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©2017 Trusted Computing Group
Software and Supply
Chain Assurance Forum
TPM for Automotive
1
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
SAE J3101 defines HW Security
• Hardware Protected Security Environment
– Offers at least one mechanism of security
implemented by hardware support
– Offers resilience against arbitrary execution
of software within a system
• Secure Keystore
• Authenticated Boot
• Authenticated Software Flashing
• Authenticate messages in the vehicle
• Broadcast/Multicast Authentication
• Secure Storage
• Access to Private Data
• etc…
• Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM)
• Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR)
• Root of Trust for Storage (RTS)
• Establish a basis of trust – belief that a device
will behave in an expected way
• TCG uses cryptographic methods to attest
identity of the device and its expected
behavior, both of HW and SW
• The TCG’s method for attestation is to use a
key associated with the hardware to sign one
or more values that represent the software
SAE J3101 TPM as a HW RoT
2
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
Defense in Depth
Fast cryptographic performance
Device identification
Isolated execution
(Message) Authentication
Virtualization
Hardware security services that can be used by applications
Platform boot integrity and Chain of Trust
Secure Storage (keys and data)
Secure Communication
Secure Debug
Tamper detection and protection from side channel attacks
Hardware security building blocks
Over-the Air Updates
IDPS / Anomaly Detection
Network enforcement
Certificate Management Services
Antimalware and remote monitoring
Biometrics
Software and Services
Security features in the silicon, for example Memory Scrambling,
Execution Prevention, etc.
Defense in Depth
HardwareRootofTrust(TPM)
Analog security monitoring under the CPU
Components associated with physical
control of the vehicle
Components associated with safety
Components associated with
entertainment and convenience
The Interconnected Car
Image credit: Mercedes-Benz
Museum (as cited in Computer History
Museum, 2011)
3
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
Vehicle Assets (by ENISA)
4
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
Vehicle Threats (by ENISA)
5
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
Why do you need HW Security?
Basic Cryptography Key Management Miscellaneous
Secure Hash (SHA2, SHA3) Key Derivation Function (KDF) Compression/Decompression
Message Authentication Code (CMAC, HMAC, GMAC)
 Generation
 Verification
Secure Key and Certificate Storage
 Access Management
 Import/Export Services
 Generation
 Update
Checksum
Signatures
 Generation
 Verification
Key exchange protocols
Random Number Generation
Encryption/Decryption
 Symmetric (CBC, CTR)
 Asymmetric
 ECC (P-256, NIST, SEC2, Brainpool)
Secure Clock
 Time stamping
 Validity check for key data
6
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
SDC Example
TSS
Dedicated
Security Core
TPM
Example from Mentor Graphics
with HW Security Core and TPM overlay
AUTOSAR CSM
Translation Stack
7
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
Automotive E/E Trends
8
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
TPM Practical Applications
• A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a microchip designed to provide basic security-related functions,
primarily involving encryption keys.
• An ECU that incorporates a TPM can create cryptographic keys and encrypt them so that they can
only be decrypted by the TPM (binding a key).
• Certificates can be installed or created; the RSA private key for a certificate is bound to the TPM and
cannot be exported.
• Running software can use the boot measurements of the operating system start state to prove the
integrity of an ECU.
• The TPM has several Group Policy settings that might be useful in certain scenarios such as
authorization.
• Because the TPM uses its own internal firmware and logic circuits to process instructions, it does not
rely on the operating system, and it is not exposed to vulnerabilities that might exist in the operating
system or application software.
9
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
TPM 2.0 Software Stack (TSS)
AUTOSAR CSM Translation
TPM is a dedicated hardware that:
• Protects a unique platform identity (TPM)
• Verifies software integrity before software is
loaded (TPM)
• Protects network integrity (TNC or Trusted
Network Connect)
• Protects data integrity and confidentiality (SED
or Self-Encrypting Drive)
10
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
TPM Main Functions
11
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
Why TPM?
• Trusted computing is cyber defense technology that can be used to protect data, platforms and
networks
• Trusted computing technologies are actively evolving, with new standards and new products
regularly entering the market
• Major hardware manufacturers and software vendors support trusted computing off-the-shelf
• Trusted computing products can offer a cost-effective path to improved compliance and security
TCG has the TPM Automotive Thin Profile specification and is working on the TPM
Automotive Rich Profile specification which will satisfy underlying SAE J3101
requirements and provide security foundation for protecting vehicles.
12
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
Backup
backup
©2017 Trusted Computing Group 14
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
©2017 Trusted Computing Group
©2017 Trusted Computing Group 17

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Why TPM in Automotive?

