The document is an essay submission discussing the 1998 Wye River Memorandum as a case study in international conflict resolution and mediation. It explores the complexities of international conflict, the definition and importance of mediation, and evaluates the success and failures of the Wye River Memorandum in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The author argues that while the memorandum did not lead to lasting peace, it exemplifies important aspects of successful mediation based on the perspectives of various scholars.

1. Schoolof Politics and International Relations EssaySubmissionSheet
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Module title and code Negotiation and Mediation PO848
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Luke Abbs
Student’s first name Devarshi
Student’s family name Sen Deka
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Word count 2616 (excluding Bibliography)
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The Case Study of the 1998 Wye River Memorandum: Understanding International Conflict,
Conflict Management, ‘Mediation’, ‘Successful Mediation’ and Lessons Learnt.
Introduction:

2. International Conflict is a ‘multicausal and multifaceted phenomenon, not easily accounted for in terms
of one single traits or approaches’ (Bercovitch, 1986: 43). International Conflict does not only
necessarily subsume nation-states conflicts, but also intrastate conflicts between state and non-state
actors also amplifies it and attracts International Mediation. It is also important to quote Bercovitch in
understanding the definite nature of International Conflict. In his view, ‘Like other social processes,
international conflict is not an autonomous, self-exacerbating processleading inevitably to violence and
destruction’ (Bercovitch, 1986, pp. 43). International Conflict is a ‘dynamic process’(Deutsch,1973),
whose development is decided/shaped by the nature of the ‘inter alia, by the nature of the issues, the
number of the parties involved, their prior relationship and the number of outsiders involved’
(Deutsch,1973). Thus, depending upon the nature of the conflict, actors – external, internal & also
primary and secondary, issues-economic, state aggression, occupation, colonization, socio-political
transformation, or the Cold War, International Conflict thus, at the backdrop of such considerations is
best defined, understood and resolved. In International Conflict resolution, Mediation is ‘a process of
conflict management’ (Kazmierczak, 2007) analogues but most importantly independent/ distinct of the
parties to the conflict’s own negotiation process,‘where those in conflict seek the assistance,or accept
an offer of help, from outsider to change their perceptions of behaviour, and to do so without resorting
to physical force or invoking the authority of the law’ (Bercovitch, 2002:7). After understanding the
nature of International Conflict, conflict resolution can be resolved through three different approaches.
They are: a. Unilaterally (through social or political transformation), b. Bilaterally (negotiation or a
peace dialogue between two conflicting parties), c. Multilaterally (binding and non-binding third party
intervention/involvement). ‘Mediation has proved to be the most popular form of contemporary conflict
resolution, present in nearly 60 percent of international and intrastate disputes between while nearly
half of all the post-Cold War crisis were mediated by third parties’ (Siniver and Thomas). In the
contemporary International Conflict resolution, despite mediation emerging as a tool of restoring some
peace and prosperity in many conflict zones mostly during the Cold War period. The case studies of
successful and failed Mediation are best highlighted through Siniver’s argument that ‘the academic
literature is surprisingly modest in its attemptsto provide tangible hypotheses about the linkage between
certain mediation characteristics and the likelihood of a successful outcome’ (Siniver and Thomas).

