as above

1. What is knowledge?
“The objective of the analysis of knowledge is to state
conditions that are individually necessary and jointly
sufficient for propositional knowledge.” – Stanford
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy

2. Kinds of knowledge
• (Some) kinds of knowledge:
– Procedural knowledge or knowing how e.g. to ride a
bicycle
– Personal knowledge or direct acquaintance e.g
knowing Lewisham, or Beethoven’s symphonies
– Knowing who e.g. identifying faces
– Knowing that: of interest to philosophers
• Any knowledge that can be phrased ‘I know that X’,
where X is an assertion or statement is called
propositional knowledge.

3. Test: what kind?
1. I know what Brad Pitt looks like.
2. I know how to get to Nunhead.
3. We know who you are.
4. We know where you live.
5. I can make lemon drizzle cake.
6. I recall Mount Everest’s height.
7. I know Berkeley is an idealist.
8. I know Berkeley.
9. I recognise that girl.
1. Knowing who.
2. Acquaintance/Procedural.
3. Knowing who.
4. Propositional (arguably)
5. Procedural.
6. Propositional.
7. Propositional.
8. Knowing who.
9. Knowing who.

4. Knowing and Opining
• The difference between knowledge and
belief or opinion:
– Knowledge: certainty, indubitability, being
proven vs Opinion: degrees of plausibility,
assent, being unproven.
– Knowledge: impossible to know something
that is false vs Opinion: possible to believe
something that is mistaken.
– Knowledge which is certain vs ‘knowledge-
claims’ which are not yet proven.

5. Plato’s tripartite definition
• Now: conceptual analysis – the Rationalist
approach
– What are the sufficient conditions for knowledge?
• Read the extract from the ‘Meno’
– What three components is knowledge composed
of?
– What is the difference between knowledge and
true belief?
– And how might we refer to this in modern
parlance?

6. 6. Extract from Plato’s ‘Meno’: knowledge as
tripartite
SOCRATES: I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larissa, or anywhere
else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and
good guide?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had
never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not? While
he has true opinion about that which the other knows, he will be just as good a
guide if he thinks the truth, as he who knows the truth?
MENO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as
knowledge…right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?
MENO: The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will
always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and
sometimes not.
SOCRATES: Exactly! [Here is] an illustration of the nature of true opinions:
while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but do not remain long,
and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of
the cause. ..But when they are bound, they have the nature of knowledge, they
are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than
true opinion, because fastened by a chain.
MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth:
knowledge differs from true opinion.

7. What Plato is saying: ‘Luck is Yuck!’
• Knowledge = True Belief + ‘a chain’ (of evidence)
• This is because
– both knowledge (that is certain) and a belief (that
happens to be right) about the best way to Lewisham
may get you good directions to Lewisham
– But the belief that happens to be right is only right by
accident (say: a lucky guess about the best way)
– Whereas the knowledge that is certain is correctly
justified so cannot be mistaken (say: you have
walked the route many times so simply can’t be
wrong about it)
– So if your true belief has justification it must be
correct

8. JTB in Standard Form
• Also called the
‘Tripartite Account’
• In Standard Form:
– ‘S knows that P’ iff
1. P is true
2. S believes that P
3. S is justified in
believing that P
Note:
1. S is any subject/
person making a
knowledge-claim.
2. P is any proposition (a
statement of the form ‘X
is Y’ e.g. ‘Derek is fat’.

9. Explanation: what is a belief?
• Often called the ‘psychological’
or ‘internal’ criterion for
knowledge
• The mental attitude we have
towards a proposition when we
hold it to be true, or to be the
case
• Actually or potentially holding a
proposition before your mind and
assenting to it
• Can be held without active
reflection – most of our beliefs
are unconscious
• [Can be a matter of degree, or
scalar]

10. Explanation: what is Truth?
• Truth is a property only of propositions…
• It is not a property of the world…which just is
• Often called the ‘external’ criterion for knowledge
• Some theories of truth…
– Correspondence – ‘Truth corresponds to the world’
– Coherence – ‘Truth fits with other truths’
– Pragmatism – ‘Truth is what works’
– Deflationary/Minimalist theories – ‘Truth adds nothing’ –
except approval.

