CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 “terrorists,” including Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and al Qaeda members, sparked attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, consolidation of the Gulf States behind Saudi Arabia, and vows of vengeance from al Qaeda supporters. The January 2 attacks in Iran will likely impair its attempts to strengthen its role in the international community. Senior Iranian officials condemned both the embassy attacks and the execution itself, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning Saudi politicians that they will face “divine retribution” for the execution. 2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat Barqa may be close to success in its campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. The group advanced eastward from its base in Sirte, seizing Bin Jawad and launching suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks on Libya’s two largest oil export ports, al Sidra and Ras Lanuf. If ISIS Wilayat Barqa can effectively consolidate its territorial gains, it will likely continue to advance eastward and seek control of major oil fields. 3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) public stoning to death of a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, is an inflection point in how the group is enforcing its interpretation of shari’a law. AQAP has governed al Mukalla since April 2015, but has limited its implementation of shari’a in the city. The group rapidly enforced shari’a judgments in territory it controlled in Abyan in 2011, which fed a popular uprising against the group. The shift may be an indicator of AQAP’s confidence in its control of the population.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
January 5, 2016

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 “terrorists,” including Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and al Qaeda members,
sparked attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, consolidation of the Gulf
States behind Saudi Arabia, and vows of vengeance from al Qaeda supporters.
2. ISIS Wilayat Barqa may be close to success in its campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure, following
eastward advancement from its base in Sirte and attacks on Libya’s two largest oil export ports.
3. AQAP’s public stoning to death of a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, is an indicator
the group believes it controls the population and can begin to enforce its strict interpretation of shari’a.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Yemeni peace process remains stalled. Al Houthi officials voiced their lack of confidence in UN-led peace talks, and former
Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh refused to meet with any representatives from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour
Hadi’s government. Saleh and al Houthi leaders met with Russia’s ambassador to Yemen, suggesting that Russia may be
attempting to take a larger role in the peace process.
Outlook: Both sides will likely refuse to make political concessions while they remain embroiled in conflict on the ground. Russia
may look to enhance its perceived role as an alternative to U.S. leadership in the Middle East by brokering a deal in Yemen.
Security
The Saudi-led coalition declared the official end to the ceasefire and intensified its airstrike campaign, which reached its highest
intensity since September 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance fired several ballistic missiles toward military and economic sites in
southern Saudi Arabia and continues to evade coalition attempts to destroy missile launch equipment. Militants attempted to
assassinate the governors of Aden and Lahij in Aden’s Inma city, one month after the ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan assassinated the
previous governor of Aden. The Hadi government and its coalition backers remain unable to curb militant activity in Aden.
Outlook: Fighting will continue along established frontlines as both sides attempt to secure an advantage.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
More than 100 ISIS militants signed a letter to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi affirming their allegiance to him but requesting a
new governor (wali) for ISIS in Yemen, indicating a major leadership crisis in the group. AQAP social media accounts promoted
the apparent rift. AQAP publicly stoned a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt. AQAP had not been fully
enforcing its strict interpretation of shari’a, and the shift may indicate AQAP’s full control of the local population.
Outlook: AQAP will continue to exploit the schism within ISIS in Yemen and reinforce its religious credentials. AQAP will
continue to take advantage of the security vacuum in southern and eastern Yemen to enhance its legitimacy there.
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somalia’s president visited Beledweyne, the capital of Hiraan region, to discuss the Hiraan-Middle Shabelle state formation
process with leaders from both regions, with the intent to appoint a new interim administration by late February 2016. The talks
come amid significant inter-clan clashes in Beledweyne. Additionally, the Somali government passed a media bill requiring
media outlets to obtain a license from the Ministry of Information before they are allowed to operate.
Outlook: The proposed Hiraan-Middle Shabelle state may be better able to deal with clan clashes on its own, possibly reducing
its need for federal security resources.
Security
Unverified Kenyan reports suggest that both al Shabaab and pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) militant cells are
active in eastern Kenya. Kenyan officials stated that the pro-ISIS militants are active in northeastern Mandera County, while al
Shabaab militants operate in southeastern Lamu County. Mandera’s governor also warned of impending attacks by pro-ISIS
militants in the area. Additionally, Ethiopia deployed troops to the Jubbaland State territories to assist in the ongoing Operation
Jubba Corridor, which is aimed at clearing al Shabaab from the Lower and Middle Jubba regions.
Outlook: Militant activity is likely in Mandera County due to its strategic location near both the Kenyan-Somali and Kenyan-
Ethiopian borders.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab is attempting to recruit citizens of Western countries. The group released a recruitment video in both English and
Arabic that focused on Western-born militants and racial and religious discrimination in the U.S. Additionally, al Shabaab
clashed with pro-ISIS militants in the northern Bari region, causing the pro-ISIS cell to flee to the former pirate stronghold
settlement of Hul-Anod.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will increase recruitment efforts to counter the loss of both militants and recruits to pro-ISIS cells.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