3. During the period of 1945-1974, out of 310 conflicts, ‘one can find that in 255 conflicts (or 82 percent)
there was some form of official mediation’ (Bercovitch,1986, pp.44). The above example highlights
the evolution of ‘mediation’ as an International Conflict Management apparatus.
CASE STUDY: 1998 Wye River Memorandum: Understanding ‘success Mediation’.
At the backdrop of the history and development of mediation, the Arab-Israeli conflict is the World’s
prolonged International conflict at the outset of First Arab-Israeli War in 1948. Many Mediation
strategies,memorandum, agreement, peace-treaties,accords have been executed/an attempt to execute,
but with fail. Similarly, the proposition forwarded in the paragraph above, it is also true in the Arab-
Israeli conflict. ‘Howeverdespite the diversity of third parties and their strategies,aswell as the changes
in global/regional contexts and the nature of relationships between the disputants, very few studies of
mediation have attempted to hypothesise about the relationship between contextual and procedural
factors of mediation and mediation outcomes in the Arab-Israeli conflict’ (Siniver and Thomas, pp.3).
The essay studies the 1998 Wye River Memorandum which was signed at the White House by Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat,through negotiations led by U.S. President Bill
Clinton, on October 1998 (Gellman,1998). The main objective of the Wye Memorandum was to
implement the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II Accord). The
main objective of the essay through reflecting the Mediation process in 1998 Wye River Memorandum
supports the argument forwarded by Siniver is that ‘if we accept that mediation success is to be
measured simply by the mutual and formal signing of an agreement, rather than by the ability of the
disputantsand external actorsto maintain it over a long period of time, then we can add four more
casesof successfulmediationin the Arab-Israeli conflict. These include the 1970 Rogers plan,the 1983
Israel-Lebanon peace treaty, and the 1997 Hebron agreement and the 1998 Wye River memorandum
between Israel and the PLO’ (Siniver and Thomas, pp.5).
History of the 1998 Wye River Memorandum and its Provisions
The basic foundation of the 1998 Wye River Memorandum is reflectedat the attempt of implementation
of 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II Accord). In the Israel-
Palestinian peace process, Oslo Accords envisioned a political autonomy rightfully granted to the

4. Palestinians. The vision of the Oslo Accords was to establish an interimPalestinian Self- government
in the Palestinian territorieson the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Oslo II Accord, redefined the
territorial boundaries between Palestine and Israel. The Oslo II Accord, created Areas A,B and C for
the administration of the disputed territorial claims between Palestinian people and Israeli settlements
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the Accord, Area A was to be administered by the Palestinian
authority. Whereas, Area B was to be administered by both the Palestinian authority and Israeli
authority. Last, Area C was to be administered by Israel. Despite, attempts from the rightful sovereign
of the Palestinian people, neither the Oslo Accords nor the Wye River memorandum could ever be
implemented. Israel, a sovereign nation, had only implemented stage 1 of the further redeployment
(FRD) which means it had withdrawn 2% of Area C instead of 13% (Bickerton and Klausner, 2002).
The Wye River Memorandum required the implementations of the provisions by both the parties. The
implementation of ‘reciprocal responsibilities’ was obligatory from both the conflicting states.
Phase one and two of the further redeployments
The Wye River Memorandum is seen to establish strategical transformation of political authority and
also the enforcement of redeployment by the Israeli Authority. Oslo II Accord did not specify the
percentage of deployment of territories to the Palestinian people. The Wye River Memorandum
contained Phases I and II. The Wye Memorandum also regulated the transfer of territory to the
Palestinian of 13% from Area C and shifts of parts of Area B to Area A. It also regulated the
‘redeployment’ strategy into three stages, and also set “Time Limit”. ‘
Stage 1 (November 1998): 2% from Area C to B; 7.1% from B to A
Stage 2 (December 1998): 5% from Area C to B
Stage 3 (January 1999): 5% from Area C to B; 1% from C to A; 7.1% from B to A
In total, 13% would thus be transferred from Area C. Area B would increase with 13% and Area A with
14%’ (The 1998 Wye River Memorandum).
The Wye River Memorandum not only envisioned to resolve territorial disputes but also tried to
promote an economic development dialogue between both the parties. It also stated that both the parties

