Thesis

M180 Demolition Cratering Kit
Page 1
Running Head: M180 DEMOLITION CRATERING KIT
Recommended Changes to the U.S. Army's
Procurement and Training Programs
for the M180 Demolition Cratering Kit
and the M270 Demolition Cratering Kit (Inert)
Ira Joe Davis
Webster University, Fort Leonard Wood

Page 2
Table of Contents
Abstract 4
Situation Analysis 6
Premise 9
Study Limitations 10
Work Plan-Applied Research Methodology 11
Study and Findings 13
Conclusions 28
Premise Assessment 30
Recommendations for Future Studies 31
Recommendations for the U.S. Army Engineer School 32
References 33
Appendices:
Appendix A - Diagrams of the M180 36
Annex 1 - Demolition Kit Assembly, M180 37
Annex 2 - Single Kit Operation Setup 39
Appendix B - Small Development Requirements 41
for a Cratering Demolition Kit
Appendix C - M57 Firing Device 44
Appendix D - Modified M57 Firing Device 46
Appendix E - Soldier Training Publication 48
References to the M180 Cratering Kit

Page 3
Appendix F - Summary of M180 Training 52
Requirements, DA Pamphlet 350-38
Appendix G - Mission Training Requirements 54
for the M180 Cratering Kit
Appendix H - Survey Results of CONUS 57
Engineer Battalions
Appendix I - Locations of Inert M270s 61
Appendix J - Results of Engineer Officer 64
Advanced Course Surveys
Appendix K - Operational Restrictions for 69
the M180 Cratering Kit

Page 4
Abstract
The M180 Demolition Cratering Kit is designed for use
by Army engineers to emplace road craters in a one-step
operation. The M270 is an inert version of the M180
used in training situations. The U.S. Army Engineer
School (USAES) is the combat and training developer for
the M180. The U.S. Army Armament Research, Development
and Engineering Center (ARDEC) is the material
developer. Operational testing for the M180 was
conducted by the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command
(TECOM). Production and supply management for the M180
is managed by Industrial Operations Command (IOC)
(formerly AMCCOM). The premise of the research was to
identify inconsistencies or shortcomings in the
procurement and training programs for the M180 and
M270. The purpose of the primary research was to
determine the status of procurement and training
actions for the M180 and M270. Secondary research
concentrated on historical and doctrinal information in
the USAES. Training with the M180 is not authorized at
unit level. Most engineer units are not training with
the inert M270. Inconsistencies exist in Army doctrine

Page 5
concerning the operational limits of the M180.
Inconsistencies also exist between Soldier Training
Publications, Mission Training Plans, and the
requirements in DA Pamphlet 350-38 (Standards in
Weapons Training). The M180 experienced high
malfunction rates during Operation Desert Storm, and in
demonstrations at Fort Leonard Wood. The USAES should
decide the future role of the M180 before any further
procurement actions are taken. The procurement and
training programs from the M180 should be integrated to
improve readiness.

Page 6
Situation Analysis
The M180 Demolition Cratering Kit is a one-step,
two-stage, surface-emplaced, 110 pound kit consisting
of a standard 15-pound shaped charge, a firing device
and a rocket-propelled 40-pound cratering charge, all
mounted on a tripod. The M180 is designed to emplace a
road crater in one step, versus the two-step operation
required with separate shaped charges and 40-pound
cratering charges (Appendix A).
"...A 50-cap blasting machine is used to fire the
kit. Current generated by the machine simultaneously
ignites the M2 squibs and the delay-type electric
blasting caps in the rocket. The squibs ignite the
propellent grain which causes the rocket motor to build
thrust until the shear strength of the attaching
hardware is exceeded. When this occurs, the entire
assembly, rocket motor and warhead, moves toward the
firing device. On impact, the cover and firing device
are crushed, current is then generated by the firing
device which causes initiation of the following
demolition components in sequence: M6 electric blasting
cap, detonating cord and M7 nonelectric blasting cap.

