CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window (EU)
Pultusk Academy of Humanities (Poland)
Rivne Institute of Slavonic studies (Ukraine)

CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS
RESEARCH PROJECT

by

Shynkaruk A.L.

Assistant Professor
of
International relations faculty
of
Rivne Institute of Slavonic studies (Ukraine)

- 2008 -

CONTENTS

PART I: NEW FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNICATIONS ..... 3
Media ........................................ 16
Methods ...................................... 21

PART II: GWOT. CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN MODERN
BATTLE OF IDEAS .............................. 25
Messages ..................................... 31
Rapid response team .......................... 32
“New Way Forward” Case: September 2007........ 38

PART III: KOSOVO CASE. EU CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS
IN INTEGRATION AND ENLARGEMENT PROCESSES ...... 51
EU civilian crisis management................. 52
Come to Europe! .............................. 57

PART IV: RUSSIAN FEDERATION. MODERN FOREIGN
POLICY COMMUNICATIONS IN CRISES SITUATIONS .... 70
Russian-Georgian relations.................... 76

PART V: UKRAINE. FOREIGN POLICY MANAGEMENT.
CRISIS COMMUNICATION APPROACH ................. 95
Foreign policy management of Ukraine.......... 95
Bistro Plan: Yushchenko post-crisis campaign .. 98
Wild Energy: “gas war” of Ukraine and Russia . 102
Echo of Dreams: Yanukovych and crisis of
President foreign policy .................... 109
We’ll be the first: Tymoshenko............... 113

Crisis communicatons in global politics 3

PART I:
NEW FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNICATIONS

Statistics of modern international relations shows some associate tendencies.
First of all, growth of globalization and technical revolution of ICT which have made
world politics more transparent and increased the effects of changes in any region of the
world. Secondly, change of the system of intergovernmental relationships from bipolar
on multipolar global system "peppered with fragile, failing, and failed states, and in
which large areas have been ravaged by years of violence, contestation, and uneven
development"1. The third and the most important element was new features of conflicts
and crises arising up between the states. Not looking on considerable reduction of the
armed (civil) conflicts as compared to the period of Cold war, social conflicts got new
qualities. Foremost it was the growth of conflicts and diplomatic crises in the
intergovernmental relations, related to the resources supplies, their transit and right of
ownership. According Ploughshares researcher Ken Epps "some kind of uneasy
balance" of small wars emerged. Researchers from HIICR also noted that non-violent
political conflicts have constant tendency of growth and they also indicated a change in
conflict conduct.
While fewer conflicts were fought out with the systematic use of large-scale violence, more and
more disputes were waged with the sporadic use of violence, e.g. ambushes, guerilla attacks,
bombings and the like2.
Former director of Swedish SIPRI A.J. K. Bailes marked that a modern world
linked to “risks” and “threats” for human security and survival3. The main task of the
state and society is to take into account all spectrum of risks for correct definition of
priorities of conflict management. However such definition, according to A.Bailes, is a
difficult process, as it is necessary to take into account different factors: natural
catastrophes, social or economic instability, terrorist actions etc. for estimation,
probabilities, consequences (effect of domino) of risks and crises. Besides “technical”

1
Marshall M.G., Goldstone J. Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility 2007 Foreign
Policy Bulletin (2007), 17: 3-21 Cambridge University Press
2
CONFLICT BAROMETER 2007 // Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
[http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/index.html]
3
Bailes A. A world of risk // SIPRI Yearbook 2007 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
[http://yearbook2007.sipri.org/files/YB07Intro.pdf]

PartI: 4
New Foreign Policy Communications

models of crises management should be expanded in order to cover the transnational,
often global, diffusion of many major risk factors today and to assess the vulnerabilities
or resilience of the world system as a whole.
Bailes also noted that "it is tempting to act to pre-empt, as well as limit and
eliminate, risk. In traditional warfare or power play, the costs of this and the ways to
reduce possible backlash are relatively well understood. The post-cold war environment
has facilitated many kinds of interventionist action (not just military) but has made the
consequences harder to assess and to master—especially when confronting non-state
actors. Views on targets and the legitimacy of various methods vary widely around the
world. Forceful approaches such as the USA’s military ‘pre-emption’ efforts can bring a
stronger backlash than anticipated from stubborn opponents, the domestic audience and
world opinion. Risk may also be ‘displaced’, so that the consequences affect innocent
parties or rebound on the initiator by another route. Fundamentally, it is futile to address
a risk without considering how one’s own behaviour may generate or aggravate it. Thus,
risk-based security analysis may actually be a useful brake on potential recklessness".
The risks, threats and “unexpected” events become thus defining feature of
modern international relations and change the structure of foreign relations
management. In particular, decision-making process becomes less hierarchical and
results in enlargement of functions of diplomacy from traditional representation,
reporting, and negotiation to additional facilitation and coordination. According to Net
Diplomacy authors “this situation reflects a shift away from clearly defined, more or
less hierarchical relationships toward a more fluid and dynamic, less hierarchical and
well-defined organization that must deal with crosscutting equities, continually
changing boundaries and jurisdictions, and formal and informal agencies and
interests”4. The subject of international relations also broadens: besides balance of
powers, weapons control and borders control, such issues as refugees, human rights,
transnational crime and terrorism, drugs, and the environment, as well as economics,
international trade, financial flows, trade, intellectual property and technology concerns,
labor standards, and negotiations over technical standards and protocols pass from area
of "low politics" into international relations.

4
Net Diplomacy I. Beyond Foreign Ministries. Diplomacy in the Information Age: Implications for
Content and Conduct [http://www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14b.html]


These circumstances show that modern foreign policy is far beyond the relations
between elites and leaders. So, development of international economic relations results
in a necessity to strengthen efficiency in-depth interaction with broader audiences. The
active use of ICT (important source of changes) becomes one of the tools of this co-
operation, as “diplomats and MFAs have lost the monopoly on information about
foreign affairs. They are no longer the sole voice of the sovereign and representative of
the state, and they do not control the flow of information to and from their
governments”.
Nature of such system-functional changes does actual so-called crisis approach
for optimization of governance. However, in this case it is important to note opinion of
James L. Richardson5, who wrote in 1994, that diplomacy in wide sense as process of
formulation of purpose and policy, decision-making and co-operation with other states
can not fully use crisis-management principles, because it hides the problem of
international politics, when any side wants to lose in a conflict. At the same time CM is
aimed to decline conflict of divergences for different participants of international
relations. Author also marks that term “management” creates additional frames
requiring technical rationality and efficiency of foreign-policy decisions.
Strategies of foreign-policy crisis-management arose up during Cold war (so
called nuclear crisis management) and were related to the policy of retention between
USSR and the USA. On a modern stage CM in international politics is considered as
development of plan and actions related to the humanitarian, military, technical and
other types of threats to national interests of the state or citizens. However, states-
nations as traditional participants of international relations also have a system crisis: it is
necessary to modernize activity of basic participants of foreign policy and to revise
foreign priorities. Thus there is another task: internal transformation of foreign-policy
making of political leaders, MFAs and diplomatic representatives according to
emergence of new forms of foreign-policy management: unofficial, media, cultural,
cyber, digital, public and other forms of diplomacy. According Boin, Hart & Stern “In
times of crisis, communities and members of organizations expect their public leaders to
minimize the impact of the crisis at hand, while critics and bureaucratic competitors try
to seize the moment to blame incumbent rulers and their policies. In this extreme

5
Richardson J.L. Crisis Diplomacy. Cambridge University Press, 1994. 426 p.

PartI: 6

environment, policy makers must somehow establish a sense of normality, and foster
collective learning from the crisis experience… In the face of crisis, leaders must deal
with the strategic challenges they face, the political risks and opportunities they
encounter, the errors they make, the pitfalls they need to avoid, and the paths away from
crisis they may pursue. The necessity for management is even more significant with the
advent of a 24-hour news cycle and an increasingly internet-savvy audience with ever-
6
changing technology at its fingertips .
In this situation governmental institutions can not pretend on leadership (it could
be ineffective for the management), but they are able to use experience of multinational
corporations, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs for reacting on new crises and
to revise style of the activity. Consequently, using terminology of strategic
management, it is possible to divide foreign-policy activity into proactive and reactive.
According to I. Ansoff during reactive strategy the reaction does not begin until all
possible operative variants will not be tested. Within the framework of every class of
reactions concrete measures will be tested consistently. The behavior in this case is the
process of tests and errors depending on past experience. At the same time, during
proactive management operative-strategic tasks are examined consistently; however for
specific measures it is used an analytical approach, namely alternative variants are
compared, and in the case of necessity the row of measures provided. For example, the
element of proactive diplomacy is projection of a ‘correct’ image of the country in
adverse situations—even if in reality its capacity to radically or immediately influence
its country’s image perception abroad may be limited7.
So Japanese foreign policy consider “strategic information provision as the foundation for
proactive diplomacy”. White paper about Japanese foreign policy stated that in promoting
Japan’s “proactive diplomacy”—that is, diplomacy in which Japan’s goals and intentions are
clearly enunciated—it is critically important that Japan, as a democratic nation, gain the
understanding and support of its people with regard to its diplomatic policy and the role of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In light of this, beyond (i) intensifying the provision of information
to newspapers, television shows, and other kinds of mass media that the Japanese people interact
with on a daily basis, in recent years, the Ministry has also proactively undertaken new efforts,
namely (ii) publicizing information through the Internet, and (iii) providing information to

6
The politics of crisis management: public leadership under pressure / Arjen Boin ... [et al.]. Cambridge,
UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 182 p.
7
Rana K.S. Bilateral Diplomacy DiploProjects: Diplo Foundation, 2002. 283 p.


eminent persons in various fields. In addition, the Ministry is making efforts to have two-way
communication with the Japanese people by (iv) public relations through dialogue with the
people and (v) gathering public comments and opinions.

