The document discusses the US perspective on Vietnam from 1945-1975. It summarizes that the US initially sought to contain communism in Vietnam and supported the South Vietnamese government. However, South Vietnam struggled with political instability and corruption while North Vietnam was able to unite its people. Ultimately, the US withdrew from Vietnam after a long and costly war, leaving Vietnam reunified under communist rule.

1. Mark Twain (1835-1910)

2. Findings
While the end of World War II brought peace to several countries, the post-war math has been extremely challenging. In establishing new world order, there is a heightened state of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States. Fearing that the Soviet Union intended to "export" communism to other nations, America centered its foreign policy on the "containment" of communism, both at home and abroad. Although formulation of the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and the Berlin Airlift suggested that the United States had a particular concern with the spread of communism in Europe, America's policy of containment extended to Asia as well. Indeed, Asia proved to be the site of the first major battle waged in the name of containment: the Korean War. [1]
In 1950 the Korea Peninsula was divided between a Soviet-backed government in the north and an American-backed government in the south. The division of Korea into two halves had come at the end of World War II. In August of 1945 the Soviet Union invaded Korea, which had been under Japan's control since 1910. Fearing that the Soviets intended to seize the entire peninsula from their position in the north, the United States quickly moved its own troops into southern Korea. Japanese troops surrendered to the Russians in the north and to the Americans in the south. In an effort to avoid a long-term decision regarding Korea's future, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide Korea temporarily along the 38th parallel, a latitudinal line that bisected the country. This line became more rigid after 1946, when Kim II Sung organized a communist government in the north---the Democratic People's Republic. Shortly after, nationalist exile Syngman Rhee returned to Korea and set up a rival government in the south---the Republic of Korea (ROK). Each government hoped to reunify the country under its own rule.
Truman's statement of June 27 illustrates his concern with communist aggression and expansion. In it, Truman argues that "communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war." Truman's statement suggests that he believed the attack by North Korea had been part of a larger plan by communist China and, by extension, the Soviet Union. The President believed that the Korean situation was similar to that of Greece in 1947. He informed his advisors that he believed the invasion was "very obviously inspired by the Soviet Union." This gave America a moral imperative to act. "If we don't put up a fight now," Truman observed to his staff, there was "no telling what they'll do." His concern over the future of anticommunist governments in Asia showed in his public statement. Truman pledged to defend Formosa (Taiwan) from attack and to support French forces in Indochina, a conflict that would eventually escalate into the Vietnam War.
The commitments and actions of United States had been remarkably consistent about what they value as a world leader in 20th century. These commitments had created huge success in giving prosperity and freedom for Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and supported positive outcomes in Philippines, India, etc. However they couldn’t imagine such the difficult case in Vietnam due to weak leadership capabilities of people in South Vietnam and the harsh commitment of Communist leader in North Vietnam.
President Lyndon B. Johnson has the best summarize of these values for the reason of further engagement in Vietnam:
Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change.

3. This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is the principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Viet-Nam.
Why must we take this painful road?
Why must this Nation hazard its ease, and its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away?
We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny. And only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.
Looking back, the United States couldn’t have done much better in the Vietnam war. As J.F Kennedy said in an interview: “In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam, against the Communists”. The ending numbers are much more shocking than Kennedy had anticipated when he were alive. The United States had committed 8,7 million people who directly and indirectly served in Vietnam war, a total death of more than 90,000 [2] and with a total cost of $738 billion (2011 value). What a huge commitment!
From North Vietnam Communist Leader, they have a deadly wrong belief that all western countries have the same intention of colonialized other countries. It’s not only an outdated but toxic view of the world. Despite fighting for superficial values, they had unique capabilities in uniting the poorly educated and miserable Vietnamese people, especially peasants in North Vietnam and delta areas, who has went through a long colonialized period by China, French and has nothing to lose, only hope in a future which can’t be much worse than their current one. They fought in the hope to liberate South Vietnam from a fancy situation painted by their Communist leaders, which in turn are driven by Soviet Union and China.
From South Vietnam Government Leader, they did a very bad job in establishing a healthy independent society. Unfortunately and a miserable case for Vietnam, there is no qualified leader to lead South Vietnam government to establish a united and strong society such as the case of Luwig Erhard in West Germany, Syngman Rhee in South Korea, etc. Ngo Dinh Diem and his family members have built a system of power to support his own interest, not for the people. There are political instability with many coups and changes in authorities which destroyed unprecedented efforts and huge economic as well as people support from the US. More over these instability and self-interest of political parties caused a separations among the people and allowed the North Communist Leaders to establish a network of guerilla armies.
In the end, this is an unbalanced civil war between Vietnamese with surprise but not hard to predict outcome. This catastrophic war and as a result being ruled by dictatorship of Communist Party in nearly 40 years till now is the main reason Vietnam is a poorly developing country with low ranking human development index [3]. During this time, other peers such as South Korea and Taiwan have gone a long way in modern world by riding on the waves of support from the United States and deep integration with developed economies.
Blame no one else than weak capability of human resources in South Vietnam in loosing this battle of freedom and prosperity. No one is the winner of this war while everyone in the country had been suffering from unprecedented losses. A deep sincere appreciation to the United States for their commitment, support, and sacrifices in the effort to create freedom and prosperity for the people of Vietnam.

