Reliabilism defines knowledge as justified true belief caused by a reliable cognitive process, rather than requiring infallible justification. This allows for more knowledge claims than infallibilism. However, Gettier cases and the "Barn County" example show that reliability alone is not sufficient. Goldman refines reliabilism to require discrimination of relevant alternatives. Later objections argue reliability is still unnecessary for justification. Overall, reliabilism aims to provide a theory of knowledge that is less restrictive than infallibilism while still accounting for the possibility of error and skepticism.
SUPORTE ESCRITO DISPONIVEL NO LINK http://www.slideshare.net/JooBastos4/trabalho-teoria-do-conhecimento-22655989
A teoria do conhecimento procura através de múltiplas teorias, solucionar as seguintes problemáticas:
1 | Natureza do conhecimento - o conhecimento será uma representação subjetiva criada pelo ser pensante? (Idealismo) ou uma imagem objetiva criada pelo sujeito que corresponde à realidade (Realismo).
2 | Possibilidade do conhecimento: É possível adquirir um conhecimento verdadeiro, objetivo e absoluto da realidade em geral (Dogmatismo) ou apenas um conhecimento ou realidade aproximada? Será que podemos conhecer umas coisas e outras não ou o conhecimento é impossível (Ceticismo)?
3 | Origem do conhecimento - será que o conhecimento têm origem na razão (Racionalismo) ou na experiência (Empirismo).
Esta última problemática, a da origem do conhecimento será aquela que iremos explicar mais exaustivamente, com o o Racionalismo em foco.
SUPORTE ESCRITO DISPONIVEL NO LINK http://www.slideshare.net/JooBastos4/trabalho-teoria-do-conhecimento-22655989
A teoria do conhecimento procura através de múltiplas teorias, solucionar as seguintes problemáticas:
1 | Natureza do conhecimento - o conhecimento será uma representação subjetiva criada pelo ser pensante? (Idealismo) ou uma imagem objetiva criada pelo sujeito que corresponde à realidade (Realismo).
2 | Possibilidade do conhecimento: É possível adquirir um conhecimento verdadeiro, objetivo e absoluto da realidade em geral (Dogmatismo) ou apenas um conhecimento ou realidade aproximada? Será que podemos conhecer umas coisas e outras não ou o conhecimento é impossível (Ceticismo)?
3 | Origem do conhecimento - será que o conhecimento têm origem na razão (Racionalismo) ou na experiência (Empirismo).
Esta última problemática, a da origem do conhecimento será aquela que iremos explicar mais exaustivamente, com o o Racionalismo em foco.
La presentazione è stata realizzata da Marco Gambetti,
Marta Giannotti, Flavia Rosati e Lorenzo Serra nell’ambito di un’attività di webquest coordinata dal Prof. Pietro Volpones
Un powerpoint che spiega nel dettaglio il dialogo platonico scritto tra il 399 e il 388 a.C. riguardo il processo di Socrate.
Vengono analizzati i due filosofi e viene analizzato e suddiviso in 3 fasi il dialogo. L'apologia di socrate
La presentazione è stata realizzata da Marco Gambetti,
Marta Giannotti, Flavia Rosati e Lorenzo Serra nell’ambito di un’attività di webquest coordinata dal Prof. Pietro Volpones
Un powerpoint che spiega nel dettaglio il dialogo platonico scritto tra il 399 e il 388 a.C. riguardo il processo di Socrate.
Vengono analizzati i due filosofi e viene analizzato e suddiviso in 3 fasi il dialogo. L'apologia di socrate
SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGEPerception has traditionally been considered.docxmckellarhastings
SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE
Perception has traditionally been considered our most reliable guide to the truth. That perception is considered a source of knowledge should not surprise us, for most of our information about the world comes to us through our senses. If our senses weren’t reliable, we could not have survived as long as we have. But even though senses are reliable, they’re not infallible. The existence of illusions and hallu- cinations demonstrates that our senses can’t always be trusted.
