Review your Digital Proof for errors and formatting

Please carefully review your Digital Proof download for formatting,
grammar, and design issues that may need to be corrected.
We recommend that you review your book three times, with each time
focusing on a different aspect.
Once you are satisfied with your review, you can approve your proof
and move forward to the next step in the publishing process.
To print this proof we recommend that you scale the PDF to fit the size
of your printer paper.
Check the format, including headers, footers, page
numbers, spacing, table of contents, and index.
Review any images or graphics and captions if applicable.
Read the book for grammatical errors and typos.
1
2
3
Digital Proofer
IED,Drones and Suici...
Authored by Mr Agha Humayun Amin
6.0" x 9.0" (15.24 x 22.86 cm)
Color on White paper
182 pages
ISBN-13: 9781492780311
ISBN-10: 1492780316
1

2
IED,DRONES
AND SUICIDE
BOMBER
WARFARE IN
AFGHANISTAN
AND PAKISTAN
3
Reflections of one who saw events from close quarters
Agha Humayun Amin
Agha Humayun Amin
Transoxiana Inc
ISBN-13: 978-1492780311
ISBN-10: 1492780316
December 2013

4
analyst@workmail.com
5
About the Author

6
Agha H. Amin , Retired Tank corps major
who served in five tank regiments and
commanded an independent tank
squadron and served in various staff ,
instructional and research assignmemts.
Author Pakistan Army till 1965, History of
Pakistan Army, Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-
59,The Essential Clausewitz,Developmemt
of Taliban Factions in Afghanistan and
Pakistan,Taliban War in Afghanistan.
Carried out various oil and gas and power
transmission line surveys in West Asia.
7
Editor in Chief of montly Intellience Review
and montly Military and Security Review
Heads the think tank Centre for study of
Intelligence Operations established in
early 2010
Centre for study of Intelligence Operations

8
Publishers of Monthly Intelligence Review, a journal devoted to
security and intelligence issues.
Intelligence history and operations.Group includes senior policy
makers and decision makers including recently retired DIA Head
LTG (Ret) Patrick M Hughes as well as many CIA and Military
Intelligence Analysts. The origin of the name is its founder Major
Agha.H.Amins first intellectual contact with United States Society
of Military History and CIA History Staff when he attended the
April 1996 meeting of Society of Military History at Rosslyn
Marriott , Arlington Virginia.The meeting was co-hosted by CIA
History Staff.
List of Publications by the author
x The Development of Taliban Factions in
Afghanistan and Pakistan: A
Geographical Account, February 2010 .
x The Pakistan Army till 1965
9
x Atlas of Indo Pak Wars
x Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59
Reinterpreted
x Pakistan Army through eyes of Pakistani
Generals
x Military Leadership and Decision Making
x The Essential Clausewitz
x Mans Role in history
x Taliban War in Afghanistan-A Writers
Transformed Perceptions from 2001 to
2011
x USA, ISI, AL QAEDA and TALIBAN
Anatomy of Grand US Strategic Failure

10
Dedication
Dedicated to all foot soldiers
and fighters on all sides who
fought these wars in vain and
to the ordinary people of
Afghanistan and Pakistan
who suffered and will suffer
11
Introduction
With friend and co author Colonel David Osinski in front of NATO
Headquarters Kabul , 29 June 2010
This is narrative of a soldier who identifies with all soldiers all
over the world regardless of race , religion or class and seeds
soldiers as a class misused by crafty politicians for furthering
personal ambitions and narrow agendas.

12
An attempt has been made to present things as I saw them
without any axe to grind.
While warfare has seen many changes the human actor remains
the constant factor.
IEDs became famous in Iraq War of 2003 and later acquired
greater notoriety in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Main impact of IEDs is that they have immensely increased the
cost of war for bigger states and states in general and made
waging war more effective at a lower cost for non state actors
as well as smaller states.
According to Peter Singer writings posted on Brookings the
United States has spent roughly $17 billion on various anti-
IED gear over the last decade, and that’s not counting the
$45 billion spent on mine-resistant vehicles.
More than the cost IEDs have shattered the basic confidence
that any soldier has in himself and in the environment in
which he operates.
13
Many NATO soldiers who I met in Afghanistan regretted the
fact that they were fighting against an enemy who they
rarely ever saw with their own eyes !
This narrative is a personal narrative also because of a many
centuries old family connection with Afghanistan and my
personal connection with Afghanistan since 1978 and with
Pakistan since birth.
Many of the events that I discuss in this narrative have a
direct connection with what I saw as a contractor in
Afghanistan , particularly from 2004 till to date.

14
Chapter One
IEDs in Afghanistan and the Opposing Strategic
Debates in NATO Command and Pakistani
Military Command circles’
According to the icasualties.org data the first IED attack
victim in Afghanistan was US Army Staff Sergeant Brian.T
Craig killed by an IED at Kandahar on 15 April 2002
alongwith three other US personnel i.e Staff Sergeant
Galewski, Justin J , Sergeant Maugans, Jamie O , and Sergeant
First Class Romero, Daniel A.
15
The death of these four soldiers appeared nothing
extraordinary and as per icasualties.org US IED deaths
actually decreased to three persons in 2003.

16
Al Qaeda alarm clock used in IEDs and recovered by NATO
forces in Afghanistan in 2002
Al Qaeda breakwire trigger
Casio watch timer
17
Casio watch timer with opto isaolator
2004 saw 12 IED deaths and 2005 saw 20 IED deaths.

18
My personal contact with Helmand went back to 1971 as
far as the Pakistani Balochistan side was concerned.In
1971 as a ten year old I had visited the Chaghai and Posti
Camp area with an uncle who was a geologist and working
for a Pakistani semi government company called WPIDC.
From 1971 till 2004 I visited Chaghai district bordering
Helmand various times.The district , longest in length in
Pakistan some 380 miles was a citadel of Pakistani military
intelligence , drug mafia , weapons smugglers and the
worst kind of crooks and cut throats that one can imagine
in the history of mankind.
My deeper contact with Helmand came when I visited
Helmand as general manager of an Afghan Construction
NGO in July August 2004.
When I drove from Kabul to Helmand to visit the clinics
that we were making for USAID contractor Louis Burger at
Khanishin, Deshu,Nad I Ali , Lashkargah and Musa Qila one
19
could not state that Afghanistan was witnessing any kind
of guerrilla war. We drank plenty of beer and Scotch
Whiskey on the way and met our sub contractors who
were reportedly Taliban but on the whole friendly.
Helmand had limited US presence and there was no Camp
Bastion at this time.
The only irritant , albeit minor ones were US and other
NATO military vehicles would not let civilians overtake

20
them for fear of attack. Although as the map below proves
there were hardly any attacks on NATO troops in 2004.
When I drove from Kabul to Heart twice in 2005 again
things were pretty good and one could see any major trace
of any insurgency apart from bandits on the uncompleted
road section of Dilaram Adraskan.
21
We hardly saw any NATO troops and things appeared
normal.The same calm was prevailaing when I visited
Herat from Kabul by air and travelled to the Iranian Border
at Islam Qila.
2006 began calmly and all was well till September
2006.Things suddenly changed when we visited Helmand
in September 2006.Nothing in Afghanistan warranted this
change but wars are fought by much bigger players than
the populace who we call the common man ?

22
However 2006 was the watershed when IED deaths
doubled to 41.
It is important to understand that all along from 2001 to
2006 a crucial strategic debate was being conducted in
NATO higher military command circles about the assertion
i.e “ How far was Pakistan involved with providing
23
sanctuary and aid to Islamist non state actors , including
Taliban , Al Qaeda and key Islamist leaders”. One could
feel this debate in any social or business event in
Afghanistan. I closely saw this debate in various meetings
with friends and business associates.
Ed Luttwak a US military thinker who I hold in high esteem
frequently interacted with me in e mails .These discussions
became more official when I met various NATO officers as
a defense sub contractor dealing with security issues as a
private consultant.
It appears that by 2006 the NATO had concluded that
Pakistani military was the major part of its problems in
Afghanistan.
A similar debate was going on in Pakistani military
command circles since 2001.We will discuss this in the
succeeding paragraphs.

24
The reasons for this sudden jump are complex and subtle .
Difficult to understand but understandable if the overall
strategic context is understood.
The US was pressurizing Pakistan into launching military
operations against what US perceived as Talibans centre of
gravity in Pakistans FATA region.Pakistans military usurper
Musharraf resisted the pressure but finally launched the
Pakistani military in FATA when in January 2004 Pakistani
intelligence confirmed that the groups who planned two
failed assassination attaempts on Musharraf in Late 2003
were based in FATA.
This new development brought the Pakistani military into
contact with IEDs.
However far more far reaching and serious deve;opments
were taking place in Pakistans Balochistan province where
an ethnic Baloch insurgency which had started in 2003
25
developed into a more serious affair in late 2006 after
killing of Baloch tribal leader Nawab Akbar Bugti in a
Pakistani military raid which has been described as a
deliberate act and a comedy of errors leading to accidental
death of Bugti because of his own mines planted in a cave
where he was hiding .