4. The following figures show comparison in term of GDP and life expectation for Vietnam, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia & Singapore during 1945-2012. Source: Gapminder
Not so big between difference these countries in 1945.
It’s a huge gap in 2012. Communist-led countries showed very poor performance. North Korea even destroyed its economic growth.

5. Marshall Plan
The Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Program, ERP) was the American initiative to aid Europe, in which the United States gave $13 billion (approximately $160 billion in current dollar value) in economic support to help rebuild European economies after the end of World War II.
The initiative is named after Secretary of State George Marshall. Marshall spoke of an urgent need to help the European recovery in his address at Harvard University in June 1947.
Secretary Marshall became convinced that Stalin had absolutely no interest in helping restore economic health in Western Europe.
The ERP addressed each of the obstacles to postwar recovery. The plan looked to the future, and did not focus on the destruction caused by the war. Much more important were efforts to modernize European industrial and business practices using high-efficiency American models, reducing artificial trade barriers, and instilling a sense of hope and self-reliance.
Marshall’s speech:
The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down. ... Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health to the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is not directed against any country, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Any government that is willing to assist in recovery will find full co-operation on the part of the USA. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.
Marshall was convinced that economic stability would provide political stability in Europe. He offered aid, but the European countries had to organize the program themselves. More a proposal than a plan, it was a challenge to European leaders to cooperate and coordinate. It asked Europeans to create their own plan for rebuilding Europe, indicating the United States would then fund this plan.
Aid to Asia
From the end of the war to the end of 1953, the U.S. provided grants and credits amounting to $5.9 billion to Asian countries, especially China/Taiwan ($1.051 billion), India ($255 million), Indonesia ($215 million), Japan ($2.44 billion), South Korea ($894 million), Pakistan ($98 million) and the Philippines ($803 million). In addition, another $282 million went to Israel and $196 million to the rest of the Middle East.
The total of American grants and loans to the world from 1945 to 1953 came to $44.3 billion. [4]
The estimated cost of Vietnam War is $111 billion (a $738 billion value in 2011) [5]

6. US’s perspective about Vietnam from 1945- 1975
32
Franklin D. Roosevelt
March 4, 1933 - April 12, 1945
12 Years, 1 months, 8 d.
Died in office
33
Harry S. Truman
April 12, 1945 - January 20, 1953
7 Years, 9 months, 8 d.
Did not seek reelection
34
Dwight Eisenhower
January 20, 1953 - January 20, 1961
8 years
Term ended
35
John F. Kennedy
January 20, 1961 - November 22, 1963
2 Years, 10 months, 2 d.
Assassinated
36
Lyndon Johnson
November 22, 1963 - January 20, 1969
5 Years, 1 month, 29 d.
Did not seek reelection
37
Richard Nixon
January 20, 1969 - August 9, 1974
5 Years, 6 months, 20 d.
Resigned
38
Gerald Ford
August 9, 1974 - January 20, 1977
2 Years, 5 months, 11 d.
Lost election
Source: Chart of presidents of the United States, http://www.jjmccullough.com/prezidents.htm