Illusions and hallucinations occur only under certain circum- stances, however. Only when we, our tools, or our environment are in a state that impedes the accurate flow of information do our senses lead us astray. For example, if we are injured, anxious, or drugged; if our glasses are cracked, our hearing aid broken, or our measuring devices malfunctioning; or if it is dark, noisy, or foggy, then our obser- vations may be mistaken. But if we have good reason to believe that no such impediments to accurate perception are present, then we have good reason to believe what we perceive.
Just as perception is considered a source of knowledge about the external world, introspection is considered a source of knowledge about the internal world, that is, about our mental states. Some peo- ple have considered this source of knowledge to be infallible. We may be mistaken about many things, they argue, but we cannot be mis- taken about the contents of our own minds. We may be mistaken, for example, about whether we see a tree, but we cannot be mistaken about whether we seem to see a tree. But we must be careful here. While we may infallibly know what our experience is like, we may not infallibly know that it is of a certain sort. In other words, we may mis- categorize or misdescribe what we experience. Infatuation, for example, may be mistaken for love, jealousy for envy, rage for anger. So the beliefs we form through introspection about our current expe- rience are not infallible.
Similarly, the beliefs we form through introspection about our dispositional mental states are not infallible. There are certain mental states (like believing, wanting, hoping, fearing, and so on) that we may be in even though we are not currently feeling or doing anything in particular. Such states are called dispositional because to be in them is to have a tendency to feel or do certain things under certain conditions. For example, if you are afraid of snakes, you will normally have a tendency to feel fear and run away when you see one. Unfor- tunately, we can deceive ourselves about our dispositional mental states. We may believe, for example, that we are in love when we really aren’t. Or we may believe that we don’t have a certain desire when we really do. Since introspection is not error free, it is not an infallible source of knowledge about our mental states.
Though introspection is fallible, it can still be trusted. Our beliefs about our mental states are about as certain as they.
Chapter 3Evaluating Moral ArgumentsWhat Is Moral Reasoning.docxwalterl4
Chapter 3
Evaluating Moral Arguments
What Is Moral Reasoning?
Moral reasoningis ordinary critical reasoning applied to ethics.
Critical reasoning(also called critical thinking) is the careful, systematic evaluation of statementsand arguments.
Statements
A statement(or claim) is the assertion that something is either true or false. The following are examples of statements:“Murder is wrong.”“1 + 1 = 2”“Shakespeare wrote The Tempest.”
Statements and Arguments –1
When at least one statement attempts to provide reasons for believing another statement, we have an argument—a group of statements, one of which is supposed to be supported by the rest.
Statements and Arguments –2
The supporting statements are called premises.
The statement that is being supported by the others is the conclusion.
Identifying ArgumentsAn argumentis intended to prove something.All arguments share a pattern: at least one premise is required to support a conclusion.A cluster of unsupported claims is not an argument.The most reliable way to identify arguments is to look for the conclusion first.Look for indicator words:terms that often appear in arguments and signal that a premise or conclusion may be nearby.
Some words indicating a conclusion:
Therefore, consequently, hence, it follows that, thus, so, it must be thatSome words indicating a premise:
Because, since, for, given that, due to the fact that, for the reason that, the reason being, assuming that, as indicated by
Two Forms of Argument
A deductive argumentis supposed to give logically conclusivesupport to its conclusion.
An inductive argumentis supposed to offer probablesupport to its conclusion.
Common Deductive Argument FormsValid forms:Denying the antecedentAffirming the consequent Invalid forms:Affirming the antecedent(modus ponens)Denying the consequent(modus tollens)The hypothetical syllogism
Deductive Arguments
A deductive argument isvalidif the premises support the conclusion. That is, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. If the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true.
A deductive argument is invalidif the premises do not support the conclusion. That is, the conclusion does not follow necessarily from the premises. If the premises are true, then the conclusion may or may not be true.
A deductive argument is sound if it is valid and all its premises are true.
A deductive argument is unsound if it is invalid and/or any of its premises are false.
Inductive Arguments
An inductive argument is strongif it gives probable support to its conclusion. That is, if its premises are true, its conclusion is also likely to be true.
An inductive argument is weak if it does not give probable support to its conclusion. That is, if its premises are true, its conclusion is not more probable than not to be true.