26
The Pakistani military deeply suspicious of US intentions
right from 2001 now assessed the Baloch insurgency and
came to the conclusion that the Baloch insurgencys centre
of gravity was in Afghanistan and more importantly that
this insurgency was US supported.
The Musharraf regime had assessed in November 2001
that Afghan Taliban were long term Pakistani assets and
had provided Afghan Taliban and many others strategic
sanctuary in Pakistan after the US attack.
However Pakistani militarys covert support to Afghan
Taliban was not for offensive operations till fourth quarter
of 2006.
It appears that in the last quarter of 2006 the Pakistani
military handlers of Afghan Taliban decided that it was
necessary to “ Step up “ and “ heat up “ the Taliban
operations in Afghanistan in order to put the US and NATO
27
on a backfoot and forcing them not to support Pakistans
Baloch secessionists.
This decision of Pakistani military could have a connection
with situation in FATA also where Pakistani military was
suffering casualties and many senior Pakistani military
officers regarded the Pakistani Taliban and other groups
they were fighting in FATA as proxies supported by
US,NATO and India through intermediate third parties.

28
Suicide VBIED Car Blast which I personally witnessed at
Voodkhel on Kabul Jalalabad Road on 19 September 2006
29

30
It was in 2006 that the NATO started concentrating on
Helmand Province which was regarded as a most strategic
and crucial province for Afghanistan covert operations by
the Pakistani military.
Helmand was the ideal launching pad to support any major
strategic level covert operation for the Pakistani military.
It bordered Pakistans Baloch areas and the Pakistani
military was very sensitive about this province.
Establishment of Camp Bastion by the British near Nad I Ali
was regarded with immense suspicion by the Pakistani
military.
31
Camp Bastion had been built in early 2006 but came to be
the Pakistani centre of attention after Baloch secessionists
“ stepped up” operations against the Pakistani state in late
2006.

32
On the Nad I Ali Camp Bastion Road Survey in September
2006
I first became aware of Camp Bastion in September 2006
when one Lebanese working as a military contractor for
the NATO made an urgent SOS like call to me to survey a
22 Km road from Nad I Ali to Camp Bastion.
33
Camp Bastion was like Greek for me.Rock Chlela and his
Lebanese staff were afraid of going for the survey . I
quickly assembled
On the Nad I Ali Camp Bastion Road Survey September
2006
When I started with Dad I Khuda my driver , Mumtaz the
Pashtun driver , Engineer Wardak from Kabul , I could
sense a very powerful change in the areas starting from

34
Ghazni , particularly Muqur. I had travelled frequently on
this road in 2004 and 2005 , but 2006 was different.
Such was the air of hostility that we decided to buy Lungis
(Turbans) of distinctly Kandahari pattern from Muqur
bazaar as the traditional white Afghan cloth caps simply
conflicted with what we saw in Muqur and onwards to
Lashkargah.
When we reached Lashkargah in Helmand the small town
was overflowing with mean in unmistakable attires of
what we know as Taliban.
Helmand carried severe scars of US military revenge.My
Tajik driver Dad I Khuda had visited the area of Nad I Ali
Nahr e Siraj soon after November 2001 and had
remembered seeing mass burials of hundreds of Taliban
fighters killed in US bombings.
35
The journey from Nad I Ali to Camp Bastion was tense but
thankfully safe. There was an air of tension on the faces of
the few civilians who we crossed paths with.Near Camp
Bastion we met some Fiji Gurkhas from the British Army.
We returned to a roadside driver hotel on the Kandahar
Herat Road near the place where Camp Bastion Road
meets the Heart Kandahar Road. Had a quick meal and
slept the night on local made shift quilt beds on the hotels
roof.In the morning we quickly returned to Camp Bastion
Nad I Ali axis to complete unfinished GPS readings and
photographs. We quickly started back for Kabul around
noon and reached the city around 2200.
The next day we submitted the survey report to Rock
Chlela who was visibly happy and paid us in complete in
cash at the time of submission of report.
The visit to Nad e Ali and Camp Bastions outskirts was
short but thought provoking . 2006 now appeared to be a

36
watershed.Something had drastically changed and this was
not the Helmand that I knew in 2004 and 2005.
The results became obvious only in 2007.But the fatal die
had been cast.
In October 2006 I had to visit Helmand again on special
request of the Italian friends to make inquiries about an
Italian journalist who had been kidnapped. In October
2006 things appeared more hostile and there was
something seriously wrong.My tajik driver was so terrified
that he refused to go to Kandahar again. The Pashtun
driver was on leave and I had been forced to take the Tajik
driver.
On the way back I was missing my Scotch Whiskey and was
surprised to learn that President Shah Shuja Karzai had
banned purchase of booze for non European foreigners
from the Supreme PX under reported Taliban pressure ! So
37
now we with Pakistani passports could no longer buy
Grants and J and B for 17 USD but were forced to buy
blackmarket Scotch from Barroo the bootlegger for 50
USD. Surely something was changing and for the worse.
However the Afghan insurgency was still hardly visible and
the NATO casualties in 2006 illustrate that things by and
large were under control ! Even Helmand !
IED casualties doubled from 2005 to 2006 from 21 to 40
but this was a variation which few in the command
positions which mattered in the US military in Afghanistan
or the Pentagon realized.In strategy things move slowly
and only great military genius can comprehend this change
as Clausewitz states ?

38 39
2006 thus was the watershed when major changes took
place.However we in 2006 could not understand the real
nature of the surge in the Afghan insurgency which
became slowly apparent only in 2007 and 2008.
In 2007 October I wrote an Afghan assessment which was
published in Pakistans Defence Journal.

40
My assessment in the journal article titled “The Ongoing
Taliban War in Afghanistan- A Brief Assessment” was thus
as follows:--
“The Taliban and USA had no conventional match so it was logical that the
Taliban disintegrated initially in face of the US bombing offensive and later
ground attacks of Northern Alliance as well as the US forces.
The Taliban's started re-grouping after mid 2002 having realized that the USA
and its NATO allies had sparse ground forces.Initially they targeted NGOs and
construction companies but by 2004 they started applying the tactics learnt in
Iraq in Afghanistan.
By 2005 they were generally organized as regional battle groups under a
command and control system.An assessment of this is shown on the map.Each
regional group comprised a hard core of 150 to 350 and a total mobilized
armed strength of 1000 to 2000 fighters.
41
According to a study done by this scribe for an international client IEDs were
initially imported from Datta Khel and Pishin but later each regional group
started manufacturing their own IEDs.Weapons and munitions were bought
from Iranian Baloch and Kurd smugglers or from groups in Central Asian
Republics.Most of the weapons were smuggled via Iran.
Taliban control over Helmand and South Nimroz ensured that they controlled
the main drug transit routes hence this enabled them to maintain a strong
leverage with Pakistani and Iranian Baloch tribes.”
The USA and its NATO allies appear to have the following strategy :---
Control the key airfields of Afghanistan with minimum strength.
x Hold Kabul in strength.
x Show piece patrolling in Southern Provinces giving the impression
that the ISAF/NATO is active but in reality avoiding pitched battles or
any heavy troop copmmitment.
x Rebuild the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police.This
may take many dccades.Actual fighting indicates that both the ANA
and ANP have extremely limited value while operating
independently.Thanks to US insistence the Afghan Army was

42
destroyed effectively in the period 1989-92 and building a effective
army may take many decades.
x It appears that the long term strategic purpose of Afghanistan was
to dominate the regional states as well the resources by occupying
airbases which would enable the USA to attack targets of its
choosing , may they be WMDs or other installations.Effective
countermeasures by President Putin of Russia however severely
limited US influence in the Central Asian Republics.
x Pressurise/armtwist Pakistani into destroying the main Taliban bases
in Waziristan and North Balochistan.
The Taliban strategy is as following :---
Harass Kabul Herat Road disturbing container movements.
43
Cause attrition on British-Canadian troops in Helmand and Kandahar the
Pashtun heartland thus demonstrating to all Pashtuns in Afghanistan that
the Talibans are a major player.
Dominate the major drug production areas in the south and the main
drug export routes thus financially sustaining the ongoing war.
Carry out continuous suicide and IEDbombings in Kabul and surrounding
area sapping morale Of anti Taliban forces and demoralising civilians.
Carry out selective IED/Suicide Attacks against US Forces and US Civilans
Targeting the Afghan National Police which was not completely
disintegrated in 1988-92.The Taliban know that the hard core of the
Afghan Government is the ANP trained by the indomitable Sayyid
Gulabozai.The Afghan National Police has at least 25 % officers trained in
ex USSR and is very professional as well as patriotic.Thus the attacks on
Afghan National Police by the suicide bombers as well as IEDs.

44
Conclusion
The Afghan battlefield will see few decisive battles and would continue to
be a slow war of attrition in which the NATO/ISAF will rarely see the faces
of their enemies.Time is on the side of Taliban.The NATO/USA has to
decide on a definite strategy unless their aim is just to control the
strategic Afghan airfields as jump off points for attacks on other regional
countries in the next decade.Pakistan lost the good will it should have had
in Afghanistan because its foreign policy was controlled by non
Professionals.This failure started from removal of Agha Shahi from the
Foreign Office.Shahi was not in favour of doing everything that the
Americans told the Pakistanis.He was a seasoned diplomat.After his exit
45
the Foreign Office passed into hands of soldiers turned diplomats with an
over ride gear from General Zia and the so called Silent Soldier.
Seen in retrospect Pakistan's Afghan policy was a failure and the threat in
2007 to Pakistan's integrity is far more grave than in 1979.In this scenario
the Taliban are a major contender.They have acquired a fearsome
reputation not only as warriors in the Pashtun areas but also in the eyes
of their NATO opponents.However the talk of engaging them is
impractical.The battle that they are fighting is to the bitter end and this
fact has to be digested by all decision makers on all sides.The Taliban
have succeeded in destabilisng the region and herein lies their nuisance
value.
It is a great mystery why the US/NATO decided to take the
war to Helmand.
A better option would have been to simply defoliate the
poppy crops using chemical agents and to concentrate on
mining and fencing the Afghan Pakistan and Afghan Iran
Border in Helmand and Kandahar provinces. A far cheaper ,
economical and cost effective option than building Camps
Leatherneck ,Dwyer etc and wasting valuable military lives
in Helmand and Kandahar ?