7. 34. Dwight Eisenhower President Dwight D. Eisenhower coins one of the most famous Cold War phrases when he suggests the fall of French Indochina to the communists could create a "domino" effect in Southeast Asia. The so-called "domino theory" dominated U.S. thinking about Vietnam for the next decade. In the long run, however, Eisenhower's announcement of the "domino theory" laid the foundation for U.S. involvement in Vietnam. John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson both used the theory to justify their calls for increased U.S. economic and military assistance to non-communist South Vietnam and, eventually, the commitment of U.S. armed forces in 1965 [6].
During a press conference on April 7, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower laid out the first major defense of the domino theory as captured below.
Q. Robert Richards, Copley Press: Mr. President, would you mind commenting on the strategic importance of Indochina to the free world? I think there has been, across the country, some lack of understanding on just what it means to us [7].
THE PRESIDENT. You have, of course, both the specific and the general when you talk about such things.
First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs.
Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world.
Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.
Now, with respect to the first one, two of the items from this particular area that the world uses are tin and tungsten. They are very important. There are others, of course, the rubber plantations and so on.
Then with respect to more people passing under this domination, Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses.
But when we come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but now you are talking really about millions and millions and millions of people.
Finally, the geographical position achieved thereby does many things. It turns the so-called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa, of the Philippines and to the southward; it moves in to threaten Australia and New Zealand.
It takes away, in its economic aspects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place in the world to go--that is, toward the Communist areas in order to live.
So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world.

8. 35. John F. Kennedy
What is "America's Stake in Vietnam" [8]:
“(1) First, Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the keystone to the arch, the finger in the dike. Burma, Thailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and obviously Laos and Cambodia are among those whose security would be threatened if the Red Tide of Communism overflowed into Vietnam.
…. Moreover, the independence of a Free Vietnam is crucial to the free world in fields other than the military. Her economy is essential to the economy of Southeast Asia; and her political liberty is an inspiration to those seeking to obtain or maintain their liberty in all parts of Asia - and indeed the world. The fundamental tenets of this nation's foreign policy, in short, depend in considerable measure upon a strong and free Vietnamese nation.
(2) Secondly, Vietnam represents a proving ground of democracy in Asia. However we may choose to ignore it or deprecate it, the rising prestige and influence of Communist China in Asia are unchallengeable facts. Vietnam represents the alternative to Communist dictatorship. If this democratic experiment fails, if someone million refugees have fled the totalitarianism of the North only to find neither freedom nor security in the South, then weakness, not strength, will characterize the meaning of democracy in the minds of still more Asians. The United States is directly responsible for this experiment - it is playing an important role in the laboratory where it is being conducted. We cannot afford to permit that experiment to fail.
(3) Third and in somewhat similar fashion, Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we have helped to shape its future. As French influence in the political, economic and military spheres has declined in Vietnam, American influence has steadily grown. This is our offspring - we cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs. And if it falls victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence - Communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest - then the United States, with some justification, will be held responsible; and our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low.
(4) Fourth and finally, America's stake in Vietnam, in her strength and in her security, is a very selfish one - for it can be measured, in the last analysis, in terms of American lives and American dollars. It is now well known that we were at one time on the brink of war in Indo-china - a war which could well have been more costly, more exhausting and less conclusive than any war we have ever known. The threat to such war is not now altogether removed from the horizon. Military weakness, political instability or economic failure in the new state of Vietnam could change almost overnight the apparent security which has increasingly characterized that area under the leadership of Premier Diem. And the key position of Vietnam in Southeast Asia, as already discussed, makes inevitable the involvement of this nation's security in any new outbreak of trouble.
This is the revolution we can, we should, we must offer to the people of Vietnam - not as charity, not as a business proposition, not as a political maneuver, nor simply to enlist them as soldiers against Communism or as chattels of American foreign policy - but a revolution of their own making, for their own welfare, and for the security of freedom everywhere. The Communists offer them another kind of revolution, glittering

