The document outlines a revised submission for a DDS (Data Distribution Service) security specification, detailing the integration of security protocols, specifically the use of MIKEY and SRTP for secure communication. It emphasizes a platform-independent security model, the roles of participants, and the required operations for protecting data within DDS systems. The document also addresses potential security threats and mandates for implementing access controls, secure communication, and interoperability standards.

1. Your
systems.
Working
as
one.
DDS
SECURITY
4rd
Revised
Submission
(Joint)
mars/2013-­‐03-­‐10
Doc
num:
mars/2013-­‐03-­‐10
SubmiRers:
SpecificaKon
lead:
Real-­‐Time
InnovaKons,
Inc.
Gerardo
Pardo-­‐Castellote,
Ph.D.
PrismTech
Corp.
CTO,
Real-­‐Time
InnovaKons,
Inc.
eProsima
(supporter)
©
2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved

2. Agenda
• Status
recap
• Summary
of
submission
• What
has
changed?
• Some
details
• Status
&
Conclusion
3/21/13
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2

3. Status
recap
• Started
with
two
separate
submissions
by
RTI
and
PrismTech
– RTI
submission
focused
on
the
mandatory
requirements
for
an
SPI
Architecture
and
built-­‐in
SPIs
– PrismTech
discussed
on
the
use
of
technologies
such
as
(MIKEY
/
SRTP)
to
support
the
needs
of
secure
DDS
• As
of
the
December
2012
meeKng
PrismTech
joined
the
RTI
submission
3/21/13
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3

4. Agenda
• Status
recap
• Summary
of
submission
• What
has
changed?
• How
the
submission
allows
a
specializaKon
to
use
MIKEY
and
SRTP
• Status
&
Conclusion
3/21/13
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2012
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rights
reserved
4

5. Intro
to
DDS
Security
and
scope
of
this
specificaKon
3/21/13
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5

6. Security
as
a
system
problem
• UlKmately
security
is
a
system
property
– Involves
hardware,
so`ware,
humans,
procedures…
• Most
directly
related:
Scope
of
1. Securing
the
data-­‐centric
bus
the
RFP
2. IntegraKng
across
security
domains
Out
3. Securing
the
operaKng
system
of
Scope
4. Securing
the
hardware
&
so`ware
configuraKon
3/21/13
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6

7. Three
security
boundaries
Ul:mately
you
need
to
implement
the
3
of
them
• Boundary
security
• Transport-­‐Level
– Network
(layer
3)
security
– Session
(layer
4/5)
security
• Fine-­‐grained
Data-­‐Centric
Security
Scope
of
the
DDS
Security
RFP
3/21/13
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7

8. Fine-­‐Grained
Data-­‐Centric
Security
Topics
• Access
control
per
Topic
• Read
versus-­‐write
permissions
• Field-­‐specific
permissions
3/21/13
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8

9. Threats
Alice:
Allowed
to
publish
topic
T
1. Unauthorized
subscripKon
Bob:
Allowed
to
subscribe
to
topic
T
Eve:
Non-­‐authorized
eavesdropper
2. Unauthorized
publicaKon
Trudy:
Intruder
3. Tampering
and
replay
Trent:
Trusted
infrastructure
service
Mallory:
Malicious
insider
4. Unauthorized
access
to
data
by
infrastructure
services
3/21/13
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9

10. Data-­‐centric/mulKcast
Insider
Threats
• Two
insider
threats
affecKng
(mulKcast)
data-­‐
centric
systems
are
of
unique
significance
1. Reader
mis-­‐behaves
as
unauthorized
writer
An
applicaKon
uses
knowledge
gained
as
authorized
reader
to
spoof
the
system
as
a
writer
2. Compromise
of
Infrastructure
Service
A
service
that
is
trusted
to
read
and
write
data
on
behalf
of
others
(e.g.
a
persistence
service
)
becomes
compromised
3/21/13
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10