46
It is beyond the scope of this short work to research why
the US went into Helmand . Was it to monopolise and
control the vast drug country which Taliban linked drug
mafia was controlling or was it to inflict a decisive military
defeat on Taliban.
Drugs were not eliminated as this was never a US objective .
Taliban were not annihilated as US force ratios were too low
and the US failed to severe the Talibans strategic line of
logistics based in Pakistan.
47
It is a great mystery why the US military established huge
military presence right in the heart of drugs in Helmand and
did nothing to eradicated drugs.Interestingly both US and
Pakistan protected select drug mafia groups as both in all

48
probability used narcotics to finance part of the war. Drug
seizures declined radically after 9/11 in both Afghanistan
and Pakistan and the period 2001-13 was the best era of life
for the drug barons of all religions and ethnicities in Af
Pak,UAE and Europe.
49
In 2008 the US went in Helmand in force by establishing
Camp Leatherneck. A US military contractor contacted me
for boring wells in Helmand and in the process sent me an
excellent map marking US camps in Helmand.
It appears that establishment of Camp Leatherneck near
Khanishin was viewed with extreme suspicion by the

50
Pakistani military and 2008 saw a major surge in Taliban
activity in targeting US troops with IEDs.
It appears that the Pakistani military thought that if the
Taliban did not exert greater pressure on the US troops in
Helmand , US alleged support to Baloch insurgents would
multiply as well as alleged US support to the Pakistani
Taliban in FATA.These were seen as a NATO proxy to
punish Pakistan for its covert support to Afghan Taliban.
51
It was simpler and easier to target US troops as they were
now in ideal IED country , with sparse population and
comfortably close to Pakistani Balochistan from where IED
logistics could be transported to Afghanistan.
Thus in 2008 , thanks to Camp Bastions establishment
Helmand rose to the top position in IED attacks and
fatalities vis a vis Kandahar.
I remember travelling through Helmand in 2008.It was a
mystery why the US commanders had decided to make
sitting duck moving targets of their troops in Helmand. I
could only see this as “ callous indifference”.
In 2008-9 Pakistans FATA and Swat regions came closest to
anarchy however the Pakistani military was able to
stabilize the Pakistani position thanks to extremely
resolute leadership of a Pakistani general named Major
General Tariq Khan.

52
In 2009 it appears that the Pakistani military realized that
the US military had to be put on the defensive if Pakistan
was to be saved. They appear to have realized that if order
was not restored in Pakistan the US would use the
prevailing chaos as a pretext to denuclearize Pakistan.
An essential part of this strategy was to support the
Afghan Taliban so that the US military is bogged down in
saving their sitting duck troops in Helmand.Sitting ducks
because of unimaginative US tactics rather than any
strategic or tactical brilliance of the Taliban !
What would you call a strategy which places your troops in
a platter for the enemy to be attacked at will and do
nothing to seal a border being used to smuggle IED
logistics ?
While US occupation of Afghanistan was a strategic
movement in a certain direction , US decision makers
53
simply slided into inertia after 2001 and allowed a
shattered Taliban to regroup with ease in six long years
during which the US military did little to bash the Taliban
in safe havens in Pakistan.

54
There are interesting similarities about IED attacks that
were carried out in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2012.
Maximum attacks were carried out in areas close to
Pakistani Balochistan where the border regions were in full
control of the Pakistani military.
In areas of Afghanistan where the anti Pakistani military
Pakistani Taliban (TTP ) held control fewer IED attacks
were carried out in adjacent Afghanistan provinces.
55
The US troops in Helmand were simply too few to even
patrol Helmand effectively.Yet the US military
commanders continued a totally non sensical exercise of
making the US troops patrol around as puny pinpricks in
Helmand and be sniped at will by Taliban IED warriors !

56
Thus the IED deaths tripled in Helmand in 2009 from 2008
and reached a three digit number of 105 in 2009.
57
2010 was the deadliest year when drone strikes comically
continued against a near dead US enemy which had little
to do with 90 % US casualties in Helmand and Kandahar ?
The result was the US peace initiative which began in 2011
for a decent exit which in reality would be a military
defeat.

58
A military defeat because it would be celebrated as a great
victory of Islam ? A perceived victory which would increase
terrorism in the region and the world ?
59

60 61
IED deaths went down in 2012 not becaues of any US
military brilliance but because the US de-escalated
operations in South Afghanistan and went for a peace deal
with cold blooded killers of US troops.
In the final outcome soldiers are pawns and slaves used by
politicians to win elections ? It is simply impossible to
justify the death of more than 3000 US troops in

62
Afghanistan because their dying did not lead to any
military victory.
No anti dote has been found to the IEDs.
An antidote can however possibly be discovered for sheer
political and military incompetence which exposes soldiers
expensively funded with tax payers money not to fight
purposeless wars ?
63
TOTAL IED FATAL ATTACKS 2001-2012

66
Chapter Two
IED Types used in attacks in
Afghanistan and Pakistan
In order to understand the requirement of an organisation
with all related/relevant components and the
expertise/training parameters that would be essential in
handling /neutralizing IEDs threat, it is pertinent to
understand certain basics of the IED characteristics.
Though the subject is quite technical in nature and details
/ explanation requires some expertise, only essentials are
being discussed to estb a basic tech understanding about
67
the IEDs, their general make up, identification procedures,
disposal operations and likely preventive and security
measures to be adopted by all concerned to thwart any
chances of an IED attk.
Home Made Explosives (HME).
A mixture of expl can be made from virtually any
combination of powerful oxidizing agent & fuel.
Internationally many terrorist organisations and factions
have been found using HMEs made through precursor
chemicals.
Making of Home Made Expl (HME).

68
Home made explosives can be developed from readily
available materials which can be obtained with out
restriction from Horticulturists, Chemists, Grocers etc.
Basic Ingredients. ingredients which are required are
Oxidants
These substances contain large quantity of oxygen which
In order to manufacture any explosive mixture two
essential can be liberated by heating. They include most
nitrates, chlorates and salts.
Sources of supply may be :--
x Oxidants Ammonium Nitrate Pot Chlorate.
x Source of Supply of Agricultural Suppliers, Farms
Labs, Shops, Paper manufacturers.
x Fertilizers
x Weed Killers / Bleaching Sterilization
69
x Potassium Nitrate
x Meat Curing,
x Glass Manufacturi
x ng materials
x Sodium Chlorate
x Agriculture Weed Killers Suppliers
x Peroxides C- Tetrachloride
x Hair dressing
x Hardware store
x Colorants Solvent
x Fuels. There are a large no of readily aval fuels for
explosive mixtures and these may be either solid
orliquid. A selection of the most common fuels is
shown below:- (1)Fuel (2) Charcoal (3) Diesel Oil (4)
Glycerin (5) Sugar (6) Aluminum Powder (7)
Nitrobenzene Paraffin Oil Vaseline

70
Source of Supply may be Garages ,Shops ,Labs ,Paint
shops Garages Cosmetic Stores.
Few Examples of home made expls are as under:Oxidants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Ammonium Nitrate 95 % Sodium
Chlorate 60% Potassium Chlorate 50% Ammonium Nitrate
90% Ammonium Nitrate 90% Potassium Chlorate 90%
Carbon tetrachloride 66% Fuels Sugar 5 % Sugar 40% Sugar
50% Nitrobenzene 10% Aluminum 10% Vaseline 10%
Aluminum powder 33%
More sophisticated materials are found in plenty in black
markets of Pakistan , Afghanistan and Iraq.
Trigger Mechanisms.
The most sensitive component of an IED is its trigger
mechanism. The complete knowledge of the mechanism
to initiate the device is a must for an IEDD operator to
neutralise the same. Trigger mechanism or activation
71
devices are incorporated into IED either as an arming
switch or a fuse. They can be simple or complex in nature.
More than one trigger mechanism can be used to create
redundancy in the system. Many IEDs incorporate an
arming switch and a fusing switch. The arming switch is a
safety to IED and works by disarming or disengaging power
to the fusing switch. When the arming switch is armed the
fusing switch becomes functional. However the circuit is
still closed. When the fusing switch is activated, the circuit
becomes open and wil connect battery power to the
initiator and resultantly the detonation will occur. Trigger
mechanisms are almost unlimited in design and
construction. So any approach or action by its intended
target or a first responder will result in detonation. Trigger
mechanism for IED can take any form and can appear
quite innocent looking, completely fitting into
environment. These mechanisms are used as triggers in