Page 7
The M7 nonelectric cap initiates the shaped charge
which blasts a pilot hole in the surface. As the hole
is being created, the rocket motor propels the warhead
through the hole. The delay-type blasting cap
initiates the tetryl lead which detonates the booster
that detonates the warhead. Detonation of the warhead
completes the cratering action of the kit..." (TM 9-
1375-213-12-1, Demolition Kit, Cratering: M180 and
Demolition Kit, Cratering, Training: M270 (Inert)).
The M180 can be configured in single or multiple kit
arrangements.
The M270 is an inert version of the M180, designed
for use in a training environment. The M270 assembles
and functions like the M180.
The United States Army Engineer School (USAES) is
the combat and training developer for the M180 and
M270. The combat developer defines the requirements
for a material system based upon operational needs and
U.S. Army doctrine. The training developer designs the
training program and training standards for the system.
The material developer designs a system to meet
the needs of the combat developer. The U.S. Army

Page 8
Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center
(ARDEC) is the material developer for the M180 and
M270.
An independent agency performs developmental tests
to verify that the system meets the combat developer's
requirements. The U.S. Army Test and Evaluation
Command (TECOM) performed the developmental testing of
the M180.
Production and supply management of a system or
commodity is performed by the item manager. The item
manager for the M180 and M270 is the U.S. Army
Industrial Operations Command (IOC). The IOC is a
subordinate element of the U.S. Army Material Command
(AMC). The Industrial Operations Command replaced the
U.S. Army Armament Munition and Chemical Command
(AMCCOM) on 31 January 1994.
Additional post fielding tests for the M180 were
conducted by the Explosives Effects Division of the
U.S. Army Waterways Experiment Station (WES).

Page 9
Premise
The premise of this research is to identify
shortcomings or inconsistencies in the U.S. Army's
procurement and training programs for the M180
Demolition Cratering Kit and M270 Demolition Cratering
Kit (Inert). The ultimate goal of the research is to
improve U.S. Army readiness by prioritizing the
procurement effort and by integrating the procurement
and training programs for the M180 and M270 Demolition
Cratering Kits.

Page 10
Study Limitations
No actual firings of the M180 were conducted
during the study due to resource constraints of range
facilities, trained personnel, and available
ammunition. Safety was also a major consideration of
the study. A temporary moratorium on firing M180s was
in effect at Fort Leonard Wood during the research
period. Telephonic interviews were conducted with
organizations off Fort Leonard Wood in lieu of personal
interviews. Telephonic interviews were limited to the
continental United States (CONUS).

Page 11
Work Plan-Applied Research Methodology
The primary research included observation of M180
firings (before the Fort Leonard Wood moratorium),
personal and telephonic interviews, and collection of
survey data. Interviews with the combat and training
developers determined the status of current and
projected procurement and training actions. Interviews
with production managers, item mangers, and contract
specialists at IOC were used to verify worldwide
inventory data and identify production problems.
Similar interviews with ARDEC personnel focused on
material problems with the M180. USAES instructors
were interviewed for their subject matter expertise
with the M180.
Telephonic interviews were conducted with
75 percent of the CONUS Engineer Battalions to
determine the status of M180 training in units. A
survey was administered to two Engineer Officer
Advanced Course (EOAC) classes to measure Company Grade
Officer's familiarity and confidence in the M180.
Secondary research concentrated on a files search
of the USAES Directorate of Combat Developments,

Page 12
Engineer Branch Safety Office, Department of Combat
Engineering, Department of Evaluation and
Standardization, and the Fort Leonard Wood Directorate
of Resource Management. The purpose of the secondary
research was to verify the status of current
procurement and training programs, and to establish a
historical base for the M180 and M270. The Fort
Leonard Wood Learning Resource Center, and the USAES
Library, provided pertinent Field Manuals, Technical
Manuals, and Army Regulations. Queries of the Defense
Technical Information Center (DTIC) produced copies of
previous research and test reports for the M180.

Page 13
Study and Findings
The development of supporting technology for the
M180 Demolition Cratering Kit began at ARDEC in 1963.
The developmental effort through 1969 was in the
advancement of various rocket and warhead designs. The
purpose of the M180 was to allow military personnel to
rapidly produce an effective road crater in all types
of roads, to obstruct the movement of wheeled and
tracked vehicles. An effective crater was defined as
one that forces a tracked vehicle to make at least
three passes in attempting to traverse it, and that
will deny passage of wheeled vehicles. The time
required for the tracked vehicle to make the three
passes must be longer than the time required for an
anti-tank weapon's crew to fire and destroy the
vehicle. The U.S. Army Combat Development Command
formalized specific operational requirements for the
M180 in the Army Small Development Requirement (SDR)
for a Cratering Demolition Kit (7 April 1969).
(Appendix B).
The Army waived the following SDR requirements for
the M180 as a result of the TECOM Development Tests and
First Article/Initial Production Tests (December 1980-
May 1981):