5. have agreedto the timely opening of the Gaza Industrial Estate at Karni. It also statedthe ‘safe passage’
betweenWestBank and the Gaza strip. It also allowed to open an International Airport in the Gaza strip
during the interim autonomy of the Palestinian people. Due to the obligations to implement ‘reciprocal
responsibilities’ by both parties, Israel the primary actor failed to enforce the Wye Memorandum
effectively. It also envisioned the respect of dignity, human rights, rule of law and the obligation and
duty to protect the civilians.
Understanding the consequences of the 1998 Wye River Memorandum: Failure or Success ?
The essay through the case study of the 1998 Wye River memorandum, also supports the proposition
forwarded by Kazmierczak and Siniver and Thomas specific critical understanding and defining
successful Mediation. ‘The mediation outcome can be considered successful if it contributed to a
cessation or reduction of violent behaviour and hostilities, and the opening of the dialogue between the
parties. It is also seenassuccessfulwhen a formal and binding agreementthat settlesmany of the issues
in conflict hasbeen signed’ (Kazmierczak, 2007). Through the criteria’s specified above, the Wye River
Memorandum is viewed from the author’s perception is understood as a ‘successful mediation’. The
provisions of agreementon the political, territorial, respectfor human right, reduction of hostilities, and
also starting point of a peaceful dialogue between both the parties respectively. The essay forth the
argument that there is no Universal definition of what constitutes a ‘successful or failed mediation’.
The essay focuses on the Subjective criteria for a ‘successful or failed mediation’. Subjective criteria as
defined by the Contingency approach of understanding of the Successful / Failed Mediation as ‘
‘parties’ or the mediators’ perception that the goals of mediation had been achieved, or that a desired
change had taken place. Using the perspective, the mediation has been successful when the parties’
express satisfaction with the processor outcome of mediation, or when the outcome is seen as fair,
efficient, or effective’(Kazmierczak, 2007). Even though there is no peace betweenPalestine and Israel
till today, the essay despite being disappointed at non- enforcement of the Wye River Memorandum,
has supported the academic understanding success of ‘Mediation’. However, in the attempt to

6. understand the success of Mediation, it is also critical to understand and definition of ‘bias in
mediation’, and its correlation to a more ‘successful mediation’.
Mediator Bias: A success story of the 1998 Wye River Memorandum
Prior to understanding and defining and also correlation of Mediation Bias success,it is important to
cite the success of such ‘mediation’ tactics. The examples of ‘the Soviet Union's mediation efforts in
the war between India and Pakistan; Kissinger's mediation efforts in the Yom Kippur War in 1973;
Carter'sintervention betweenthe same parties in 1976; Algerian mediation betweenIranand the United
States on the American hostages held in Iran in 1980; and the United States mediation attempts in the
Israeli-Lebanese negotiations in 1983. In all these cases, the mediator was accepted and considered
successfuldespite his perceived alliance with one of the parties’ (Kazmierczak, 2007). The essay states
the “success” of the ‘mediation’ tactics employed by the US President Bill Clinton during the
negotiation dialogue between Israel and PLO. The role of the US President in bringing a “successful
mediation” at the table is mostly influenced by the ‘mediators’ resources’ which allows him to access
‘wider arsenal of strategies and tactics than weak mediators’ (Siniver and Thomas, pp.23). The
relationship between the tactics and strategies employed is highlighted in the subsequent sections.
Definition: Biased Mediation:
A ‘biased mediator’ is one who has closer ties with one of the parties to the conflict, and is perceived
as such by both sides’ (Touval, 1985: 375). It is also important to state the foremost criteria for a
“successful mediation” through ‘Carnevales’ (2002) distinction between strategic and tactical strength
in mediation is useful here. The first refers to the ̳social power that relates to the resources and
relationships that the mediator brings to the conflict, whereas the latter ̳refers to what the mediator does
at the negotiating table; this involves adroit manoeuvring, technique, and procedure’ (Siniver and
Thomas, pp.23). To state the relation between how a biased mediator, with wider access to ‘mediation

