
Argument are more understandable than those of Socrates. That
is, the affinity and invisible nature of the soul can be used to
explain some of the religious beliefs, such as the existence of
ghosts. What is more is that although the soul and the body only
differ through the emotional attachments of the body, people
can experience spiritual fulfillment when the intellect is free
from the desires of the body.
The Views of Elton
On the other hand, Elton (1997) provides a different opinion of
the affinity argument, whereby he holds that the soul is entirely
indissoluble. The author claims that Plato was not in agreement
with the view, based on the analogical forms. Moreover, he
explains that the soul should not be considered immortal,
mainly because the soul ceases to exist.
The difference is the views provided in Elton (1997) are in that
the author basis his claims on the analogical arguments made by
the Cebes and the Simmias. The analogy of the tuning of the
lyre is given, whereby the attunement is the immortal aspect
while the lyre is the mortal part. Thus, it is claimed that if the
strings of the lyre were to break, it would be expected that the
lyre ceases to exist, while the attunement remains. However,
this is never the case because the attunement is no longer there
while the lyre remains visible. Thus, this kind of thinking
should not be encouraged when comparing the invisible and

visible natures of the soul and its relation to the body.
Furthermore, Elton (1997) views Socrates’ views of the visible
and the invisible reams as an appeal to the emotions of the
Simmias and the Cebes. That is it is not a rational philosophical
argument, mostly because it lacks proof. Rather than,
considering Socrates argument as accurate, Elton (1997) use the
Phaedo to show how Socrates’ theory is an example of the
making of mistakes in philosophy.
References
Apolloni, D. (1996). Plato's Affinity Argument for the
Immortality of the Soul. Journal of the History of Philosophy,
34(1), 5-32.
Elton, M. (1997). The Role of the Affinity Argument in the"
Phaedo". Phronesis, 42(3), 313-316.
Plato's Affinity Argument for the Immortality of the Soul
David Apolloni
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 34, Number 1,
January 1996,
pp. 5-32 (Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI:
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https://muse.jhu.edu/article/225860
Plato's Affinity Argument for
the Immortality of the Soul
D A V I D A P O L L O N I
VROM P h a e d o 78b to 8od, Socrates a t t e m p t s to a n s
w e r S i m m i a s ' f e a r that, e v e n
if t h e soul has existed e t e r n a l l y b e f o r e birth, it m i
g h t be d i s p e r s e d a n d this
w o u l d be the e n d o f its existence (77b5). His a n s w e r
is an a r g u m e n t which
a t t e m p t s to s h o w t h a t t h e soul is i n c o m p o s i t
e because it is similar to t h e F o r m s
a n d dissimilar to physical objects. T o date, this a r g u m e n
t - - t h e so-called A f t i n -
ity A r g u m e n t - - h a s n o t r e c e i v e d m u c h s y m p
a t h y f r o m Plato's c o m m e n t a t o r s ,
w h o universally c o n s i d e r it the weakest o f Plato's a r g
u m e n t s f o r t h e i m m o r t a l -
ity o f t h e s o u l ?
T h e lack o f s y m p a t h y a n d e n t h u s i a s m f o r
this a r g u m e n t is n o t difficult to

u n d e r s t a n d . J u s t c o n s i d e r t h e following o u t l
i n e o f the a r g u m e n t . T h e soul is
invisible, t h e r e f o r e t h e soul is m o r e similar to the
Invisible, i.e., t h e F o r m s ,
which a r e always t h e same, t h a n a r e bodies, which a r e
visible a n d which a r e
c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g , a n d which a r e m o r e
similar to t h e Visible t h a n is t h e soul
( 7 9 a - b ) . F u r t h e r , t h e soul is m o r e like the
Always t h e S a m e in that w h e n it
uses t h e b o d y to see o r h e a r o r perceive, it is " d r a g
g e d " by the b o d y into t h e
N e v e r t h e Same, a n d the soul " w a n d e r s a n d is c o
n f u s e d a n d whirls as if
i n t o x i c a t e d " i n s o f a r as t h e soul has c o m e in c
o n t a c t with such t h i n g s ( 7 9 c 5 - 8 ) .
W h e r e a s w h e n t h e soul c o n s i d e r s by itself, it
goes to the r e a l m o f the F o r m s ,
a n d ceases its w a n d e r i n g . T h e r e f o r e t h e soul is
m o r e like the Always t h e S a m e
t h a n t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e (79d). Finally, w h e n t h
e soul is in the b o d y , t h e soul
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the First
Annual Conference of the Minne-
sota Society of Ancient Philosophy, held at the College of St.