An inductive argument is cogentif it is strong and all of its premises are true.
An inductive argument is not cogent if it is weakand/or any of.
12/04/17
1
Introduc0on to Philosophy
Theory of Value 1
Theory of Value
• Theory of Value is about things which are good or bad, right or wrong,
concerning issues related to how one ought to behave and to what
makes life valuable
• Broadly, there are two types of issues we are going to discuss:
1. Are statements of value, like ‘You ought to do this’, because ‘it is good
to do this’ and ‘This person is a good person’ and ‘Pleasure is good’,
true/false, or are they not the kind of things which can be true/false?
If no, you are subjec,vist.
If yes, there is a next ques0on: How are such statements true/false?
If because of reality, then you are a realist
If because someone determined it so, then you are a
conven,onalist
> God: Divine Command Theory
> Society: Ethical Rela,vism
> Individual: cf. Existen,alism
Theory of Value II
2. What makes valuable/good ac0ons good?
Ø We are going to discuss three views:
a. U,litarianism: an ac0on is good if and only if it
maximizes the amount of pleasure/absence of
pain or distress in society.
b. Kan,anism: an ac0on is good if you could turn it
into a ra0onal law
c. Aristotelianism: an ac0on is good if it
contributes to or flows from your well-
func0oning as a human being
Subjec0vism
• Statements of value are neither true nor false
• Perhaps they are more like expressions of liking/disliking?
(emo0vism)
• Some ini,al arguments for subjec0vism:
Ø There is a lot of disagreement on value - therefore value is
subjec0ve
Ø What is true or false describes what is the case; but a value
statement does not describe what is the case, but what ought to be
the case – therefore value is subjec0ve
Only works if one assumes that only what is the case can be true/false
– can be a fact
Ø What is true or false describes natural proper0es; but according to
the meaning of value statements, they do not describe natural
proper0es – therefore value is subjec0ve
Only works if one assumes that only natural (observable) proper0es
can be described in true/false statements – only they appear in facts.
12/04/17
2
Some ‘Stronger’ Arguments for
Subjec0vism
1. There is no reasoning in ethics, while there is in science, because
there is nothing really to reason about
Ø But there is a lot of reasoning in ethics, at least to check consistency
2. There are no observa0ons in ethics, while there are in science,
because there is nothing really there to observe
Ø But we do make ethical observa0ons, at least of par0cular cases
3. Disagreement in ethics cannot really be solved, for there is no path
towards agreement one can agree about, while in science there are
ways of ul0mately finding out (and if not, it does not ma_er)
Ø Sober’s cri0cism: one can fail to see the truth in ethics because of,
say, self-interest or self-decep0on > so there might be truth, even if
there is no path to agreement
Ø But in ethics, failure ...
An Introduction to Philosophy
Lecture 02: Epistemology
James Mooney
Open Studies
The University of Edinburgh
j.mooney@ed.ac.uk
www.filmandphilosophy.com
@film_philosophy
Great Usability begins with trust. But how do we accomplish greater trust with our work and ultimately with people? This presentation starts with the philosophy behind great UX and how we can build convincing design solutions based around truth and trust.
This powerpoint is helping one figure out the differences between Validity, Truth, and The Continuum of Certainty. I want people to understand the difference between the lower case t and the upper case T. Also I give examples on the differences of Validity and truth. " Being a critical thinkier you use Validity not Truth,"
Biological screening of herbal drugs: Introduction and Need for
Phyto-Pharmacological Screening, New Strategies for evaluating
Natural Products, In vitro evaluation techniques for Antioxidants, Antimicrobial and Anticancer drugs. In vivo evaluation techniques
for Anti-inflammatory, Antiulcer, Anticancer, Wound healing, Antidiabetic, Hepatoprotective, Cardio protective, Diuretics and
Antifertility, Toxicity studies as per OECD guidelines
Operation “Blue Star” is the only event in the history of Independent India where the state went into war with its own people. Even after about 40 years it is not clear if it was culmination of states anger over people of the region, a political game of power or start of dictatorial chapter in the democratic setup.