11. Explanation: what is justification?
• Often called the ‘justification
condition’.
• Connects truth and belief.
• There are various theories of
justification e.g. coherentism,
reliabilism, foundationalism.
• All seek to explain how mental
content can be connected to the
world.
• All can be seen as clarifying the
justification condition of the
tripartite account.

12. JTB in Standard Form, revised
• ‘S knows that P’ iff
1. P is true
2. S believes that P
3. [S is justified in believing that P] can be
revised to:
a) [coherentism] P is justified iff it fits with other
beliefs that are held.
b) [reliabilism] P is justified iff the belief that P
is produced by a good method.
c) [foundationalism] P is justified iff P rests on
a basic and indubitable belief.

13. Coherentism
• P is justified iff it fits with other beliefs that are held.
• So the process of justification has no ultimate ground.
• Rather the justification of a belief consists in the way it
fits in or makes sense with other beliefs that one holds.
• Key image: not foundations, but a web of beliefs.
– Justification is fit, and the better the fit, the better the justification.
– Belief-systems are internally consistent, and the beliefs mutually
supporting.
• a good way of explaining how belief-systems change:
one belief (Santa Claus existing) simply stops fitting with
another one…

14. Reliabilism
• P is justified iff the belief that P is produced by a good
method.
• the infinite regress of justification can be halted using
beliefs that are the results of a sound method or a
process that has worked in the past
– if in the past the method has led to a successful prediction,
diagnosis, description, identification or explanation…
– then it can be trusted again.
• Good methods of justification would therefore include:
the senses, memory, testimony of others known to be
truthful, inductive and deductive reasoning and so on.
• This approach rules out luck, but is a ‘black box’ theory:
doesn't require you to understand how a view is arrived
at.

15. Foundationalism
• P is justified iff P rests on a basic and indubitable belief.
• There are basic beliefs that are self-evident and don’t
need justification.
• There are two versions of this view:
– The best basic beliefs are rationally discovered and
self-evident statements: truths of reason underlie
and ultimately justify all our knowledge-claims.
– OR The best basic beliefs arise from simple
observation: sensory truths underlie and ultimately
justify all our knowledge-claims.

16. Foundationalism recap
• P is justified iff P rests on a basic and indubitable belief.
• There are basic beliefs that are self-evident, non-
inferential and don’t themselves need justification.
• There are two versions of this view:
– RATIONALISM: The best basic beliefs are rationally
discovered and self-evident statements: truths of
reason underlie and ultimately justify all our
knowledge-claims.
– EMPIRICISM: The best basic beliefs arise from
simple observation: sensory truths underlie and
ultimately justify all our knowledge-claims.

17. Incomplete Examiner’s Notes for 9-mark question: Q4 -
Outline and explain the tripartite view of knowledge
(‘Justified True Belief’).
• Only about __________ knowledge – ‘s knows that p’.
• Gives ________ conditions that are each _________ and taken together
sufficient for s to know p.
• Condition 1 – s knows that p only if s _____________. It is impossible for a
person to know a proposition without believing that proposition. This is
sometimes called the ____________ or ‘internal’ criterion.
• Condition 2 – s knows that p only if p is true. It is impossible for a person to
know a proposition that is _______. When a false _______ is held it is
merely a ______. Beliefs can be ______ or false. Knowledge can only be
true (distinction between ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowledge-_________’). This is
sometimes called the ____________criterion.
• Condition 3 – s knows that p only if s is justified in believing p. This
condition is required because it is possible to have a _____________that
would not, at least intuitively, count as knowledge, e.g. lucky guesses. For
a person to __________ a proposition they must have a reason/grounds for
holding that belief. There are various theories of justification.