Catherine, St. Paul, Minnesota, May
7, 1994. Thanks are due to Martha Beck-Phillips, John Pepple,
and an anonymous referee of the
J l t P for their valuable suggestions and criticisms.
' See Kenneth Dorter, "'Plato's Image of Immortality," The
Philosophical Quarterly 6/lo 5 (Octo-
ber, 1976): ~95-3o4 . Dorter's interpretation is probably the
most sympathetic that I have seen,
and yet he thinks that the argument is "set forth rather casually,
is frequently weakened by
qualifications and hesitancy, and is based merely upon analogy"
('~95)-
[5]
6 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S
O P H Y 34:1 J A N U A R Y 1996
r u l e s t h e b o d y a n d t h e r e f o r e is m o r e like t h
e D i v i n e t h a n is t h e b o d y , w h i c h is
m o r e like t h e M o r t a l .
S o i n t e r p r e t e d , t h e m a i n t h r u s t o f this c h a i
n o f a r g u m e n t s is c l e a r l y v e r y
w e a k . T h a t t h e s o u l is m o r e s i m i l a r t o t h e
F o r m s t h a n it is t o b o d i e s d o e s n o t
e s t a b l i s h h o w it is s i m i l a r . 2 A n d s o it falls s h
o r t o f s h o w i n g t h a t it is s i m i l a r i n
t h a t b o t h t h e s o u l a n d t h e F o r m s a r e i n d e s

t r u c t i b l e o r i n d i s s o l u b l e .
N o r d o e s t h e s i t u a t i o n i m p r o v e w h e n w e c
o n s i d e r t h e i n d i v i d u a l a r g u -
m e n t s i n t h e c h a i n . F o r e v e n i f t h e s o u l is
invisible, this in n o w a y e s t a b l i s h e s
t h a t it is u n c h a n g i n g , like o t h e r t h i n g s w h i c
h a r e invisible. N o r d o e s it f o l l o w
t h a t t h e s o u l is s i m i l a r in a n y i n t e r e s t i n g
w a y t o w h a t is a l w a y s t h e s a m e j u s t
b e c a u s e it s t o p s c h a n g i n g w h e n it c o n t e m p l
a t e s " t h e p u r e , t h a t w h i c h a l w a y s is
b o t h i m m o r t a l a n d t h e s a m e . " N o r d o e s t h
e s u p p o s e d f a c t t h a t t h e s o u l r u l e s
t h e b o d y m a k e it s i m i l a r t o t h e D i v i n e t o s
u c h a n e x t e n t t h a t it w o u l d f o l l o w
t h a t t h e s o u l is i n d e s t r u c t i b l e as t h e D i v i n
e is t h o u g h t t o be.
F i n a l l y , S o c r a t e s ' c o n c l u s i o n f r o m all o f
this at 8 o b 8 - ~ o is t h o u g h t t o b e
d i s a p p o i n t i n g l y w e a k , b u t u n d e r s t a n d a b l
y so: " i f t h e s e t h i n g s a r e so, is it n o t
f i t t i n g f o r t h e b o d y t o q u i c k l y c o m e a p a r
t , b u t t h e s o u l t o b e c o m p l e t e l y
i n d i s s o l u b l e , o r s o m e t h i n g c l o s e t o it [r ~

m g ~t TO6TOU]?" I f t h e c o n c l u s i o n
l e a v e s o p e n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e s o u l
is nearly i n d e s t r u c t i b l e , t h e n it is d e -
s t r u c t i b l e a f t e r all, in w h i c h c a s e t h e a r g u
m e n t falls s h o r t o f e s t a b l i s h i n g w h a t
it w a s s u p p o s e d to.
T h u s t h e a r g u m e n t a p p e a r s t o h a v e f a u l t s
so g l a r i n g t h a t it is h a r d t o t h i n k
t h a t P l a t o t o o k it s e r i o u s l y , a n d a t least o n e
r e c e n t c o m m e n t a t o r g o e s so f a r as
t o s u g g e s t t h a t S o c r a t e s i n a d v e r t e n t l y r e
p u d i a t e s it in t h e f a c e o f o b j e c t i o n s
t h a t his c o m p a n i o n s raise.3 B u t i f t h e a r g u m e
n t is so b a d , w e a r e l e f t w i t h a
s i g n i f i c a n t p u z z l e as t o w h y P l a t o w o u l d t
a k e it s e r i o u s l y e n o u g h t o w r i t e it,
a n d t o w r i t e it a t t h e c e n t e r o f o n e o f his g r
e a t e s t d i a l o g u e s , w h e r e it w o u l d
h a v e a s p e c i a l p l a c e o f h o n o r . 4
I n w h a t f o l l o w s , t h e n , [ w o u l d like t o a r g u e
t h a t t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t is
m o r e t h a n a r h e t o r i c a l f l o u r i s h , a n e m o t i
v e e x p r e s s i o n o f b e l i e f s d e e p l y felt, o r

' David Gallop, Plato: Phaedo (Oxford, 1975), 14o: "But if
'being more similar' means 'having
more features in common', the fact that the soul shares with the
Forms a given feature that the
body lacks would not show that it is 'more similar' to them than
is the body. Even if this were
shown, it would not follow that the soul has all features in
common with the Forms that the body
lacks."
For example, David White, Myth and Metaphysics in Plato's
"Phaedo" (London and Toronto:
Associated University Press, 1989) , 133.
4 Kenneth Dorter, Plato's "Phaedo": An Interpretation (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press,
1982), 7 ~. Dorter (76) thinks that the argument has value as an
articulation of deep feelings that
there is something noble and eternal about us. Thus he thinks
that the Affinity Argument, like
the Argument from Design for God's existence, is logically
defective but very persuasive, and that
this accounts for Plato's inclusion of it in the dialogue.
P L A T O ' S A F F I N I T Y A R G U M E N T 7
a weak analogy which Plato put forward only to discard, that it
is a deductive
a r g u m e n t whose conclusion follows from its p r e m i s s e
s - - p r e m i s s e s whose truth
Plato w o u l d have t h o u g h t he had established. As such,
it is an a r g u m e n t o f equal
or greater philosophical merit than either the A r g u m e n t
from Recollection