The people of Punjab felt alienated from main stream due to denial of their just demands during a long democratic struggle since independence. As it happen all over the word, it led to militant struggle with great loss of lives of military, police and civilian personnel. Killing of Indira Gandhi and massacre of innocent Sikhs in Delhi and other India cities was also associated with this movement.
Unit 8 - Information and Communication Technology (Paper I).pdfThiyagu K
This slides describes the basic concepts of ICT, basics of Email, Emerging Technology and Digital Initiatives in Education. This presentations aligns with the UGC Paper I syllabus.
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Synthetic fiber production is a fascinating and complex field that blends chemistry, engineering, and environmental science. By understanding these aspects, students can gain a comprehensive view of synthetic fiber production, its impact on society and the environment, and the potential for future innovations. Synthetic fibers play a crucial role in modern society, impacting various aspects of daily life, industry, and the environment. ynthetic fibers are integral to modern life, offering a range of benefits from cost-effectiveness and versatility to innovative applications and performance characteristics. While they pose environmental challenges, ongoing research and development aim to create more sustainable and eco-friendly alternatives. Understanding the importance of synthetic fibers helps in appreciating their role in the economy, industry, and daily life, while also emphasizing the need for sustainable practices and innovation.
Acetabularia Information For Class 9 .docxvaibhavrinwa19
Acetabularia acetabulum is a single-celled green alga that in its vegetative state is morphologically differentiated into a basal rhizoid and an axially elongated stalk, which bears whorls of branching hairs. The single diploid nucleus resides in the rhizoid.
Welcome to TechSoup New Member Orientation and Q&A (May 2024).pdfTechSoup
In this webinar you will learn how your organization can access TechSoup's wide variety of product discount and donation programs. From hardware to software, we'll give you a tour of the tools available to help your nonprofit with productivity, collaboration, financial management, donor tracking, security, and more.
A Strategic Approach: GenAI in EducationPeter Windle
Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies such as Generative AI, Image Generators and Large Language Models have had a dramatic impact on teaching, learning and assessment over the past 18 months. The most immediate threat AI posed was to Academic Integrity with Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) focusing their efforts on combating the use of GenAI in assessment. Guidelines were developed for staff and students, policies put in place too. Innovative educators have forged paths in the use of Generative AI for teaching, learning and assessments leading to pockets of transformation springing up across HEIs, often with little or no top-down guidance, support or direction.
This Gasta posits a strategic approach to integrating AI into HEIs to prepare staff, students and the curriculum for an evolving world and workplace. We will highlight the advantages of working with these technologies beyond the realm of teaching, learning and assessment by considering prompt engineering skills, industry impact, curriculum changes, and the need for staff upskilling. In contrast, not engaging strategically with Generative AI poses risks, including falling behind peers, missed opportunities and failing to ensure our graduates remain employable. The rapid evolution of AI technologies necessitates a proactive and strategic approach if we are to remain relevant.
Digital Tools and AI for Teaching Learning and Research
What is knowledge 2016 revision reliabilism
1. Reliabilism in Standard Form What are its strengths?
How does it contrast with other views? What is (arguably) wrong with it?
Variant 2
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
3. Reminder: Infallibilism
• Goldman characterises this as the ‘traditional Cartesian perspective
in epistemology’.
• It is the notion that knowledge is certain (infallible = ‘can’t be
wrong’ or: knowledge must have infallible foundations.
• Goldmann: ‘Its theory of knowledge asserts that S knows that p at t
only if either a) p is self-warranting for S at t or b) p is strongly
confirmed by propositions each of which is self-warranting for S at
t.’
– So Gettier counter-examples are not examples of justified true belief, so are
not examples of knowledge anyway.
– But it is rare that we can rule out the possibility of error (so infallibilism argues
that we can have very few beliefs that in fact are knowledge).
– Is there a definition of knowledge that allows us more knowledge, perhaps
more probable knowledge?
4. Issues with Infallibilism
• As a theory of justification, it’s too restrictive: too many knowledge-
claims are ruled out.
• What we can know for sure (the Cogito, mathematical knowledge,
perhaps basic sensory experiences) is too limited.
