2. Decentralisation in Education Policy: The Story
Choice of Decentralisation for Financing and
Delivery of Basic Education
Policy Questions for Consideration
2
4. Source: Adapted from McGinn, N., Welsh, T., 1999.
Decentralisation of Education: why, when, what and how? IIEP,
UNESCO.
4
5. Decentralisation is now seen as an alternative to central
financing and delivery of basic education
Why?
Extreme financial constraints of central government have
compelled them to shift part of the financial burden to
lower levels of government and non-state actors
Potential benefits of decentralisation include: efficiency,
quality, choice and participation
5
9. 9
To what extent and how does decentralisation
improve education service delivery?
10. Does not automatically lead to improved service
delivery
Has the potential to improve service delivery and
education quality if designed and implemented
well, including sound policy and institutional
frameworks
More research needs to be undertaken, especially
in Asia-Pacific region, but, evidence suggests that
decentralisation and, especially, school autonomy
can improve service delivery, with some risk of
increased inequality of outcomes
What
do we
know?
10
11. What does it take to establish appropriate
policy framework for the effective delivery of
equitable and quality education in order to
achieve the EFA and MDG goals?
What legal and regulatory instruments and
measures are needed to reach out to the
marginalized and the disadvantaged in the
context of education?
Can countries be benchmarked to compare and
understand benefits of education
decentralisation?
What
more
do we
need
to
know?
11
12. What role can non-state actors play in order to
address the exclusion and marginalisation?
12
13. The preferred or, in some cases, the only
available providers of basic education
services for the underserved by the public
system
◦ e.g. NGO/BRAC schools serving the hard to reach
groups in Bangladesh, NGOs serving the rural
areas in Cambodia
The rationale:
◦ poor quality of state education
◦ lack of state ability to provide state schooling to all
◦ cost effectiveness, responsiveness and
accountability of private fee-charging schools
What
do we
know?
13
14. 14
Non state
providers
Exclusion addressed Government recognition Examples
Private Low-income groups in urban areas,
excess demand in perceived low
quality government provision. Does
not address all excluded groups
Registered and unregistered
schools. Often not explicitly
recognised in government policy.
Low-budget private schools
in many countries
NGOs Hard-to-reach groups requiring
alternative service delivery models,
e.g. street children, refugees etc.
Registration often not on
education-related criteria; Usually
does not receive state support; Not
always explicitly recognised in
government policy
INGOs, Save the Children
BRAC, Bangladesh
Aga Khan Rural Support
Programme, Pakistan
Faith-Based
Organisations
Responsive to differentiated
demand, may include moral
obligation to cater to the poor
Some registered and recognised in
government policy; Others choose
to avoid government interference
Madrassahs, India and
Pakistan; Church-owned
schools, Malawi and Nigeria
Spontaneous
Community
Approaches
Demand-driven provision often in
rural areas
Often undergo process of
registration to gain government
support
Registered Non-Government
Primary schools,
Bangladesh
Philanthropic
Associations
Focus on poorest Often seek government recognition CARE, Pakistan
Source: Centre for International Education, University
of Sussex (Outputs of DFID funded study of
non-state service providers)
15. What is the role of the government vis-a-vis
the increasing involvement of non-state
actors in financing and provision of basic
education?
What is the scope for partnerships with non
state actors in order to successfully engage
and support them in enhancing the
educational opportunities for the
marginalised and the disadvantaged?
What
more
do we
need
to
know?
15
16. How do governments finance decentralised
education and what do they finance?
16
17. Dominant source of revenues for sub-
national governments in many countries
◦ e.g. Indonesia 72%; South Africa 85%; Pakistan
82% to 9%
Design of transfers matters for efficiency
and equity of resource allocation for
education
◦ e.g. selection of criteria for use in the funding
formula
What
do we
know?
17
18. Formula-based block grant for local governments from
the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
Total domestic revenues to be allocated to subnational
government set in the Local Government Code at
significant level: IRA shares 40% of the gross national
internal revenues and accounts for 94% of total
transfers)
Positive effects: Predictability and transparency
Adverse effects: Little discretion for local governments in
financing education initiatives outside central
government influence.
What
do we
know?
18
Source: Joint UN Agencies (2010). Governing local
service delivery for the MDGs in Asia
19. User fees can contribute to lessen central
government’s education budget burden but raise
great concerns over inequality in spending and
inability of poor households to pay for their
children’s education
Demand-Side Financing is an alternative
option by which public funds are channeled
directly to service users or to institutions based
on some expression of demand by users
Public Private Partnership is another
option in which government can engage with the
non-state actors in the financing and delivery of
education
What
do we
know?
