Transantiago was a major public transit reform project in Santiago, Chile that aimed to modernize the bus system and integrate fares. Its implementation in 2007 was flawed as infrastructure, technology, and operator readiness were incomplete. This led to service breakdowns and low approval ratings. Since then, improvements have been made such as expanding bus-only lanes and fleet, though fare evasion and deficits remain challenges. Key lessons are the need for proper planning, phased implementation, user information, and a single coordinating authority. While far from its original goals, Transantiago has formalized operations and reduced environmental impacts, showing potential with continued effort.

1. Unconventional wisdom: the
Transantiago experience
Juan Carlos Muñoz
Bus Rapid Transport Centre of Excellence
Department of Transport Engineering and Logistics
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
MIT May 2nd, 2013

2. 2
What is Transantiago?
• A major transit modernization effort as no other
worldwide city has suffered.
– New firms
– New buses
– Bus control system
– Integration among services (fares, services, etc)
• For many:
“The worst public policy ever implemented in Chile”
– New services
– New fare
– Touchless payment card

3. 3
The bus system before Transantiago
• Did not work as a network
• Excessive on-street competition
– Drivers paid per passenger
– Average size of a firm: two buses.
• High operational costs
– High fares for the quality of service offered
• Severe externalities: accidents, pollution, congestion
• Drivers frequently assaulted
• Student discrimination
• Poor night services
People in Santiago rated bus service very badly

4. Buses: worst service in Santiago

5. 5
And even more …

6. Goals of Transantiago

7. Goals of Transantiago
Transantiago’s first goal was to modernize
the transit system in Santiago:
 Keep (and increase) its modal split.
 Improve quality of service.
 Offer a economically, socially and
environmentally sustainable system.

8. Transantiago an integrated
system

9. How would these goals be achieved?
• Bus services respond to a trunk and feeder
system sing Metro as a main trunk operator
• Only corporate operators are allowed. Bus
services are grouped into 15 units.
• Better work conditions for drivers.
• No passenger discrimination
• Integration among services: routes, fares,
infrastructure.
• Distance travelled and necessary fleet are
reduced considerably
• Intensive use of Metro
• Gradual inclusion of new buses: some
articulated, smoother drive, disabled
friendly, etc.
Centro de
Información y Gestión
(CIG)
Administración
Financiera del
Sistema (AFT)
Servicios de busesInfraestructuraMetro

10. How would these goals be achieved?
• Considers a smart and contactless
payment card
– Allowing fare integration and eliminating cash
from buses
• Reaches the environmental goals (new
buses, fewer kilometers traveled, filters,
Diesel 50 ppm)
• Considers a user information system and
a centralized headway control system
• Considers segregated bus corridors and
modern bus stops
• Cost savings would allow keeping the
fares stable.

11. Traveling in Transantiago

12. 12
Trunk services
The trunk network is
grouped into 5 firms.
Trunk buses are
colored white and
green.
Metro is a sixth trunk
operator

13. Transition

14. 14
• Within a year, components were to be incorporated
gradually
– Operators
– Buses
– Infrastructure
– Smart card
– Card charging network
– Headway control system
• Finally, integrated fares and new services;
simultaneously in the whole city.
Transition designed between systems

15. Implementation of
Transantiago
(January 10th, 2007)

16. 16
• Infrastructure was not built.
– Almost no exclusive bus lanes
– No bus stops with pre-paid zones
• Information was very poorly provided
• Firms were not ready to start
• GPS-based control system was not ready
• Card validating devices were not trusted
• A nervous authority guaranteed the income, fixed
the fare and extended trip lengths
Incomplete system

17. 17
• Not enough buses, and additionally operators
lacked all incentives to operate…
• Operating buses bunched consistently, losing
reliability
• Metro collapsed
• Lack of services in some areas
• A financial deficit started to grow
Incomplete system

18. Dramatic evidence

24. Improvements since
February 10, 2007

25. Incentives in place…

26. Bus service growth
Year Commercial
km (million)
Fleet Average
Age
Routes
2007 371.1 4,489 8.4 223
2008 481.4 6,399 7.4 322
2009 487.2 6,572 5.9 334
2010 512.4 6,564 5.3 357
2011 483.0 6,165 5.2 370
Strict trunk and feeder logic has been relaxed to reduce the number of transfers

27. Bus technology
30%
10%
3% 1%
38%
37%
30%
27%
10% 9% 8%
32%
53%
65%
68%
59% 58% 58%
2% 5%
31% 33% 34%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
EURO III + DFP
EURO III
EURO II
EURO I