• Key Cartesian claims – the Cogito etc – don’t show what they’re
claimed to.
• It’s not easy to show how these infallible foundations link to other
knowledge-claims e.g. Descartes’ attempt to reconstruct knowledge
on new foundations isn’t plausible, as it relies on God’s existence
etc.
• A key step in the infallibilist argument (‘If you know P, you can’t be
mistaken about P’ is ambiguous: does it mean ‘in fact aren’t
mistaken at this moment’ or ‘can’t ever be mistaken’. The second
meaning is needed, but isn’t plausible.
5. Reliabilism defined – first version
• Goldmann: ‘whether we know something or not
depends not upon what justification we have for
believing it, but on whether our belief was produced by
a reliable process.’
• Laid out in Standard Form: S knows that P iff
– (Truth-condition) P is true.
– (Internal condition) S believes that P.
– (Justification condition is replaced by) This belief is caused by
a reliable cognitive process.
6. Reliabilism defended
• Advantages
– A ‘reliable cognitive process’ is just one that produces
probabilistically true beliefs. (What % is high enough, though?)
– So memory, sensation, trustworthy testimony, deductive and
inductive reasoning – all count.
– And so we can have much more knowledge than in the case of
infallibilism.
– And reliabilism explains how we can be mistaken/are prone to error
( cases of falsehood, error etc are explained: they rest on a false
belief so simply aren’t knowledge.)
– ‘Black Box’ explanation: no deeper explanation of how any reliable
process works is needed (so ‘children and idiots’ can know things).
– Rules out scepticism: ‘epistemic justification requires de facto
reliability rather than utterly vindicated reliability’ (John Greco)
7. Reliabilism attacked I: ‘Barn County’ revisited
• Remember: Henry is excellent at identifying barns non-
inferentially
• So in most parts of the world, not Barn County, we would be
happy to say that his knowledge-claim succeeds: if he
identifies something as a barn, he knows.
• But in Barn County there are many fake barns, and some real
ones.
– So if Henry saw one of the fake ones, he would mistake it for a
barn.
– And if Henry saw one of the real ones, he would take it for a
barn, but be right by luck.
• So here even if Henry actually were to see a real barn, we would
not want to say that he knows that what he sees is a barn…
• Why?
8. • Does our first version of
reliabilism help in Barn
County?
• Is the notion of ‘reliable
method’ any use?
• Isn’t Henry’s normal
perceptual approach
– Reliable?
– Yet consistently, in these
cases, wrong?
Reliabilism attacked I: ‘Barn County’ revisited
9. Why does ‘Barn County’ show the first
formulation of reliabilism to be inadequate?
• What explains the change in our view about whether Henry knows?
– [The traditional empiricist account of knowledge cannot explain the change in
our view, since in both scenarios, Henry has the same justification (an
immediate sense-perception) for believing that he sees a barn. ]
– [The ‘No False Lemmas’ account cannot explain the change in our view, since
Henry is not relying on any false intermediate steps in his knowledge-claim:
perceptual knowledge is non-inferential.]
– The initial formulation of reliabilism cannot explain the change in our views, as
Henry has a true belief that is arrived at by a reliable process.
• So in fact he can’t reliably distinguish between true barns and fake
ones…
• Solution when 3 conditions aren’t enough…?
10. Goldman (1976): Relevant alternatives
• Goldman’s response to the Barn County example: ‘someone is said
to know that P in cases where he distinguishes or discriminates the
truth of P from relevant alternatives.’
• So Goldman suggests that to know that it is a barn would require
ruling out any relevant alternative in which it isn’t a barn.
• So, in Barn County, Henry doesn’t know it’s a barn because:
– There is a relevant alternative state of affairs in which what Henry sees is a
fake barn.
– And Henry is unable perceptually to discriminate seeing a barn from seeing a
fake barn.
– But Henry would have known were he able to discriminate between these
relevant alternatives.
11. Reliabilism refined: version 2
• ‘A process is reliable if (i) it produces true beliefs in actual
situations and (ii) would produce true beliefs (or at least
inhibit false beliefs) in relevant counterfactual situations.’
