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1. 447
Croatian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. XIII, No. 39, 2013
An Argument for a Quasi-Dretskian
Approach to Causal Explanation
MARCO MAESTRELLO
McMaster University
In this paper I will present Jaegwon Kim’s causal explanatory exclu-
sion principle as described in Explanatory Exclusion and the Problem
of Mental Causation (1995) and Fred Dretske’s version of the two ex-
plananda strategy as depicted in Mental Events as Structuring Causes
of Behaviour (1993). I will attempt to demonstrate that Dretske’s theory
is not flawless in its assumptions but that it nevertheless demands a
close look in so far as it provides us with a valuable theory for explaining
certain events.
Keywords: Dretske, Kim, Davidson, mental causation, causal ex-
planation, anomalous monism.
In this paper I will discuss Jaegwon Kim’s causal explanatory exclu-
sion principle as described in Explanatory Exclusion and the Problem
of Mental Causation (1995) and Fred Dretske’s version of the two ex-
plananda strategy as depicted in Mental Events as Structuring Causes
of Behaviour (1993). This paper is broadly divided into two sections.
The first portion describes Dretske’s assumptions and theory, along
with Kim’s response to this theory. The second portion includes my
response to Kim and a partial re-construal of how much we can salvage
from Dretske’s version of this strategy. I will argue that Dretske’s the-
ory is not flawless in its assumptions but that it nevertheless demands
a serious look in so far as it provides us with a practical theory for
explaining specific events. As a terminological side note, I will be using
the terms explanandum and explanans when discussing explanations.
To clarify: an explanandum is a proposition or fact which is in need of
explanation. An explanans is the set of propositions that attempt to
explain the explanandum in question.1
1
As described by Samir Okasha (2002: 42–43).

2. 448 M. Maestrello, An Argument for a Quasi-Dretskian Approach
1. Dretske’s formulation
Dretske is working from several fundamental assumptions. Therefore,
it is beneficial to mention them now prior to explaining his theory. The
first assumption is made explicitly clear when Dretske states that in
his view “causal explanations are context-sensitive” (Dretske 1993:
121). This means that what we decide to be the cause depends on how
we frame the event in relation to our goals, interest, purposes, and
prior knowledge. The second assumption draws from his use of proper-
ties. He wants to make it clear that there are two kinds of properties:
intrinsic and extrinsic (Dretske 1993: 129). Intrinsic properties are the
non-relational, essential characteristics that make it that object. Using
one of Dretske’s examples, the intrinsic properties of a ten dollar bill
are that it is rectangular, flat, green, and grainy. Extrinsic properties
are relative and defined by the object’s relation to other things. Going
back to the example of the ten dollar bill, an extrinsic property is its
monetary value. The value of that green piece of paper depends on how
it originated. If it was printed illegally in a criminal’s basement then its
monetary value would be extremely diminished. The third assumption
is taken directly from the last distinction and claims that the contrast
between those properties is a fundamental aspect in distinguishing
the mental from the physical (Dretske 1993: 131).2
The last point will
become clearer once we look at the connection in further detail. Tak-
ing these assumptions into consideration we can now look at Dretske’s
elaboration of causes.
Dretske holds that there are two kinds of causes: structuring and
triggering (Dretske 1993: 121). To facilitate a proper understanding of
the differences between these causes it is useful to reiterate his sim-
plest example. Imagine that I wire a switch to a light so that every time
I pull the switch the light turns on or off. The structuring cause is said
to be the installation of the wiring. The triggering causes are said to
be each token instance that I flip the switch on/off (Dretske 1993: 124).
In addition to this example there are three other characteristics. The
first is that the kind of explanation we get depends on how we frame
and specify between the triggering and structuring causes. It is impor-
tant to note that they display very diverse relationships to their effect
(Dretske 1993: 123). The second characteristic states that a triggering
cause of an event is just that which fulfills a pre-existing set of condi-
tions, which in turn is sufficient for the event to occur. When an event
has these conditions and a triggering cause, it will produce regulari-
ties. In other words the installation of the light switch by itself is not
sufficient to produce the regularity of the light turning on/off (Dretske
1993: 123). The third point states that a structuring causal relation-
ship is a one—many relation; whereas, the triggering causal relation-
ship is a one—one (Dretske 1993: 123). To explain this we can go back
2
This is not to say that the mental is metaphysically distinct from the physical,
but rather that they are distinct in regards to explanatory vocabulary.