11. Reader
mis-­‐behaves
as
unauthorized
writer
• SituaKon:
– Alice
-­‐
creates
a
Crypto
Key
per
Topic/DataWriter
– Alice
-­‐
shares
its
Key
with
all
intended
readers
as
needed
to
mulKcast
– Mallory
–
is
an
authorized
reader
so
it
has
Alice’s
key
– Mallory
–
behaves
maliciously
and
uses
Alice’s
key
to
create
fake
UDP
messages
pumng
Alice’s
informaKon
(IP,
Port,
GUIDs,
etc.)
but
with
bad
data.
• ImplicaKons:
– Bob
sees
message
from
Mallory
and
processes
it
believing
it
is
from
Alice
– Mallory
can
provide
a
system-­‐wide
failure
for
all
subscribers
to
topic
T,
making
them
process
wrong
data,
delete
instances,
– Depending
on
the
Topic
this
can
be
catastrophic
for
the
system
• Notes:
– The
problem
is
that
all
secrets
shared
by
Alice
and
Bob
are
also
known
to
Mallory
• So
the
aRack
cannot
be
solved
with
a
MAC
or
HMAC
if
Alice’s
key
is
also
shared
with
all
readers…
– The
problem
can
be
solved
with
a
digital
signature
but
that
is
1000X
slower
than
a
MAC
3/21/13
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12. Summary
of
RFP
requirements
3/21/13
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12

13. RFP
Mandatory
Requirements
Proposals
shall
define
…
6.5.1
…
a
Plaoorm
Independent
Security
Model
for
DDS
independent
of
the
programming
language
used…
6.5.2
…
a
collecKon
of
Plaoorm
Independent
IntercepKon
Points
and
SPIs
…
6.5.3
…
built-­‐in
Plaoorm
Independent
Security
Plugins
that
implement
the
Plaoorm
Independent
Interfaces
6.5.4
…
plaoorm
specific
mappings
for
the
built-­‐in
plugins
to
all
the
language
PSMs
supported
by
DDS
6.5.5
…
how
the
DDS
Interoperability
Wire
Protocol
is
used
to
allow
DDS
applicaKons
to
interoperate
securely
3/21/13
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13

14. Mandatory
Requirements
6.5.1:
Security
Model
The
Security
Model
for
DDS
shall
…
6.5.1.1
…
support
mechanisms
that
establish
the
ability
for
a
DDS
ParKcipant
to
run
in
a
plaoorm
6.5.1.2
…
support
mechanisms
to
configure
and
access
the
credenKals
of
the
underlying
DDS
ParKcipants
…
6.5.1.3
…
allow
specificaKon
of
authorizaKon
policies,
controlling
[1]
Joining
a
DDS
Domain
[2]
Access
to
DDS
Discovery
Data
[3]
Publishing
a
DDS
Topic,
[4]
Subscribing
to
a
DDS
Topic
[5]
Publishing
on
a
DDS
ParKKon,
[6]
Subscribing
on
a
DDS
ParKKon
6.5.1.4
…
include
the
concept
of
data
tagging
6.5.1.5
…
support
mechanism
for
ensuring
data
integrity,
including
[1]
traceability,
pedigree,
and
tamper
[2]
digital
signatures
[3]
data
encrypKon
[4]
use
of
different
keys
for
data
from
different
DataWriters
3/21/13
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15. Mandatory
Requirements
6.5.2:
Set
of
IntercepKon
Points
and
SPIs
The
Plugin
SPIs
shall
…
6.5.2.1
…
allow
applicaKons
to
exchange
credenKals
with
a
DDS
ParKcipant
[1]
exchanging
credenKals
for
authenKcaKon
[2]
delegaKon
of
authority
for
authenKcaKon
6.5.2.2
…
allow
an
external
plugin
to
perform
all
the
authorizaKon
funcKons
[1]
full
support
of
the
authorizaKon
policies
[3]
support
delegaKon
of
authority
[4]
support
delegaKon
of
authority
separately
for
each
DDS
Topic
6.5.2.3
…
allow
an
external
plugin
to
perform
all
the
tagging
and
tag-­‐accessing
funcKons
6.5.2.4
…
allow
an
external
plugin
to
perform
all
the
encrypKon
and
decrypKon
funcKons
6.5.2.5
…
external
plugin
to
perform
all
the
digital
signing
and
verificaKon
funcKons
3/21/13
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15