19
20. Despite the legal guarantees, some primary
school fees continue to be charged in 19 of the
following 31 countries in Asia:
East Asia and the Pacific
◦ Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, DPR Korea,
Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Myanmar, New Zealand, Niue, Palau,
Philippines, RO Korea, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tokelau, Viet Nam
South and West Asia
◦ Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Nepal
Central Asia
◦ Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan
What
do we
know?
20
21. Mechanism Benefits Issues Country Examples
Stipend/
Scholarship
Equity No choice; misuse;
targeting; increased school
fees
Bangladesh; Brazil;
Indonesia; Morocco;
Mozambique; Pakistan;
Senegal
Community Financing Access; quality;
responsive to
community needs;
management capacity
May not be sustainable Chad; El Salvador;
Myanmar; Pakistan
Vouchers Choice; equity; quality;
efficiency
May result in selective
admission; be socially
divisive
Chile; Colombia; Holland;
New Zealand; Spain; UK;
US
Student Loans Equity by reducing cost
of school attendance
Need of functional loan
system; need of recovery
system and taxation (esp for
income contingent loans)
Australia; Canada;
Jamaica; UK; US
Matching Grants; Mix
public-private support;
social funds
Equity; improved
management; quality
through special
programs
May negatively impact poor
students
Grants: Brazil; China;
Ghana; India; Tanzania
Social Funds: Armenia;
Bolivia; Ethiopia
21
Source: Vawda, Ayesha Yaqub, Demand Side Financing
Schemes: Mechanisms for Improving Equity. World Bank.
* Selected Mechanisms for all Education Levels
22. What
do we
know?
Source: “Student Loans in Thailand: Are they Effective,
Equitable, Sustainable? “UNESCO (2003)
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Problem expected to be addressed:
◦ Increase of upper secondary school fee by over 70%
◦ Sharp decline in enrolment rates
◦ Increasing risk of drop out at upper secondary level
Solution:
◦ Loans to students from poor families enabling them to study
at the upper secondary and tertiary levels
Results:
◦ The scheme reached 32.6% of poor students and 22.6% of
poor youth at upper secondary level
◦ Small sample survey indicated effectiveness in preventing
discontinuation of studies amongst a significant proportion of
borrowers
23. Wide range of possible non-state involvement
from provision of non-educational services
(e.g. catering) to provision of teaching services
Different models
Many expected benefits including improved
service delivery but needs rigorous evaluation
Need state-specific strategies
What
do we
know?
23
24. Charter schools (USA)
◦ Publicly-funded
◦ Governed by group or organization under contract with government
◦ Funding is per student, based on actual enrollment, at or below public
average unit costs
◦ Exempt from government regulations
◦ Open to all students, by lottery
◦ Capital costs are not financed
Public Subsidy of Poor Children to Attend
Private Schools (Philippines)
◦ Gov’t purchases “places” on per-pupil funding basis (at or below public
unit cost)
◦ Gov’t certifies quality of private schools (faculty, facilities, curriculum,
administration, etc.)
◦ Double-shifting allows more efficient use of infrastructure
◦ School hires/fires all staff
What
do we
know?
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25. What works and what should be avoided?
To what extent is resource allocation for
decentralised basic education a technical
process, and to what extent a political
process?
How can the equity implications be
addressed?
What measures can be introduced to help
improve the equity and efficiency of
education financing in the context of
decentralisation?
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What
more
do we
need
to
know?
26. Careful analysis of empirical issues is needed if
informed judgments are made by policy makers,
such as:
Impact of education decentralisation on basic education
service delivery
The scope for effective partnerships with non-state
actors
The balance between state and private financing of
basic education services, and implications for public
support for service provision particularly for poor and
vulnerable children
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Editor's Notes
1970 - 80s
Rise in this debate of the political – economic factors resulted in the disintegration of the ‘Keynesian Consensus’ that previously favored strong, centralized governments. This carried on into the 1980s as well. [decentralisation is an attractive alternative to the centralized financing and management]
Number of students and teachers - doubled or tripled, straining governmental capacities for quality, creating public disdain and shift toward local leadership. [Many merit decentralisation as one ‘fix’ for quality of education.]
1990s – Today
Globalization has weakened central government
- Emergence of supra-national organizations, reduced national sovereignty
- Shift toward market-based decision has strengthened local groups [supporters of decentralisation point to local choice and participation over the decisions made by central governments]
Developing Information and Communication Technology – made decentralized management possible [supporters of decentralisation point to an increase of efficiency, aided by this increase of ICT]
The problems with the centralized, public provision of education are well-known:
citizens may lack adequate voice in making their preferences known to politicians,
political leaders may pass ambiguous legislation and give unclear mandates to the education ministry,
the education ministry may be unable to translate policy and program objectives into the necessary resources and capacities, and
the service provider may have weak incentives to directly respond to parental pressure.