Page 14
- The total package weight of 165 pounds
exceeded the 125 pound requirement (two-man carry).
- The M180 could not produce an effective
crater in sand, perma-frost, or bedrock.
- The M180 was deemed effective through
seven inches of concrete (SDR requirement was five
inches), but the autobahn standard (needed for use in
Germany) was 8.66 inches (Miscellaneous Paper SL-83-10,
Explosive Ditching and Pavement Breaching Tests at Yuma
Proving Ground, 1978-1980, WES). The German Army
tested and rejected the M180 in 1985 (Trial of U.S.
Crater-Blasting Device M 180, Test No. 1375-00-148-
7159).
- Craters exceeded the required diameter of
fifteen feet, but never achieved the desired diameter
of twenty-five feet.
- The M180 was not usable under water.
- The M180 was sensitive to small arms fire.
The SDR requirement stated that the M180 must "...be
as insensitive to detonation by small arms fire and
chance shell fragments as standard military
explosives...", but did not quantify the degree of
sensitivity. Military explosives range in bullet
impact sensitivity from zero percent (ammonium nitrate,

Page 15
C4) to 100 percent (PETN, RDX). The M180 was estimated
at 50 percent bullet impact sensitivity.
- The original safe distance requirement for
exposed personnel using the M180 was 1000 feet, but
fragments as large as 1.69 pounds were recovered 3608
feet from the test site.
Reliability failures on hard surfaces (primarily
concrete) were caused by rocket motor separation from
the warhead during functioning. The rocket motor
contains the initiator for the warhead. Ineffective
pilot holes, created by the shaped charge, were the
cause of the separations. The SDR required the M180 to
effectively crater all types of road surfaces, but
"...The ability of a single or multiple kits to produce
an effective crater is a function of soil
characteristics as well as the amount of explosives
used. The meeting of reliability requirements on hard
surfaces is technically not feasible as no device
containing conventional explosives which can be carried
by two men can meet the requirements..." (Supplement to
Evaluation of Development Test II of Demolition Kit,
Cratering, XM180, TECOM Project No. 7-MU-011-180-
001/002/003/004/005/006, 15 April 1975).

Page 16
With these accepted waivers, full production of
the M180 began in August 1983, and M180s were fielded
to units for live demolitions training.
The Army suspended live training on the M180 when
an accident occurred at Hohenfels, Germany, on
28 June 1987. Three soldiers died, and another twelve
were seriously injured when the shaped charge on a M180
detonated prematurely during static training. ARDEC
supported the Army Safety Board investigation. The
accident was a result of both human error and material
defect. The human errors included:
- Using a live munition to conduct static
training. Four inert M270s were available at Hohenfels
for training use.
- Failure by the primary trainer to obey the
direct orders of the unit commander to not arm the
shaped charge.
- Excessive personnel near an armed
explosive. All fifteen casualties were standing by the
M180 when the shaped charge detonated.
- Over-confidence in the M180 safety
features. The initiator for the shaped charge on the
M180 was a modified M57 blasting device which included
the standard safety bail in front of the handle, plus

Page 17
an additional M180 shear pin specifically designed to
prevent accidental detonation of the shaped charged
during assembly and arming procedures (Appendix C).
The assistant trainer on the accident scene was
demonstrating this safety feature (with the blasting
cap in the shaped charge) when the M57 prematurely
functioned.
ARDEC's investigation confirmed that the modified
M57 blasting device (with shear pin) could not always
prevent premature detonation of the shaped charge.
ARDEC tests revealed that in some cases, sufficient
electrical charge to initiate the M6 electric blasting
cap could be generated without engaging the shear pin.
An Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) (No. M7B2006) was
approved to retrofit all existing M180s with a
crushable aluminum protective cover over the M57
blasting device (Appendix D). The protective cover
allowed proper functioning of the M57 during firing of
the rocket motor, but prevented personnel from
depressing the handle on the M57 during setup or arming
procedures. The M180 technical manual was modified to
reflect the ECP.
Radio frequency shielding of the M180 was also
considered during the accident investigation.