3. M. Maestrello, An Argument for a Quasi-Dretskian Approach 449
to the light switch example. In regards to the structuring cause (the
installation of the wiring) I must not rewire the light switch prior to
every token instance of the light turning on/off. If I turn the switch on
Wednesday and then turn the switch again on Friday, the structuring
cause remains the same. However, the triggering causes (flipping of the
switch) are different each time. Before moving on we should address
two complexities which arise.
The first complexity comes in the form of an objection to structur-
ing causes (Dretske 1993: 124). This objection claims that structuring
causes are not really causes of events. This is the case because they
are truthfully merely sets of pre-conditions or background conditions
that in turn allow the triggering cause to, in actuality, cause the event.
In other words, the structuring cause can at most be said to cause the
various conditions but not the event in question. Dretske agrees with
this point in so far as it is dependent upon the purpose of the descrip-
tion. Nevertheless, he will continue to speak of structuring causes as
causes of the events out of respect to those who hold that the cause of
an event E is an earlier event which E is counterfactually dependent
in the right way.3
For example, the light would not turn on/off if I had
never installed the wiring properly. For this reason, Dretske wants to
maintain that there is a strong relationship between the structuring
cause and event E.
The second complexity arises out of confusion in regards to proximity.
This is when structuring and triggering causes appear to be one or fused
together (Dretske 1993: 128). This is usually the case when the same in-
dividual or object is involved in both causes. However, Dretske wants to
clarify that this does not mean that the causes are the same. Structuring
and triggering causes are always distinct. Now that we have a better un-
derstanding of the distinction we will look at Dretske’s example to help
determine the supplementary explanation it claims to provide.
Dretske’s example begins by imagining a system Q whose internal
states cause it to behave in various ways (Dretske 1993: 131–6). He will
then label a state R+ as that state whose tokens of it cause movements
M. He then attributes two kinds of properties to that state: Pe (extrinsic
property) and Pi (intrinsic property). Given that our system Q is alive,
its intrinsic properties are chemical, electrical and its extrinsic prop-
erties can be causal, informational, functional, and/or historical. He
wants to show that movement M can have as part of its causal expla-
nation R’s possession of Pe. In other words, Q’s behaviour can be caus-
ally explained through being in a state defined by specific intentional
content. He asks us to suppose that Q is wired so that R+ is tokened
when (and only when) an object of type O is nearby. When Q perceives
and R registers O’s presence, R takes on the positive representational
state of R+. He also wants us to suppose that O is dangerous to Q and
3
This type of counterfactual is framed in psychological terms by Tim Crane in
his discussion of the relations between thought and behaviour. See Crane 2005: 58.

4. 450 M. Maestrello, An Argument for a Quasi-Dretskian Approach
therefore learns to avoid it. This means that movement M will be an
evasive behaviour. If we were to observe this scenario (Q seeing O and
doing M) how would we explain it?
The traditional response to answering this question is that Q is
running away from O because it perceived O. This is what Dretske
calls the triggering causal explanation of movement M. Since we aren’t
aware of Q’s neurobiology we must trace around it when positing the
causal chain. He wants to claim that this response can be substan-
tially enriched if we also take into account the structuring cause of the
event. It gives the observer additional knowledge of the event that is
not grasped by merely looking at the triggering cause. In other words,
the triggering cause may answer the question of how Q is doing M but
it does not answer the question of why Q is doing M. It seems that R+’s
triggering cause is due to its intrinsic properties, Pi, and its structuring
cause is due to its extrinsic properties, Pe. In the case of Q’s avoidance
behaviour, Pe includes Q’s learning history. In other words, we can
explain the avoidance behaviour as the result of Q’s learning that O’s
are dangerous (perhaps an O killed Q’s mother, like in Disney’s 1942
film Bambi). It is the fact that tokens of R+ are signs of O that in turn
explains why this token and future tokens of R+ are the cause of M.4
It
will become evident later on why this more complex explanation pro-
vides us with an improved epistemic position when we reinterpret an
event and its corresponding explanations. Before commenting, we will
briefly look at Jaegwon Kim’s response to Dretske’s theory.