However the state is the complex system with strong probability of delays,
therefore reactive strategy of saving and support of steady relations prevails in a foreign
policy before beginning of crisis: "a postponement of start of actions after the awareness
of threat to the moment of appearance of confidence in its existence" (Ansoff). For
example, Soviet strategy of crisis management during Cold War years considered crisis
as an objective situation, corresponding to a period of threat marked by actual
preparations for war. It allowed to USSR to use weak probability of war for the conduct
of foreign policy. Thus, as S.Shenfield noted, once "crisis"—the very antechamber of
war—has been reached, avoiding war takes overriding priority”.
With the origin of instability there are attempts to pass to proactive strategy with
the use of preventive diplomacy for the decline of tension. At further growth of tension
the choice of reactive (attempt of economy) or proactive (choice of optimum variants of
reaction) diplomacy depends on complication of conflict (ordinary crisis or military
collision), and also from quality of management and understanding of situation by
leaders. For this purpose crisis diplomacy and crisis management are used, based on
determination of aims of conflict—for changing of foreign-policy strategy (crisis
approach) and initiation of conflicts or for saving of foreign-policy course and
avoidance of conflicts (countercrisis approach).
However specific of management in international crises is that sides plan to
represent the point of view. As a result there is the row of limitations capable to
influence negatively on the conduct of participants of international crisis. Among them:
wrong communication with different interpretations of news by different sides and
media; psychological stress related to high intensity of international crises and causing
the wrong decisions; inadequate standards of return activity as a result of inflexibility
and inoperativeness of bureaucratic and military structures; casual events-triggers able
to result in escalation of critical statements and transition to the opened opposition8.

8
Stumpf M.S. "Preventing Inadvertent War: Problems and Prospects for Sino-American Crisis
Management." Cambridge, MA: Preventive Defense Project, July 2002.
[http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/3118/preventing_inadvertent_war.html?breadcrumb=
%2F]

PartI: 8

Professor D. Caldwell described the features of US style of crisis-management during Caribbean
crisis, which however can be typical for the foreign-policy behavior in any state, as related to the
psychological features of president or other key political leader. For example, confidence in that
it is possible to manage a crisis according to personal estimations; unexpected change in the
conduct after the beginning of crisis; to lean exceptionally on the limited number of advisers for
decision-making; persons who have unpopular ides are excluded from advisers of decision-
makers; president’s concentration of authority over power structures; overload of informative
channels during a crisis; use of threat of force (nuclear weapon) as facilities of notification about
seriousness of conflict9.
Post-crisis diplomacy is directed on reduction of conflict. It can be cease-fire
which enables to reduce tension and to transfer the relations in the plane of ordinary
crisis. On this stage it is made basement for proactive diplomacy according to the choice
of optimum form of relations, however if the decision of conflict was attained on the
basis of former experience, there is probability of return of reactive foreign policy.
The similar specific of dynamics of international crises determines the row of
requirements for a foreign-policy crisis management. The correct decision-making thus
needs reduction of time pressure on policymakers and commanders. “One result of the
compression of decision time in a crisis is that the likelihood of undetected attack and
falsely detected attack errors increases”. Important condition is also an offer the other a
safety valve or a face-saving exit from a predicament that has escalated beyond its
original expectations. The search for options should back neither crisis participant into a
corner from which there is no graceful retreat. At the same time each side maintains an
accurate perception of the other side's intentions and military capabilities. This
becomes difficult during a crisis because, in the heat of a partly competitive relationship
and a threat-intensive environment, intentions and capabilities can change. As S.
Cimbala noted further:
Intentions can change during a crisis if policymakers become more optimistic about gains or
more pessimistic about potential losses during the crisis. Capabilities can change due to the
management of military alerts and the deployment or other movement of military forces.
Heightened states of military readiness on each side are intended to send a two-sided signal: of
readiness for the worst if the other side attacks, and of a nonthreatening steadiness of purpose in
the face of enemy passivity. This mixed message is hard to send under the best of crisis
management conditions, since each state's behaviors and communications, as observed by its

9
Caldwell D. The Cuban Missile Affair and the American Style of Crisis Management RAND, 1989
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N2943/]


opponent, may not seem consistent. Under the stress of time pressures and of military threats,
different parts of complex security organizations may be making decisions from the perspective
of their narrowly defined, bureaucratic interests. These bureaucratically chosen decisions and
actions may not coincide with the policymakers' intent, nor with the decisions and actions of
other parts of the government10.
But in most cases crises emerge as a result of lack of information and
communication, thus the choice of reactive or proactive foreign policy depends also on
the system of foreign-policy communications. Thus the key requirement of successful
crisis management is communications transparency based on clear signaling and
undistorted communications. Signaling refers to the requirement that each side must
send its estimate of the situation to the other. It is not necessary for the two sides to have
identical or even initially complementary interests. But a sufficient number of correctly
sent and received signals are prerequisite to effective transfer of enemy goals and
objectives from one side to the other. If signals are poorly sent or misunderstood, steps
taken by the sender or receiver may lead to unintended consequences, including
miscalculated escalation. Communications transparency also includes high fidelity
communication between adversaries.
According to E. Gilboa, “definition of diplomacy… refers to a communication
system through which state and non-state actors, including politicians, officials, and
professional diplomats, express and defend their interests, state their grievances, and
issue threats and ultimatums. Diplomacy is a channel of contact for clarifying positions,
probing for information, and convincing states and other actors to support one’s
position”11. Consequently crisis communications became elements of management in
international relations: issue, media, internet, rumour-management12. They could be
integrated in foreign-policy communications in different forms: traditional diplomatic
activity, preventive diplomacy, propaganda, psychological operations, public
diplomacy, cultural, cyber and media diplomacy.
As a whole crisis communications are estimated as “…dialog between the
organisation and its public prior to, during, and after the negative occurrence. The

10
Cimbala S.J. Nuclear Crisis Management and Information Warfare Parameters, Summer 1999, pp. 117-
28. [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/99summer/cimbala.htm]
11
Gilboa, E. 2002. Real-Time Diplomacy: Myth and Reality. In E. Potter (Ed.), Cyber-Diplomacy.
Montreal: McGill-Queen University Press, 83-109.
12
Naveh Ch. The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Theoretical Framework //
Conflict & communication online, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2002 [www.cco.regener-online.de]

PartI: 10

dialog details strategies and tactics are designed to minimize damage to the image of
the organisation…”13. K.Fearn-Banks marks also that effective CC can both eliminate
the crisis but also to influence positively on reputation of organization after a crisis.
Thus the special attention is paid to work with a target audience and public relations14.
However crises communications straightly depend on activity and purposefulness of
foreign-policy departments and diplomats, their ability to work with media and public.
Besides, not looking on the publicness, CC is often used on the stage of origin of
conflict, while by the purpose of CM in foreign policy rather to diminish possible
channels of loss of information or change of accents with the purpose to change public
attention (Wag the Dog Principle). In addition very often the functions of crisis
management and media planning in foreign affairs are passed to external organizations:
to advertising agencies, consulting companies etc., which develop action plan
depending on the features of country or geographical area of conflict.
Crisis communications include strategies according to stages of crises:
prevention, preparation, response and learning. These stages serve as a framework for crisis
communication in a foreign-policy management and for effective communications of
political leaders and missions abroad:
Openness—information about an issue released immediately and based on internal and
external opportunities to tell own side of the story.
Agenda Setting—country’s values should be communicated first and only then
representatives should plan reaction of the media.
Relevance—leaders and diplomats should save communication of importance of the issue
in the first place.
Legal Limitations—all international reactions should be based on internal legal counsel
which should coincide with media reaction.
Legal Implications: Cultural—it is important to foresee cultural impact and the laws of
the hosting country-area of conflict.
Release Coordination—leaders and missions abroad should coordinate actions and not to
release conflicting information.
Public Think—main task for foreign affairs crisis management is public perception so
diplomats should address public internally and externally what they would
want to know from representatives during a crisis.