  • 1. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group Software and Supply Chain Assurance Forum TPM for Automotive 1
  • 2. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group SAE J3101 defines HW Security • Hardware Protected Security Environment – Offers at least one mechanism of security implemented by hardware support – Offers resilience against arbitrary execution of software within a system • Secure Keystore • Authenticated Boot • Authenticated Software Flashing • Authenticate messages in the vehicle • Broadcast/Multicast Authentication • Secure Storage • Access to Private Data • etc… • Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM) • Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR) • Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) • Establish a basis of trust – belief that a device will behave in an expected way • TCG uses cryptographic methods to attest identity of the device and its expected behavior, both of HW and SW • The TCG’s method for attestation is to use a key associated with the hardware to sign one or more values that represent the software SAE J3101 TPM as a HW RoT 2
  • 3. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group Defense in Depth Fast cryptographic performance Device identification Isolated execution (Message) Authentication Virtualization Hardware security services that can be used by applications Platform boot integrity and Chain of Trust Secure Storage (keys and data) Secure Communication Secure Debug Tamper detection and protection from side channel attacks Hardware security building blocks Over-the Air Updates IDPS / Anomaly Detection Network enforcement Certificate Management Services Antimalware and remote monitoring Biometrics Software and Services Security features in the silicon, for example Memory Scrambling, Execution Prevention, etc. Defense in Depth HardwareRootofTrust(TPM) Analog security monitoring under the CPU Components associated with physical control of the vehicle Components associated with safety Components associated with entertainment and convenience The Interconnected Car Image credit: Mercedes-Benz Museum (as cited in Computer History Museum, 2011) 3
  • 4. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group Vehicle Assets (by ENISA) 4
  • 5. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group Vehicle Threats (by ENISA) 5
  • 6. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group Why do you need HW Security? Basic Cryptography Key Management Miscellaneous Secure Hash (SHA2, SHA3) Key Derivation Function (KDF) Compression/Decompression Message Authentication Code (CMAC, HMAC, GMAC)  Generation  Verification Secure Key and Certificate Storage  Access Management  Import/Export Services  Generation  Update Checksum Signatures  Generation  Verification Key exchange protocols Random Number Generation Encryption/Decryption  Symmetric (CBC, CTR)  Asymmetric  ECC (P-256, NIST, SEC2, Brainpool) Secure Clock  Time stamping  Validity check for key data 6
  • 7. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group SDC Example TSS Dedicated Security Core TPM Example from Mentor Graphics with HW Security Core and TPM overlay AUTOSAR CSM Translation Stack 7
  • 8. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group Automotive E/E Trends 8
  • 9. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group TPM Practical Applications • A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a microchip designed to provide basic security-related functions, primarily involving encryption keys. • An ECU that incorporates a TPM can create cryptographic keys and encrypt them so that they can only be decrypted by the TPM (binding a key). • Certificates can be installed or created; the RSA private key for a certificate is bound to the TPM and cannot be exported. • Running software can use the boot measurements of the operating system start state to prove the integrity of an ECU. • The TPM has several Group Policy settings that might be useful in certain scenarios such as authorization. • Because the TPM uses its own internal firmware and logic circuits to process instructions, it does not rely on the operating system, and it is not exposed to vulnerabilities that might exist in the operating system or application software. 9
  • 10. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group TPM 2.0 Software Stack (TSS) AUTOSAR CSM Translation TPM is a dedicated hardware that: • Protects a unique platform identity (TPM) • Verifies software integrity before software is loaded (TPM) • Protects network integrity (TNC or Trusted Network Connect) • Protects data integrity and confidentiality (SED or Self-Encrypting Drive) 10
  • 11. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group TPM Main Functions 11
  • 12. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group Why TPM? • Trusted computing is cyber defense technology that can be used to protect data, platforms and networks • Trusted computing technologies are actively evolving, with new standards and new products regularly entering the market • Major hardware manufacturers and software vendors support trusted computing off-the-shelf • Trusted computing products can offer a cost-effective path to improved compliance and security TCG has the TPM Automotive Thin Profile specification and is working on the TPM Automotive Rich Profile specification which will satisfy underlying SAE J3101 requirements and provide security foundation for protecting vehicles. 12
  • 13. ©2017 Trusted Computing Group Backup backup

Editor's Notes

  1. The interconnected components include the vehicle’s engine management system, brake controller, airbags, seatbelt pre-tensioners, door locks, gauge cluster, sound system, CD changer, seat controls, communications system, telematics unit, and more. Running throughout the vehicle is a network of wires on which sensor data and vehicle control commands transit back and forth. Also visible are several long rectangular boxes that represent controllers. These controllers are responsible for issuing commands to the different vehicular components based on the inputs they receive, either in the form of sensor data or commands from the vehicle operator.
  2. Bullet Point Template
  3. Body Text Template