9. and seductive in its superficial appeal. The choice between the two can be made only by the Vietnamese people themselves. But in these times of trial and burden, true friendships stand out.” In September of 1963, President Kennedy declared in an interview, "In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam, against the Communists. . . . But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. . . . [The United States] made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia." [9] [10]
Q. Following up that, sir, would you give us your appraisal of the situation in South Viet-Nam now, since the coup, and the purposes for the Honolulu conference?
“THE PRESIDENT: Now, that is our object, to bring Americans home, permit the South Vietnamese to maintain themselves as a free and independent country, and permit democratic forces within the country to operate, which they can, of course, much more freely when they are solved from the inside, and when the manipulation from the North is ended. So the purpose of the meeting in Honolulu is how to pursue these objectives.” [11]
36. Lyndon Johnson
President Lyndon B. Johnson's Address at Johns Hopkins University: "Peace Without Conquest" [12]
April 7, 1965
Viet-Nam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Viet-Nam's steaming soil.
Why must we take this painful road?
Why must this Nation hazard its ease, and its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away? We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny. And only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure.
This kind of world will never be built by bombs or bullets. Yet the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason, and the waste of war, the works of peace.
We wish that this were not so. But we must deal with the world as it is, if it is ever to be as we wish.
Over this war--and all Asia--is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.
WHY ARE WE IN VIETNAM?

10. Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Vietnam?
We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-Nam defend its independence.
And I intend to keep that promise.
To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.
We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.
We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in Southeast Asia--as we did in Europe--in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."
There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile--that China's power is such that it is bound to dominate all Southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the nations of Asia are swallowed up. There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for the defense of freedom.
37. Richard Nixon
425 - Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam [13]
November 3, 1969
Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place?
Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.
In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

11. Now, many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others--I among them--have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.
But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it? In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace. For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before.
--They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.
--We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.
--With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation--and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.
For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.
Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done. In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said: "we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence. We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Viet-Nam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there."
President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.
For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.
--A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.
--Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.
--This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace--in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.
Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace; it would bring more war. For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront.

12. In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.
In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.
--We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year.
--We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.
--We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.
……
We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.
In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.
Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them."
Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:
--First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
--Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.
--Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.
After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy. The defense of freedom is everybody's business--not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.
The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.
The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March.

13. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.
In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams' orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.
38. Gerald Ford
The war is finished Today, America can regain the sense of pride that existed before Vietnam. But it cannot be achieved by refighting a war that is finished as far as America is concerned. As I see it, the time has come to look forward to an agenda for the future, to unify, to bind up the Nation's wounds, and to restore its health and its optimistic self-confidence. [14]

14. References
[1]
N. Archives, "The United States Enters the Korean Conflict," [Online]. Available: http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/korean-conflict/. [Accessed 12 2014].
[2]
U. D. o. VA, "American's War Fact Sheet," [Online]. Available: http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf. [Accessed 12 2014].
[3]
UNDP, "Human Development Report," 2013. [Online]. Available: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/VNM.pdf. [Accessed 12 2014].
[4]
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[5]
S. Daggett, "Costs of Major U.S. Wars," 07 2010. [Online]. Available: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22926.pdf. [Accessed 2014].
[6]
History.com, "Eisenhower gives famous "domino theory" speech," [Online]. Available: http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/eisenhower-gives-famous-domino-theory-speech. [Accessed 2014].
[7]
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[8]
JFK, "John F. Kennedy Speeches, American's Stake in Vietnam," 1956. [Online]. Available: http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/JFK-Speeches/Vietnam-Conference- Washington-DC_19560601.aspx. [Accessed 2014].
[9]
J. F. K. P. L. A. MUSEUM, "JFK in History - Vietnam," 1963. [Online]. Available: http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Vietnam.aspx. [Accessed 2014].
[10]
J. Interview, "JFK on Vietnam," 1963. [Online]. Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vSjTNpyJMUo. [Accessed 2014].
[11]
J. P. L. a. Museum, "President Kennedy's News Conferences, November 14, 1963," 1963. [Online]. Available: http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/Press- Conferences/News-Conference-64.aspx. [Accessed 2014].
[12]
J. Lyndon B., "Peace Without Conquest," 1965. [Online]. Available: http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650407.asp. [Accessed 2014].
[13]
R. Nixon, "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam," 1969. [Online]. Available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2303. [Accessed 2014].

15. [14]
G. Ford, "Address at a Tulane University Convocation," 4 1975. [Online]. Available: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4859. [Accessed 12 2014].