16. RFP
OpKonal
Requirements
Proposals
may
define
authorizaKon
policies
that
control
…
6.6.1
…
the
content
a
DDS
ParKcipant
is
allowed
to
publish
on
a
Topic.
6.6.2
…
the
content
a
DDS
ParKcipant
is
allowed
to
subscribe
on
a
Topic..
6.6.3
…
the
QoS
Policies
a
DDS
ParKcipants
can
use
when
publishing
a
Topic
6.6.4
…
the
QoS
Policies
a
DDS
ParKcipant
can
use
when
subscribing
to
a
Topic.
Proposals
may
define
…
6.6.5
…
data-­‐tagging
plugins
that
apply
different
tags
for
each
data-­‐sample
published
by
a
DDS
DataWriter.
6.6.6
…
built-­‐in
plugins
that
interoperate
with
standard
authenKcaKon
and
authorizaKon
protocols
and
services,
such
as,
LDAP
and
SAML.
6.6.7
…
a
PSM
mapping
of
the
DDS-­‐RTPS
Interoperability
Wire
Protocol
to
a
secure
transport,
such
as,
DTLS.
6.6.8
…
a
PSM
of
the
DDS-­‐RTPS
Interoperability
Wire
Protocol
allowing
interoperability
over
UnidirecKonal
Transports.
3/21/13
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17. Summary
of
DDS
Security
spec.
3/21/13
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17

18. Submission
Guiding
Principles
• Performance
&
Scalability
– Do
not
impact
parts
of
the
system
that
do
not
have
security
needs
– Allow
opKng
out
of
specific
features
such
as
MAC,
EncrypKon.
Digital
Signature
with
sufficient
granularity
– Limit
use
of
asymmetric
keys
to
discovery
&
session
establishment
– Support
MulKcast
• Robustness
&
Availability
– Be
robust
to
the
failure
or
compromise
of
any
single
component.
– Limit
privileges
of
infrastructure
services
and
relays
– Avoid
centralized
policy
decisions/services
– Avoid
mulK-­‐party
key
agreement
protocols
• Fitness
to
data-­‐centric
model
– Express
policies
and
permissions
in
terms
of
familiar
DDS
terminology
and
objects
– Support
all
of
DDS:
consumpKon
of
samples
out
of
order,
best
efforts,
Kme
filters,
history
cache,
etc.
• Leverage
exis:ng
technologies
– Support
plugging
in
exiKng
technologies
for
ciphers,
MAC,
PKI
• Ease
of
use
&
Flexibility
– DO
not
preclude
integraKng
with
their
exisKng
security
and
crypto
infrastructure.
3/21/13
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18

19. Audience
and
Purpose
for
this
SpecificaKon
• Audience:
– DDS
vendors/implementers,
not
the
users
of
DDS
• Purpose:
– Define
a
Security
Model
for
DDS
systems
– Define
concrete
IntercepKon
points
in
the
middleware
where
SPI
interfaces
must
be
called
– Define
concrete
SPI
Interfaces
vendors
must
invoke
at
the
IntercepKon
Points
and
the
behavior
upon
various
returns
– Define
specific
SPI
implementaKons
to
the
extent
required
for
interoperability
– NOT
guidance
to
users
implemenKng
secure
DDS
systems
– NOT
definiKon
of
security
technologies
beyond
what
is
required
to
implement
the
specificaKon
3/21/13
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19

20. DDS
Security
covers
4
related
concerns
Security
Model
Security
Plugin
DDS
&
RTPS
support
APIs
&
Behavior
for
Security
Buil:n
Plugins
3/21/13
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20