Page 18
Shielding of the M180 was not part of the original SDR.
The concern over accidental detonation of the M180
from radios waves prompted a Product Improvement
Proposal (PIP) to shield the M180 initiation devices
from radio waves anticipated on the battlefield. The
PIP is approved, but is unfunded.
A major problem discovered during the accident
investigation was the serious shortage of inert M270s
available for worldwide training. AMCCOM was the item
manager for both the M180 and M270. There were no
procurement contracts in effect for the M270, and
AMCCOM was unable to obtain the needed inert trainers
in the time required by the USAES. Instead, Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) obtained the necessary
M270s through the Training Audiovisual Support Center
(TASC) channels. This change was also included in the
M180 technical manual.
Live fire training with the M180 resumed at
limited locations after the completion of the ECP for
the M57 protective cover. Live fire training
(demonstrations) resumed at Fort Leonard Wood (Engineer
Officer Basic Course (EOBC), Sapper Leader Course, and
sometimes in the Combat Engineer One Station Unit

Page 19
Training), and at Fort Bragg (Special Operations
Command (SOCOM)).
Soldier Training Publications (STPs) (also called
Soldier's Manuals) contain standardized training
objectives for military occupational specialties (MOS).
STPs are used to train and evaluate soldiers on
critical tasks that support possible unit wartime
missions. Three engineer MOSs require solider
proficiency with the M180 (Appendix E):
- Combat Engineer (MOS 12B)
- Bridge Crewman (MOS 12C)
- Construction Engineering Supervisor
(MOS 51H)
The 12B task for the M180 requires proficiency at
skill level 20 (Sergeant). The M180 task for the 12C
and 51H is the same, and requires proficiency at skill
level 30 (Staff Sergeant). Skill level 20 tasks are
taught at unit level. There is a proposal in the USAES
Department of Combat Engineering to remove the M180
task from the 12C MOS. Training on the M180 in the 51H
Advanced Non-Commissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) is
limited to classroom review. There is no M180 task in
STP 5-21II-MQS, Military Qualifications Standards II
Engineer (21) Company Grade Officer's Manual.

Page 20
Chapter 6 (Engineer Weapon Systems) of DA Pamphlet
350-38, Standards in Weapons Training (STRAC),
"...provides training standards, strategies, and
resource requirements to conduct training with engineer
systems, mines and demolitions. The training programs
provided have tied directly to Soldier's Manuals and
AMTP tasks at the different training readiness
conditions (TRCs)...". The STRAC requires M180
proficiency for squads in combat engineer and bridge
units, and for combat heavy engineer (construction)
units (Appendix F). There are separate requirements
for active and reserve units. The STRAC does not
support unit level training with the M180; all training
requirements are to be accomplished with the inert
M270.
Army Mission Training Plans (AMTPs or MTPs)
establish critical tasks, conditions, and standards for
collective (unit) tasks to be performed in combat. The
STRAC requires engineer squads to install and remove an
inert M270 to MTP standards for the task "Create
Obstacles with Explosives". The only engineer MTP with
that task (or any cratering task) is ARTEP 5-145-11,
Combat Engineer Platoon (Heavy Division/Corps/ACR)
(Appendix G). There is no reference to the M180 in

Page 21
ARTEP 5-145-11, or any other platoon-level engineer
MTP. The only MTPs to include any demolition tasks are
ARTEP 5-145-17, Engineer Construction Platoon, and
ARTEP 5-145-11. Both contain the task "Disable Bridge
with Explosives".
The survey of nineteen CONUS Engineer Battalions
revealed only one battalion had conducted any training
with the M270 in the last twelve months (Appendix H).
That same battalion was the only unit certain that
M270s could be obtained through TASC channels
(Appendix I).A survey was conducted with two Engineer
Officer Advanced Course (EOAC) classes to determine
their familiarity and confidence in the M180 (Appendix
J). EOAC classes are an excellent sample of engineer
company grade officers; comprised of students from
active and reserve units, from both overseas and CONUS
assignments. The survey revealed that approximately
50 percent of the students were unaware of proper
initiation procedures for the M180. The students
preferred standard or expedient explosives to the M180
for road cratering and airfield denial missions. Less
than 5 percent of the students believe that Army
engineers are proficient with the M180. Less than
20 percent claimed to have trained with the M270 in

