Menzies embraced the atomic age rather more enthusiastically than many other Australians. He envisaged Australia’s substantial uranium and thorium reserves providing Australia with a source of clean, reliable, and affordable energy that would ultimately replace fossil fuels. But he also knew that “what is best advertised tends to be more popularly understood”. Despite the opening of a nuclear reactor at Lucas Heights in 1958 to “test materials for their suitability in use in future power reactors”, the purpose of Australia’s first nuclear reactor was gradually reduced to producing medical radioisotopes and conducting research. Menzies faced similar concerns about the safety of nuclear reactors, the propensity for conflating nuclear industries with nuclear weapons, and storing nuclear waste to those concerns political leaders face today. But with Australia’s strategic defence capabilities enhanced by nuclear-powered submarines through the AUKUS agreement, and the absence of a ‘Plan B’ for a carbon-neutral future, the unrealised potential of Australia’s atomic age has manifested into the very lack of skills Menzies was concerned about in 1962. The Lucas Heights facility was more than just a case of hubris, or “what are they doing here that can't be better done elsewhere?” It provided opportunities for training Australian scientists and sharing and transferring nuclear-related research and knowledge. At the same time, recently declassified documents suggest that Menzies aimed to develop Australia’s nuclear capability amid eleven years of atomic weapons tests conducted by Britain in Australia. While much has been written about “nuclear colonialism” following the Royal Commission into the tests, very little attention has been given to the unrealised potential of Australia’s nuclear industry envisaged during the atomic age. This paper, then, traces the development and subsequent stagnation of the nuclear industry in Australia, with a focus on Menzies’ legacy and its influence on energy and defence policy today.

1. Menzies’ legacy and nuclear’s
unrealised potential
Australia in the Atomic
Age
Dr Michael de Percy FRSA FCILT

2. Overview
• Much has been written about “nuclear colonialism” since
the Royal Commission into British nuclear tests in
Australia
• But not the unrealised potential of Australia’s nuclear
industry envisaged during the atomic age
• This paper traces the development and subsequent
stagnation of the nuclear industry in Australia
• The focus is on Sir Robert Menzies’ legacy and its
influence on energy and defence policy today
• Podcast episode appeared on Afternoon Light, Robert
Menzies Institute

3. Method
• Chronologies of technological developments, resource
discoveries in Australia, and allies’ decisions
• Process tracing to identify critical junctures
• Coinciding arrangements between the US and UK had an
important impact on Australia’s nuclear development
• Four key aims of nuclear technology:
+ Research, experiments, and skills capability
+ Medical products
+ Nuclear energy
+ Nuclear weapons

4. Builds on earlier work…
• Models of Government-Business Relations: Industry
Policy Preferences versus Pragmatism (de Percy, 2021)
• Considered the effect of politics in time:
+ Short-term governments and leadership turnover
+ Leads to pragmatism over policy preferences
+ In Menzies’ case we see the decline of policy over time
+ But recent events are bringing the policy full circle
• Policy choices are path-dependent
• Menzies’ tenure was not immune to path-dependency

5. Historical Development
• 1930s: Canada discovers uranium at Eldorado Mine in
the Northwest Territories (by-product of radium)
• 1942-1946: Manhattan Project, Canada provides uranium
and British are involved, but later removed by US
• 1940s: US-Canada and Britain cooperation halted
• 1946: Chifley government joins Britain in research
for nuclear energy and weapons (informal meeting)
• 1946: ANU established (Act) with nuclear priority
• 1949: Menzies Government elected

6. Historical Development (cont.)
• 1949: Uranium discovered at Rum Jungle
• 1951: Colombo Plan and links to SE Asia (anti-Communist)
• 1953: Atomic Energy Act est. Aust Atomic Energy Comm (later ANTSO)
• 1954: Commonwealth uranium mining commenced
• 1956-63: British nuclear weapons tests in Australia
• 1958: High Flux Australian Reactor (HIFAR) commences
• 1961: Small Moata reactor at Lucas Heights
• 1960s: Exploration of uranium for energy
• 1970s: French nuclear testing reinforces non-proliferation culture
• 1998/2007: Howard compromise with Meg Lees leads to OPAL reactor
• 2023: Coalition nuclear energy mix vs Bowen’s crash through or crash

7. Policy Trajectory: The Launch Point
• May 1946: Prime Ministers’ Conference in London -
Australia joins with Britain to develop an atomic
bomb (Britain wanted
• Chifley accepted Monte Bello and Maralinga as testing
sites for atomic weapons in 1946
• Chifley “accepted the project, subject to Australia
having full access to information and being able to
manufacture modern weapons at ‘a future date in
accordance with the need to disperse manufacture
throughout the Empire’” (Reynolds 1998, p. 856).