72
industry, and can be acquired at the cost of Rs 500.
However, basing on the accumulation of evidence in the
incidents, widely used trigger basing on different sensor
technologies are:--
x Acoustic triggers.
x Magnetic / electromagnetic triggers
x Timers (mechanical and elec).
x Induction Triggers Resistance Triggers Piezoelectric
Triggers
x Pyro-electric Triggers
x Thermal triggers.
x IR reception/ interception triggers.
x Analogue triggers.
x Photo sensitive triggers.
x Mercury based triggers.
x Acid Initiated delay/hypergolic triggers.
x X ray sensitive triggers.
73
x Servo motor triggers.
x GSM or cell phone based triggers.
x Long Range Cordless Tel based triggers (LRCTs).
x Anti-handling mechanical triggers.
x Chemical/hypergolic triggers.
x Occupancy and Motion triggers.
x Barometric triggers. Composite triggers.
Induction
An ability of a varying magnetic field to induce electric
current in a wire. It is not important how the field is
produced—either by a permanent magnet or by a
solenoid—the effect is the same. Electric current is
generated as long as the magnetic field changes. A
stationary field produces no current.
Pyroelectric Effect

74
Pyroelectric materials are crystalline substances capable of
generating an electrical charge in response to heat flow.
The pyroelectric effect is very closely related to the
piezoelectric effect. Like piezoelectric, the pyroelectric
materials are used in the form of thin slices or films with
electrodes deposited on the opposite sides to collect the
thermally induced charges The pyroelectric sensor is
essentially a capacitor which can be electrically charged by
an influx of heat. The detector does not require any
external electrical bias (excitation signal). It needs only an
appropriate electronic interface circuit to measure the
charge. 8. Sound Waves. Alternate physical compression
and expansion of medium (solids, liquids, and gases) with
certain frequencies are called sound waves. The medium
contents oscillate in the direction of wave propagation;
hence, these waves are called longitudinal mechanical
waves. The name sound is associated with the hearing
75
range of a human ear, which is approximately from 20 to
20,000 Hz. Longitudinal mechanical waves below 20 Hz are
called infrasound and above 20,000 Hz (20 kHz), they are
called ultrasound. If the classification were made by other
animals, like dogs, the range of sound waves surely would
be wider. Detection of infrasound is of interest with
respect to analysis of building structures, earthquake
prediction, and other geometrically large sources. When
infrasound is of a relatively strong magnitude, it can be, if
not heard, at least felt by humans, producing quite
irritating psychological effects (panic, fear, etc.). Audible
waves are produced by vibrating strings (string music
instruments), vibrating air columns (wind music
instruments), and vibrating plates (some percussion
instruments, vocal cords, loudspeaker). Whenever sound is
produced, air is alternatively compressed and rarefied.
These disturbances propagate outwardly. A spectrum of

76
waves may be quite different from a simple
monochromatic sounds from a metronome or an organ
pipe, to a reach violin music. Noise may have a very broad
spectrum. It may be of a uniform distribution of density or
it may be “colored” with predominant harmonics at some
of its portions.
Light
Light is a very efﬁcient form of energy for sensing a great
variety of stimuli.
Among many others, these include distance, motion,
temperature, and chemical composition. Light has an
electromagnetic nature. It may be considered a
propagation of either quanta of energy or electromagnetic
waves. Different portions of the wavefrequency spectrum
are given special names: ultraviolet (UV), visible, near-,
77
mid-, and far-infrared (IR), microwaves, radio waves, and
so forth. The name “light” was arbitrarily given to
electromagnetic radiation which occupies wavelengths
from approximately 0.1 to 100 μm. Light below the
shortest wavelength that we can see (violet) is called
ultraviolet, and higher than the longest that we can see
(red) is called infrared. The infrared range is arbitrarily
subdivided into three regions: near-infrared (from about
0.9 to 1.5 mμ), mid-infrared (1.5 to 4 μm), and far-infrared
(4 to 100 μm). 10. Acoustic. These trigger mechanisms are
sound sensitive (acoustic frequencies) and can also
identify specific sound. The circuit is programmed to
operate on a certain frequency of generated sound which
may be a gunshot, closing of a car door/bonnet, drawers,
door locks or made to function on a pre-determined/fed
sound.
Photosensitive

78
These circuits are basically light sensitive, and use a photo
cell for detecting light. They can op either on sudden
absence of light or intro of light effect. Industrial utility of
this mechanism is in Cigarette factories, textile mills,
where it is used as a counter, also used in main street
lights, ATMs .
Peizo Electric
These circuits are sensitive to touch, vibration or any
seismic pulse and initiate as soon as something comes in
contact with their host. They are used in packing industry,
bottling factories etc. In the terrorism history these
mechanisms have been used on railways lines, garages,
hotels etc.
Mercury Operated
These are of a volatile nature and used mainly in suicidal
attacks,since chances of op are 100%.The mercury is
79
housed in glass tube, with initiation contact wires on top
or aside. The mechanism comes into effect, as soon
mercury comes in direct contact with wires. Mercury being
a conductive material is used to complete the circuit or to
short circuit. The same trigger was used on suicidal
attempt on the PM of Pakistan.
GSM Initiation
The IED is initiated by means of a mobile phone, The
vibrator circuit of a mobile is used to operate as an
auxiliary relay, which is further soldered to a battery
connected with the detonator and explosive. The circuit is
fool proof and very effective. The vibrator circuits releases
a pulse of 4 volts DC, which switches the auxiliary relay for
milliseconds. The relay on op completes the secondary
circuit through a battery to initiate the detonator and main
charge. The IMEI (International Mobile Eqpt Ident) is
changed by the terrorists to conceal their ident, and the

80
SIM (Subscriber Ident Module) is also cloned and
unregistered SIMs are used for accomplishment of the
task. GSM initiation was used in the 1st attempt on
President of Pakistan in Chaklala Rawalpindi. Cell phones
have also been used as complete IEDs Like in 2006,
Hammas Ldr Ayyash’s head was blown when he identified
himself to the caller.
Timed IEDs
These IEDs do not need any action to be induced by the
intended tgt for the triggering mechanism to activate,
rather are timed devices which automatically detonate at
a predetermined time or delay. The system of getting an
accurate delay is on-board and no external
command/interference is needed for activation. The
simplest and most accurate method of incorporating delay
is to use some form of clock or timer.
81
However, any mechanical or chemical reaction that takes a
measurable time to complete its function can be used.
Command IEDs
These are “opportunist” IEDs. Command devices
incorporated in the IEDs as triggering devices, allow the
terrorist to retain control of the device until the optimum
moment of firing is achieved/conceived.
Mobile Phones / Pagers.
Door bells (remote and wireless) Garage Door Openers
LRCTs
Postal IEDs
It includes all IEDs which come through mailing /postal
channels, courier companies, or personally del packages in

82
shape of mail or courier del e.g letter bomb and parcels
etc.
Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIEDs) Also sometimes called
“mobile” or “intelligent” IEDs. Recent terrorist incidents at
Pakistan and abroad have shown a very common trend of
using vehs loaded with huge amount of explosives to bring
massive devastating effects on the tgt. Oil tankers and
loaders are the ideal vehs for such IED attacks.
Person Borne IEDs (PBIEDs) or Suicide Bombing
Highly provoked or brainwashed human platforms make
the most deadliest and difficult to detect IEDs. Such IEDs
are intelligent and very difficult to detect and differentiate
from ordinary humans. Latest incidents have shown an
83
increasing trend in suicidal attks across the globe.
Different types of such IEDs are Self triggered Radio
Controlled triggered MBIED Explosive belted individuals
(blast or shrapnel effects or both) Rectal cavity PBIED
Chapter Three
Drones , Jihad and Causes of US
Deaths-Exploring Myths of US
Afghan War
The US drone strikes lacked any strategic purpose as the
insurgent groups that these drones targeted had little to
do with the Taliban killing 90 % of US troops in Helmand
and Kandahar.

86 87
The US military simply allowed the Taliban to operate with
impunity from Pakistani Balochistan while they targeted
non entities in Pakistans FATA region ?
This is a case of classic military incompetence fit to be
subject of a Norman Dixon book or a Gabriel and Savage
analsysis of the failed US war in Afghanistan on pattern of
Crisis in Command ?

88
Chapter Four
IED War in Pakistan
Pakistans 11 Corps (FATA/Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces)
was most seriously affected by the IED warriors.
At the strategic level it appears that the FATA War of
Pakistan Army is the revenge inflicted on Pakistan Army
for covertly supporting Taliban all along from 2001 till to
date by the USA and NATO . It is possible that some other
intelligence agencies also played a minor role in this war
.These include Russians,Indians,Saudis,Iranians etc.
89

90
In January 2011 rough breakdown of IED incidents in
Pakistan was as below:--
91
Some 84 % of the incidents occurred in 11 Corps area.
Pakistani analysts knowledge of techniques of initiation of
IEDs was limited as seen from the table below:--

92
However due to efforts at the army level and particularly
because of research at the Pabbi counter terrorist school
the Pakistan Armys ability to understand IEDs improved as
is apparent from the February 2012 report below:--
Now the army was having a greater understanding of the
IED war that they were fighting.
It was discovered that the evil genius circuit maker who
created the near impregnable four stage electric circuit
used in FATA IEDs was based in Pakistans second largest
city of Lahore !
93
IED blast Kohat Adda at Peshawar 23 February 2012
VBIED used in attack on US Consulate at Peshawar

94
Various Frontier Corps vehicles were attacked successfully by Dr
Allah Nazars Balochistan Liberation Front particularly on the
Turbat Mand Road.
However these attacks at best rocked the boat at the tactical
level
Attack on US Consulate in Peshawar
95
IEDs as employed by the terrorists in Pakistan were not a
success story.In FATA IEDs initially inflicted many casualties on
Pakistan Army but this weakness was stabilized with fool proof
standard operating procedures created by LTG Tariq Khan as
Commander of 14 Division and later as Inspector General
Frontier Corps.
Thus IEDs at the strategic and even operational level failed to
influence the outcome of war in Pakistan.
A major reason for this is the fact that Pakistans strong factor is
cheaper military manpower.A luxury which the US did not have
in Afghanistan.
However Pakistani decision makers need to realize that cheaper
manpower cannot benefit Pakistan in the long run unless the
Pakistani state introduces major strategic changes at the
strategic and political level.