Page 22
their previous unit. Only 12 percent of the students
surveyed could identify the STRAC requirements for
training on the M180 (35 percent believe there is no
standard for M180 training in the STRAC).
The EOAC students could not identify operational
conditions (road surfaces) on which the M180 is
ineffective. Army doctrine is inconsistent in
addressing the proper operating environment for the
M180. Six different Army manuals describe six
different operational limits for the M180 (Appendix K).
The doctrinal manual most likely found at squad-level
in engineer units is Engineer Field Data, FM 5-34,
14 September 1987. It states "...The M180 is only good
for soft, unfrozen soils, and nonreinforced concrete.
Test shots are advised...".Besides the inconsistent
doctrine, several other problems exist with the M180.
TRADOC accepted that the M180 cannot crater modern-day
highways or destroy most bridges in any operational
environment (System MANPRINT Management Plan (SMNP) for
the Bridge and Road Munition (BRM), 22 October 1990;
Operational and Organizational Plan (O&O) for Bridge
and Road Munition (BRM), 18 April 1991). The BRM is
the programmed replacement for the M180, but its
funding is unlikely. Forty-nine percent of the EOAC

Page 23
students surveyed perceive that standard shaped charges
and cratering charges are safer than the M180
(41 percent had no opinion). The radio frequency
shielding PIP for the M180 remains unfunded. The M180
procurement contracts for fiscal years 88 and 89 have
been in litigation for over two years for contractor
failure to comply with production specifications. The
U.S. Government has not accepted any of the M180s
produced in those two years. Additionally, Lots 19 and
20 failed Lot Acceptance Tests (LAT). ARDEC believes
the LAT failures may be related to the A5 booster
material. This may be a larger problem since the same
booster material is used in numerous munitions.
The only recorded combat use of the M180 was by
the 19th Engineer Battalion in Operation Desert Storm.
They used M180s unsuccessfully to crater airfields in
Iraq. The craters produced were deemed ineffective,
the unit experienced electrical continuity problems,
and several warheads burned instead of exploding (low-
order detonation). These low-order detonations are not
new. The same problems occurred during operational
testing before full production of the M180.
Fort Leonard Wood experienced an 8.3 percent
malfunction rate on M180s between April 1991 and

Page 24
November 1992. This fails the 97 percent reliability
requirement in the SDR. The exact cause of these
malfunctions is unknown.
Ammunition procurement is based upon annual
training requirements, and projected requirements for
war depot stocks. Since the STRAC does not support
live training in units, the annual training
requirements for the M180 are small (162 in 1991).
The Department of the Army uses computer
simulations of major regional conflicts to predict the
logistical requirements for possible future wars. The
outcomes of these simulations determine the shortfalls
of ammunition for war depot stocks. Army Material
Command (AMC) uses these shortfalls to direct
procurement actions. IOC procures additional M180s to
fill these projected war stock shortfalls. IOC
negotiates the price of the M180 with the production
contractor. The negotiated price of a single M180 in
the fiscal year 1991 procurement contract was $3381.
There are 21,533 serviceable M180s in the
worldwide inventory. There are 3237 unserviceable
M180s in inventory. Most of the unserviceable M180s
are due to the fiscal year 88 and 89 contract
litigations; the remainder require maintenance,

Page 25
modification, or repacking (AMCCOM Item Manager,
14 January 1994). The Army has spent $62.5 million to
date on the development and fielding of the M180.
AMC approved an Army Idea for Excellence (AIEP)
suggestion in March 1993 to cancel the fiscal year 1991
production contracts (4,851 M180s for $16.4 million)
(AIEP Suggestion TCLW003866, 6 March 1992). However,
most of the savings were lost due to the extended
processing time for the suggestion. The estimated
savings from the suggestion are $500,000 (AMCCOM
Contract Specialist, 24 January 1994).
The USAES requested a M180 Milestone IV Logistics
Readiness and Support Review/In Process Review (IPR)
from AMCCOM on 9 November 1992. The purpose of the
Milestone IV IPR is to evaluate readiness and
reliability issues for the M180. In response, AMCCOM
initiated the following actions:
- Scheduled an Ammunition Stockpile Reliability
Program (ASRP) for the M180.
- Reviewed the M180 technical manual for possible
modification to the misfire procedures.
- Directed Jefferson Proving Ground to attempt to
recover an undetonated M180 warhead at their test range
for failure analysis.

Page 26
- Directed the production support engineer to
prepare a test plan for further analysis of recent M180
LAT failures. The ASRP for the M180 was completed in
December 1993. One of forty-eight M180s tested
experienced a failure (low-order detonation). This is
similar to the problems experienced at Fort Leonard
Wood. The point estimate of reliability for the test
was 97.9 percent. The reliability estimate at the 90
percent confidence level was 92.1 percent. The sample
size (48) is too small to estimate stockpile
reliability at a higher confidence level. AMCCOM
believes that this is within the acceptable reliability
range for the M180, with the possible exception of the
one lot whose warhead failed. The cause for the one
failure has not been determined. Nor do these results
explain the higher malfunction rate experienced at Fort
Leonard Wood. Crater dimensions are not included in
the report. AMCCOM recommended no changes to the
firing procedures for the M180 (ASRP Report for the
Demolition Kit, Cratering, M180 (1365-M965),
27 December 1993). However, ARDEC recommended
modification of the firing procedures in training, by
adding a continuity check with a low-current digital
multi-meter of all firing circuits prior to initiation.