21. Security
Model
3/21/13
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21

22. MR#
6.5.1
Security
Model
• A
security
model
is
defined
in
terms
of:
– The
subjects
(principals)
– The
objects
being
protected
• The
operaKons
that
are
protected
on
the
objects
– Access
Control
Model
• A
way
to
map
each
subject
to
the
objects
they
can
perform
operaKons
on
and
which
are
the
allowed
operaKons
3/21/13
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23. Security
Model
Example:
UNIX
FileSystem
(simplified)
• Subjects:
Users,
specifically
processes
execuKng
on
behalf
of
a
specific
userid
• Protected
Objects:
Files
and
Directories
• Protected
OperaKons
on
Objects:
– Directory.list,
Directory.createFile,
Directory.createDir,
Directory.removeFile,
Directory.removeDir,
Directory.renameFile
– File.view,
File.modify,
File.execute
• Access
Control
Model:
– A
subject
is
given
a
userId
and
a
set
of
groupId
– Each
object
is
assigned
a
OWNER
and
a
GROUP
– Each
Object
is
given
a
combinaKon
of
READ,
WRITE,
EXECUTE
permissions
for
the
assigned
OWNER
and
GROUP
– Each
protected
operaKon
is
mapped
to
a
check,
for
example
•
File.view
is
allowed
if
and
only
if
– File.owner
==
Subject.userId
AND
File.permissions(OWNER)
includes
READ
– OR
File.group
IS-­‐IN
Subject.groupId[]
AND
File.permissions(GROUP)
includes
READ
3/21/13
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23

24. MR#
6.5.1
DDS
Security
Model
• Subjects:
DDS
DomainParKcipant
(ParKcipant
GUID)
• Protected
Objects:
DDS
Domain
and
DDS
Topic
• Protected
Opera:ons
on
Objects
(logical
view):
– DomainParKcipant.join
– DomainParKcipant.add_read_parKKon
– DomainParKcipant.add_write_parKKon
– Topic.create
– Topic.set_qos
– Topic.set_reader_qos
– Topic.read
– Topic.set_writer_qos
– Topic.write
– Topic.create_instance
– Topic.update_instance
– Topic.dispose_instance
3/21/13
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24

25. MR#
6.5.1
Mapping
of
DDS
API
to
protected
operaKons
DDS
API
Call
Protected
Opera:on
DomainParKcipantFactory.create_parKcipant
Discovery.match_remote_parKcipant
DomainParKcipant.join
DomainParKcipant.create_publisher
Publisher.set_qos
DomainParKcipant.add_write_parKKon
DomainParKcipant.create_subscriber
Subscriber.set_qos
DomainParKcipant.add_read_parKKon
DomainParKcipant.create_topic
Discovery.dicover_topic
Topic.create,
Topic.seq_qos
Topic.set_qos
Topic.set_qos
Subscriber.create_datareader
Discovery.dicover_datareader
Topic.read,
Topic.set_reader_qos
DataReader.set_qos
Discovery.change_datareader_qos
Topic.set_reader_qos
Publisher.create_datawriter
Discovery.dicover_datawriter
Topic.write,
Topic.set_writer_qos
DataWriter.set_qos
Discovery.change_datawriter_qos
Topic.set_writer_qos
DataWriter.register_instance
DataWriter.write
Topic.create_instance
Protocol.receive_instance_new
DataWriter.dispose
3/21/13
Protocol.receive_dispose
Topic.dispose_instance
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26. DDS
&
RTPS
Support
for
Security
3/21/13
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26

27. Support
for
Security
in
DDS
&
RTPS
• DDS
ParKcipants
need
to
exchange
security
informaKon
– CerKficates
for
AuthenKcaKon
&
Permissions
– Handshake
messages
for
mutual
authenKcaKon
and
shared-­‐secret
establishment
– KeyTokens
for
key-­‐exchange
• These
messages
reuse
exisKng
DDS
mechanisms
– Discovery
topics
– BuilKn
data
readers
/
writers
• EncrypKon
and
signatures
introduce
new
RTPS
Submessage
and
Submessage
elements
– SecureSubMessage
– SecuredData
3/21/13
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27

28. Security
informaKon
propagated
via
DDS
discovery
struct
Property
{
string<>
name;
2
addiKonal
aRributes
added
string<>
value;
to
};
typedef
sequence<Property>
ParKcipantBuilKnTopicData:
PropertySeq;
struct
Token
{
IdenKtyToken
idenKty;
string<>
token_classid;
PermissionsToken
permissions;
string<>
wrapper_classid;
PropertySeq
properKes;
sequence<octet>
value;
sequence<octet>
wrapped_value;
};
typedef
Token
Iden:tyToken;
typedef
Token
PermissionsToken;
3/21/13
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28