Many countries choose to decentralise the financing and delivery of basic education with the expectation that it will help address these problems
Education decentralisation is an unresolved agenda. The question is not whether or not to decentralise, but how and what to decentralise
Focus of this seminar: Non-state actor involvement and funding arrangements for basic education in the context of decentralisation. Privatisation will not be discussed.
Decentralisation does NOT always have a positive influence on education quality. To the extent education finance is decentralized, differences in fiscal capacity at the local level may generate increased disparities in spending and educational outcomes. If not implemented under the right conditions decentralization can lead to: centrally-run information systems collapsing and confusion over education management, causing conflicting decisions or failure to carry out required functions. Therefore, it is not the right choice for all countries at all times.
Decentralization has the potential to improve accountability, increase parental participation, strengthen the leadership role of school directors, and increase teamwork among the teaching faculty. The magnitude of success, however, may depend on such things as the scope of budget authority, available technical and political support and the degree, willingness of parental and community involvement, and the local level of capcity.
It is important to note that existing research on decentralization has found mixed results.
Mention UNESCO – WB collaboration on Benchmarking as an example
- In many countries, intergovermental transfers/grants provide the dominant financial resources for subnational governments:
South Africa85%
Indonesia72% Provinces 72% Local85%
Nigeria67% to 95%
Mexico70% to 90% (poorer states)
Pakistan82% to 99%
- The design of such a transfer system can influence the accountability of sub-national governments for service delivery. Why? Fiscal transfers typically have a conditional and an unconditional portion through which sub-national governments can be held accountable for the use of financial resources transferred to them. The former leads to a more hierarchical system of accountability whereby the center holds the sub-national accountable for proper use of central transfers. The latter falls in the category of discretionary resources for which sub-national governments are directly accountable to their constituencies. The other critical issue is the predictability of fiscal transfers based on which sub-national governments can plan local service delivery more effectively. Formula funding can sometimes be an effective means for enhancing accountability and transparency of such fiscal flows as it provides for an objective calculation of the amount of financial resources that sub-national levels including schools receive
- To lend predictability and transparency, some countries fix a percentage of a major tax, a group of taxes, or total domestic revenues as the pool of resources to be allocated to subnational government through intergovernmental transfers. In the case of the Philippines, this percentage is significant and set in the Local Government Code. The Internal Revenue Allotment shares 40% of the gross national internal revenues (in the third year prior to the allocation year) and accounts for 94% of total transfers.
- Local governments have an allocation of finance from the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), a formula-based block grant from the national government. Congress requires detailed specification of the proposed expenditure items for education under the justification as a way to limit the opportunities for corruption. In practice people in congress are able to manage the budget allocations of the schools and municipalities within their political jurisdiction, making the role of politics in the basic education governance acute. The adverse effect is the inability of local service providers to manage resources according to changing requirements of their schools.
Demand-side financing does not necessarily imply less public financing, but only channeling public funding through students/parents rather than through schools. Thus, looking for an alternative source of funding must examine how non-state actors, e.g. the entrepreneurs, commercial firms, NGOs, etc. can be encouraged to be involved in financing and delivery of education. Innovative approaches to financing education have come the way for partnerships with the non-state actors or public-private partnership. The main rationale for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) programs is the potential role of the non-state sector for expanding equitable access and improving learning outcomes.
Countries which don’t have legal guarantees of free PE:
East Asia and the Pacific: Fiji, Kiribati, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, PNG, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu
South and West Asia: Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
Central Asia: none
19 countries:
East Asia and the Pacific: Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Philippines, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam
South and West Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Nepal
Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
This slide shows selected demand side financing mechanisms for education in general with respective benefits, issues and examples.
Range of possible non-state involvement:
- School facility services (build and maintain schools)
- Provide non-educational services (e.g. catering) and support services (e.g. technology)
- Provide curricula and educational services
- Provide teacher training services
- Manage public schools
- Provide all teaching and non-teaching services at public schools
- Provide teaching services to publicly-funded students at privately-owned and managed schools
The scope for partnerships with non-state actors in order to successfully engage and support them in enhancing the educational opportunities for the marginalised and the disadvantaged
The balance between state and private financing of basic education services in comparative regional perspective and over time, and implications for the level of public support for the provision of education services particularly for poor and vulnerable children