96
Pakistan has survived the existential crisis imposed on it in
2006-9 but needs to prepare for more serious internal security
crisis which may erupt after 2014.
Ideally this would need a great statesman at Pakistans highest
level and an army chief like LTG Tariq Khan ? Pakistans survival
as a state may depend on having two great men at the political
and military level and even one man combining both spheres ?
However Pakistan has to improve basic changes at the
institutional level ? To do this again a great man is required at
the highest political and military levels.
Chapter Five
Pakistan Army and War on Terror
Pakistan Army along with perhaps the US Army and CIA
hold the unique honour of having been midwife , mother ,
97
father figure , mentor and facilitator of the terrorists that
they are fighting today.
While both the US and Pakistani states took the decision
to use non state actors as proxies and means and tools of
state policies for a rationale , today this rationale needs to
be re-evaluated , questioned and revised. Mistakes of the
past are irrevocable facts however it is imperative to learn
from them if the future is to be stabilized.
Conventional forces and armies cannot rival non state
actors in quality of motivation at the the personal level.
State actors however hold superior odds against non state
actors in spheres of higher strategy , intelligence
operations, conventional power and mobility.
When a state actor fails in the first two stages of IED
warfare described in earlier part of this book, the price
that they pay in the final execution stage is very high.

98
In case of US and Pakistan both states miserably failed in
first two phases of the war .This is a serious cause for
reflection for policy makers , researchers, academics and
all principal actors.
The period particularly in Pakistan from 2001 to 2013 saw
a security transition gigantic in scope and
consequences.Pakistan thus became a highly insecure
state from what it was before 2001. A not rich but
relatively safe and secure state.
What happened in Pakistan from 2001 to 2013 in terms of
collapse of law and order and vastly increased insecurity
was not a random event.
This was a consequence of policy which the Pakistani state
had followed from 1978 till 2001.
Policy makers forgot that tools can become masters of
manipulators when manipulators lack long term strategic
99
vision and extreme thoroughness. This has happened in
human history repeatedly starting from the Roman
Emperors guards and barbarian races that they employed ,
down to Turkish guards of Abbasids and communists
initially seen as harmless by Chiang Kai Shek in China and
the US in Vietnam.
There are limits to misuse of ideology and religion in war
and these were not understood by both US and Pakistani
decision makers.
The direct result of this above perceptual failure was 9/11
and the Iraq and Af Pak Wars.All costly affairs which
weakened both the US and Pakistan.
Pakistan Army started unlearning and re-learning soon
after it bloodied its nose in Waziristan and FATA. The US
learnt the lessons more harshly in Helmand and Kandahar.

100
Both the US state and Pakistani state played games with
each other in Afghanistan and FATA and Balochistan and
the result was the triumph of the non state actors.
At this stage the non state actors have been contained but
the position is that of a hunter holding a live wolf with its
ear. The final results are not yet clear. Much will depend
on how the US conducts its foreign policy after 2014.
Both Afghanistan and Pakistan need support like US
support to West Germany and South Korea.Both were
success stories.
Abrupt and total US withdrawal from Af Pak will
destabilize the region.
The Pakistan Army has improved at the operational and
tactical level. But its military virtue has been severely
eroded
101
At the strategic level Pakistani state both political and
military suffers from many delusions and confusions and
needs strategic therapy.
Pakistani policy makers have to make a clear choice
whether they want a modern , progressive , well managed
,economically viable state or want to be an archaic , old
fashioned,confused state which supports all types of
clowns and devils in the name of religion in Afghanistan
and neighbouring countries.
A clean break has to be made and this clean break requires
a major reorganization of the collapsing Pakistani state at
all levels.

102
IED used by TTP against Pakistan Army comprising rockets
and washing machine timer
Pull switch IED using live ammunition
103
GSM initiated IED
Chapter Six
Techniques, Types of IEDs
IED

104
1. IEDs are one of the major and most frequent
threats confronted by troops in tribal areas. Images of
IED attack invoke immense psychological influence
over military and public. In operational terms, IEDs
present asymmetric threat for two reasons: first, the
IED was something not fully understood; and second,
they represent a new method of attack that
conventional capabilities were un-prepared to
address.
2. The Russain invasion of Afghanistan and post
9/11 era witnessed Pakistan as frontline state. During
both these spells, there had been an upsurge in the
IED attacks especially in FATA and Balochistan area.
Colossal human casualties and sizeable damage to
private and public properties was sustained primarily
due to increased number of technically sophisticated
IEDs and suicidal attacks. In this section an effort has
been made to understand this threat.
105
3. IEDs
a. Definition. An explosive device made by a
bomb-maker by modifying the characteristics
of munitions, explosive or substance with
explosive properties in a homemade fashion.
b. Basic Components of an IED. Though
IEDs vary widely in types, shapes and forms,
yet they share a common set of components.
It consists of:-

106
(1) Main Charge (Explosive). It includes
casing and camouflage around
explosive. Following are the types of
explosives available:
(a) Agro based chemicals like urea
and nitrates.
(b) Commercial explosives.
(c) Military explosives including RDX.
(2) Initiator. It initiates detonation.
(3) Detonator. It detonates the explosive.
The purpose of a detonator is to initiate
a larger, less sensitive explosive charge.
The military/commercial detonator is
widely available and can be initiated by
a variety of mechanical or electrical
devices. A detonator is placed in contact
107
with a secondary explosive to cause the
explosive to detonate.
(4) Power Supply /Receiver/transmitter.
Transmits sigs or detonating waves to
receiver detonating cord / wire through
radio, may be a mobile or remote control
in case of command operating system,
and switches in case of booby traps.
(5) Container. It encapsules explosive
along with its components.

108
c. Types of IEDs. IEDs are unique in
nature. Their complexity depends upon the
creativeness of their designer who improvises
the system using available materials.
Depending upon the method of employment,
IEDs can be categorized into following main
types:-
(1) Types as per means of Detonation.
IEDs can be further cat into three main
types as per the means of detonation: -
(a) Timed IEDs. These IEDs
activate on a predestined time set
by the miscreants within the circuit.
These are of following types:-
i. ClockTimer
109
ii. Electronic Timer
(b) Command IEDs. In such devices
activation takes place on
predestined radio freq or command
operating action by the perpetrator
causing the device to initiate. The
TO OPERATE:
1. BE SURE TOGLE SWITCH IN THE OFF POSITION
2. SELECT TIMER 1 OR 2
3. SET TIMER TO TIME
4. START TIME

110
initiation of command can be
through radio, wire or light.
(c) Victim Operated IEDs. These
IEDs are designed in such a way
that they get initiated by the victim
himself, on entering into a well
concealed trap laid for him.
Normally pull, pressure or release
type switches are used to initiate
such IEDs.
111
(2) Types of IEDs as per Deployment
Means
(a) Package Type IED.
(b) Vehicle-Borne IEDs (VBIEDs).
(c) Suicide Bomb IED.
(3) Types of IEDs as per their
deployment/ components
(a) Pepsi Can IED

112
(b) Camouflage Concrete Block IED
113
(c) Use of Plastic IEDs

114
(d) Mortar Round IED
(e) Multiple Rock IEDs
115
(f) Rock Pile IED
(g) Plastic Bag IED

116
(h) Land Mine IED
(j) Garbage Bag IED
(k) Artillery Round IED
117
(l) Buried IED
(m) Unexploded Ordnance IED

118
(n) Donkey Cart IED
119
(o) Dead Animal IED
(p) Human Figure IED

120
d. Possible IED Indicators. Some of the
possible IED indicators are described as
under:-
(1) Holes
(a) Old holes.
(b) Natural holes are ready made for
explosive devices.
(2) Colours. Enemy may provide clues
unwittingly. Brightly coloured detonating
cord may be visible, colour of IED not
121
covered completely. Freshly disturbed
dirt will be darker in colour (Look for
colour changes of the dirt).
(3) Markings. Unusual items (use of
tires, piled rocks, ribbon, tape etc to
identify IED location or used as aiming
reference).
(4) Shapes. Outline that is not normal in nature.

122
(5) Traffic patterns. Signs to be watched
during both foot and vehicular
movement.
123
(6) Graffiti. It may be indicating some type
of warning to locals (use interpreter to
translate).
4. IEDs Mechanism
a. Pressure activated mines on roads and
its shoulders.
b. IEDs/mines buried on road diversions
and under culverts.
c. Side attack IEDs/mines/rockets to target
selected vehicles/ Troops Carrying
Vehicles (TCVs).