Page 27
This check is in addition to the required continuity
check with the M51 test set. The low-current digital
multi-meter is not part of the Army's standard
demolition equipment (Recommended Procedural
Modifications Resulting from M180 Demolition Kit Red
Team Failure Investigation, 9 December 1993). ARDEC
has requested further meetings and tests on the M180
with the USAES in 1994.

Page 28
Conclusions
The study and findings support the following
conclusions concerning the procurement and training
programs for the M180 and M270 Demolition Cratering
Kits:
- Army doctrine inconsistently describes the
operational limitations of the M180.
- The USAES has not determined the future role of
the M180 in a combat environment.
- The planned replacement for the M180, the
Bridge and Road Munition, remains unfunded.
- Army training doctrine has not integrated the
use of the M180. Inconsistencies exist between the
Soldier Training Publications, DA Pamphlet 350-38
(Standards in Weapons Training - STRAC), and the
engineer platoon Mission Training Plans.
- Army engineers are not proficient at employing
the M180. Proficiency cannot be maintained without
adequate training. The STRAC does not support live
training with the M180 in units, and the majority of
engineer units are not training their soldiers with the
inert M270.

Page 29
- The M180 could be issued to engineer soldiers
for use in a future combat environment.
- The procurement and training programs for the
M180 and M270 Demolition Cratering Kits are not
integrated.

Page 30
Premise Assessment
The primary and secondary research data proved
that inconsistencies do exist in the Army's procurement
and training programs for the M180 Demolition Cratering
Kit and the M270 Demolition Cratering Kit (Inert). The
premise of this research was to identify shortcomings
or inconsistencies so that changes could be made to
procurement and training programs to improve Army
readiness. Those changes can be made only after the
Army decides the future role of the M180 in a combat
environment.

Page 31
Recommendations for Future Studies
Before any decision can be reached about the
future role of the M180, it is imperative that its
operational limitations, system reliability, and
effectiveness of emplaced craters be accurately
quantified. Full tests should be conducted with
existing M180s, in the desired operational
environments, until these issues are fully resolved.
Further studies should be conducted of other
engineer munitions and weapon systems for possible
inconsistencies in their procurement or training
programs.

Page 32
Recommendations for the U.S. Army Engineer School
The USAES should ensure that all procurement
actions for the M180 and M270 Demolition Cratering Kits
are halted until the future role of the M180 is
determined.
Possible procurement actions for the M180 include:
- Maintain current inventory (status quo).
- Implement product improvements to the M180
to improve reliability and effectiveness. This course
of action is dependant on available funding.
- Declare the M180 obsolete, and remove from
the inventory.
- Demilitarize the M180 and use its
components for other munitions. The cost-benefit ratio
for this course of action may make it unrealistic.
The future role of the M180 must drive the
training programs. USAES should update the appropriate
technical and tactical doctrine to accurately and
consistently address the employment of the M180.
Lastly, they should integrate the training doctrine to
ensure that Army engineers receive the necessary
training on the M180 Demolition Cratering Kit.

Page 33
References
Army Ideas for Excellence Program (AIEP) Proposal
TCLW003866, 6 March 1992, Cancellation of the
procurement of the M180 cratering device and the
M270 Trainer.
The Language Center, Inc. A-268, South Orange NJ, Trial
of U.S. Cratering-Blasting Device M 180, Test No.
1375-00-148-7159, Translated from German, 1985.
U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station,
Miscellaneous Paper SL-83-10, Explosive Ditiching
and Pavement Breaching Tests at Yuma Proving
Ground, 1978-1980, June 1983.
Headquarters, U.S. Army Armament Munitions, and
Chemical Command, Ammunition Stockpile Reliability
Program (ASRP) Report for Demolition Kit,
Cratering , M180 (1365-M965), 27 December 1993.
Headquarters, U.S. Army Armament Research, Development
and Engineering Center, SMCAR-FSM-S (D),
Recommended Procedural Modifications Rsulting from
M180 Cratering Kit Red Team Failure Investigation,
9 December 1993.
Headquarters, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command,