( 7 3 - 7 6 ) or the Final A r g u m e n t from Opposites ( l o ~
- i o 6 ) . 5 Indeed, the first
and third portions o f it anticipate s o m e m o d e r n
arguments for dualism. 6
1 . T H E A R G U M E N T ' S C O N T E X T W I T H I N
T H E D I A L O G U E
A persistent and crucial t h e m e t h r o u g h o u t the Phaedo
states that the philoso-
pher m u s t detach from the senses and from desires for
physical objects
t h r o u g h rigorous training. We find expression o f this idea
n o t only j u s t after
the Affinity A r g u m e n t ( 8 o e - 8 ld), but also both
earlier, at 6 6 - 6 7 e , and later,
at 1 1 4 d - e . In the latter passage, Plato clearly distinguishes
this idea from all o f
the mythic o n e s elaborated immediately preceding. But even
if it were mythic,
this w o u l d not c o u n t as evidence that Plato himself did
not believe it. For Plato
conceives o f the relationship between a r g u m e n t and myth
as o n e o f loose
evidential s u p p o r t o f the former for the latter (114d).7
But the onlyjustifica-
5 In s u p p o r t o f this statement I can only invite my readers
to compare the Affinity A r g u m e n t
as 1 shall reconstruct it with these o t h e r two a r g u m e n t s
in the Phaedo. I believe that such a
comparison will show that all three approach the definition o f
a great philosophical a r g u m e n t as
one which moves f r o m premisses which everyone considers
obvious to conclusions nobody can
believe. This does not mean that I am trying to establish the

Affinity A r g u m e n t as sound (or
unsound). It, like any o t h e r a r g u m e n t by an ancient
philosopher, makes assumptions that are, in
the end, questionable or would require f u r t h e r revision and
assessment i f a c o n t e m p o r a r y philoso-
p h e r were to try to d e f e n d them. For example, the a r g u
m e n t assumes Plato's T h e o r y o f F o r m s - -
that the world o f the senses is largely composed o f c o m p r
e s e n t opposites but the Forms are not,
that like is attracted to like so that the immaterial soul, when
separated f r o m the body, goes to a
world o f similar objects, whereas if the soul is too attached to
the body, it remains in the world o f
physical objects. C o m p a r e these assumptions with those o f
the A r g u m e n t from Recollection--that
sensible equals somehow "fall short" o f true Equality (Phaedo
7 4 d - e ) , that a priori knowledge is
"forgotten" (76d); or those o f the Final A r g u m e n t - - t h a
t the soul cannot be destroyed because it
has life a n d life cannot receive death (1 o6c-e). For critical
assessment o f both o f these arguments,
and f u r t h e r references, see Gallop, Plato: Phaedo, i 19ff. a
n d 192ff., respectively. See also G.E.M.
Anscombe, " U n d e r s t a n d i n g Proofs," in h e r From
Parmenides to Wittgenaein: Collected Philosophical
Papers, Voi. i (Minneapolis, t981 ), 34-43; Gregory Vlastos,
"Anamnesis in the Meno," Dialogue 4
0965): 146-67.
s See below, n. 48 a n d my Epilogue for this and o t h e r
reasons for a wide interest for the
a r g u m e n t .
7 Following his final mythic description o f the afterlife,
Socrates says here, "Complete affirma-
tion that these things are as I have described is not p r o p e r

for a reasonable person; nonetheless,
that these things are so or something like them [xotct~t' ~trtct]
concerning the soul and its habita-
tion, it seems fitting to me and a p p r o p r i a t e to risk
thinking, since it is manifest [qbcts o~oct]
that t h e soul is immortal. For the risk is a reasonable one
[xcO.6g], and it is necessary f o r me to
chant to myself such things as these, for which reason I have
embellished my account [xct~, ttO3.at
itllxt3vt0 t6v p.~0ov]." T h e s e words make clear that
Socrates takes himself to have established that
the soul is immortal, a n d because he has established this, the
mythic account o f the h e r e a f t e r he
8 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 4 : 1
JANUARY I 9 9 6
t i o n we f i n d in t h e d i a l o g u e is in t h e A f f i n i t
y A r g u m e n t itself, specifically in
t h e p o r t i o n s s h o w i n g t h a t t h e soul is t h e s a
m e a n d (as we shall see) d i v i n e .
W i t h o u t t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t , o n e o f S o
c r a t e s ' m o s t i m p o r t a n t d o c t r i n e s
t h r o u g h o u t t h e d i a l o g u e is g i v e n n o s u p p o
r t p r e c i s e l y w h e r e we w o u l d e x p e c t
t o f i n d it. A n d o n e w o u l d e x p e c t S o c r a t e s
to h a v e d r o p p e d this d o c t r i n e i f t h e
A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t w e r e d e f e a t e d . B u t h e
d o e s n o t d o this.
A n d w h a t a b o u t t h e o b j e c t i o n s o f S i m m i a