13
Fearn-Banks K. Crisis communications: a casebook approach 3rd ed. Mahwah, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum,
2007. 384p.
14
Responding to Crisis: A Rhetorical Approach to Crisis Communication. Eds.: Dan P. Millar, Robert L.
Heath. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Mahwah, NJ. Publication, 2003.


Responsiveness—missions should act quickly and responding to any requests for
information, or requests about issues affecting crisis.
Message—diplomats should be especially active in sending appropriate message during the
initial phase of the crisis.
Cultural—international crises should include cultural, ethnic sensitivities and language
elements of communication.
Single Spokesperson—there should be single source of answer during international crisis
from each side.
Firefighter—firefighter diplomacy include person or group, who examine issues during a
crisis that can flare up and/or intensify the situation further.
Understanding of crisis communications in foreign affairs could be improved as
T.M.Woodyard noted that crisis communications and war principles have correlations.
The shared principles are: objective; offensive; economy of force; maneuver; unity of
command; security; surprise and simplicity15.
WAR CRISIS COMMUNICATION
Objective Define the problem and objective, concern
Offensive Concern, answer what happened, direct communication
Economy of force Centralize information flow, crisis team
Maneuver Crisis team, contain the problem
Unity of command Centralize information flow, crisis team, spokesperson
Security Centralize information flow, direct communications
Surprise Answer what happened, concern
Simplicity Centralize information flow, crisis team
However it determines as well specific of crises communications in the
international relations. In comparison with natural, humanitarian, technical catastrophes,
the political conflicts of international meaning have mainly hidden goals, that influences
at choice of strategy of conduct of sides: confrontation or collaboration. As a result, the
sides of international conflict follow foremost internal national interests for creation of
the crisis program of actions at diplomatic, political or power level. Some kind of
rivalry arises up between two and more programs of activity in a crisis situation, in
mainly political international conflicts the fight goes for positive perception by public of
events, not for the decision of conflict.

15
Woodyard T.M. Crisis communication: A commanders guide to effective crisis communication
[http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/98-307.pdf]

PartI: 12

Before crises communications were part of information work of diplomatic
missions and such activity was concentrated around informing of elites. Revolution in
information and communications technologies (ICT) has transformed the ways in which
diplomatic communications take place. Governments and other diplomatic actors have
new tools to communicate directly to publics without having to use traditional channels
of mediation. The emergence of these capabilities has had the effect of blurring the
boundaries between three once rather distinct forms of political communication:
propaganda, lobbying, and public diplomacy. Specialists define three vectors of
communication work used by militaries and diplomats: Public Affairs (PA),
Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), and Information Operations (IO). The latter type
of work does not look to influence decisions or “buying habits”, this is primarily a
technical field.
At the same time public affairs and community relations activities directed
toward both the external and internal publics. This is generally a reactive method of
communication designed to explain events after they occur, but not necessarily designed
to influence behavior. They tend to focus on the media as its distribution channel.
Public relations do not necessarily direct their message toward neutral or hostile
audiences. Thus, considering modern stage of public diplomacy we should note that it
united elements of traditional propaganda, crisis management and new technologies.
There are different approaches to definition of public relations in international
relations. According to Bruce Gregory16 public diplomacy, public affairs, non-military
international broadcasting are among core instruments of strategic communications in
conflict zones17. Traditionally term “public diplomacy” has been used in USA as
truthful propaganda. But critics, such as the editors of the National Security Archive at
George Washington University, have viewed it in more nefarious terms, as a form of
"covert propaganda", when "public diplomacy" turned out to mean public relations-
lobbying".
Crisis management potential of public diplomacy could be shortly described by
US Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World which noted

16
Gregory B. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms
[http://www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/gregory.pdf]
17
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, (Washington, D.C.:
Defense Science Board, 2004), pp. 12-13. [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-
Strategic_Communication.pdf]


that “public diplomacy [was] the promotion of the national interest by informing,
engaging, and influencing people around the world. Public diplomacy helped win the
Cold War, and it has the potential to help win the war on terror."18 Today public
diplomacy priorities concentrated on “the management of the complex issues and fast-
breaking situations”19. As Daryl Copeland argued public diplomacy nowadays aimed on
the resolution of asymmetrical conflict
The intensity of interaction and the speed of events that typify counterinsurgency have created a
huge opportunity for public diplomacy. This association of public diplomacy with
[counterinsurgency] is not as much of a stretch as it might initially appear. Conflict situations in
many ways represent the leading edge of the craft, with useful insights to be gleaned for
application to mainstream public diplomacy practice. …Creative, empathetic public diplomats,
fully aware of the background and details of a given conflict, can use local knowledge to learn to
think like, and in certain respects identify with, the insurgents. The potential for intelligence
generation to inform policy, particularly in the critically important area of human intelligence, is
real and substantial.
As a result Daryl Copeland concluded that “public diplomacy [i]s an
indispensable tool in tackling global challenges, in particular the nexus of
underdevelopment and insecurity”.
Besides public diplomacy is seen under different angles from military and
diplomats. First one aimed to use public diplomacy elements as new tool for persuading
foreign audiences meanwhile diplomats mostly speaking about information,
engagement and only then influencing people in other countries. Political and
diplomatic meaning of public diplomacy is also discussed that caused by different
models of foreign policy communications. Brian Hocking noted that public diplomacy
“in the United States rests on state-centered models in which people are seen as targets
and instruments of foreign policy. The dominant question is how to target them more
effectively. The answer usually involves allocating more resources to public diplomacy
programs, adopting a better-coordinated or ‘holistic’ approach, and responding more
rapidly and more flexibly to crisis situations”.

18
"Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab
& Muslim World," p. 13. (October 1, 2003) [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf]
19
Copeland D. No Dangling Conversation: Portrait Of The Public Diplomat // ENGAGEMENT Public
Diplomacy in a Globalised World P.138-139 [http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-
fco/publications/publications/pd-publication/dangling-conversation]

PartI: 14

At the same time, there is another model—network model of public
diplomacy—that “rests on a fundamentally different picture of how diplomacy works…
It recognises the importance of policy networks in managing increasingly complex
policy environments through the promotion of communication, dialogue and trust”.
Besides in the “network [model], the focus is on the identification of policy objectives
in specific areas and of ‘stakeholders’ who possess interests and expertise related to
them20. These stakeholders are viewed less as targets or consumers of government-
generated messages than as possible partners and producers of diplomatic outcomes.
Hierarchical communication flows are replaced by multidirectional flows that are not
directly aimed at policy elites, although the ultimate goal will often be to influence elite
attitudes and policy choices”.
Example of new public diplomacy was proposed by Alex Evans and David
21
Steven . In particular they mentioned terrorism as form of public diplomacy and
terrorist organisations that “adopt decentralised organisational structures and seek to
develop alternative sources of authority. And they are innovative communicators,
weaving together the propaganda of word and deed, and exploiting the potential of new
communication channels”. Al-Qaeda, according to Alex Evans and David Steven, has
“steadily degraded from a centralised organisation to an amorphous network, has set out
a simple strategy: entangle ‘the ponderous American elephant’ in conflict overseas, thus
radicalising potential recruits and creating a cycle of violence that aims to ‘make
America bleed to the point of bankruptcy’.
Additionally Alex Evans and David Steven defined strategies of new public
diplomacy: Engagement, Shaping, Disruptive, Destructive. Characteristics of these
strategies show similarity to crisis communications strategies. For example, engagement
strategies based on multiple ways to initiate, feed and broaden a conversation—and
sustain it until a tipping point is reached (accordingly public think and responsiveness).
The aim of shaping strategies is to inject new content, change the composition of key

20
Stakeholders refer to spokepersons in crisis communications. Though definitions of stakeholders vary,
but the most useful is: ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the
organisation’s objectives’ (R. Edward Freeman, Strategic management: a stakeholder approach,
London: Financial Times/Prentice-Hall, 1983). [Bird C. Strategic Communication And Behaviour
Change: Lessons From Domestic Policy // ENGAGEMENT Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World]
21
Evans A., Steven D. Towards a Theory of Influence for Twenty-First-Century Foreign Policy: Public
Diplomacy In A Globalised World [http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-
fco/publications/publications/pd-publication/21c-foreign-policy]


networks, or do both simultaneously—given that a new narrative is the best way to
bring new voices into a debate (accordingly release coordination or message). The aim
of disruptive strategies is to marginalise or co-opt opposing interests, or fundamentally
to shift the terms of a debate (accordingly agenda setting). And finally destructive
strategies in public diplomacy used to deny an opponent space. “This is public
diplomacy as propaganda or psy-ops. Deceptive tactics can be used to confuse and
undermine the adversary” (accordingly relevance).
Propaganda and psychological operations are used mainly on the stages of
tension and opened conflicts between the states. Consequently they also are the element
of foreign-policy crises communications and can be estimated according to the features
of strategic (persuasive) communications. It is thus necessary to indicate relationship of
strategic communications and public diplomacy. Depending on dynamics of conflict
and actor, which uses these technologies, character of information work changes.
PSYOPS is a proactive event. It is defined as planned operations to convey
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions,
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately influence the behavior of foreign
governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological
operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the
originator's objectives. Generally, PSYOPS are used in tactical or operational level
operations to sway the actions of enemy combatants and potential combatants and not
directed to the general populace. Depending on the immediate need PSYOPS may or
may not be truthful. As a result using PSYOPs anywhere other than the tactical
battlefield could hurt us more than help. If the message is perceived as (or is) lies then
we lose credibility.
Specialists from crisis management company Booz Allen Hamilton estimated
eight best commercial and social marketing practices for relevance to PSYOP22.
- Have a strategic communications planning process.
- Segment and re-segment audience.
- Become a customer-centric marketing organization.
- Become results-oriented; pre-test concepts and measure results.