7. resources’and also wider range of mediation strategies and tactics which could be effectively employed
by the mediator.
Analysis: Highlighting Mediation Tactics and Strategies, Critical Turning Points and Outcome .
Stating the proposition that ‘biased mediation’ is always proven to be a tool for frequent successful
mediation. It is also seen as very strong ‘Mediation tactics’, and allows to reshape/reformulate the
strategy in times of conflict and change. Thus, ‘biased mediation’ is also related to the ‘GREAT
POWER MEDIATION’ (Kazmeirczak, (2007). In the 1998 Wye River Memorandum, it is clearly
depicted in history that US President opening the dialogue process between Israeland PLO. It is clearly
highlighted how US tried to push for a negotiation, with the fact that Bill Clinton intervening in the
negotiation processin order to finalize a concrete deal. Moreover, the ‘GreatPowerMediation’ strategy
is also employed by US President through inviting King Hussein, King of Jordon, to influence the
negotiation process,as he was earlier involved in reducing political tensions and also influencing both
the parties to start a dialogue. Supporting the above proposition is also highlighted through the
understanding as ‘Large states may also be tempted to impose the agreements that are to their liking’
(Rubin, 1992: 267-268). To interpret the above proposition in the Wye River Negotiation process it is
important to interpret ‘that are to their liking’ is the fact that Bill Clinton inviting King of Jordan, is
seen as a strategical m
It also reflectsa correlation of another component of successfulmediator, which canbe linked to ‘biased
mediator’, which is ‘a different kind of mediator role is usually played by convenorsand facilitators of
inter- active problem-solving workshops, dialogue groups, back-channel meetings between
adversaries, and other official and non- official meetings. These settings tend to be particularly useful
in preparing the ground for official negotiations, invigorating stalled negotiations, and developing
support for negotiated agreements’ (Kriesberg,2001, pp.380).

8. Critical Turning Point:
During the final stage of negotiation was to become a ‘failed mediation’, when Israel Prime Minister
Netanyahu asked US President to release Jonathan Pollard, who served as American naval intelligence
officer who had been disclosing classified information to Israel, and had been serving in the US prison.
Despite being in a critical stage of negotiation, Bill Clinton affirmed to ‘review’ the case (Glenza and
Beaumont, 2015). Moreover, King Hussein’s involvement also managed to ease the rising tensions
between Israeland PLO during the negotiation process at critical stage where the negotiation, without
‘biased mediation’ would have resulted in a ‘failed negotiation and mediation’.
Outcome:
As stated above through Siniver’s proposition that if ‘if we accept that mediation success is to be
measured simply by the mutual and formal signing of an agreement, rather than by the ability of the
disputantsand external actorsto maintain it over a long period of time, then we can add four more
cases of successful mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict’ (Siniver and Thomas, pp.5). Thus, the essay
also reflects the academic and critical understanding and also defining ‘successfulmediation’ through
the ‘mutual conscience agreement’ between Israel and PLO in the 1998 Wye River Memorandum.
Nevertheless, the history of River memorandum did and does not yield ‘any peace and justice’ to the
Palestinian People. Academically, and critically 1998 Wye River Memorandum is seen as a ‘successful
mediation’.

9. Lessons Learnt:
From the above referred authors, critiques, commentators, and also the fathers’ of ‘International
Mediation’ through books, journals and online articles, the essay forwards the following crucial points
learnt:
1. Like Great Power Mediation strategy, smaller nations/entities should also be given an
influencing power to balance the bargaining in the Negotiation and Mediation process.
2. Also, such small state actors/ entities should also be invited in mediation process,to show their
cause of peace and security of the neighbouring nations.
3. The US President Bill Clinton efforts in the progressiveness and ‘biased’ mediation tactics,
should be taken as an example by contemporary mediators and negotiators.
4. Mediation should also focus on issues which ‘unites rather than what divides them’ (Bartoli,
1999)
5. Lastly, no matter what forum of ‘conflict management’ whether be negotiation or mediation, it
is always important for the mediators and negotiators to remember always ‘separate the people
from problem’ (Fish and Ury, 1983).

10. Bibliography
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