124
d. Direct mine pattern i.e. having pallets,
nails, nuts and bolts etc.
e. Toy bombs.
f. Booby traps.
5. Activation Devices
a. Walkie talkie sets and mobile phones.
b. Door bells.
c. Clockwork delay fuze.
d. Toys with anti handling devices and
chemically operated mechanism.
6. Objectives of IED Attack.Terrorists are using
IEDs to achieve following aims:-
a. To cause attrition on security forces (SFs)
without engaging them in an encounter.
b. To impose caution and delay on operation
of SFs.
125
c. To compel SFs to commit larger quantum of
manpower for road clearance and guard
duties.
d. To lower morale of SFs who have gained
upper hand during raids, ambushes and
clearance of hideouts.
e. To eliminate opponents.
f. To eliminate political leaders.
g. To gain position of strength.
h. To cripple the economy.
7. Effects of an IED Attack. IED usually
combines the effects of blast, fragmentation as well
as armour penetration, through the use of shaped
charge liners. Camouflage explosives frequently
serve as roadside bombs. These devices are remote
controlled, triggered by infra-red, pressure bars, trip
wires or remote control. These IEDs are aimed at the
softer sides of unprotected vehicles, armoured

126
vehicles and can be effective even from a distance of
several meters. IEDs can be grouped by "daisy
chains" inflicting max damage on military patrols
consisting of several vehicles. Using time delay
activation, programmed to hit the rescue teams that
rush to the scene is a frequent IED tactics. A common
tactics aims at stopping the softer vehicle in a convoy
or group, which can then be targeted by heavier
charges employed by special teams covered by small
arms fire, or RPG. An IED scene is usually covered
by a fire support team which will attack the target with
small arms or RPGs, once the vehicles are stopped,
or when the convoy or patrol disintegrate individually.
The attackers may also attempt to kill, or kidnap the
crew.
Components of an IED Life Cycle
127
ReactionMotivation
Destination
Funding
Over watch
Intelligence
Assessment
Training
Purpose
Emplacement

128
7. Stages of an IED life cycle. Following are
the stages of an IED life cycle:-
a. Planning Stage.
b. Laying Stage.
c. Terrorist Surveillance.
d. Firing Stage.
8. Planning Stage
Recruiting
Fabrication
Targeting
129
a. Selection of site.
b. Risk in laying and expected pay-off.
c. The target on the site selected will be
kept under observation for a long time before
arrival at the correct time of the blast.
d. Good intelligence about composition/ timings
and routes of convoy.
9. Laying Stage
a. Principles of Laying IEDs
(1) Bluff.
(2) Everyday operation.
(3) Attractive.
(4) Alternative method of firing.
(5) Concealment.
(6) Variety.
(7) Inconvenience.
b. Move Up to Laying Site. This will
involve collection of explosive & other

130
accessories and physical move up to the
selected site.
c. Laying of IEDs. This will involve laying,
camouflage of IEDs and preparation of firing
point.
d. Laying of IEDs by the Road Side. This is
the most pervasive form of IEDs. Following
are the usual methods followed by the
miscreants:-
(1) Road crossing and junctions become
natural choice as these cover more than
one route which can be used by the SF
columns.
(2) Normally distance between vehicles
reduces at bends and defiles, which
present larger target to onlookers for
IED attack. The vehicles slow down thus
making them vulnerable.
131
(3) In some areas due to lack of space
along the roads, halting areas available
are very few, which are good targets for
IED attack.
(4) Closing up of vehicles at the beginning
of steep gradient along a road/track is
very natural which provides good
opportunity to terrorists for an IED
attack.
(5) In camping grounds which are few and
are not kept under constant
surveillance, it is likely that the terrorists
will seize opportunity and lay IEDs for
achieving maximum results.
(6) Likely Places on the roads are:
(a) Drain and pipes.
(b) Pot-holes and road under repair.

132
(c) Unoccupied building and boundary
walls.
(d) Bridges and culverts.
(e) Tracks frequently used by SFs.
(f) Common resting place for patrols.
(g) Road blocks.
e. Use of Tandem IEDs
(1) To wipe out the trace of first IED.
(2) To inflict casualty to the troops rushing
towards the site of first IED.
(3) To enhance chance of destruction of
chosen target.
(4) Causing causalities and damage to
vehicles.
10. Terrorist Surveillance
133
a. Fixed Surveillance. Fixed surveillance
is done from a static position, possibly an
adjacent building, business or other facility.
b. Mobile Surveillance. Mobile surveillance
usually entails observing and following
individual human targets.
c. Progressive Surveillance. Progressive
surveillance is a technique whereby the
terrorist will follow a target for a short period
of time from point A to point B, withdraw for a
period of time, possibly days or even weeks,
and then resume surveillance from point B to
point C. This will continue until the terrorist
develop target suitability and noticeable
patterns in the target movements.
11. Firing Stage. This stage includes firing
IEDs and escaping from the site to hideout.

134
Chapter Seven
Countering the IED
Both US and Pakistan have acquired valuable experience
in counter IED warfare.
Ironically the main reason why both countries by and
large succeeded is that both have in the first place acted
as midwife of terrorists in the period 1979-88. Both
countries directly or indirectly employed terrorists for
their proxy wars.
135
The IED war cycle may be simply understood by the
diagram below:--

136 137
The state response has to ideally come in the first
phase.This is a strategic response incorporating state
economic policy , foreign policy , military policy to
defeat the threat in the first stage.The ideal phase to
defeat IED warriors is this first phase.
The second response , i.e defeating the terrorists in
the preparatory phase centres around intelligence
warfare and military counter measures.This phase is
also most critical.It will be easier to execute if the first
phase described above has been a success and
tough to execute if the first phase has not been a
success.
To defeat the IEDs in the execution stage the
emphasis has to be on good training of troops , good
anti IED detection and defeating devices and good

138
anti IED tactics.This is the most difficult stage of
counter IED warfare.
Attack the Network
(1) Predict
(2) Prevent.
(3) Detect.
b. Defeat the Device
(1) Detect.
(2) Neutralize.
(3) Mitigate.
c. Train Forces
139
Response Mechanism
3. Predict
a. The primary indication of an IED will be a
change in the environment (something new
on the route that was not there yesterday).
Lines of
operation
Predict Prevent Detect Neutralize Mitigate
Attack the
Network
Defeat the
Device
Train the Force

140
b. The enemy may leave behind visual
indicators of an emplaced IED by accident
or purpose (to inform the local population).
Vigilant observation for these subtle
indicators can increase the likelihood of IED
detection by friendly forces before
detonation. Examples of possible roadside
IED indicators include:-
(1) Unusual behavior patterns or
changes in community patterns,
such as noticeably less people or
vehicles in a normally busy area,
open windows, or the absence of
women or children.
(2) Vehicles following a convoy for a
long distance and then pulling to the
roadside.
(3) Personnel on overpasses.
141
(4) (4) Signals from vehicles or
bystanders (flashing headlights).
(5) People videotaping ordinary
activities or military actions. Enemies
using IEDs often tape their activities
for use as recruitment or training
tools.
(6) Suspicious objects.
(7) Metallic objects, such as soda
cans and cylinders.
(8) Colours that seem out of place,
such as freshly disturbed dirt,
concrete that does not match the
surrounding areas, coloured
detonating cord, or other exposed
parts of an IED.
(9) Markers by side of road, such as
tires, rock piles, ribbon, or tape that

142
may identify an IED location to local
population or serve as an aiming
reference (such as light poles, fronts
or ends of guardrails, and road
intersections or turns).
(10) New or out of place objects in an
environment, such as dirt piles,
construction, dead animals, or trash.
(11) Graffiti symbols or writing on
buildings.
(12) Signs that are newly erected or
seem out of place.
4. Prevent
a. Study local environment and population.
b. Think like enemy, determine what you think
may be good locations for IEDs and how to
get to those locations.
143
c. The environment is always changing so
new locations may become available at any
time to enemy.
d. Track IED attacks in your area; learn about
others that happen outside of area of
operation.
e. Routes and traffic patterns of the area.
Know the main roads as well as secondary
routes. Know who uses them and for what.
f. Know what is normal for a given time in the
day.
g. Know the conditions of the road and
surrounding areas.
h. Determine priority areas of the Patrolling
sector.
j. Evaluate daily what portions will be cleared,
cleared mounted, cleared dismounted, etc.

144
k. Select routes to priority areas. Vary the
route every day as much possible. Vary
throughout the day the time and duration of
patrol.
l. Identify high threat areas of route to be
cleared.
m. Move at appropriate speed to the area.
n. Clear high threat area at a slow speed (if
mounted). If you are driving fast, you are
not capable of finding IEDs.
o. Always maintain security 360 degrees,
close in, far out, up and down.
p. Route clearance to be conducted prior to
movements.
q. Changing the formation adopted for route
clearing.
r. Clearing the vegetation on either side of the
road.
145
s. Classification of the areas by colour code
such as red, grey and white.
t. Paying special attention to:-
(1) Road construction materials dumped
on sides.
(2) Walls on either side of the roads
especially where posters are pasted.
(3) Unattended vehicles/ cycles parked on
sides of the roads.
(4) When reoccupying vacated road
blocks / bunkers.
(5) Tree tops.
(6) Isolated object in an open area.
(7) Stop all the vehicle and personal
movements towards the area.
(8) Clear the area approximately 400 m
around the claymore mine.