2. Kim’s response to Dretske
As we saw earlier Dretske has a distinctive conception of the explanan-
da of rationalizations. In order to explain S’s doing A, we must, on his
view, explain why the internal state causes the motor output. Sticking
to the problem of causal-explanatory exclusion Kim classifies Dretske’s
response to this problem as the two explananda strategy. Kim states
that in Dretske’s theory rationalizations and biological explanations do
not share the same explanandum, and because of this there is no need
for explanatory competition. It is not required that one explanation ex-
cludes the other. In others words, reasons rationalize actions in a fully
intentional sense, while physiological explanations can only explain
bodily movements described in purely physical terms. Kim believes
that this view is fundamentally dualistic. He wants to claim that it is
possible that the explananda of both types are amenable to physical-
biological explanations. If this turns out to be the case, this reply does
not escape the problem of explanatory exclusion.
4
Explanations which cover multiple token events are likely to be based upon
reliability of reoccurrence and should not be made akin with the level of certainty
found in deterministic laws described below.

5. M. Maestrello, An Argument for a Quasi-Dretskian Approach 451
In other words, Kim states that the only way Dretske can escape
causal-explanatory exclusion is by drawing a line between the physical
and mental domains. This theory would have to claim that there are en-
tities in the physical world for which there are in principle no physical
causal explanations, but only intentional explanations. However, this
seems to appear very similar to Cartesian interactionist dualism. Given
that Dretske is committed to naturalism and physicalism he would not
go the dualistic route. For what Dretske has in mind, and Kim rightly
points out, is not that these psychological explanations are non-phys-
ical but rather that these explanations invoke relational properties of
the agents internal states whereas neurobiological explanations refer
solely to their intrinsic physical properties. In summary, for Kim even if
Dretske is correct in pointing out the limitations of neurobiological ex-
planations, it still doesn’t follow that physical theory, broadly construed,
cannot handle these causings as explananda (Kim 1995: 131–135).
3. A response to Kim
Causal exclusion states that there cannot be two causes that are both
complete and independent for an event, except in cases of genuine over-
determination. Explanatory exclusion states that there cannot be two
causal explanations that are both complete and independent for an
event. In what follows I will uphold physicalism but will reject Kim’s
explanatory exclusion principle for several reasons. I will refer to these
reasons directly and indirectly through analysing Kim’s response to
Dretske’s theory.
Firstly, I believe that Kim is mistaken in his description of Dretske’s
causal chain. In reference to system Q, the cause of M is the state R+.
Dretske has stated that it is the instantiation of this token state which
is the cause of the behaviour. Dretske also claimed that this state is
constituted by two types of properties: Pe and Pi. For this reason, in or-
der to have an independent and complete explanation we must describe
R+ in its entirety. If we only described Pi it would be an insufficient
causal explanation. This is because the particularities of Pe are contex-
tually relevant to the causal happenings of system Q. As Dretske stated
the effect remains counterfactually dependent upon the structuring of
Q’s stimulus-response system. Therefore, it is epistemologically advan-
tageous to include Pe and its corresponding structural cause within
our explanation of R+ as the cause of Q’s doing M. Kim’s response to
this would fall in line with one of Dretske’s proposed objections to his
theory. Kim could object by stating that the structuring cause of an
event should and would be more accurately described as the set of pre-
conditions for the effect.5
However, I will agree with Dretske in main-
5
This is also described by Neil Campbell as Kim imposing his particular model
of causation known as qua-causation or quasation (Campbell 2003). Campbell’s
defense of this conception is in relation to Davidsonian theory, which by extension
applies to my view as well.

6. 452 M. Maestrello, An Argument for a Quasi-Dretskian Approach
taining that there remains a useful explanatory relation between the
structuring cause and the effect.
I believe that Kim’s over-zealous obsession with the exclusion prin-
ciple stems from a fundamental hidden assumption. This principle
is best known as Ockham’s razor. The principle states that given the
equality of all other variables the simplest and most elegant theory
should be chosen. This is not to say that the world acts in the simplest
way possible, but that our explanations of the world should be ideally
simplistic. Consequently, this is not a descriptive principle but a nor-
mative ideal which is meant to apply to the epistemic agent in the act of
conceptual deliberation. It is important to note that there is no logical
reason for accepting this principle. It is entirely a matter of formative
and stylistic choice which stems from historically theological princi-
ples.6
I am not claiming that we should reject this principle outright;
but merely see if Kim’s use of it helps or hinders explanatory effective-
ness. I want to argue that Kim’s use of this principle to systematically
exclude mental vocabulary when explaining mental events is unwar-
ranted. This claim will be given force below through the introduction of
a Davidsonian conception of events.