5. ASSESSMENT:
Political
UN envoy to Libya Martin Kobler met with House of Representatives (HoR) and General National Congress (GNC) leadership
in an effort to secure their support for the UN-brokered Government of National Accord (GNA), signed by minority factions of
both parliaments on December 17. Tobruk-based HoR head Ageela Salah accepted the GNA “in principle” and reports indicate
that key general Khalifa Haftar may back the unity government, but both will likely seek amendments to safeguard their own
power before giving support. The Tripoli-based GNC continues to reject the GNA.
Outlook: International backers will struggle to implement the unity government without the support of local power brokers and
the GNA will likely create a third political bloc claiming national legitimacy.
Security
The HoR-affiliated Libyan National Army (LNA) will reportedly dispatch a battalion from Benghazi to Ajdabiya, possibly in
response to an uptick in ISIS operations in the area. The LNA continued air and ground operations targeting ISIS- and Ansar al
Sharia-held positions in western and southern Benghazi, Libya.
Outlook: The LNA will continue to focus its efforts on Benghazi, but it may also mobilize against an ISIS takeover in Ajdabiya.
Ansar al Sharia and ISIS in Libya
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat Barqa detonated two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and
launched heavy artillery attacks on oil export facilities at al Sidra and Ras Lanuf, Libya’s largest oil ports, on January 4 and 5.
The group also seized nearby Bin Jawad, indicating its ability to conduct sustained operations to the east of its base in Sirte.
A faction of the Ajdabiya Revolutionary Shura Council, an Islamist group with prior ties to AQIM, pledged allegiance to ISIS
leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. This pledge signals the expansion of ISIS influence into eastern Libya, though the Ajdabiya
Revolutionary Shura Council has dismissed the faction that pledged.
Outlook: ISIS Wilayat Barqa will attempt to consolidate its territorial gains near al Sidra and take control of oil infrastructure in
the area. It may also continue to push toward Ajdabiya in an effort to extend both territorial control and influence east of Sirte.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

6. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
The Algerian army eliminated the head of AQIM’s Sharia Committee, Abu al Hassan Rashid al Bulaydi, following weeks of clearing
operations in northern Algeria’s Tizi Ouzou province. AQIM will immediately replace al Bulaydi with another figure who will call
recruits to jihad. AQIM’s Sahara Emirate announced that it will release a new video soon.
Outlook: AQIM’s recruitment efforts will continue unabated despite the disruption in its leadership. AQIM and its affiliates will
continue to release statements and conduct operations in an effort to drive recruitment and unite radical Islamist militants in the
region.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
An al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) official praised AQIM affiliates and included Uqba Ibn Nafa’a, indicating that the
group is still affiliated with AQIM despite recent uncertainty about its allegiance. Tunisian army units killed a suspected terrorist
and seized a weapons cache in Siliana, central Tunisia. Local residents demanded better government protection from jihadist
groups operating in central Tunisia’s mountainous regions.
Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will remain on the defensive and attempt to protect its strongholds from the Tunisian military’s clearing
operations. The persistence of terrorist safe havens in Tunisia’s mountains may contribute to civil unrest.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Mali extended its current state of emergency due to ongoing militant activity. Ansar al Din attacked the a Tuareg rebel group, the
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad, in northern Mali. Ansar al Din also targeted French and Chadian troops in
the region. French forces in eastern Mali neutralized an al Murabitoun cell allegedly tied to the November 20 Radisson Blu attack.
Outlook: Ansar al Din and its affiliates will continue to conduct attacks in Mali in order to destabilize the region and gain control of
more territory.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

7. ASSESSMENT:
Regional Developments and Diplomacy
Saudi Arabia executed prominent Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and 46 other prisoners on January 2, prompting attacks by Iranian
protesters on the Saudi embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad. Saudi Arabia subsequently severed diplomatic relations
with Iran. Khamenei warned Saudi politicians that they will face “divine retribution” for the execution, while the attacks prompted
strong criticism from President Hassan Rouhani, who criticized them as “unjustifiable” and “damaging” to Iran’s reputation. The
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Sudan each downgraded or severed diplomatic relations with Iran as well.
Outlook: Iran will face international backlash for the embassy and consulate attacks, which will likely impair Iran’s attempts to
strengthen its role in the international community.
Domestic Politics
Iranian officials escalated rhetoric against “seditionists” as the registration period for the February 2016 elections for the
Parliament and the Assembly of Experts closed. Many officials use the term “seditionist” in part to refer to serious political
reformers, such as the participants in the 2009 Green Movement, which alleged fraud in the presidential elections that year and
sought government reforms. Guardian Council Spokesman Nejatollah Ebrahimian stated that candidates must not have
“partnered or cooperated in the illegal acts that occurred” during the Green Movement protests. Meanwhile, Assembly of
Experts member Ayatollah Ahmad Alam ol Hoda warned against seditionists gaining power in the elections and added that
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has called the 2009 Green Movement protests a “red line.” The Guardian Council will
present final lists of candidates who have been approved to run for both the Assembly of Experts, which is tasked with selecting
the next Supreme Leader, and the Parliament to the Interior Ministry in early or mid-February.
Outlook: The uptick in anti-seditionist rhetoric from senior officials likely indicates that the vetting process for candidates for
Parliament and the Assembly of Experts will disproportionately affect reformists.
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IRAN

8. ACRONYMS
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Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

9. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
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