22
Lamb Ch.J. Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience
National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. September 2005
[http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occassional_Papers/Lamb_OP_092005_Psyops.pdf]

PartI: 16

- Balance long-term brand image with short-term promotions.
- Become a local player.
- Create and engage in communities.
- Use alternative channels and evaluate when to bypass traditional ones.

Media
Mass media, new forms of mass communications based on Internet should be
considered as inalienable part of communication management in a modern foreign
policy and international relations. Thus, if the traditional mass-media based on mainly
thematic inertia of attention, concentrated on main events and not lighting other events,
new technologies allow to the audience to take part in presentation of positions of the
different states and social groups, to influence on forming of public opinion and to
create competition of news. As a result, new media besides classic functions of agenda-
setting, framing, priming23 fulfill also function of mediator in the international messages
transmission. Thus often complementing events by non-existent details and distortion of
facts. It often becomes the factor of complication of relations of media and MFA,
because the foreign media use thoughts of national leaders in estimation of other states
and their representatives. And these estimations can’t coincide with a foreign-policy
course of the other country, especially if the countries are in conflict. Besides analysing
the last trends of media, researchers mark considerable reduction of foreign
representative offices of media conditioned by economic ineffectiveness of permanent
presence24.
As a result R.K.Manoff discussed that media's role in conflict management is
quite small. Although, as Manoff noted, media could play the roles of engaging in
confidence building, identifying underlying interests of each party involved,
establishing networks to circulate information on conflict prevention, etc.
Thus development of information technologies requires the constant revision of
media-diplomatic relations, and role of media not always estimated as positive.
Especially in crises situations when, as writes M.Baum, "…media outlets cover major

23
Hulme, S.J. The Modern Media: The Impact on Foreign Policy. Fort Leavenworth, KS, Army
Command and General Staff College, June 1, 2001. 106 p.
[http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/media-hulme.pdf]
24
Potter, E.H. (Ed.) Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: McGill-
Queen's University Press 2002


events in the past, including the entertainment-oriented soft news media. When they do
cover a political story, soft news outlets focus more on “human drama” than traditional
news media—especially the character and motivations of decision-makers, as well as
individual stories of heroism or tragedy—and less on the political or strategic context,
or substantive nuances, of policy debates. …[S]oft news media raise attentiveness to
foreign policy crises. Because they rarely cover ‘politics as usual’, however, soft news
does not raise interest in foreign policy beyond crises. When public attentiveness to
crises rises, in turn, politics becomes increasingly oriented toward the interests and
priorities of the newly attentive segments of the population. In the United States, soft
news reorients politics toward personalities and away from policies"25.
Characterizing coverage of foreign policy Nik Goving specifies that media often
counterproductive for diplomatic activity and crisis management.
Too often during discussions or negotiations, the protagonists or delegations perform somewhat
theatrically for the press corps, thereby apparently stiffening their positions and compounding
the problems of mediation or confidence building…. It is misguided for diplomats, the military,
and NGOs to view the "media" as a single, homogeneous grouping of journalists and
broadcasters who act in a predictable, uniform way. The media are neither monolithic or
homogeneous. They are a diverse, highly competitive, unpredictable lot.
During foreign-policy crises unconnected with global problems and not attracting
public as audiences of mass-media, “there is no automaticity to a uniform, international
news response. Indeed, the response of news organisations at all levels has become
increasingly variable and unpredictable”. Besides attention of media can be related to
the editorial policy, but here the selection of events takes place depending on national
priorities of country.
Nik Goving continues that "a crisis in one part of the world can easily be viewed
elsewhere as irrelevant. The level of coverage (or refusal to cover) will often be a
function of national interest and distance from the event. The lower the national interest
and the greater the distance, the less likely it is that news organisations will have
anything more than a passing interest in the developing story. There is no uniform
media response that defies international borders and national identities. Responses to
conflicts depend on considerations like editorial perceptions, the nationalities of those
fighting and the forces being engaged to stop them, calculations about the interests of
25
Baum M.A. Soft News and Foreign Policy: How Expanding the Audience Changes the Policies //
Japanese Journal of Political Science 8 (1) 115–145

PartI: 18

their audiences, and cash- availability in the news organisation. Gatekeeping theory has
narrowed the media trends in conflicts that are a fickle and nationalistic process” 26.
Media functions of agenda-setting and framing are widely used by foreign policy
departments and diplomatic missions. For example such elements of agenda setting as
problem perception, issue definition and institutional attention could be used in foreign
affairs in connection with domestic issues. As a result “the economy of attention is
stable so long as issues persist and problems continue to be defined as important.
Disturbances to this stability may occur, however, due to exogenous events or changing
public perceptions of the relative importance of foreign policy problems”27.
The most disputable phenomenon of media-foreign policy relations is CNN
effect which in fact arose during Somali, Yugoslavia and Iraq crises in 1990ies. In spite
of different estimations of CNN effect there are three basic variations how modern
media could affect international relations in conflict zones. S. Livingston in particular
wrote that media could be accelerant as media shortens decision-making response time
and offer potential security-intelligence risks. Another effect is impediment when
grisly coverage may undermine morale and constitute a threat to operational security.
Third effect is agenda setting when emotional compelling coverage of atrocities or
humanitarian crises reorder foreign policy priorities28 .
Livingston also summurised types of media behavior in different crisis
situations. So, during (1) conventional warfare media and public have the biggest
interest. Experience in recent wars indicates that when and where possible, the military
will attempt to control the movements of journalists and the content of their reports,
behavior rooted in the two concerns outlined above: fear that the “wrong” pictures will
undermine public or congressional support for the effort and, second, that journalists
will inadvertently disclose tactical or strategic information to the enemy. At the same
time, high public interest and the journalist’s ambition and sense of independent
professionalism will lead to efforts to avoid and undermine the military’s attempts to

26
Gowing N. Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention? New York, Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, September 1997. 46 p.
[http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/media/medfr.htm]
27
Wood B.D., Peake J.S. The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting. The American Political
Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1. (Mar., 1998), pp. 173-184.
28
Livingston S. CLARIFYING THE CNN EFFECT: An Examination of Media Effects According to
Type of Military Intervention Research Paper R-18 June 1997
[http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/research_publications/papers/research_papers/R18.pdf]


control them. The media will be assisted in these efforts by the greater mobility
provided to them by smaller, light-weight equipment capable of point-to-point
transmissions from anywhere to anywhere on Earth. In conventional warfare, media are
most likely to serve as accelerants and impediments in the policy process. The media
effect of greatest concern to the military in conventional warfare is their ability to
provide adversaries sensitive information. In an era of highly mobile, decentralized,
global, real-time media, the risks to operational security are considerable.
During (2) strategic deterrence it is used “the persuasion of one’s opponent that
the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.”.
Thus persuasion involves communication. Typically, media coverage of strategic
deterrent operations during times of relative stability will be highly routinized. The level
of media and public interest will vary according to the perceived stability of the
situation, that is, according to the perceived effectiveness of deterrence. Meanwhile in
(3) tactical deterrence as a rapid response media interest is likely to be extremely high.
Global media are often important and valuable assets to the military, particularly when
time is short and conditions are critical.
(4) Special operations and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC) include counter-
terrorism operations, hostage rescue, and during conventional warfare, infiltration into
enemy territory. Such operations take place in hostile environments, are usually limited
in scope, and are conducted in an envelope of extreme secrecy. Thus they are sensitive
to media coverage.
(5) Peacemaking operations aimed to create the conditions necessary for the
implementation of an accord. The hostile, unstable nature of the peacemaking
environment means media and public interest is likely to be extremely high, at least
initially. As with peacekeeping, if and when a sense of stability is established, media
interest will diminish accordingly. Also as with peacekeeping, the most likely potential
media effect with peacemaking is as an emotional impediment. (6) In Peacekeeping
missions lightly-armed forces are deployed in a “permissive environment” to bolster a
fragile peace. News media will show considerable interest in peacekeeping operations,
though after a period of apparent stability, media interest is likely to flag.
(7) Imposed Humanitarian Interventions objectives are limited to providing
food, medicine, clean, safe water, and a secure but limited geographical location. In