Page 34
DRSTE-CT-T, Final Report for First Article Initial
Production Test of Demolition Kit, Cratering,
M180, TECOM Project No. 8-MU-011-180-007,
8 June 1981.
Headquarters, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command,
AMSTE-GE, Supplement to Evaluation of Development
Test II of Demolition Kit, Cratering, XM180, TECOM
Project No. 7-MU-011-180-001/002/003/004/005/006,
15 April 1975.
Headquarters, Department of the Army, TM 9-1375-213-12-
1, Operator's and Organizational Maintenance
Manual (Including Repair Parts and Special Tools),
Demolition Materials, Demolition Kit, Cratering:
M180, NSN 1375-00-146-7159 and Demolition Kit,
Cratering, Training: M270 (Inert), NSN 6920-01-
087-0038, Change No. 5, 29 June 1990.
Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-38, Standards in
Weapons Training, 24 September 1990.
Department of the Army, STP 5-21II-MQS, Military
Qualification Standards II Engineer (21) Company
Grade Officer's Manual, March 1991.

Page 35
Department of the Army, STP 5-12B24-SM-TG, Combat
Engineer, December 1990.
Department of the Army, STP-5-12C24-SM-TG, Bridge
Crewman, December 1986.
Department of the Army, STP 5-51H34-SM-TG, Construction
Engineering Supervisor, January 1985.
Department of the Army, ARTEP 5-145-11-MTP,
Combat Engineer Platoon, Heavy
Division/Corps/Armored Cavalry Regiment,
February 1989.
Department of the Army, ARTEP 5-415-17-MTP, Engineer
Construction Platoons, September 1991.
Department of the Army, Field Manual, FM 5-34,
Engineer Field Data, 14 September 1987.

Page 36
Appendix A

Page 37
Annex 1

Page 38

Page 39
Annex 2

Page 40

Page 41
Appendix B

Page 42
Small Development Requirement for a
Cratering Demolition Kit
(7 April 1969)
1. Be capable of surface emplacement, arming, and
firing in not more than 15 minutes by not more than 2
men wearing arctic clothing.
2. Be specifically designed to produce effective
craters from initial surface emplacement with no
preparation of the emplacement site, such as digging
holes, required.
3. When emplaced and fired on any type of soil or
stabilized gravel, bituminous or concrete road surface
up to 5 inches thick, produce a crater which will have
sufficient depth, diameter, wall slopes and bottom
characteristics to insure an effective obstacle to
tracked and wheeled vehicles. One kit should be
capable of producing a crater 15 feet (25 feet
desirable) in diameter at the surface, 7 feet deep, and
with side slopes of at least 30 degrees. For long
craters or anti-tank ditches, kits are spaced 7 feet
apart to produce maximum effective obstacles.
4. Have a 97 percent probability (99 percent desired)
of functioning as designed.
5. Be capable of being actuated by standard ordnance
hardware.
6. Be suitable for emplacement at night under
blackout conditions.
7. Be as small in size as practical, consistent with
required performance, and should not exceed 120 pounds
in weight. Components should be of size and weight
that 2 men can easily carry a complete kit.
8. Be packaged to facilitate safe storage, transport,
handling, and emplacement in standard Army ground, air,
rail, and water facilities.
9. Be air-deliverable without special preparations.

Page 43
10. Be as insensitive to detonation by small arms fire
and "Chance" shell fragments as standard military
explosives.
11. It is desirable that the kit be capable of
underwater use.
12. If expended, the kit will not be reusable.
13. The kit will meet operational and environmental
conditions to ensure operation between -40 to 140
degrees fahrenheit.
14. Minimum allowable time between scheduled and
unscheduled maintenance.
15. The expected service life is ten years.

Page 44
Appendix C

Page 45

Page 46
Appendix D

Page 47
Page 47

Page 48
Appendix E

Page 49
Soldier Training Publication (STP)
References to the M180 Cratering Kit
Soldier Training Publication M180 Task Demo
Tasks
STP 5-62E12-SM-TG NO NO
Heavy Construction Equipment
Operator (SEP 85)
STP 5-62F12-SM-TG NO NO
Crane Operator
(JAN 89)
STP 5-62J12-SM-TG NO NO
General Construction
Equipment Operator
(OCT 86)
STP 5-81B12-SM-TG NO NO
Technical Drafting Specialist
(NOV 84)
STP 5-82B12-SM NO NO
Construction Surveyor
(MAR 86)
STP 5-62G13-SM-TG NO YES
Quarrying Specialist
(MAY 86)
STP 5-62H13-SM-TG NO NO
Concrete and Asphalt
Equipment Operator
(MAY 86)
STP 5-62N34-SM-TG NO NO
Construction Equipment
Supervisor
(FEB 89)
STP 5-51B12-SM-TG NO YES
Carpentry and Masonry
Specialist (AUG 87)