s a n d C e b e s ? B o t h o f t h e s e fail, so
t h e y c a n n o t i m p l y t h a t S o c r a t e s g a v e u p t
h e Affinity A r g u m e n t . I n d e e d ,
Cebes" o b j e c t i o n m i s s e s t h e p o i n t . F o r i f i n
d e e d t h e soul is i n c o m p o s i t e , it is n o t
a n a l o g o u s to t h e tailor, w h o / s , a f t e r all, c o m p
o s i t e . S o c r a t e s ' final r e m a r k s a t
9 5 b - c c o n c e r n i n g C e b e s ' o b j e c t i o n 8 s h o w
t h a t at m o s t it h a s a p o i n t a g a i n s t t h e
A r g u m e n t f r o m R e c o l l e c t i o n , a n d w o r k s a
g a i n s t t h e final t h i r d o f t h e a r g u -
m e n t w h i c h c o n c e r n s t h e d i v i n i t y ( a n d " s
t r e n g t h " ) o f soul. O r r a t h e r , it w o r k s
a g a i n s t a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f this p o r t i o n
o f t h e a r g u m e n t . F o r S o c r a t e s h a s
n o t a r g u e d t h a t t h e soul is i m m o r t a l j u s t b e c
a u s e it is d i v i n e - - h e h a s a r g u e d
t h a t it is i m m o r t a l b e c a u s e it is invisible a n d u n
c h a n g i n g , as well as d i v i n e .
I n r e s p o n s e to P h a e d o ' s r e c o u n t i n g t h e
discussion, E c h e c r a t e s m e n t i o n s
o n l y S i m m i a s ' o b j e c t i o n as t h e o n e c o n v i n
c i n g to h i m (88d). So t h e t e x t a g a i n
m a k e s c l e a r C e b e s ' lack o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l a
s t u t e n e s s . O f c o u r s e , S o c r a t e s d o e s
n o t explicitly say this. R a t h e r , p r e s u m a b l y , h e is
v e r y g e n t l y a n d i n d i r e c t l y p o i n t -

i n g it o u t w i t h o u t e m b a r r a s s i n g his f r i e n d ,
w h o is t o o o b t u s e to notice. H e h a s a
g e n t l e r w a y o f t r y i n g to c o n v i n c e C e b e s . T
h u s C e b e s ' o b j e c t i o n is m e r e l y a d r a -
m a t i c i n t r o i t to a n e w , i n d e p e n d e n t a r g u m
e n t f o r i m m o r t a l i t y (9 6 - 1 o 6 ) .
S i m m i a s ' o b j e c t i o n is m u c h m o r e o n t h e m
a r k , f o r it q u e s t i o n s a c r u c i a l
i n f e r e n c e m a d e in t h e A f f i n i t y A r g u m e n t ,
i.e., t h a t w h a t is invisible is i n d e -
s t r u c t i b l e . F o r t h e a t t u n e m e n t o f t h e s t r i
n g s o f a l y r e is invisible, b u t is d e -
s t r o y e d w h e n t h e s t r i n g s a r e s n a p p e d . So i
f t h e soul is a n a t t u n e m e n t o f
o p p o s i t e s in t h e b o d y , it c a n n o t s u r v i v e t h
e d e a t h o f t h e b o d y e i t h e r .
has just elaborated o r something like it is reasonable to
believe. Cf. Veda Cobb-Stevens, "Mythos
and Logos in Plato's Phaedo," in A.-T. Tymieniecka, ed., The
Philosophical Reflection of Man in
Literature (Dordrecht, 1982 ), 4o4, who points out that in the
Phaedo, we are not completely
separable from the body in this life; so we must address death in
perceptual, mythical terms. But
the soul must maintain primacy over the body, so the myth is
structured by the conclusions of
reasoned argument. "The basic structure of the philosophical
insight gained by logos must guide
and order the content of the myth. In this way, the myth can
speak directly to the fear which has

its origin in the body, hut speak with the 'hidden meaning' and
calming effect of its logical
structure. Thus the myth, instead of inducing the soul to regress
to the level of the body, speaks to
the body in a language structured by the insights of the soul."
See also Ludwig Edeistein, "The
Function of Myth in Plato's Philosophy,"Journal of the History
of Ideas lo (1949): 463 - 8 l, esp. 466.
s,,To show that the soul is strong and godlike, and even that it
existed before we were born--
all this, you may say, may very well indicate not that the soul is
immortal, but merely that it is long-
lived, and preexisted somewhere for a prodigious period of
time, enjoying a great measure of
knowledge and activity."
As f o r this o b j e c t i o n , t h e r e is n o r e a s o n to
believe t h a t Plato t h i n k s h e has
failed to r e f u t e it, w h a t e v e r o n e thinks o f t h e r e
f u t a t i o n itself.9 A n d to
E c h e c r a t e s ' q u e s t i o n as to w h e t h e r Socrates r e
s c u e d his a r g u m e n t , P h a e d o in
his r o l e as m o d e r a t o r in t h e d i a l o g u e r e s p o n
d s a f f i r m a t i v e l y ( 8 8 e - 8 9 a ) . In-
d e e d , S o c r a t e s has a l r e a d y a n t i c i p a t e d this
o b j e c t i o n because, as we shall see,
his r e s p o n s e to t h e o b j e c t i o n is a m e r e e x p a n
s i o n o f t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e a r g u -
m e n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e divinity o f t h e soul.
So i f Plato d i d n o t t a k e t h e a r g u m e n t seriously,