28. Metro network
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Network length (km) 66 85 85 85 85 95 104
Number of stations 78 92 92 92 93 101 108
Number of train cars 636 666 751 751 751 967 967
Car kilometers driven
(million)
52 71 94 105 106 119 131
Annual ridership
(million )
267 331 601 642 608 621 640

29. Bus infrastructure
Year
Segregated
corridors
Bus only
lanes
Exclusive streets
(peak hrs only)
2007 13 68 8
2008 16 77 31
2009 65 101 31
2010 90 101 31
2011 90 101 31
Red bus lanes + camera enforcement

30. Speeds per mode
AVERAGE IN-VEHICLE SPEED PER MODE
AVERAGE OPERATIONAL
SPEED (Km/hr)
Mixed Traffic Bus-Only
Lane
Exclusive &
Seggregated
Lanes
Express
service
(freeway)

31. Bus infrastructure
Resistance from neighbourhoods and local governments

32. Bus infrastructure

33. 148 operating provisional prepaid bus stops
Bus stops ….

34. Level of service

35. AVERAGE DISTANCE AND DOOR TO DOOR SPEED PER TRIP
AVERAGE DISTANCE
PER TRIP (Km)
AVERAGE SPEED
PER TRIP (Km/hr)
Lowest standard deviation of travel time across trips of the same length

36. AVERAGE DISTANCE AND IN-VEHICLE SPEED PER TRIP
AVERAGE DISTANCE
PER TRIP (Km)
AVERAGE IN-VEH
SPEED (Km/hr)

37. Travel time composition (Santiago)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 17.5 20.0 22.5 25.0 Más
Tiempo(min)
Length of trip (km) Trips Caminata Espera En vehículo
Walking = 13.8 min
Waiting = 8.6 min
In-vehicle = 28.5 min

38. AVERAGE DISTANCE AND IN-VEHICLE SPEED PER TRIP
DISTANCE PER TRIP (Km)
AVERAGETRAVELTIME(MIN)

39. Fare evolution
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
22%
24%
26%
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
Jun-07
Oct-07
Feb-08
Jun-08
Oct-08
Feb-09
Jun-09
Oct-09
Feb-10
Jun-10
Oct-10
Feb-11
Jun-11
Oct-11
Evasion
Fares($)
Bus Fare Metro Fare Evasion
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
Jun-07
Oct-07
Feb-08
Jun-08
Oct-08
Feb-09
Jun-09
Oct-09
Feb-10
Jun-10
Oct-10
Feb-11
Jun-11
Oct-11
Fares($)
Bus Fare Metro Fare

40. Monthly Deficit (million US$)
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
may-07 nov-07 jun-08 dic-08 jul-09 ene-10 ago-10 mar-11 sep-11
Deficit is about 40% of total costs. From this, over half goes to subsidize students
who pay 1/3 of the regular fare and 15% does to new Metro lines

41. Contracts
• Changed more than 17 times…
– Link payment to demand and performance
– Increase the visibility of individual firms to users
– Eliminate maximum fines per operator
– Stabilize revenues for firms
– Reduce transfers for users
– Drop the trunk and feeder scheme, and the
feeder zones

42. Transantiago approval rates
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
ene-07 may-08 sep-09 feb-11 jun-12
Approvalrate(%)

43. December 2009: Approval rate of
President Bachelet at her peak: 81%
“…Her approval in Santiago significantly
improved while it remained constant in the
rest of the country.
This is probably due to Transantiago, the
level of approval of which has increased
substantially, particularly among Santiago
citizens….” (ADIMARK)

44. Satisfaction level with Metro’s
Quality of Service
83 81
85 87 89
81
37
52
57
-4 -3 -2 -1 -1 -3
-27
-16
-11
79 78
83
86 88
78
10
36
46
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Dic Ago
2008 2009
% Satisfacción (% 6 y 7) % Insatisfacción (% 1 a 4) ISN

45. 89
92 93
89
53
67
86
-2 -1 -1 -2
-20
-10
-3
87
91 92
87
33
57
83
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Ago
% Satisfacción (% 6 y 7) % Insatisfacción (% 1 a 4) ISN
Perception of Metro’s Image

46. • President Piñera vows not to dismantle the
legacy of the Chilean Concertacion por la
Democracia
• “Santiago de Chile has one of the most efficient
combined public transport networks in the world”
El País, Spain (January 19, 2010)

47. • “Transantiago will become the best bus system
in Latin America in 4 or 5 years time”
• Interview to Enrique Peñalosa, Former Mayor of
Bogotá and creator of TransMilenio.
Enrique Peñalosa (2010)

48. • Piñera se compromete a no deshacer el legado
de la Concertación chilena
• “Santiago de Chile dispone de una de las redes de
transporte combinado más eficientes del mundo”
El País de España (Enero 19, 2010)

49. • “Transantiago va a ser el mejor sistema de
buses de América Latina en 4 ó 5 años”
Entrevista a Enrique Peñalosa, Ex-Alcalde de
Bogotá y gestor del TransMilenio.
Enrique Peñalosa (2010)

50. 50
February 10, 2007
What did we learn?
In what aspects did we advance?
What should Transantiago do?