8. Menzies’ View
• Menzies inherited the Chifley government’s defence
strategy – British “left out” of Canada by US funding
• General belief that UK would provide Australia with
nuclear weapons due to cooperation
• British needed Australian skills and geography as Canada
integrated with US, Brits “left out”
• Later idea for Australia to obtain tactical nuclear
weapons to address Malayan Emergency (1948-1960)
• Reynolds (1998) Australia’s place in nuclear history
“marginalised” – Australia wanted “nuclear deterrence”

9. Menzies’ View (cont.)
• Support for the US in Korea and the ANZUS Treaty were
crucial “hedging” of bets in defence policy
• Amid Eisenhower’s “atoms for peace” initiative 1953
• Menzies (1962) saw nuclear technology as:
+ Becoming economical for electricity “by the early 1970s”
+ Used for desalination
+ For digging craters (through explosions) to hold water

10. The Nuclear Plan
• UKAEA “kick-started” Australia’s power reactor
program with HIFAR as the first step (1958)
• Next step was Snowy Hydro reactor (using war powers a
la Scott Morrison) ideas for thorium (fertile) and
“breeder” reactor, including plutonium
• Australian reactors would have a role in defence –
Australia “should not agree to any proposal that
would prohibit the manufacture of atomic weapons
(Reynolds, 1998, p. 863)”
• 1955 final approval for Maralinga on this basis

11. The Nuclear Plan (cont.)
• 1956 there were eight Australian universities engaged
in related nuclear research
• However, by 1957 Lucas Heights had cost twice as much
and British began restricting sharing of information
• 1957: Nevil Shute’s On the Beach
• 1957: Sputnik
• 1957: Bermuda conference – UK gained access to
Canadian uranium and in 1958, US technology

12. Atomic Hot Potato
• Menzies’ cabinet divided on pushing on alone with a
nuclear deterrent and the cost (ended 1957)
• AAEA envisaged breeder reactors not until 4/4 20th C.
• Focus shifted to atomic energy at Lucas Heights
• To move to “Phase 2” during 1965-68 (energy)
• Australia opposed to NPT in the 1960s
• By 1970s, NPT was an unexpected backflip
• 1984 Bill Hayden said of Australia that it could
still be an “opaque nuclear proliferator”

13. Lost Momentum
• Series of conferences between AAEC and State
Electricity Generating Authorities suggested no
nuclear electricity economically feasible until at
least after 1975
• Period of at least 8-9 years to develop
• AAEC “to maintain a certain level of trained
expertise in order to ensure that technological
developments did not bypass Australia”
• Gorton’s 1970 backflip on NFT was the first “coffin
nail” in Australia’s nuclear energy impetus

14. Conclusions: Menzies “full circle”
• International affairs were the main driver for early
nuclear adoption
• Australia’s nuclear sector declined in stages from
nuclear proliferation, to nuclear energy, to nuclear
experimentation and medicine production
• Long timeline and pragmatism on all sides of politics
• ALP has tried to “re-write history” (Albanese 2003)
• AUKUS is the impetus for reinvigorating nuclear
science and engineering in Australia

15. Key References
Carr, M. (1979). Australia and the nuclear question: A survey of government attitudes,
1945 to 1975. Thesis, Master of Arts (Honours), UNSW.
De Percy, M.A. (2021). Models of Government-Business Relations: Industry Policy
Preferences versus Pragmatism in Andrew Podger, Michael de Percy, and Sam Vincent (Eds.)
Politics, Policy and Public Administration in Theory and Practice: Essays in honour of
Professor John Wanna. Canberra: ANU Press.
Menzies, R. (1962, March 23). Speech at the Atomic Energy Establishment, Lucas Heights.
PM Transcript no. 487, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. URL:
https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-487 (Accessed 15 May 2023).
Reynolds, W. (1998). Rethinking the Joint Project: Australia's Bid for Nuclear Weapons,
1945-1960. The Historical Journal, 41(3), 853-873.
Sydney Morning Herald. (2023, April 18). From the Archives, 1958: HIFAR goes into
operation. URL: https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/from-the-archives-1958-hifar-goes-
into-operation-20230405-p5cy8a.html (Accessed 15 May 2023).
Walsh, J. (1997). Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of Australia’s Nuclear
Ambitions. The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1997, 1-20.

16. Questions?
Thank you.
These slides are available
at my website:
Le Flâneur Politique
www.politicalscience.com.au