It is partially for this hidden assumption that Kim narrowly de-
scribes Dretske’s Pe as being purely mental. However, I do not see how
the informational, functional, and/of historical characteristics of Q’s
mental state R+ cannot be legitimately placed within a picture of the
physical world. If this were the case then how does Kim account for all
the purely logical and formal aspects of reality (the principle of suffi-
cient reason is itself purely formal)? Nevertheless, Kim rightly points
out that Dretske’s theory implies the existence of multiple explanan-
dum facts. According to Kim this leads Dretske’s theory with only one
route to take and this is the major reason for Kim’s charge that this
theory leads to dualism. However, this is only a problem in so far as
Dretske accepts Kim’s conception of an event which leads us to the final
reason for rejecting Kim’s version of explanatory exclusion.
Kim defines an event as consisting of three parts: [x, P, t] (Marras
2008: 117). In other words, an event is “the having of property P by
object x at time t” (Marras 2008: 104). According to this depiction of an
event Kim has no choice but to claim that Dretske’s theory of explana-
tory causes must reduce itself to one explanans and in turn one cause
(the triggering cause). But what if we were to reject Kim’s assumption
that a causal explanation of an event must exclusively consist of one
explanans and replaced it with a more Davidsonian conception of an
event. This would allow for Dretske’s different kinds of causal explana-
tions and in turn would remain more consistent with his starting as-
sumption that causal explanations are context-sensitive.
6
See John Losee’s discussion of the historical reasons for Ockham’s razor. It is
explained that since William of Ockham believed that “to insist that nature always
follows the simplest path is to limit God’s power ... Ockham shifted emphasis on
simplicity from the course of nature to theories which are formulated about it”
(Losee 2010: 34).

7. M. Maestrello, An Argument for a Quasi-Dretskian Approach 453
Donald Davidson in Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963) argues
for the common sense explanation of human actions through rational-
izations using mental vocabulary. Even though he does urge caution
as rationalizations have their limitations he still provides us with the
observation that “it is an error to think no explanation has been given
until a law has been produced” (Davidson 2001: 17). He argues that
this mistake is based on the assumption that “singular causal state-
ments necessarily indicate ... the concepts that will occur in the en-
tailed law” (Davidson 2001: 17). Faced with the same apparent con-
tradiction as Dretske between physicalism and mental explanations,
Davidson introduces four relevant metaphysical categories. In Mental
Events (1970) he states that theories regarding human actions:
...are divided into four sorts: nomological monism, which affirms that there
are correlating laws and that the events correlated are one (materialists...);
nomological dualism, which comprises various forms of parallelism, inter-
actionism, and epiphenomenalism; anomalous dualism, which combines on-
tological dualism with the general failure of laws correlating the mental and
the physical (Cartesianism). And finally there is anomalous monism...which
resembles materialism in its claim that all events are physical, but rejects
the thesis...that mental phenomena can be given purely physical explana-
tions (Davidson 2001: 213–214).7
In other words, Davidson is not rejecting the causal exclusion prin-
ciple but the causal explanatory exclusion principle. In order to reject
this leap he states that we must accept three foundational principles.8
The first is that “some mental events interact causally with physical
events” (Davidson 2001: 208); the second states “that where there is
causality, there must be a law” (Davidson 2001: 208);9
and the third
claims “that there are no strict deterministic laws on the basis of which
mental events can be predicted and explained” (Davidson 2001: 208).
To clarify what follows from this anomalism is that mental events be-
come individualized token events in every instantiation. A causal law
requires a type of event to cover beyond a singular set of cause and
effect between two events. Dretske has argued that “explanations ap-
pealing to mental events involve structuring causes while physiological
explanations deal in triggering causes” (Campbell 2009: 79). Accepting
these principles and anomalous monism then allows Dretske’s theory to
escape Kim’s charge, as it allows Dretske to maintain the explanatory
7
For further elaboration of Davidson’s anomalous monism see Thinking Causes
(1993), Laws and Cause (1995), Causal Relations (1967), The Individuation of Events
(1969) and Events as Particulars (1970).