w h y t h e n d o S o c r a t e s '
i n t e r l o c u t o r s fail to r e f u t e it? I believe, t h e n , t
h a t the a b o v e c o n t e x t u a l r e a s o n s
f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t Plato r e j e c t e d t h e a r g u m e
n t all fail. It r e m a i n s f o r us to
c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r it is a bad a r g u m e n t .
2 . T I I E B A S l C S T R U C T U R E O F T H E A R G
U M E N T
A n y a t t e m p t to u n d e r s t a n d t h e a r g u m e n t m
u s t solve t h e following puzzle. At
7 9 b - c , S o c r a t e s asserts t h a t t h e b o d y is more s
i m i l a r a n d more a k i n to the Visible.
W h y d o e s h e settle f o r this, w h e n h e can assert s o
m e t h i n g s t r o n g e r - - t h a t t h e
b o d y i n d e e d / s visible? F u r t h e r , h e asserts t h a t
t h e soul is invisible ( o v x 6Qctx6v)
a n d h e n c e u n s e e n (&tiS~g). T h e n h e s t r a n g e l
y i n f e r s f r o m this what a p p e a r s to
be a f a r w e a k e r c o n c l u s i o n - - t h a t t h e soul is
m o r e similar t h a n is t h e b o d y to
the U n s e e n , a n d t h e b o d y is m o r e similar t h a n
is t h e soul to t h e Visible
(79 b 1 6 - 1 7 ) . W h y d o e s h e n o t i n f e r instead t h
a t t h e b o d y b e l o n g s to t h e Visible
a n d t h e soul to t h e Invisible?
F u r t h e r , S o c r a t e s m a k e s similar m o v e s in t h e
l a t e r stages o f t h e a r g u m e n t :
at 7 9 d o - e i , S o c r a t e s i n f e r s t h a t the soul is m o
r e similar a n d m o r e a k i n to t h e
Always t h e S a m e w h e n h e has established t h a t t h e
soul is in fact u n c h a n g i n g ;
a n d at 8 o a 6 - 8 , h e i n f e r s t h a t soul is m e r e l y
like t h e Divine, w h e n h e has

e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t its n a t u r e is to r u l e r a t h e r t
h a n to be r u l e d . In t h e s e last two
stages, t h e n , h e o d d l y r e p l a c e s a m o r e specific c
o n c l u s i o n with a v a g u e r , if n o t
w e a k e r , o n e . W h y ?
D o r t e r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n is a p p a r e n t l y t h a t
this shows S o c r a t e s ' " h e s i t a n c y '''~
a n d t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t is n o t m e a n t to be a r i g
o r o u s d e d u c t i o n . ~ H o w e v e r , t h a t
Plato i n t e n d s us to see t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t is n o t
a r i g o r o u s d e d u c t i o n c a n n o t
e x p l a i n w h y S o c r a t e s d e d u c e s that t h e soul is
m o r e like t h e Invisible f r o m t h e
p r e m i s e t h a t t h e soul is invisible. Such a d e d u c t i o
n is r i g o r o u s ; lack o f r i g o r is
n o t t h e p r o b l e m . I f S o c r a t e s is b e i n g
hesitant, we n e e d to k n o w w h y if this is
g o i n g to s e r v e as a n e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e p r o b l
e m is, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e d e d u c t i o n
9 My own assessment of the point of the Socrates' argument
from the "strength" of the soul is
outlined below, pp. 27-29. For a critique of Socrates'
counterarguments against the harmony
theory, see David Bostock, Plato's "Phaedo'" (Oxford, 1986 ),
1~5-34.
,o Dorter, "Plato's Image of Immortality," 295.
" Dorter, Plato's "'Phaedo": An Interpretation, 76.
1 0 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S
O P H Y 3 4 : 1 J A N U A R Y 1 9 9 6

j u s t s e e m s o d d . A n d o d d n e s s i n d i c a t e s t h
a t w e a r e n o t u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e
a r g u m e n t - - n o t t h a t w e s h o u l d t a k e it as a w
e a k a r g u m e n t f r o m a n a l o g y .
S o w e m u s t t r y t o f i n d a n o t h e r a n s w e r . I t
was a c o s m i c p r i n c i p l e w i d e l y
a c c e p t e d b y t h e G r e e k s t h a t like g r a v i t a t e s
t o like. S o c r a t e s utilizes s u c h a
p r i n c i p l e a t 8 1 a , t o e x p l a i n w h y t h e i m p u
r e s o u l r e m a i n s o n t h e e a r t h a n d w h y
t h e p u r i f i e d s o u l g o e s t o h e a v e n . T h i s c o
u l d easily b e a t l e a s t p a r t o f t h e r e a s o n
S o c r a t e s p u t s s o m u c h e m p h a s i s u p o n t h e
s i m i l i t u d e o f t h e s o u l t o t h e I n v i s i -
ble, A l w a y s t h e S a m e , a n d D i v i n e . W i t h i n t
h e a r g u m e n t i t s e l f h e s e e m s t o b e
m a k i n g a s i m i l a r p o i n t a t 8 o c - d - - w h e n t h e
s o u l t a k e s s e r i o u s l y t h e o b j e c t s o f
t h e senses, it is d r a g g e d b y t h e b o d y i n t o t h o s
e t h i n g s w h i c h a r e n e v e r t h e
s a m e a n d like t h e m " w a n d e r s a n d is c o n f u s e
d a n d w h i r l s as i f i n t o x i c a t e d " ;
a n d w h e n it c o n t e m p l a t e s all b y itself, it g o e s
(in t h o u g h t ? ) t o t h e p u r e , a l w a y s
b e i n g , etc., a n d b e c a u s e it is a k i n t o this w o r l d