51. The most relevant objectives are still
far ahead

52. 52
Transantiago’s first goal was to modernize the public
transport system of Santiago:
 At least maintain, but hopefully increase,
its modal split.
 Improve quality of service.
 Offer a economically, socially and
environmentally sustainable system.
Transantiago’s second goal was to meet
certain emission targets

53. What did we learn?
• A transformation of such magnitude should have required
a minimum legal, institutional and financial support
• Such a transformation required more citizen participation
and better information for users and prospective users
• A more realistic vision of the new system should have
been offered
• The transformation could not be asked to be self-financed
• It required continuity of authorities and those in charge
• If structural elements were not in place, implementation
should have been delayed
• A bad start is irreparable
• Simultaneous changes to a system ought to be avoided

54. • The great importance of detailed engineering (i.e. at bus
stops)
• The importance of infrastructure (bus-only streets, pre-paid
zones, priority at traffic lights). Car users should not be
winners of this process !
• If uncontrolled fare evasion grows
• The relevance of reliability and comfort
• The need to reduce transfers and make them as
convenient as possible
• Headway control is crucial
• It seems reasonable to start with an excess supply that
may be filled up relatively soon
What did we learn?

55. Achievements

56. Achievements
• Formalized bus industry with new international companies
• Externalities reduced significantly (accidents, pollution, congestion,
noise)

57. Bus-involved accidents
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

58. Achievements
• Formalized bus industry with new international companies
• Externalities reduced significantly (accidents, pollution, congestion,
noise)
• Low floor buses improve access for users with reduced mobility
• Fare integration with all buses and Metro
• Metro moves twice as much people
• Students no longer discriminated and drivers are no longer robbed
• War for the passenger is over
• Modern bus terminals
• An economy sector has been formalized and drivers workshifts respect
labor legislation

59. Challenges and goals

60. 36
25
23
14
13
11
8
7
7
5
5
4
4
3
3
21
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
SPEED
THE BIP! CARD
FREQUENCY
PAYMENT SYSTEM
COMFORT
NICER DRIVERS/BETTER EDUCATED/BETTER TREATMENT BY DRIVERS
USEFUL SERVICES
CLEANBUSES
ROOMIER BUSES
DRIVERS DRIVE BETTER
COMFORTABLE SEATS
NEW BUSES/INBETTER CONDITIONS
LESS TRANSFERS
MORE SECURE BUSES/SAFER TRIPS
BETTER ACCES TO BUSES
NOTHING/NO ONE
ON THE BUS: WHICH ASPECTS DO YOU VALUE MORE WHEN TRAVELLING IN A BUS OF THE PUBLIC TRANSPORT SYSTEM?
Most valued attributes

61. Challenges and goals
• Operational
– Bus headway control
– Bus infrastructure (segregated corridors, stations, traffic signal priority)
– Fare evasion
• Information for users
– Online and Off-line
– Metro and buses seen as a single system
• Subsidies
– How much is reasonable?
– Focalize
• Institutional
– Formalize the program
– A single authority!
• Win the heart of its users

62. Lessons for other cities

63. Lessons for other cities
• Design issues
– Consider subsidies, otherwise you will abuse of big buses
– Critical BRT components can not be postponed
– Avoid a rigid trunk and feeder network.
– Consider express services from the beginning
• Modernizing incumbent operators is feasible although very complicated
– Carrot or stick
• Business model
– Start witha low risk model to attract bidders
– Shift towards more demand-driven revenues as steady state is approached.
• Institution with managerial, legal, financial, technical attributions

64. Lessons for other cities
• Implementation issues
– Start with formalize the firms
– Implement fare integration city-wide
– Based on the new load profiles adjust bus capacity to routes
– Introduce new vehicles and infrastructure (compatible) sequentally in each corridor
according to BRT principles

65. Unconventional wisdom: the
Transantiago experience
Juan Carlos Muñoz
Bus Rapid Transport Centre of Excellence
Department of Transport Engineering and Logistics
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
MIT May 2nd, 2013