8
Davidson states that, as foundational metaphysical principles, we cannot fully
support these in any deductive sense as they remain assumptions; however, in Mental
Events (1970) and other numerous essays, attempts to show how these principles
provide us with a truly robust ability to explain our experiences of the world. I will
follow suit with Davidson and not attempt to provide any explicit argument for these
principles in this paper.
9
This principle should not be confused with the claim that causal explanations
require laws as it refers to causation itself.

8. 454 M. Maestrello, An Argument for a Quasi-Dretskian Approach
efficacy of structural causes through increasing our understanding of a
token mental event where the physical law remains absent. However it
comes at the serious cost of an ability to naturalize the mental, which
is an assumption Dretske himself is likely to nevertheless uphold, even
if his theory can persist.10
To reiterate, I propose that we uphold causal exclusion without ac-
cepting causal explanatory exclusion which would allow us without
competition to form multiple explanans of an event. Like a Davidso-
nian theory, this would also remain consistent with the causal closure
of physicalism. As a formal response to Kim, I propose an amended
principle of explanatory exclusion. This version of the principle will
leave open the possibility for either conceptions of an event. This re-
vised version was originally proposed by Ausonio Marras and states
the following:
PEX*: There can be no more than a single complete and independent expla-
nation of a given explanandum (Marras 1998: 49).
This principle replaces an event with an explanandum in order to erad-
icate the unwarranted competition between explanandum facts in any
given event. I believe that this principle allows for and encourages a
more accurate depiction of the complexity of events in the real world. In
closing I would like to present one last objection to Dretske’s theory.
4. A final revision of Dretske’s formulation
It might have been obvious to some that I have not remained com-
pletely faithful to Dretske’s original theory when responding to Kim’s
objections. However, my intention was not to save Dretske’s theory
hand and foot but rather to salvage the legitimate parts and to progress
with what was learned. My main goal was to argue that we should not
eliminate Dretske’s way of describing events through his formulation
of structuring and triggering causes. This formulation seems to pro-
vide at least some additional epistemic gain in explaining an event, if
that event is conceived of through Davidsonian theory. In light of this
I would like to raise what I see as a successful objection by Ausonio
Marras in relation to one of Dretske’s underlying claims. Marras points
out that in order for Dretske to truly escape any threat of Cartesian
dualism he must reject his underlying distinction between an action
and a bodily movement. Dretske defines an action type and token as
that which can only be successfully described in terms of psychological
intentional language. He also defines a bodily movement type and to-
ken as that which can only be successfully described in purely physical
terms. This distinction is heavily problematic in relation to any two
10
“Since Dretske accepts the idea that intentionality can be naturalized it seems
he is committed to the claim that there is a complete physical explanation parallel
to any appeal to a structing cause in mental vocabulary, in which case the mental
explanation is excluded once again.” See Campbell 2009: 79–80.

9. M. Maestrello, An Argument for a Quasi-Dretskian Approach 455
explananda strategy. Given that I accept this objection and have ar-
gued for the practicality of a more Davidsonian conception of an event,
I propose that Dretske re-think that distinction to facilitate a more
physicalist friendly theory. This would in turn allow us to claim that:
One and the same physical event can be a token both of an action type and
a movement type … and [in doing so] the principle of explanatory exclusion
(properly understood as PEX*) is not contravened. Nor is there any threat
of Cartesian dualism… (Marras 1998: 450)
Therefore, Dretske’s approach has vitality to live on, just not exactly as
it was originally formulated. In this paper I have presented Jaegwon
Kim’s causal-exclusion principle as described in Explanatory Exclusion
and the Problem of Mental Causation (1995) and Fred Dretske’s version
of the two explananda strategy as depicted in Mental Events as Struc-
turing Causes of Behaviour (1993). This was in order for the reader to
familiarize themselves with the relevant aspects of each theory and
criticisms. I attempted to show that Dretske’s theory is not flawless in
its assumptions but that it nevertheless demands a close look in so far
as it provides us with a useful theory for explaining the causes of at
least some types of events.
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