146
(9) A qualified BD team is employed to
deal with the device.
(10) If it is designed to be detonated by the
command wire system, clear and find
the far end of the wire.
(11) Prior to getting closer to the device,
clear the area around and observe the
operating system.
(12) Dragging the IED/ mine, using hook
and line method.
(13) Adopt a suitable method to separate
the detonator from the mine or power
source from the detonator.
(14) Keep the recovered mine in a safe
place where even if it is detonated will
not cause any harm. The best is to
demolish it as soon as possible.
147
u. Avoid establishing a pattern in timings,
move and use of tracks.
. The IEDs are usually planted during night.
Night foot/ mobile patrolling on vulnerable
stretches can prevent terrorists from
planting the devices.
. There are some common known
ingredients of these devices. Strict checking
on border and Check Points may prevent
terrorists from laying their hands on
material required for construction of IEDs.
t. During move, following measures are
suggested: -
(1) Keep alert; make yourself a “hard
target”.
(2) Be prep for IED attack followed
by ambush.

148
(3) Maintain convoy speed and
vehicle dispersion.
(4) Be cautious at choke points,
bridges, defiles, sharp turns etc.
(5) If some thing causes the convoy
to stop, watch your flanks for IEDs.
(6) Wear helmets and bullet proof
jackets.
(7) Wear safety glasses to protect
eyes from shrapnel.
(8) Before move of every convoy,
troops are briefed on the latest IED
threats.
5. Detect. IEDs can be detected by
remaining vigilant. Common areas of IED
emplacement:-
a. Previous IED sites (past successes).
149
b. Frequently travelled, predictable routes,
such as roads leading to Posts and
along common patrol routes.
c. Boundary / turn around points (pattern).
d. Roadway shoulders (usually within 10
feet).
e. Trees, light posts, signs, overpasses,
and bridge spans that are elevated.
f. Unattended vehicles, carts, or
motorcycles (attached or installed in
them).
g. Guardrails (hidden inside) or under any
type of material or packing.
h. Potential incident control points (ICPs).
j. Abandoned structures (sometimes
partially demolished).
k. Animal carcasses and deceased human
bodies.

150
l. An otherwise normally looking item with
exposed:
(1) Wires.
(2) Antenna.
(3) Detonation cord.
(4) Ordnance.
m. Freshly dug holes.
n. New dirt/gravel piles.
o. Obstacles in roadway (channeling).
q. Persons standing on overpass.
r. Empty street that is normally busy.
s. Calls for prayer at night.
t. Objects hanging from trees or electrical
poles (tree IEDs).
u. Flares launched or a single gun shot
fired, just as your convoy enters a
village or makes a major turn.
151
v. House or village lights going off or
blinking on/off as your convoy
approaches.
w. Empty street except for a man talking on
a cell phone in a doorway.
x. IED aiming or timing pts:
(1) Painted rock.
(2) Mound of dirt or rocks (may have
a can on top).
(3) Small coloured flag next to rd.
y. For IEDs placed on concrete roads
(difficult to bury), look out for:-
(1) Fresh concrete.
(2) Pot holes.
(3) Water filled pot holes.
(4) Trash.
(5) Dead animals.
(6) Manhole cover.

152
(7) Street drainage pipe/hole.
(8) Disabled or abandoned vehicles.
z. For IEDs placed on asphalt roads
(again, difficult to bury), look for the
above, plus:
(1) Newly melted asphalt patch.
(2) Fresh asphalt, just laid on top of
older rd.
aa. Most IEDs not manually detonated
require an over watch position for
remote detonation.
bb. Vehicle Bombs
(1) Pay special attention for
unattended vehicles.
(2) Search fuel tank for additional
attachments.
(3) Search for additional wire
attachments to battery terminals.
153
(4) Additional switches at the driver's
seat and dash board area.
(5) Search boot, engine
compartment, dash board, behind
the seats, below the carpets,
inside the spare wheel, door
panels etc.
(6) When large vehicles are driven
only by the driver with no other
passengers.
(7) When the driver does not obey
the traffic code.
6. Neutralize
a. Jamming. Most IED counter measures
have high-tech answers. Electronic
jammers sending out radio waves to
either detonate IEDs or block signals
received by IEDs have to be employed.

154
Still, not all IEDs are detonated with
wireless radio-wave devices. Though
HF jammers are likely to be effective but
the inherent character of jammers must
be kept in consideration. They
inclclude:-
(1) Limitations of Jammers
(a) Limited range due to high
power output demand.
(b) Requirement of clear line of
sight, generally not available
in hilly terrain.
(c) Due to limited range not
suitable for convoys as inter
vehicle dist is generally 100-
150 yards.
(d) Possibility of using anti-
jamming devices by
155
miscreants cannot be ruled
out.
(e) One jammer can not be
used for wide frequency of
jammers.
(2) Usefulness of Jammers
(a) Protect scout / search
vehicles.
(b) Protect individuals
conducting search /
detection / neutralization of
IEDs.
(c) Jammer, if provided on
every vehicle will ensure
complete safety of vehicle.
(d) Protect VIP vehicle / special
cargo.

156
b. Physical Neutralization. On
detection, an IED can be neutralized
through direct handling which is possible
in the presence of qualified Bomb
Disposal (BD) Staff and requisite
equipment. It is done by following
methods:-
(1) Demolition in situ method.
(2) Jerk and Bump method.
(3) Hook and line method.
(4) Shot gun opening method.
(5) Detonating cord opening method.
(6) Self destruction method.
(7) Water disrupter method.
(8) Hand entry method.
c. Premature Actuation
(1) Destroy in location. The IEDs
if located can be detonated there
157
and then by employing
conventional means like pulling,
firing at IED from a distance or
through explosive packing. For
this purpose equipment
mentioned below will have to be
provided to troops operating in
IED environment:-
(a) Hook and line kit.
(b) Disrupter recoilless.
(c) Electronic stethoscope.
(d) Explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) suit.
d. Remote Control Mine / IED Exploder
(1) Flying Platform (C-130). Flying
platform emitting strong
frequency signals can explode
radio operated IEDs. Reportedly

158
US forces are using C-130
mounted exploders. The same
can prove to be useful.
(2) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) System. UAV System is
also being actively researched as
lead reconnaissance devices to
scout for ambushes and IED
threat ahead of convoys.
7. Mitigate. After encountering an IED,
following steps can be taken to mitigate the after blast
effects:-
a. Security is 360 degrees maintained.
Scan close in and far out.
b. Move away at about 300 meters safe
distance. Make maximum use of
available cover. Get out of line of sight
of IEDs.
159
c. Always scan your immediate
surroundings for more IEDs. Report
additional IEDs to the on scene
commander.
d. Attempt to confirm suspected IEDs. Use
optics.
e. Stay as far back as possible. When in
doubt, back away. Do not ever touch.
f. Cordon off the area. Direct people out of
the danger area, don’t allow anyone to
enter besides those responsible for
responding.
g. Question, search and detain as needed.
h. Check any and all locations that you
move to, for other IEDs.

160 161
Chapter Eight
Counter IED Training
The first and most essential step is to accept the fact that
the IED is here to stay and is the preferred choice of the
future.
IED Warfare must be inducted as a compulsory subject in
all military and law enforcement training institutions
starting from the basic/ recruit level right till the highest
policy/war college/university level.
Pakistan Army has already made a gigantic leap forward in
the shape of counter terrorist school organized and fine
tuned by LTG Tariq Khan and his team of outstanding

162
officers notably Brigadier Nauman ( 20 Lancers) and
Colonel Umair (24 Baloch).
The Counter Terrorist School can train a two brigade force
at any one time and is an ideal place for the counter IED
warrior.
Counter IED training can save up to 75 % lives. Although
actually fighting IEDs is the most undesirable phase of IED
Warfare.
As already stated the best option to defeat IEDs is in the
first phase by good state policy and national strategy.
Similarly the second best option is to defeat the IED
warriors in the preparatory stage where good intelligence
and good military counter measures are the best option.
It must be understood that IED warfare is relative and
cannot be understood in black and white terms.
163
Good anti IED tactics means slowing down the pace of
operations to a level which may lead to tactical
defeat.Seen in this context IED Warfare confronts a
conventional military force with hard choices.Time and
Space favour the insurgents in the execution phase and
the ideal time to gain victory in IED warfare is in the first
two phases described above i.e “ Basic Phase” and “
Preparatory Phase”.
In this regard both the USA and Pakistani states miserably
failed in Afghanistan and FATA respectively.
Both the states actually created the enemies who they
later faced as foes in Afghanistan and FATA. Both the
states failed in “ Threat Perception” in the first two
phases.