• Laid out in Standard Form: S knows that P iff
• P is true
• S believes that P
• This belief is caused by a reliable cognitive process
• The actual state of affairs in which p is true is
distinguishable or discriminable by S from relevant
possible states of affairs in which p is false.
• Objection: it is not clear which factual and counterfactual
situations are relevant.
• Reply: we do not have to have all of these in mind.
12. Reliabilism attacked II: The Evil Demon
• Does the reliabilist escape the epistemic closure
of the Evil Demon problem?
• In the demon’s closed world, beliefs are reliably
formed (i.e. have predictive accuracy etc) and so
are justified
• Yet do they still amount to knowledge?
• Does Goldman’s fourth condition – discrimination
between relevant counterfactuals – help here?
– Can the demonic reliabilist ever tell the difference
between real and illusion?
13. Reliabilism attacked III – Brain Lesions
• Counter-examples exist where highly reliable cognitive
processes don’t produce adequate justification:
• Rare Brain Lesions – ‘Suppose that S suffers from a
rare sort of brain lesion, one effect of which is to cause
the victim to believe that he has a brain lesion.
However, S has no evidence that he has such a
condition, and even has evidence against it: he has
been given a clean bill of health by highly competent
neurologists. His belief that he has a brain lesion is
unjustified, even though it has been produced by a
highly reliable cognitive process.’ (John Greco)
14. Reliabilism attacked IV:
The New ‘Evil Demon Problem’
• Reliability can in fact be argued to be unnecessary for
epistemic justification.
• Ernest Sosa’s ‘new Evil Demon problem’: ‘Consider the
victim of the evil demon…her belief system is as coherent
as our own…she bases her beliefs on her experience as we
do, and reasons to new beliefs as we do…Clearly, her
beliefs cannot amount to knowledge, since she is the victim
of a massive deception…still, it seems wrong to say that her
beliefs are not justified at all…[yet] the victim’s beliefs are
not reliably formed. The problem for reliabilism is to
explain why the victim’s beliefs are nevertheless justified.’
(John Greco)
• How would we justify these beliefs?
15. Goldmann’s defence of reliabilism I
Against Cartesian Infallibilism:
• ‘My theory protects the possibility of knowledge by making
Cartesian-style justification unnecessary.
• Yet: ‘an adequate account of the term ‘know’ should make the
temptations of scepticism comprehensible, which my theory
does, [as it acknowledges] scepticism by its stance on
relevant alternatives.’
• But: ‘it should also put scepticism in a proper
perspective…Cartesian-like conceptions of justification or
vindication [have a foolish] tendency to overintellectualise or
overrationalize the notion of knowledge.’
16. • ‘My theory requires no justification for external-world
propositions that derives entirely from self-warranting
propositions.
• ‘It requires only, in effect, that beliefs in the external world
be suitably caused, where ‘suitably’ comprehends a process
or mechanism that not only produces true belief in the actual
situation, but would not produce false belief in relevant
counterfactual situations.’
• Its compatibility with empiricism:
– ‘A fundamental facet of animate life…is telling things
apart…the concept of knowledge has its roots in this kind
of cognitive activity.’
Goldmann’s defence of reliabilism II
Against Cartesian Infallibilism’s problems demonstrating that the
sensory world exists:
17. Robert Nozick: Truth-Tracking
• Nozick’s ‘Truth-tracking’ theory of knowledge is from
‘Philosophical Explanations’ (1981)
• It could be seen as a further refinement of what Goldman says
about weighing up alternatives in order to confirm a
knowledge-claim.
• Laid out in Standard Form, S knows that P iff
– P is true
– S believes that p
– if p were true, S would believe that p
– if p weren't true, S wouldn't believe that p
• So what S knows tracks the truth, reliably.
18. Discussion Questions
• How does Goldmann define reliabilism?
• What strengths does he see it as possessing,
particularly against infallibilism?
• Does his account of reliabilism answer the
Argument from Dreaming and the Evil Demon
argument?
Editor's Notes
Ask students to make this grid in their books.
Read first seven paragraphs of Goldmann extract
Because he would not be able to reliably tell the difference between the real and the fake.