PartI: 20

these circumstances the military is used for their technical capabilities, such as water
purification, field medicine, and, most importantly, logistical capabilities. Media
interest is likely to be quite high, particularly at the beginning…. This will be
particularly true if correspondents can operate safely in the secure zone established by
the military. Though media content alone is not likely to lead to an imposed
humanitarian intervention, it cannot be ruled out. The media effect of greatest potential
in imposed humanitarian missions is as an impediment. (8) Consensual Humanitarian
Interventions involve the use of the military in addressing the urgent needs of a
distressed population. Such interventions are relatively low-cost, not only in material
resources but also in terms of the potential political capital at stake. If truly consensual,
and if it remains so, there will probably be little sustained media interest in the story.
Media also have the function of framing, which can be important for the
decision-making in extreme situations, at negotiations, for determination of descriptions
of situation, actions of sides etc. According to Robinson frames offer ways of
explaining, understanding and making sense of events29. At the same time most scholars
noted importance of framing first of all for elites. As M.Baum noted ‘cheap framing’ is
important for policymakers and it is made by soft news media. As a result US
politicians using media—“that is, highly accessible, episodic coverage of
sensationalized human drama—by portraying America’s adversaries as the embodiment
of evil, thereby turning virtually any foreign crises into a morality play. For instance,
following 9/11, President George W. Bush repeatedly referred to the hijackers as
‘evildoers’”30.
Character of crisis communications in international relations transformed since
new media based on Internet and mobile communications developed. Although new
media meant both negative and positive consequences. As Matt Armstrong noted new
media has more than 24/7 news cycles with such defining characteristics as
“hyperconnectivity, persistence of information, inexpensive reach, and dislocation with

29
Robinson P. Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics Models of Media Influence on
Foreign Policy European Journal of Communication 2001, Vol 16(4): 523–544.
[http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/1848/robinson2.pdf]
30
Baum M.A. Soft News and Foreign Policy….


speaker and listener virtually close but geographically distant”31. Consequently Internet
affected and improved crisis communication in such forms as:
1) Decentralization of crisis communication. Crisis communication becomes multi-
directional, more intercultural.
2) Qualification of journalism. Media communication is supplemented by personal
communication.
3) Acceleration of crisis communication. The disembeddedness of Internet
communication relative to time means that there is a continuous flow of
information; news spreads without temporal boundaries. Internet enables
distribution to an unlimited audience.
4) The Internet has become a watch dog of official and journalistic crisis
communication.
5) The Internet becomes a global archive of crisis communication.
6) The Internet creates global virtual communities32.
In international conflicts, as a result, Internet creates possibilities for all parts in
conflict to persuade, mobilize, and facilitate action. Armstrong continues that new
media for terrorist and insurgent amplify and increase the velocity of an issue that is
critical.
“They increasingly rely on the Internet’s ability to share multiple kinds of media quickly and
persistently to permit retrieval across time zones around the world from computers or cell
phones. The value is the ability to not just persuade an audience to support their action, but to
mobilize their support and to facilitate their will to act on behalf of the group”.
However it also creates some negative side of Internet in crisis communications.
H. Bucher selected among negative effects: (1) limited access to certain kinds of
information; (2) rumours and hoaxes; (3) false information; and, (4) bias.

Methods
For analysis of CC in modern foreign politics this study focuses on the coverage
of three cases: USA in Iraq, Russia on Caucasus, EU in Kosovo, as well as Ukrainian
foreign policy. Counter-crisis measures for change of reputation of the states and

31
New Media and Persuasion, Mobilization, and Facilitation
[http://mountainrunner.us/2008/08/new_media_and_persuasion_mobil.html] August 5, 2008
32
Bucher, Hans-Juergen Crisis Communication and the Internet: Risk and Trust in a Global Media. First
Monday, vol. 7, no. 4 2002 [http://www.firstmonday.org/Issues/issue7_4/bucher/index.html]

PartI: 22

political leaders is the central concept of these events. For this purpose we estimate
quality of system of the foreign-policy making and activity of foreign media. On the
whole, these concepts can be described in the basic terms of social networks analysis:
degree is count of the number of different categories that connected each other;
betweenness measures the importance of mentioned categories as a link between other
categories. It counts the number of the shortest communication chains throughout the
network that include the category; closeness measures the ability of mentioned category
to send information out through the network or receive information back in. It reflects
the average number of intermediaries needed to reach other categories or receive their
information.
Thus we focus on social network analysis as core approach for definition of
events, their coverage and effectiveness of foreign policy communications provided by
main participants or so called “speakers” (stakeholders). Adequacy of method proved by
other researches of international problems. As H.Anheier and H.Katz33 noted that
“network analysis is useful because global… society is a very relational, ‘networky’
phenomenon. …[Among examples we could mention] Rosenau described global
governance as a framework of horizontal relations; Castells’ argument that actors
increasingly form metanetworks at the transnational level and create a system of
‘decentralised concentration’, where a multiplicity of interconnected tasks takes place in
different sites. Castells points out, technologies such as telecommunications and
Internet brought about the ascendancy of a ‘network society’ whose processes occur in a
new type of space, which he labels the ‘space of flows’. This space, comprising a
myriad of exchanges, came to dominate the ‘space of places’ of territorially defined
units of states, regions and neighbourhoods, thanks to its greater flexibility and
compatibility with the new logic of network society. Nodes and hubs in this space of
flows construct the social organisation of this network society. According to M.
Ratcliffe and J. Lebkowsky34 in political sphere this network process creates “extreme
democracy” (in the context of concept “emergent democracy” of J.Ito 35), when people

33
Anheier H., Katz H. Network Approaches To Global Civil Society // in Anheier, Helmut, Marlies
Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds.). Global Civil Society 2004/5. London: Sage, 2004.
[http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/Yearbooks/2004/NetworkApproaches2004.pdf]
34
Extreme democracy. Ed. by Mitch Ratcliffe, Jon Lebkowsky [http://www.extremedemocracy.com/]
35
Joichi Ito, Emergent Democracy // Extreme democracy. Ed. by Mitch Ratcliffe, Jon Lebkowsky
[http://extremedemocracy.com/chapters/Chapter One-Ito.pdf]


become the participants of political process of decision-making, which is based on the
great number of centers linked between themselves by network coalition and organized
on the base of local, national and international problems.
Network metaphor, thus, can be used for the international relations. In spite of
novelty, there are some researches about modern organization of hidden or
decentralized social structures which do not have clear scopes: international
organizations36, NGOs, mass media (especially so called social media), social protests,
religious communities terrorist organizations. Network organizations are also analysed
in military sphere, that related to the change of features of battle operations in modern
conditions. RAND Corporation in 1998 proposed concept “social netwar”37 as new
form of protest.
It is also possible to describe international communications as network
structures, concept of Internet includes network metaphor38, even more such approach
allows to define another concept of “news”. The modern system of mass-media
represents the network of satellites, digital, mobile and other technologies in which the
message published by agency or national media gets an impulse as the reaction of
readers, quoting in other, including foreign, media. So emerges glocalisation of news,
when media managed by economic laws select international news with the purpose
attract audience. Ritzer defines glocalization as “the interpenetration of the global and
local resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas”39, as a result Nel
Ruigrok and Wouter van Atteveldt even proposed hypothesis that: newspapers pay more
attention to local events than global events; all news is local; local news is globalized;
the local media will perform a “rally around the flag” role.
The reaction on news and events can be studied on the examples of social
projects, blogs and comments which arise up in Internet. In this case not organizations
or personalities but separate words and combinations of words, which create an
information stream, can become units of SNA. Hyperlinks in similar virtual associations

36
Hafner-Burton E.N., Montgomery A.H. Power Positions. International Organizations, Social Networks,
And Conflict // Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XX No. X, Month 2005
37
Ronfeldt D.F., Arquilla J., Center A., Fuller G., Fuller M. The Zapatista “Social Netwar” in Mexico,
Rand Corporation, 1998. 168 p.
38
Halavais A. National Borders on the World Wide Web New // Media & Society, Vol. 2, No. 1, 7-28
(2000) [http://nms.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/2/1/7]
39
Cited: Nel Ruigrok and Wouter van Atteveldt Global Angling with a Local Angle: How U.S., British,
and Dutch Newspapers Frame Global and Local Terrorist Attacks Press/Politics 12(1):68-90 2007

PartI: 24

can also serve as the object of analysis. In both cases, semantic and hypertext SNA
allows to set a subject, activity, emotional colouring of event, estimate geographical or
temporal descriptions of news stream.
Thus, taking into account modern of communications processes, we can specify
on importance of network approach:
1. it is necessary to examine the modern international relations as network of
relations of traditional and new participants;
2. activity of media also finds new quality—decentralization of information
generators related to development of Internet;
3. Nature of news report also changes—independent “life” of event is determined
by the reaction or attention to the report, quotation or foot-note on the report
about an event40.
These features can be used for estimation of foreign-policy communications. For
treatment of large volumes of information on network structures, and also for their
graphic interpretation we can use software NetDraw41, Pajek42, Issuecrawler43.