164
And finally both the states paid back hard prices with
compound interest with the blood and guts of their
soldiers in actual operations !
The highest decision makers must understand that hard
prices will have to be paid at the execution level if state
policy fails in first two phases.
Chapter Nine
Suicide Bombings
Suicide bombings received much media attention in the Af
Pak War.
165
Interestingly while much attention of the media and the
public was focussed on drine attacks and suicide attacks ,
both of these were peripheral issues of the real military
business of Afghan war.
Suicide bombers despite all their Islamic zeal and much fan
fare were a miserable failure as all along from 2001 to

166
2012 they just succeeded in killing 85 NATO military
personnel in Afghanistan.
Thus suicide bombers like Drones again despite all Obamas
rhetoric and Sangers book were again a miserable failure
as they hardly killed any Taliban insurgent resposnible for
deaths of 1200 US troops with IED attacks.
In Pakistan also suicide attacks had a near zero impact on
military conduct of war.
True that the suicide bombers attacked 95 % civilians but
suicide bombings were logistical difficult to carry out and
resulted in loss of credibility for the terrorists at the
strategic level.
Suicide bombings future as a major terrorist tactic at the
strategic level is limited.However IEDs will continue to
have affects on wars at the tactical, operational and
strategic level.
167
The difference will emerge where IED warriors are
supported by a major state actor.In this IEDs impact will
impact the strategic outcome of war.If IED warriors are a
non state actor affair or supported by a weaker state actor
they will by and large fail to have an impact at the strategic
level.
The best IED strategy as earlier discussed is to have a
victory in the initial or preparatory stage of the IED war.
This would require a superior military and political strategy
and extremely effective intelligence organisations.

168
Chapter Ten
Conclusion
While US invasion of Afghanistan was a strategic act
which placed the US in a central position from where it
could strike a wide variety of objectives , US strategy
after 2001 invasion degenerated into a directionless river
which peters out into a sandy desert and cannot produce
anything useful , productive or palatable.
The US failed in all of the following objectives in
Afghanistan :--
1. Destroy the Afghan Taliban and various Islamist
groups with an extremist agenda.
2. Dominate the Central Asian Republics from where
the US was simply kicked out or contained by the
169
Russians despite initial successes in Uzbekistan
and Kirgizistan.
3. Make any offensive progress against Iran where
the Iranian Baloch were an ideal strategic asset
that the US could have exploited.
4. Arm twist and pressurize Pakistan into not
providing sanctuary and logistic support to
Taliban , other Islamist groups etc.
5. Fence and block the Afghan Pakistan border
opposite Pakistani Balochistan province and
interdict Taliban logistics using which maximum
casualties were inflicted on the US troops
deployed in Afghanistan.
6. Create alternative states in Afghanistan or
Pakistan which could replace existing Pakistani
and Afghanistan states as a better and more
reliable US ally despite the fact that many ethnic

170
groups in both Af Pak were pro US and looked at
the US as a savior and benefactor.
On the Islamist side following lessons stand out :--
1. Non state actors cannot win wars without support
of a major state actor which was non existent in
this case. Although Pakistan at the covert level
supported Afghan Taliban , the very secrecy and
discreteness of the support made its impact
limited.
2. IED warfare could discourage a major state actor
from waging war but could not win a war itself.
What would follow a US withdrawal from
Afghanistan would be a new civil war and greater
chaos.
3. Suicide bombings are a failed method od waging
low intensity conflict. They are difficult to execute
and cannot kill regular soldiers of a major state
171
actor in numbers sufficient to make any strategic
operational and even tactical impact.
4. Even IED tactics and other techniques can succeed
only if a state actor physically moves into hostile
areas and maintains a presence there.
5. An advanced western state sensitive to casualties
and maintaining an expensive army has limited
manpower to carry out the heavy demands that
low intensity conflict demands. In case of
Afghanistan the force to space ratio of US forces
at no stage was sufficient to even mildly dominate
the land.
6. IED warfare will succeed only in areas where
population is pro insurgent . Since Talibans
became increasingly ethnic after US invasion IEDs
succeeded only in heavy Pashtun majority areas

172
where the populace saw it as a Pashtun war of
liberation.
7. Islamists cannot succeed against a third world
state actor army where the state actors very
survival exists on winning or not losing the
conflict.The FATA War in this case was a matter of
survival for the Pakistani state thus much larger
number of troops were used to contain the
insurgents. In contrast the Afghan war was not a
matter of survival for the US and the US can one
day withdraw from Afghanistan or even maintain
a presence in North Afghanistan where the non
Pashtun and even moderate Pashtuns regard the
US as a strategic savior. It was cheaper for the
Pakistani state to wage the war in FATA as cost of
a Pakistani soldier is less than 5 % cost of a US
soldier. Pakistanis could garrison the area and
173
stay there indefinitely a luxury the US could not
afford in Afghanistan.
8. Free press and pluralism are greatest weaknesses
of Western democracies in a low intensity conflict
and Islamists did succeed in exploiting this
weakness although not to a full extent.
9. Iraq war was not a failure for the US as in Iraq it
was fighting against a 30 % Sunni minority and
Iraqi insurgents received hardly any support like
Afghan Taliban received from Pakistan or non
state Islamist donors worldwide.However Iraq
war at the grand strategic level was a failure for
the US as by removing Saddam regime the US
created a contiguous Shia block in the Middle East
stretching from Iran to Lebanon and Syria.
Lessons for small state actors like Pakistan are as following
:--

174
x While Pakistan can follow its own choices at the
covert level , following a double game policy will
weaken the Pakistani state from within and create
a confusion of principle which would act as midwife
of anti Pakistan groups like the Pakistani Taliban
(TTP).
x When a smaller state meddles with a super power
for whatever valid reason , it has to face the heat
and Pakistan was forced to face the heat in FATA
and Balochistan.In this case Pakistans survival had
a link with its being outer western bastion of China
as well as its nuclear deterrent and sheer size in
terms of its population.
x Pakistani state has to re-assess its strategy in terms
of use of Islamists as a proxy and concentrate on
internal reform . A small state like Pakistan can
175
hardly afford the luxury of waging proxy wars
anywhere outside Pakistan.
x Introduce merit in the Pakistani state institutions
where presently the system is a consoiracy against
originality and boldness. The FATA battle and the
Swat battle proved that few men like LTG Tariq
Khan or Brigadier Nauman can change the outcome
of a war but both men were exceptions and its
miracle that any of the two and some others were
promoted beyond the rank of colonel in a slavish
and parochial military system like Pakistan Army.
x Pakistan cannot indefinitely last on foreign largesse
and IMF aid and if the Pakistani state has to survive
the rich have to be taxed and corruption eradicated
from all state organs.
Invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq stand out as strategic
failures of USA. US policy first acted as catalyst to galvanise

176
and organize Islamists as a loose coalition of groups that
could destabilize the Middle East and thus become a low
but irritating threat to US interests.
First US invasion of Iraq in 1991 and failure to destroy
Saddam regime in 1991 caused strategic loss of 12 years
on US economy.What was done in 2003 with a far greater
cost was not done in 1991.
US occupation of Afghanistan was not an end in itself.It
was means to establish a foothold in a region which had
become a sanctuary of Islamists which again were no
threat to the US but constant irritants.
Brilliant US strategic thinker Ed Luttwak brilliantly
summed up this phenomenon as following :--
177

178
Al Qaeda,Taliban , all Islamists are irritants and not
threats to the USA.
The strategic imbalance caused to the US is because of
the overkill that it resorted to in Iraq in 2003 .
It was a self inflicted injury where war contracts and the
resultant paybacks , vague ideas of glory and Texan
revenge propelled the Bush regime.
179
US strategic failure primarily lay in the fact that by
destroying the minority Sunni clique which had dominated
Iraq it laid foundation of a contiguous Shia block from Iran
to Syria.Thus what Khomeini had failed to do in a 8 year
long war was presented to Iran on a platter by Bush in
2003.
The Afghan war was again a strategic failure as the US
failed to destroy the Taliban centre of gravity in Pakistan.
The complications of dealing with a nuclear state
supporting covertly an armed insurrection against the US
were never fully understood by US strategic planners.
Drone attacks were a mickey mouse tactical response
which in no way destroyed 90 % of Taliban leadership
based in Pakistani Balochistan.
Public opinion remained obsessed with Drones and
Haqqani in the Af Pak war while in reality both were minor
tactical affairs.Haqqani never caused more than 5 to 8 %

180
casualties on US forces in Afghanistan and drones merely
attacked forces who never killed more than total of 10 %
of all US troops killed in Afghanistan till to date.
Osama Bin Laden was also a marginal issue in 2011 when
he was eliminated as the vast bulk of US casualties were
due to Mulla Omar Group who remained safe and healthy.
War is not special forces raids or hanging Saddam.In
order to be successful every war and every act of
aggression must create a new system which stabilizes
rather than creates chaos.US strategy is a failure because
it created chaos rather than stability.
Al Qaeda much magnified by Bruce Riedel remained a
minor threat as its attacks or actions were tactical irritants
rather than strategic threats.Despite much chatter by
Riedel Al Qaeda hardly seemed alive in Pakistan and hardly
any US Aid or US diplomat was attacked or killed in
181
Pakistan where Riedel thinks Al Qaeda is strong in the
period 2001-13.
98 % of Al Qaedas casualties remained Muslim non
combatants and civilians.
Lastly the war on all sides was a war where the poor foot
soldiers from lowest income groups fought and died.
Where children of the poorest people were used as suicide
bombers , mostly orphans. Big US companies made big
profits and the only winners of the war were big
companies or Afghan war lords and the drug mafia which
included US, Pakistani,NATO , Afghan,UAE and many other
countries citizens.

Proof
Printed By Createspace
Digital Proofer

Review your Digital Proof for errors and formatting

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (19)

Similar to Review your Digital Proof for errors and formatting

Similar to Review your Digital Proof for errors and formatting (12)

More from Agha A

More from Agha A (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Review your Digital Proof for errors and formatting