a n d a l w a y s c o m e s t o b e w i t h it, it
s t o p s its w a n d e r i n g a n d r e m a i n s t h e s a m e .
B u t i f S o c r a t e s h a s s u f f i c i e n t g r o u n d s t o
say t h a t t h e s o u l b e l o n g s t o t h e
I n v i s i b l e b e c a u s e it is invisible, o r t h a t it b e l o
n g s t o t h e A l w a y s t h e S a m e
b e c a u s e it i n s o m e w a y d o e s n o t c h a n g e , w
h y d o e s h e n o t say this? S o I w o u l d
like t o s u g g e s t a n o t h e r a n s w e r as well.
V e r y r o u g h l y s p e a k i n g , t h e a r g u m e n t , as I
will i n t e r p r e t it, r u n s as follows.
T h e r e a r e t w o a n d o n l y t w o k i n d s o f b e i n g
- - ( a ) t h e Visible, N e v e r t h e S a m e a n d
t h e M o r t a l , a n d (b) t h e I n v i s i b l e , t h e A l w a
y s t h e S a m e , a n d t h e D i v i n e . T h e s o u l
will b e l o n g t o w h i c h e v e r k i n d it m o s t c l o s e l
y r e s e m b l e s b y s h a r i n g a t t r i b u t e s
definitive o f t h a t k i n d . S i n c e t h e s o u l m o s t c l
o s e l y r e s e m b l e s (b), it m u s t b e l o n g t o
(b). B u t t h e n it will a l s o h a v e a n o t h e r c h a r a c t
e r i s t i c o f ( b ) - - i n d e s t r u c t i b i l i t y .
T h e a r g u m e n t , so u n d e r s t o o d , is b a s e d u p o
n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r e a r e
j u s t t h e s e t w o k i n d s w i t h j u s t t h e s e d e f i n

i t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( 7 9 a 6 - 7 ) . S o c r a t e s
d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n t h e A l w a y s t h e S a
m e a n d t h e N e v e r t h e S a m e a t 78c.
T h e f o r m e r a r e likely t o b e c o m p o s i t e a n d a r
e o b s e r v a b l e t h r o u g h t h e
s e n s e s / ' a n d t h e l a t t e r i n c o m p o s i t e a n d c
a n o n l y b e g r a s p e d t h r o u g h r e a s o n
'" Presumably, Socrates means to exclude from the Invisible
objects of all and any of the
senses (cf. 79c2-3). He merely chooses the term "Visible"
because he is taking vision as a represen-
tative of all the senses. The Visible consists, then, not only of
visible objects but sensible objects,
and the Invisible consists not just of objects which cannot be
seen, but which cannot be objects o f
the other senses as well.
One wonders whether objects too small to sense are "invisible"
in Plato's sense. (See Bostock,
P/ato's "Phaed0," 118--19.) Presumably, Plato would not have
thought of Democritus' atoms as
invisible and unchanging as the Forms are. Accordingly, I
suggest that they would be "visible" in
the sense that one could see what turn out to be great numbers
of them together and that they
could be seen individually if human sight were extended to see
smaller objects than it in fact does.
That is to say, the Visible includes any objects it would be
logically possible to perceive through the
senses. On the other hand, what is "invisible" is something
whose nature is such that it is logically
impossible that it could be seen or sensed at all.

Of course Simmias later brings up attunemem as an example of
something which would violate
(79a). T h e m e m b e r s o f t h e f o r m e r c l a s s - - b o
d i e s - - c o n s t i t u t e t h e Visible; a n d
t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e l a t t e r - - S o c r a t e s ' o n l y
e x a m p l e s are F o r m s - - c o n s t i t u t e t h e
Invisible. Since t h e m e m b e r s o f the f o r m e r class are
bodies, visibility, c h a n g e ,
a n d m o r t a l i t y a r e a t t r i b u t e s essential to a n d
definitive o f t h a t class. A n d invisi-
bility, i m m u t a b i l i t y , a n d divinity m u s t t h e n be a
t t r i b u t e s essential to a n d defini-
tive o f t h e latter class as well.
T h u s s o m e o f t h e p r e d i c a t e s d e f i n i n g t h e
Invisible are "always t h e s a m e "
a n d " d i v i n e , " so t h a t l a t e r in t h e a r g u m e n t
these b e c o m e a l t e r n a t i v e n a m e s f o r
t h e Invisible. A n d similarly f o r t h e Visible at 7 9 d 9 - e
l : "~.6 ~t~[ r
~:XovtL" a n d " ~ la/I [r ~:;(o~L]" are clearly a l t e r n a t i v
e n a m e s f o r t h e
Invisible a n d t h e Visible, since Socrates r e f e r s to each
as a " k i n d [e[6et] o f
those talked a b o u t p r e v i o u s l y a n d those talked a b o
u t n o w " a n d the o n l y k i n d s
he has p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d a r e t h e two e[Svl
T6~v 6~c0v at 7 9 a 6 - 7 , which a r e
t h e Invisible a n d t h e Visible. P r e s u m a b l y " t h e
Divine" a n d " t h e M o r t a l " at