40
See also: M. Rosvall, K. Sneppen Dynamics of Opinions and Social Structures (August 2, 2007)
[http://arxiv.org/abs/0708.0368]
J.C. Gonzalez-Avella, V. M. Eguýluz, M. San Miguel, M. G. Cosenza, K. Klemm Information feedback
and mass media effects in cultural dynamics [http://arxiv.org/abs/0705.1091]
41
Hanneman, Robert A. and Mark Riddle. 2005. Introduction to social network methods. Riverside, CA:
University of California, Riverside [http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/]
42
Wouter de Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj, Exploratory social network analysis with
Pajek: New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 334 p.
43
Rogers R. Mapping Web Space with the Issuecrawler
[http://www.govcom.org/publications/full_list/issuecrawler_1oct06_final.pdf]


PART II:
GWOT. CRISIS MANAGEMENT
IN MODERN BATTLE OF IDEAS

There are few important conditions for modern public diplomacy and
consequently for foreign policy communications. As Dr. Marieke De Mooij noted that
“the ‘western’ model of communication doesn’t work equally well in other parts of the
world” and “communication will be more effective if it is adapted to the communication
behaviour of those at whom it is targeted”44. It is obvious that these conditions are
vitally important for modern US foreign policy communications.
Understanding of necessity of crisis management in US foreign policy arose up
during Caribbean crisis 1962, when R.S. McNamara, J.F.Kennedy's defense secretary,
declared that "there is no longer such a thing as strategy; there is only crisis
management", not crisis prevention or solving45. In 21 century unipolarity of US
position in international relations created more negative than positive moments.
Foremost absence of obvious opponent after Cold war complicated determination of
source of threat to US national interests. September, 11 2001 testified growth of tension
and made crises categories significant for US foreign policy, namely national security
and war with terrorism (which is according to Bush administration proceeded from
Middle East and Muslim world on the whole). Thus, as A. Bailes wrote “the security
behaviour of the United States has been dominated …by its often costly effort to block
new perceived sources of vulnerability”46.
New crisis management in US foreign policy showed up in formulation of Bush
Doctrine in 2002 as unilateral pre-emptive/preventive war to defeat terrorism, stop
nuclear proliferation and democratize global politics, starting with Afghanistan and
Iraq. On the first stage (2001-2004) "diplomatic, military, financial, intelligence,
investigative, and law enforcement actions—at home and abroad" defined as Global

44
De Mooij M. Cross-Cultural Communication in a Globalised World [http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-
the-fco/publications/publications/pd-publication/cross-cultural]
45
Caldwell D. “The Cuban Missile Affair and the American Style of Crisis Management” RAND, 1989
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N2943/]
46
SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
[http://yearbook2007.sipri.org/]

Part II: 26
GWOT. Crisis Management of
Modern Battle of Ideas

war on terrorism, directed "against all those who seek to export terror, and a war
against those governments that support or shelter them" (George W. Bush October 11,
2001). This term was especially actual during preparation of military campaigns in
Afghanistan and Iraq—operations Enduring Freedom и Iraqi Freedom.
First response US actions in 2001 were directed on Afghanistan to capture
Osama bin Laden, destroy al-Qaeda, and remove the Taliban regime which had
provided support and safe harbor to al-Qaeda, however key element of US war on
terrorism became war in Iraq started in 2003 G.Bush declared repeatedly, that Iraq is
"the central front in the War on Terror", where chemical and biological WMD were
placed. Bush and his officials made hundreds of false statements in an PR campaign for
the Iraq war47. For example, on at least 532 occasions top Bush Administration officials
stated unequivocally that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, or was trying to
produce or obtain them, or had links to al Qaeda, or both. U.S. media facilitated the
government's campaign of false statements by their largely quite uncritical and
deferential coverage of USG statements, thus providing seemingly "independent"
validation of the false statements in the minds of the U.S. public48.
Official military campaign of encroachment and occupation of Iraq passed in
March-May 2003—“mission accomplished”—however after escalation of tension in
2004 and start of civil war it became obvious that the military stay in Iraq can delay:
"The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every
effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done"49. In 2005 the war was rebranded
into Global struggle against violent extremism (G-SAVE) that has been in use since
at least May 2005 by the Department of Defense. The New York Times reported July 26,
2005 that the "Bush administration is retooling its slogan for the fight against Al Qaeda
and other terrorist groups, pushing the idea that the long-term struggle is as much an
ideological battle as a military mission". In August 2005 US strategy was renamed into
“long war” strategy—term proposed by Rumsfeld50.

47
Study: Bush led U.S. to war on 'false pretenses' // [http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22794451/]
48
Public relations preparations for 2003 invasion of Iraq
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_relations_preparations_for_2003_invasion_of_Iraq]
49
'Mission Accomplished,' 5 Years Later
[http://cbs2.com/national/iraq.mission.accomplished.2.713064.html] May 1, 2008
50
Regan T. The 'rebranding' of the war on terror // Csmonitor.com
[http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0728/dailyUpdate.html]


In January 2007 G.Bush declared a shift to “new strategy [that] will change
America’s course in Iraq, and help [to] succeed in the fight against terror”—The New
Way Forward in Iraq51. According to WH fact sheet Iraq in this strategy remained key
element in war on terror: “Our enemies …are trying to defeat us in Iraq. If we step back
now, the problems in Iraq will become more lethal, and make our troops fight an uglier
battle than we are seeing today”. New strategy, meanwhile, was based on six
fundamental elements: (1) let the Iraqis lead; (2) help Iraqis protect the population; (3)
isolate extremists; (4) create space for political progress; (5) diversify political and
economic efforts; and (6) situate the strategy in a regional approach. However, such
strategy also included increase of number of troops in Iraq, that enabled opponents to
criticize G.Bush, and to compare surge and escalation of conflict. Such criticism had
certain base. According to information of ICasualties at the end of 2006 after stage of
disengagement (from December 15 2005 to September 23, 2006) started insurgent
offensive stage (September 23 2006 to February 3, 2007), then started period of US
surge troop buildup (February 4 2007 to June 16 2007)52. Not looking on changing of
priorities, the change of strategy resulted in the increase of killed soldiers exactly in the
first half of 2007 (this year became most “bloody” for US army, 961 soldiers were
killed—about 25% of all period of military actions in Iraq).
US officials and militaries estimated events in 2007 as successful operation
which dramatically improved security in Baghdad and throughout Iraq 53 54
. But
according to CrisisGroup “in the absence of the fundamental political changes in Iraq
the surge was meant to facilitate, its successes will remain insufficient, fragile and
reversible”. In addition CrisisGroup and SIPRI reported that if before USA tried to set
in Iraq some model of regional democrasy—battle for political control—in 2007-2008
there was necessity to set rational relations between Sunni and Shia groups in Iraq, it

51
Condoleezza Rice Iraq: A New Way Forward Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Washington, DC January 11, 2007
52
http://icasualties.org/oif/CasualtyTrends.aspx
53
Kagan K. How They Did It. Executing the winning strategy in Iraq. 11/19/2007, Volume 013, Issue 10
[http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/346ydlgo.asp]
54
Surge Strategy Helping Iraqis Protect Their Country, Bush Says. President cites “hopeful signs” in
dealing with sectarian violence [http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2007/June/20070629171522idybeekcm0.7258112.html] 30 June 2007