29. Security
informaKon
exchanged
via
BuilKnParKcipantMessageWriter
typedef
Token
CryptoToken;
sequence<CryptoToken>
CryptoTokenSeq;
4
addiKonal
kinds:
KIND_SECURITY_AUTH_HANDSHAKE
KIND_SECURITY_PARTICIPANT_CRYPTO_TOKENS
struct
CryptoTokensMsg
{
KIND_SECURITY_DATAWRITER_CRYPTO_TOKENS
octet
sending_guid[16];
KIND_SECURITY_DATAREADER_CRYPTO_TOKENS
octet
receiving_guid[16];
CryptoTokenSeq
crypto_tokens;
};
typedef
Token
HandshakeTokenMsg;
typedef
CryptoTokensMsg
Par:cipantCryptoTokensMsg;
typedef
CryptoTokensMsg
DatawriterCryptoTokensMsg;
typedef
CryptoTokensMsg
DatareaderCryptoTokensMsg;
3/21/13
©
2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved
29

30. BuilKnParKcipantMessageWriter
typedef
octet
GuidPrefix_t[12];
typedef
octet
Par:cipantMessageDataKind[4];
struct
Par:cipantMessageData
{
GuidPrefix_t
par:cipantGuidPrefix;
//@Key
Par:cipantMessageDataKind
kind;
//@Key
sequence<octet>
data;
};
3/21/13
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2012
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30

31. Background:
RTPS
RTPS
Message
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
Header
SubMsg
Header
RTPS
SubMessage
SubMsg
Element
RTPS
SubMessage
SubMsg
Element
RTPS
SubMessage
SerializedData
RTPS
SubMessage
3/21/13
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2012
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rights
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31

32. Cryptographic
SPI
at
the
wire-­‐protocol
level
Message
TransformaKon
RTPS
Header
RTPS
Header
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SubMessage
(*)
Secure
encoding
RTPS
SubMessage
(*)
SerializedData
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SubMessage
Secure
decoding
SecuredData
SerializedData
SerializedData
RTPS
SubMessage
(*)
RTPS
SubMessage
SecuredData
SerializedData
©
2012
RTI
•
UNCLASSIFIED
•
PROPRIETARY

33. RTPS
Header
RTPS
Header
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SubMessage
encode_seriali
SerializedData
zed_data
SecuredData
SerializedData
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SubMessage

34. RTPS
Header
RTPS
Header
encode_datawrite
RTPS
SubMessage
r_submessage
RTPS
SecureSubMsg
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
Header
RTPS
Header
encode_dataread RTPS
SecureSubMsg
RTPS
SubMessage
er_submessage
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SubMessage

35. RTPS
Header
encode_rtps_message
RTPS
Header
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SecureSubMsg
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SubMessage

36. RTPS
Header
encode_rtps_message
RTPS
Header
RTPS
SubMessage
RTPS
SecSubMsg
enco
de_d RTPS
SecSubMsg
SerializedData
enco ataw
de_s riter_
eriali su b m
zed_d essag RTPS
SubMessage
ata
e
RTPS
SubMessage
SecuredData
SerializedData
SerializedData
RTPS
SecSubMsg
RTPS
SubMessage
SecuredData
SerializedData

37. Security
Plugins
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
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rights
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37

38. Plaoorm
Independent
IntercepKon
Pts
+
SPIs
MR#
6.5.2
Service Plugin Purpose Interactions
Authentication Authenticate the principal that is The principal may be an
joining a DDS Domain. application/process or the user
associated with that application
Handshake and establish or process.
shared secret between
Participants may messages to
participants do mutual authentication and
establish shared secret
Access Control Decide whether a principal is allowed Protected operations include
to perform a protected operation. joining a specific DDS domain,
creating a Topic, reading a
Topic, writing a Topic, etc.
Cryptography Perform the encryption and Invoked by DDS middleware to
decryption operations. Create & encrypt data compute and verify
Exchange Keys. Compute digests, MAC, compute & verify Digital
compute and verify Message Signatures
Authentication Codes. Sign and
verify signatures of messages.
Logging Log all security relevant events Invoked by middleware to log
Data Tagging
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tag for each data sample 38