8 o a 3 - 8 a r e to be u n d e r s t o o d in the same way.
As it t u r n s o u t , Socrates t h i n k s t h a t …
Discussion Notes
The Role of the Af nity Argument in the Phaedo1
MATTHEW ELTON
The af� nity argument (78b4-84b8) stands out in the Phaedo as
the weakest
of all SocratesÕ arguments for the immortality of the soul. Not
only does Socrates
recognise that it shows no more than that the Òsoul must be
completely indis-
soluble, or something close to itÓ (80b10) but, unlike his other
arguments, it
is thoroughly trounced by stinging and sarcastic replies from
Simmias and
Cebes. It is clear from the dialogue that Plato has grave doubts
about the
mode of argument employed in the af� nity passages. But if
Plato knows the
argument is so bad, then why is it here, nestling amongst, by the
usual count,
three more reasonable arguments for immortality?2 My answer
is that it is here
precisely in order to illustrate how not to argue the case for
immortality, and,
more generally, how not to argue the case for any thesis. The
af� nity remarks,
then, form part of an object lesson in how not to do good
philosophy.

My strategy will be, � rst, to show that Plato (and his leading
man) reject
analogical forms of argument, and, secondly, to defend the
stronger claim that
the use of this argument forms part of an illustration of where
the philos-
ophy can go wrong.
I
I am more concerned with the overall role, rather than the � ner
details of the
af� nity remarks, so a quick and crude recap should serve my
purposes here.
Socrates claims that the soul is akin to unchanging, incomposite
and invis-
ible forms, the body is akin to mutable, composite and visible
particulars.
Forms are immortal, by analogy so too are souls. Or then again,
the soul is
akin to the divine, the body to the mortal. The divine are
immortal, by anal-
ogy so too are souls.
In fact, as already noted, the claim is that souls are immortal
Òor some-
thing close to itÓ (80b10). The quali� cation indicates an early
awareness of
© Koninklijke Brill, Leiden, 1997 Phronesis XLII/3
Accepted February 1997
1 All quotations are from Plato: Phaedo translated with notes by
D. Gallop. Oxford:

Clarendon, 1975.
2 Of course no-one would dispute that the remarks have plenty
of other work to do
besides taking the main argument forward.
the limits of analogical argument. But Plato indicates the
severity of the situ-
ation by the responses he places in the mouths of Simmias and
Cebes. In both
cases, an explicit reference is made to the style of argument.
[One] could surely use the same argument about the attunement
of a lyre and its
strings, and say that the attunement is something unseen and
incorporeal and very
lovely and divine in the tuned lyre, while the lyre itself and its
strings are cor-
poreal bodies and composite and earthy and akin to the mortal.
Now, if someone
smashed the lyre, or severed and snapped its strings, suppose it
were maintained,
by the same argument as yours, that the attunement must still
exist and not have
perished – because it would be inconceivable that when the
strings had been
snapped, the lyre and the strings themselves, which are of
mortal nature, should
still exist, and yet the attunement, which has af� nity and
kinship to the divine
and the immortal, should have perished. . . . (85e2)
The conclusion about the lyre is absurd. But until we reach the
absurdity the

analogies look to be quite as strong as SocratesÕ, and, as
Simmias makes very
clear, the same argumentative strategy is being used. The mode
of argument,
then, is cast under suspicion. (It is perhaps also worth noting
that these
remarks of Simmias come just after he has made some remarks
about philo-
sophical method.)
Cebes opens his reply in a similar manner:
WhatÕs being said [by Socrates in the af� nity argument] is
very much as if some-
one should offer this argument about a man – a weaver who has
died in old age –
to show that the man hasnÕt perished but exists somewhere
intact, and should
produce as evidence the fact that the cloak he had woven for
himself, and worn,
was intact and had not perished; and if anyone doubted him, he
should ask which
class of thing is longer-lived, a man, or a cloak in constant use
or wear . . . [This
weaver], though heÕd woven and worn out many such cloaks,
perished after all
of them, despite their number, but still, presumably, before the
last one; and yet
for all that a man is neither lesser nor weaker than a cloak.
(87b5)
Cebes goes on to press an analogy between the body and the
cloak, on the
one hand, and the soul and the weaver, on the other. Once
again, the analo-
gies look just as convincing as SocratesÕ own, but here they are

pressed into
the service of a contrary conclusion. How is this possible? –
because of the
type of argument that is being employed. In fact, in both of
these replies,
Plato is illustrating the problems of analogical reasoning.
SocratesÕ friends
have grasped the way in which that style of reasoning works –
as Socrates
says Ò[Simmias] really seems to be coming to grips with the
argument in no
mean fashionÓ (86d9) – and are using their grasp to poke fun.
But there is further evidence that Socrates, despite having
offered an argu-
ment of this form, does not believe in the method. One of his
criticisms of
SimmiasÕ harmony theory is that it is incompatible with the
pre-existence of
the soul, a thesis established by the recollection argument.
When pressed
by Socrates to explain which argument he prefers, the
analogical argument
for the harmony theory or the earlier, Ònon-analogical Ó
argument, for pre-
314 MATTHEW ELTON
existence, Simmias goes for the latter. And his choice is made
on account of
the type of argument used:
I acquired the [harmony conclusion] without any proof, but
from a certain likeli-