Part II: 28

needs as well to reconfigure the fight against general enemy al-Qaeda as it was
weakened but not vanquished55 56.
As a result US Army is on the stage of surge of operations (from June 17 2007 to
August 2008). It didn’t mean stop of violence as in March-May 2008 Iraq Spring
Fighting exploded in southern Iraq and Baghdad, that began with an Iraqi offensive in
Basra which was the first major operation to be planned and carried out by the Iraqi
Army since the invasion of 2003. The whole fighting followed a lull in the civil war in
Iraq and was the most serious crisis since October 2007.
The whole timeline of military and political events connected to US war on
terrorism, and particular war in Iraq, since 2003 was provided in the frames of Bush
statement that “struggle against international terrorism is different from any other war in
[US] history. [US] will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might”. At
the same time, he defined descriptions of GWOT primary objective—terrorist networks
with global distribution. Thus, it defined key feature of GWOT and war in Iraq:
combination of military and political operations, simultaneously directed on opponent—
Al Qaeda and its supporters, but also on public attention in a whole world and foremost
on public of countries of GWOT coalition participants, as well as on political and public
actors in Muslim world.
In this case it is important to notice so called rules of engagement. These rules
are the method of crisis management uniting the political and military requirements for
the decline of vagueness in public in connection with military operations. As Bradd C.
Hayes noted "tension inescapably exists in a system that subordinates armed forces
under civilian control while retaining military command. Managing this tension by
delineating the boundaries of military action in support of political objectives is another
major role of ROE. Finally, ROE used in managing another related tension—centralized
versus decentralized control”57. In crisis ROE help manage the tension between defense
and political objectives. In wartime ROE are very limited because political and military
objectives are generally in tune. Embedded journalists in Iraq war could be an example

55
Iraq after the Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy Middle East Crisis Group Report N°75 30
April 2008 [http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5418&l=1]
56
Stepanova E.Trends in armed conflicts // SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and
International Security [http://www.sipri.org/contents/conflict/YB08chapter2.pdf/download]
57
Hayes B.C. Naval Rules of Engagement: Management Tools for Crisis July 1989
[http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2005/N2963.pdf]


of rules of engagement, troops both embedded media into their operations and worked
on topics to be discussed, conditions of interview and reporting.
Rules of GWOT engagement included attack on Al-Qaeda ideology provided
first of all through civilian field. It would help to avoid clash between USA and Islamic
world caused by lack of credibility. According to US National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism 2006: "In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battle
of ideas"58 so most officials, militaries, researchers etc. noted that GWOT is a struggle
of ideas, based on new environment that completely different from Cold War. From one
side, this collision of different cultures and religions (Christianity and Islam), from the
other side it is conflict between state and non-state formations which successfully apply
new information technologies for the ideological fight, therefore there is a necessity for
the USA to review approaches to diplomatic, military and ideological activity. As a
result battle of ideas in GWOT includes basic elements of crisis communications that
was reflected in U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic
Communication (NSPDSC) 2006.: (1) definition of main messages and ideology; (2)
creation of rapid response team; (3) definition of key speakers; (4) definition of key
audience; (5) active co-operation with media.
All these elements are included in complex system of US strategic
communications thus public diplomacy became a US national security priority and core
instrument for GWOT communications management. Although US public diplomacy
has challenges and problems of realisation. First of all it deals with decreasing
international image of the USA since 2003 both in Muslim and European societies59. At
the same time critics of US Middle East policy strengthened as US fights an enemy it
hardly knew. Its descriptions have relied on gross approximations and crude categories
(Saddamists, Islamo-fascists and the like) that bear only passing resemblance to reality.
From the other side GWOT PD strategy also needed reconsideration. As
C.Hayden stated U.S. public diplomacy is losing the "information war," because it is
being outflanked by jihadist media campaigns. Meanwhile U.S. efforts look absurdly
anachronistic as the USA relies on message strategies rooted in Cold War models and

58
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionIV.html]
59
Global Unease With Major World Powers Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey
[http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf] 27 June 2007

Part II: 30

appears increasingly unresponsive to audiences in the Middle East and Islamic world 60
61
. In 2008 J. Glassman, Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs62 stated that "in the early 1990s, the United States, in bipartisan fashion, began to
dismantle this arsenal of persuasion. It was "a process of unilateral disarmament in the
weapons of advocacy." As a result public diplomacy in GWOT faces row of problems
which B.Gregory charaterised as “episodic commitment, organizational stovepipes,
tribal cultures, and excessive reliance on “accidental” personalities”63 64
. J. Glassman
also noted that strategy towards public diplomacy have already changed, “budgets have
risen, backing is bipartisan. One of the biggest enthusiasts for public diplomacy in
government is the secretary of defense”.
Last notion shows overlap of interests between USG and DoD in definition of
objectives and directions of public diplomacy. Glassman stressed on “war” as central
objective for modern US public diplomacy “to create an environment hostile to violent
extremism”. That’s why “war of ideas is not a radical departure from overall public
diplomacy strategy. It is an integral part of that strategy”. He also made clear priorities
for war of ideas: first, the United States itself is not at the center of the war of ideas but
couldn’t as well to be a bystander in battle for power in Muslim societies; second, US
will help to destroy Al-Qaeda brand. “The effort is to help show populations that the
ideology and actions of the violent extremists are not in the best interests of those
populations“.
Glassman also defined the methods for “war of ideas”. First, to confront the
ideology that justifies and enables the violence by identifying, nurturing and supporting
anti-Islamist Muslims. Second, cooperation with the private sector and using the best
technology including Web 2.0 social networking techniques, a full range of productive

60
Hayden C. Can branding define public diplomacy 2.0?
[http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_print/070209_can_branding_define_pu
blic_diplomacy_20/] FEB 9, 2007
61
Ludowese J.C. Strategic Communication: Who Should Lead the Long War of Ideas? Strategy Research
Project [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/long_war_of_ideas.pdf] 15 March 2006
62
Glassman J. Winning the War of Ideas
[http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf.php?template=C07&CID=408] July 8, 2008
63
From the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy: no one in PD conducts PD overseas June
24, 2008 [http://mountainrunner.us/2008/06/from_the_us_advisory_commissio.html]
64
Gregory B. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms
Presentation at the American Political Science Association Conference on International
Communication and Conflict [http://www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/gregory.pdf] August 31,
2005


alternatives to violent extremism. The shorthand for this policy is powerful and lasting
diversion, the channeling of potential recruits away from violence with the attractions of
entertainment, culture, literature, music technology, sports, education, business and
culture, in addition to politics and religion. Our role is as a facilitator of choice. The
third method is to create a broad awareness of the war of ideas throughout the U.S.
government, business, academia. But more than the war of ideas itself. We want to
spread a culture of "active understanding".
The result of such approach transformed into military and governmental interest
in strategic communications. As Todd Helmus noted US military and government “has
spent the past three years studying lessons learned …in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that
like any corporate brand, the US military must make sure its actions match its words.
Otherwise, it won't receive the trust or support of the ever-critical civilian population on
which military operations ultimately depend”. Jack Leslie added that the US
government is increasingly willing to study best practices from the corporate world.
Keith Reinhard also agreed that government agencies are embracing corporate
communications principles65.

Messages
As it was mentioned before “war on terrorism” was central element for Iraq war
which lately transformed into “struggle against violent extremism”. Accordingly, as
W.Rosenau noted, “war of ideas” is based on a coherent and powerful set of themes that
are meant to suggest in a general way what the campaign might look like and how it
might be orchestrated.
The Islamic world, made up of more than one billion people, is obviously diverse, and so it will
be critical to tailor these themes to Muslims in specific nations or regions and Islamic traditions.
The focus here is on elite and intellectual opinion, although some of these themes might be
adapted for a broader audience: (1) Jihadist-Salafism as an Alien Ideology; (2) Jihadist-Salafism
as a Threat to Islam; (3) Al-Qaida and Nationalism; (4) Al-Qaida as a Threat to Key Values66.

65
McKenna T. Comms pros consult on US military report // PR Week,
[http://www.prweek.com/uk/news/article/673768/Comms-pros-consult-US-military-report/] July 30,
2007
66
Rosenau W. Waging the ‘War of Ideas’ [http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1218.pdf]

Part II: 32

In U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication8
(NSPDSC67) the quest for control of the message also exists. The report begins by
setting out a group of themes—essentially broad talking points—that are designed to
promote American values and support national security objectives68. Specific attention
in NSPDSC was paid to war on terror with accents on freedom and tolerance. The
message of public diplomacy also stressed on “clear message: that killing oneself and
murdering innocent people is always wrong”. As for international community NSPDSC
should foster debate, encourage education and provide information, to help people learn
and make decisions for themselves, because “most people everywhere, of every faith,
will choose freedom over tyranny and tolerance over intolerance.

Rapid response team
U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication
defined Interagency Crisis Communication Team69 for coordination of US efforts
against extremism which included: (1) White House Communications Office; (2)
National Security Council; (3) White House Press Secretary; (4) State Department
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; (5) Defense Department Public Affairs.
Though definition of most active participants, players and initiatives should be
expanded and more detailed. First initiatives on crisis reaction were made just after
September 11, 2001 when under US President The Office of Strategic Influence (OSI)
was "established shortly after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, a response to concerns in the
administration that the United States was losing public support overseas for its war on
terrorism, particularly in Islamic countries"70. As well as The Office of Strategic
Initiatives, part of the Executive Office of the White House, is "responsible for
coordinating the planning and development of a long-range strategy for achieving
Presidential priorities. The office conducts research, and assists in message
development and other communications activities in conjunction with the Office of
Public Liaison and the Office of Political Affairs."