39. Plaoorm
Independent
SPIs
MR#
6.5.2
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved
39

40. MR#
6.5.3
BuilKn
Plugins
SPI
Buil:n
Plungin
Notes
AuthenKcaKon
DDS:Auth:PKI-­‐RSA/DSA-­‐DH
Uses
PKI
with
a
pre-­‐configured
shared
CerKficate
Authority.
DSA
and
Diffie-­‐Hellman
for
authenKcaKon
and
key
exchange
Establishes
shared
secret
AccessControl
DDS:Access:PKI-­‐Signed-­‐ Permissions
document
signed
by
shared
XML-­‐Permissions
CerKficate
Authority
Cryptography
DDS:Crypto:AES-­‐CTR-­‐ Protected
key
distribuKon
HMAC-­‐RSA/DSA-­‐DH
AES128
and
AES256
for
encrypKon
(in
counter
mode)
SHA1
and
SHA256
for
digest
HMAC-­‐SHA1
and
HMAC-­‐256
for
MAC
DataTagging
Discovered_EndpointTags
Send
Tags
via
Endpoint
Discovery
Logging
DedicatedDDS_LogTopic
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved
40

41. MR#
6.5.4
Mapping
to
DDS
Language
PSMs
• Plugin
SPIs
to
be
defined
using
IDL
• IDL-­‐to-­‐Language
mappings
used
for
each
Language
PSM
• No
need
to
define
mappings
to
new
Javs5
PSM
and
STD-­‐C++
PSM
– IDL-­‐derived
Language
PSMs
suffice
as
these
are
low-­‐level
interfaces
that
will
only
be
exercised
by
SPI
plugin
implementers.
NOTE:
IDL
file
is
missing
from
submission
3/21/13
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2012
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rights
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41

42. Use
of
DDS
Interoperability
Protocol
MR#
6.5.5
• Uses:
Buil%nPar%cipantMessageWriter/Reader
– Msg
kind:
KIND_SECURITY_AUTH_HANDSHAKE
• data:
MessageToken
– Msg
kind:
KIND_SECURITY_KEY_TOKEN
• Data:
KeyToken
• Discovery
propagates
addiKonal
security
info
– Buil:nPar:cipantTopicData
• Iden:tyToken
[PID_SEC_IDENTITY_TOKEN]
• PermissionsToken
[PID_SEC_PERMISSIONS_TOKEN]
– Buil:nPublica:onTopicData
• DataTags
[PID_SEC_DATA_TAGS]
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved
42

43. Agenda
• Status
recap
• Summary
of
submission
• What
has
changed?
• Some
details
• Status
&
Conclusion
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rights
reserved
43

44. What
has
changed
• Unified
Token
representaKons
– All
Tokens
use
common
data-­‐type
– Tokens
can
be
encrypted
(wrapped)
by
key
• AuthenKcaKon
SPI
can
now
do:
– Configurable
mulK-­‐step
Handshake
(subsumes
Challenge)
– Establishment
of
Shared
Secret
• Cryptography
SPI
– Focuses
just
on
Crypto,
MAC,
DigitalSignature
and
KeyExchange
– No
handshakes
anymore
• Secure
envelopes
– Data
protected
by
encrypKon
using
AES-­‐CTR
(as
before)
– MAC
can
be
used
for
whole
RTPS
message
(as
before)
– MAC
can
be
used
for
part
of
RTPS
message
(new)
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved
44

45. Agenda
• Status
recap
• Summary
of
submission
• What
has
changed?
• Some
details
• Status
&
Conclusion
3/21/13
©
2012
Real-­‐Time
InnovaKons,
Inc.
-­‐
All
rights
reserved
45

46. Tokens
are
a
generic
mechanism
to
pass
informaKon
between
DDS
and
SPIs
Token
interpretaKon
defined
by
SPI
ImplementaKons
Some
tokens
are
propagated
via
DDS
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved
46

47. Token
RepresentaKon
typedef string<> TokenClass;
typedef string<> TokenWrappingClass;
struct DDS_Property {
char *property_name;
char *property_value;
};
struct DDS_Token {
TokenClass token_classid;
WrappingClass wrapping_classid;
DDS_PropertySeq properties;
DDS_OctetSeq value;
DDS_OctetSeq wrapped_value;
};
3/21/13
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2012
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rights
reserved
47