hood and plausibility about it, whence its appeal for most
people; but IÕm aware
that arguments basing proofs upon their likelihoods are
impostors, and if one
doesnÕt guard against them, they completely deceive one . . .
the argument about
recollection and learning has come from a hypothesis worthy of
acceptance. . . .
(92c11)
If Simmias is aware of this methodological principle which
prejudices ana-
logical arguments, Socrates and SimmiasÕ alike, we can hardly
countenance
that Socrates himself is not. Indeed, SimmiasÕ remark
foreshadows SocratesÕ
later discussion of right philosophical method, his Òsecond
voyageÓ (99d-102a) .
Here, in any case, we can take Socrates to endorse what
Simmias has said,
as he directly moves on to the next criticism of harmony,
without pausing to
comment or clarify SimmiasÕ moves.
Lastly, we can note that at no point does Socrates attempt to
defend or
shore up his own analogical argument. Rather, he attacks the
conclusions of
Simmias and CebesÕ replies, and goes on to defend the
conclusion of his ana-
logical argument by other, non-analogical means. On the
evidence gathered
so far, we can con� dently claim that Plato was very clear about
the pitfalls
of analogical reasons, and, although Socrates himself seems to
have dropped

his guard for a moment, he too is, at the very least, dimly aware
of their
limitations. 3
II
I now want to push for the stronger claim, viz. that Plato is
providing an
object lesson in how not to mount an argument. Consider �
rstly the conver-
sation just before Socrates launches into the af� nity remarks
(77a7-78b4) .
Cebes and Simmias appear to be rationally convinced by
SocratesÕ case for
immortality, but are still anxious. Socrates chides them:
I think you and Simmias would like to thrash out this argument
still further; you
seem afraid, like children, that as the soul goes out from the
body, the wind may
literally blow it apart and disperse it. . . . (77d5)4
Cebes: ÒTry to reassure us, Socrates, as if we were afraid; or
rather, not as if we
were afraid ourselves – but maybe thereÕs a child inside us,
who has fears of that
3 Cf. Republic 434d-435b and 435d. Socrates explains that the
analogy of justice
in the state and in the individual should be treated as a
heuristic, delivering merely
provisional and fallible results.
4 The fear of a wind blown dispersal is an allusion to a
materialist theory of the soul.
The af� nity remarks help along PlatoÕs main argument by

illustrating a non-materialist
picture of the soul, but they do not provide a rational argument
for that picture.
AFFINITY ARGUMENT IN THE PHAEDO 315
sort. Try to persuade him, then, to stop being afraid of death, as
if it were a
bogey-man.Ó
ÒWell, you must sing spells to him every day,Ó said Socrates,
Òtill youÕve charmed
it out of him.Ó (77e3)
Socrates, then, is being exhorted to press on not with a decent
philosophical
argument, but rather with something that will soothe Cebes and
SimmiasÕ
anxiety. He is being exhorted to appeal to their emotions and
not their rational
faculties. And what does he deliver? – an argument that, to
borrow from
Simmias, has Òa certain likelihood and plausibility about it,Ó
but which falls
somewhat short of a proof.
Simmias and Cebes, forgetting what they had asked for, treat
these remarks
as kosher argument, and engage in a rational, and effective,
critique. The
result is that argument itself is given a bad name, for equally
cogent argu-
ments seemed to have established contradictory conclusions.
This brings us

to the remarks on misology (88c1-91c5) .5 Socrates explains
that:
[It] would be a pitiful fate, if there were in fact some true and
secure argument,
and one that could be discerned, yet owing to association with
arguments of the
sort that now seem true and now false, a man blamed neither
himself nor his
own lack of skill, but � nally relieved his distress by shifting
the blame from him-
self to arguments. . . . (90c10)
Just as naive trust of people of poor character leads to
misanthropy, tarring
all people with the same brush, so too does naive trust of
arguments of poor
character lead to misology. Analogical arguments, Socrates is
telling us here,
are arguments of poor character. If one cannot distinguish
between those sorts
and the better sorts – such as the sort praised by Simmias as
being derived
from Ò[hypotheses] worthy of acceptance,Ó then it is no
wonder trouble fol-
lows. The pickle that all three friends � nd themselves in arose
out of failure
to distinguish between arguments of a decent sort and rogues.
Socrates has to
take some of the blame for this – he should not have given in to
the requests
to address the fears of Òthe child insideÓ – and in the misology
remarks he
is doing his best to undo the damage. Indeed the situation
affords him an ideal
opportunity to draw out a very important moral.

And so I suggest that Plato included the af� nity argument not
in order to
support directly the case for immortality, but, rather, to
illustrate the pitfalls
of analogical reasoning. Once this has been done, and once
SimmiasÕ impor-
tant rival hypothesis has been rejected, Plato returns to what is,
in his eyes,
kosher argument in support of the main claim of the dialogue.
University of Stirling
5 Here, we might note, there is a wholly legitimate use of
analogy. Socrates helps
make clear what misology is by an analogy with misanthropy,
but the pitfalls of misol-
ogy are independently explained.
316 MATTHEW ELTON

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