67
U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication
[http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87427.pdf]
68
Corman, S.R.; Dooley, K.J. (2008): Strategic communication on a rugged landscape: principles for
finding the right message. Consortium for Strategic Communication [CSC], January. - 16 p.
69
U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication…
70
Ludowese ….


In 2002 the White House temporary wartime communications were transformed
into a permanent Office of global diplomacy to spread a positive image of the United
States around the world and combat anti-Americanism. In July 2002 The Office of
Global Communications (OGC) was established by WH "to coordinate the
administration's foreign policy message and supervise America's image abroad." [2][3]
The OGC was made official January 21, 2003, by President George W. Bush through
Executive Order: Establishing the Office of Global Communications.. There were also
another The White House Iraq Group (aka, White House Information Group or
WHIG)—the marketing arm of the White House whose purpose was to sell the 2003
invasion of Iraq to the public. As Frank Rich noted spirit of WHIG saved in 2007 but
“instead of being bombarded with dire cherry-picked intelligence about W.M.D., this
time [it] serenaded with feel-good cherry-picked statistics offering hope”71.
US Department of State also had a number of initiatives and offices
responsible for public affairs, first of all provided by Undersecretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs. This undersecretary includes in particular Bureau of
International Information Programs—the former U.S. Information Agency. The
Bureau is "the principal international strategic communications entity for the foreign
affairs community. IIP informs, engages, and influences international audiences about
U.S. policy and society to advance America's interests. IIP is a leader in developing and
implementing public diplomacy strategies that measurably influence international
audiences through programs and technologies, and provides localized context for U.S.
policies and messages, reaching millions worldwide in English, Arabic, Chinese,
French, Persian, Russian, and Spanish." Office of Strategic Communication (OSC),
which falls within the IIP is "responsible [in particular] for countering misinformation
and disinformation in the foreign press"
In late 2005 Undersecretary became a platform for rapid response office
creation72. In her testimony before the House Committee on International Affairs, Karen
P. Hughes, Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, said:

71
Rich F. As the Iraqis Stand Down, We’ll Stand Up // New York Times
[http://select.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/opinion/09rich.html?_r=1&oref=slogin] September 9, 2007
72
Hughes K. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Remarks at
Department of Defense Conference on Strategic Communication Washington, DC
[http://www.state.gov/r/us/2007/88630.htm] July 11, 2007

Part II: 34

"We have set up a new rapid response office at the state department. It monitors global news and
issues report each morning with alerts as needed so that busy policy makers focus not only on
the news environment in Washington or America, but also around the world. This has already
proven to be an effective early warning system that helps us respond quickly to misinformation
or emerging stories. We are asking ambassadors and public affairs officers to speak out on major
issues, to do more speeches and television interviews, and my office is providing tools and
guidance to help them do so in ways that are clear, concise and coordinated. We’re proceeding
with plans to set up regional public diplomacy platforms to expand our television presence, and
make programs such as our speaker’s bureau more targeted and strategic. We are at work on a
technology initiative to make greater use of web chats, graphics, streaming video perhaps even
text messaging to help amplify our message and make it relevant to younger audiences."73
Among other initiatives of USG were: in 2005, IIP created its “Media Matrix,”
an internal Web site and database that tracks information about key media outlets in
individual countries around the world. Embassy staff were responsible for inputting and
maintaining the information. Bureau of Intelligence and Research conducts and
contracts for public opinion polls and focus groups, in over 50 countries each year, to
support U.S. government public diplomacy staff, as well as members of the intelligence
community. Research activities focused on both mass and elite audiences and examine
public opinion of the United States, including foreign policy, as well as other issues of
importance to foreign audiences. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)
conducted focus groups, in-depth interviews, and surveys with program participants to
evaluate the impact of bureau programs, including exchanges. Media Reaction
Division, Office of Research, INR that monitored print commentaries around the world,
and provides daily summaries and special products. Digital Outreach Team monitored
of blog content as part of an effort to counter terrorist use of the Internet74.
US Army (DoD) is, currently, the main public diplomacy institution regarding
rules of GWOT engagement75. DoD closely cooperates with USG and other institutions
of public diplomacy and structure of DoD public diplomacy includes information
departments in each Command and besides has 4th Psychological Operations Group,
Strategic Studies Detachment (SSD) which conduct target audience analysis, assessing

73
http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/hug111005.pdf
74
U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research
[www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-904] July 2007
75
Wright D.P. The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005: On Point
II: transition to the new campaign / Donald P. Wright, Timothy R. Reese ; with the Contemporary
Operations Study Team. 720 p.


how to communicate specific messages to identified target audiences, to support
psychological operations around the world. The Information Awareness Office is a
branch of the DoD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency whose mission is to
"imagine, develop, apply, integrate, demonstrate and transition information
technologies, components and prototype, closed-loop, information systems that will
counter asymmetric threats by achieving total information awareness".
Information, media, and public affairs work in Iraq fulfilled by several
institutions. The temporary offices which comprised the Bush administration's "'rapid
response' team" included Coalition Information Center established shortly after
September 11, 2001, as "a temporary effort to rebut Taliban disinformation about the
Afghan war" and propaganda war" against Osama bin Laden. In January 2003 Defense
Department recommended the creation of a "Rapid Reaction Media Team" to serve as a
bridge between Iraq's formerly state-controlled news outlets and an "Iraqi Free Media"
network. The team portrayed a "new Iraq" offering hope of a prosperous and democratic
future, which would serve as a model for the Middle East. US, British, and Iraqi media
experts provided "approved USG information" for the Iraqi public as a part of "strategic
information campaign" for "likely 1-2 years ... transition"76.
Later Combined Press Information Center in Baghdad oversees the media
offensive, including the Iraqi Media Engagement Team (IMET, March 2004) that was
vital to spreading releases about coalition efforts in Iraq. IMET worked closely with the
Arabic media. The Information Operations Task Force (IOTF) was a unit -- "deeper in
the Pentagon's bureaucracy" -- which assumed much of the operations of the Office of
Strategic Influence after it was shut down in February 2002. According to "Pentagon
documents, the Rendon Group played a major role in the IOTF. The company was
charged with creating an 'Information War Room' to monitor worldwide news reports at
lightning speed and respond almost instantly with counterpropaganda"77. The Iraq
Communications Desk at the Pentagon—running 24/7—"to pump out data from
Baghdad — serving as what could be considered a campaign war room".

76
IRAQ: THE MEDIA WAR PLAN National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 219 Ed. by
Joyce Battle [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB219/index.htm] May 8, 2007
77
Bamford J. The Man Who Sold the War // Rolling Stone magazine
[http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/8798997/the_man_who_sold_the_war/] November 17,
2005

Part II: 36

Besides crisis communication functions were made by other US state
organisations. Broadcasting Board of Governors that includes International
Broadcasting Bureau responsible for Voice of America, Radio/TV Marti, and the
Middle East Broadcasting Networks, as well as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and
Radio Free Asia. U.S. Agency for International Development has missions in
Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and West Bank/Gaza and others to
support specific, targeted public awareness campaigns through the Development
Outreach and Communications Program. Central Intelligence Agency includes Global
Information and Influence Team (GIIT) that conducts polling with an undisclosed
focus in an undisclosed number of countries7879.
NSPDSC 2006 also foresaw closer cooperation between governmental and
private organisation in foreign policy communications, although this cooperation
existed during Iraq invasion in 2003. There are several reasons for private organisations
participation, as US Army operates in areas where culture and language are not well-
understood, it causes misinformation and rumours. Work involves a wide range of
communications activities, including monitoring and analyzing Arabic and Western
media; spokesperson training; and development and dissemination of TV, radio,
newsprint, and Internet “information” products80. The general contractors of US public
diplomacy are Rendon and Lincoln Groups, who mainly work in Iraq.
The Rendon Group is a secretive public relations firm that has assisted a number
of US military interventions in nations including Argentina, Colombia, Haiti, Iraq,
Kosovo, Panama and Zimbabwe. Company founder John Rendon described himself he
is "an information warrior and a perception manager81. Rendon's activities included
organizing the Iraqi National Congress, a PR front group designed to foment the
overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

78
U.S. Public Diplomacy. Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research
[www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-904] July 2007
79
U.S. Public Diplomacy. Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National
Communication Strategy [www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-323] April 2005
80
McKenna T. Military to select firm for 'info ops' initiative in Iraq // PRWeek
[http://www.prweekus.com/Military-to-select-firm-for-info-ops-initiative-in-Iraq/article/115740/]
August 21, 2008
81
Gerth J., Gall C., Khapalwak R. The reach of war: propaganda; Military's Information War Is Vast and
Often Secretive
[http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9500E6DF1E31F932A25751C1A9639C8B63&sec=
&spon=&pagewanted=print] December 11, 2005

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