48. AuthenKcaKon
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved
48

49. AuthenKcaKon
SPI
MR#
6.5.2
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
-­‐
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rights
reserved
49

50. MR#
6.5.2
Meta-­‐Protocol
to
handshake
and
AuthenKcaKon
establish
shared
3/21/13
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2012
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rights
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Behavior
secret
50

51. BuilKn
DDS:Auth:PKI-­‐DSA-­‐DH
• Uses
shared
CerKficate
Authority
(CA)
– All
ParKcipants
pre-­‐configured
with
shared-­‐CA
• Performs
mutual
authenKcaKon
between
discovered
parKcipants
using
the
Digital
Signature
Algorithm
(DSA)
• Establishes
a
shared
secret
using
Diffie-­‐
Hellman.
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved
51

52. ConfiguraKon
of
Auth:PKI-­‐DS-­‐DH
• Three
things:
– X.509
cerKficate
that
defines
the
shared
CA.
This
cerKficate
contains
the
Public
Key
of
the
CA.
– RSA
private
key
of
the
DomainParKcipant.
– An
X.509
cerKficate
that
chains
up
to
the
CA,
that
binds
the
DomainParKcipant
public
key
to
the
disKnguished
name
(subject
name)
for
the
parKcipant
and
any
intermediate
CA
cerKficates
required
to
build
the
chain
• ConfiguraKon
API
outside
scope
of
specificaKon
– Vendors
can
use
file,
QoS
property,
etc.
3/21/13
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2012
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reserved
52

53. Behavior
of
Auth:PKI-­‐DS-­‐DH
• validate_local_parKcipant
– IdenKtyCredenKalToken
has
X.509
cerKficate
– Validates
cerKficate
against
CA
• validate_remote_parKcipant
– Receives
X.509
cert
of
remote
parKcipant
in
IdenKtyToken
– Validates
X.509
cert
against
CA
– Does
3-­‐message
handshake
to:
• verify
possession
of
private
key
• establish
SharedSecret
3/21/13
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2012
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rights
reserved
53

54. Remote
ParKcipant
AuthenKcaKon
ParKcipants
receive
X.509
Cert
of
remote
parKcipant
via
discovery
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved
54

55. Remote
ParKcipant
AuthenKcaKon
Each
ParKcipant
calls
validate_remote_idenKty()
this
checks
remote
X.509
Cert
against
locally-­‐configured
CA
ParKcipant
with
highest
GUID
returns
PENDING_HANDSHAKE_REQUEST,
the
other
PENDING_HANDSAHKE_MESSAGE
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved
55

56. Remote
ParKcipant
AuthenKcaKon
ParKcipant1
creates
CHALLENGE1
=
“CHALLENGE:<nonce>
and
sends
message
via
ParKcipantMessageWriter
with
MessageToken
:=
{CHALLENGE1}
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved
56

57. Remote
ParKcipant
AuthenKcaKon
ParKcipant2
creates
CHALLENGE2
:=
CHALLENGE:<nonce>
ParKcipant2
sends
to
ParKcipant1
message
with
MessageToken
:=
{SIGN(CHALLENGE1),
CHALLENGE2}
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
-­‐
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rights
reserved
57

58. Remote
ParKcipant
AuthenKcaKon
Part1
verifies
SIGN(CHALLENGE1)
using
Part2’s
PK
Part1
computes
a
SharedSecret
Part1
sends
message
with
contents:
MessageToken
:=
{SIGN(CHALLENGE2),
ENCRYPT(SharedSecret)}
Encrypt
uses
Part2’s
PK.
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
-­‐
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rights
reserved
58

59. Remote
ParKcipant
AuthenKcaKon
Part2
verifies
SIGN(CHALLENGE2)
using
Part1’s
PK
Part2
decrypts
SharedSecret
using
its
own
PK
We
have
Mutual
Authen:ca:on
and
a
SharedSecret
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
-­‐
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rights
reserved
59

60. Access
Control
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
-­‐
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rights
reserved
60

61. MR#
6.5.2
Access
Control
SPI
3/21/13
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2012
Real-­‐Time
InnovaKons,
Inc.
-­‐
All
rights
reserved
61

62. BuilKn
DDS:AC:PKI
SPI
• Configured
with:
– X.509
CerKficate
of
shared
Permissions
CA
– PermissionsCredenKalToken
• PermissionsCredenKalToken
contains
– XML
file
with
permissions
– Includes
SubjectName
matching
the
one
on
IdenKtyCredenKalToken
– All
signed
by
Permissions
CA
This
binds
the
permissions
to
the
idenKty
established
by
the
AuthenKcaKonPlugin
3/21/13
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2012
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InnovaKons,
Inc.
-­‐
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rights
reserved
62

63. Example
Permissions
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
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rights
reserved
63

64. Cryptographic
3/21/13
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2012
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rights
reserved
64

65. Cryptographic
3/21/13
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2012
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rights
reserved
65

66. MR#
6.5.3
Crypto-­‐AES-­‐CTR-­‐HMAC-­‐DSA-­‐DH
• EncrypKon
uses
AES
in
counter
mode
– Similar
to
SRTP,
but
enhanced
to
support
mulKple
topics
within
a
single
RTPS
message
and
infrastructure
services
like
a
relay
or
persistence
• Use
of
counter
mode
turns
the
AES
block
cipher
into
a
stream
cipher
– Each
DDS
sample
is
separately
encrypted
and
can
be
decrypted
without
process
the
previous
message
• This
is
criKcal
to
support
DDS
QoS
like
history,
content
filters,
best-­‐efforts
etc.
• DSA
and
Diffie-­‐Hellman
used
for
mutual
authenKcaKon
and
secure
key
exchange
3/21/13
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2012
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Inc.
-­‐
All
rights
reserved
66

67. BuilKn
DDS:Crypto-­‐AES-­‐CTR-­‐HMAC-­‐DSA-­‐
DH
SPI
• Shared
secret
used
to
create
a
KeyExchangeKey
• KeyExchangeKey
used
to
send
following
Master
Key
Material
using
the
BuilKnPublicaKonWriter:
– MasterKey
– MasterSalt
– MasterHMACSalt
• Based
on
this
the
following
Key
Material
is
computed:
– SessionSalt
:=
HMAC(MasterKey,"SessionSalt"
+
MasterSalt
+
SessionId
+
0x00)
[
Truncated
to
128
bits]
– SessionKey
:=
HMAC(MasterKey,"SessionKey"
+
MasterSalt
+
SessionId
+
0x01)
– SessionHMACKey
:=
HMAC(MasterKey,"SessionHMACKey"
+
MasterHMACSalt
+
SessionId)
Note:
SessionId
goes
on
the
EncryptedMessage
Envelope
• EncrypKon
uses
AES
in
Counter
(CTR)
mode
– The
session
counter
is
sent
on
EncryptedMessage
Envelope.
3/21/13
©
2012
Real-­‐Time
InnovaKons,
Inc.
-­‐
All
rights
reserved
67

68. Conclusion
• Submission
revised
based
on
addiKonal
implementaKon
experience
• Plugin
APIs
modified
to
enhance
performance
and
support
implementaKons
that
want
to
use
MIKEY
exchanges
and
SRTP
style
encrypKon
• A
few
things
are
sKll
missing
– IDL
for
interfaces
– Wire
protocol
parameter-­‐ID
assignment
– Resolve
inconsistencies
in
document
– Examine
is
there
are
special
rules
that
affects
ParKKons
• TargeKng
June
2013
for
vote
to
recommend
adopKon
3/21/13
©
2012
Real-­‐Time
InnovaKons,
Inc.
-­‐
All
rights
reserved
68

69. Find
out
more…
www.rK.com
dds.omg.org
community.rK.com
www.omg.org
demo.rK.com
www.youtube.com/realKmeinnovaKons
blogs.rK.com
www.twiRer.com/RealTimeInnov
www.facebook.com/RTIso`ware
www.slideshare.net/GerardoPardo
©
2012
RTI
•
ALL
RIGHTS
RESERVED
69