Page 50
Soldier Training Publication M180 Task Demo
Tasks
STP 5-51K12-SM-TG NO YES
Plumber
(SEP 87)
STP 5-51R12-SM-TG NO YES
Interior Electrician
(OCT 88)
STP 5-51H34-SM-TG Employ/Remove the YES
Construction Engineering M180 Demolition
Supervisor Cratering Charge
(JAN 85) 051-193-3021
STP 5-12B1-SM NO YES
Combat Engineer
(DEC 90)
STP 5-12B24-SM-TG Employ the M180 YES
Combat Engineer Demolition
(DEC 90) Cratering Charge
051-193-2130
STP 5-12C1-SM NO YES
Bridge Crewman
(SEP 86)
STP 5-12C24-SM-TG Employ/Remove the YES
Bridge Crewman M180 Demolition
(DEC 86) Cratering Charge
051-193-3021
STP 5-12F24-SM-TG NO NO
Engineer Tracked
Vehicle Crewman
(SEP 86)
STP 5-21II-MQS NO YES
Military Qualification
Standards II Engineer (21)
Company Grade Officer's
Manual
(MAR 91)

Page 51
Notes:
1. Career Management Field (CMF) 51 is comprised of
several construction capper MOSs. General demolition
tasks are limited to the vertical skills MOSs in CMF 51
(at the 10/20 skill levels). The vertical skill MOSs
are; 51B (Carpentry and Masonry Specialist), 51C
(Structures Specialist), 51K (Plumber), and 51R
(Interior Electrician). The vertical skills MOSs cap
into the 51H (Construction Engineering Supervisor) at
Skill Level 30. The 51H30 is the only CMF 51 MOS with
a M180 task requirement.
2. The M180 task for the 51H30 (Construction Engineer
Supervisor) is the same as the task for the 12C30
(Bridge Crewman).
3. The 12B MOS (Combat Engineer) requires mastery of
the M180 at Skill Level 20.
4. The demolition tasks for the 62G (Quarry
Specialist) are unique to quarry operations.

Page 52
Appendix F

Page 53
Summary of M180 Training Requirements
DA Pam 350-38, Standards in Weapons Training
24 September 1990
TRC A (Active) TRC C (Reserve)
Combat Engineer Within 6 months Within 12
months
Combat Heavy Within 12 months Within 12
months
Notes:
1. The STRAC requirement is similarly worded for all
types of units, except for the frequency of training;
"Cratering Kit (M180) Standard. All Combat Engineer
squads must have installed and removed an inert M180
(M270) cratering charges to AMTP standards (task:
Create a crater obstacle with explosives) within the
last ----- months."
2. STRAC describes units in Combat Heavy Engineers as
"Combat Engineer Squads". This is incorrect and
confusing. However, assume that the data is correct.
The higher standard for squads in TRC A Combat
Engineers versus Combat Heavy is logical.
3. STRAC lists Combat Engineer and Bridge units
together, but it is difficult to determine if training
requirements apply to Bridge Units since the reference
is to "Combat Engineer squads" only.
4. Requirements for TRC L (light) units are the same
as their appropriate Active or Reserve counterparts.

Page 54
Appendix G

Page 55
Mission Training Plan
Requirements for the M180 Cratering Kit
Mission Training Plans Cratering Task M180
ARTEP 5-145-11-MTP Create a Crater NO
Combat Engineer Platoon Obstacle with
Heavy Division/Corps/ Explosives
Armored Cavalry Regiment (Squad Level)
(FEB 89) 05-4-0201
ARTEP 5-145-12-MTP NO NA
Engineer Bridge Platoon
(JUL 91)
Engineer Dump Truck Platoon
(SEP 92)
Engineer Equipment Platoons
(SEP 91)
Engineer Maintenance Platoons
(SEP 91)
Engineer Construction Platoons
(SEP 91)
Notes:
1. DA Pam 350-38 (Standards in Weapons Training)
states that "All Combat Engineer Squads (TRC A) must
have installed and remove an inert M180 (M270)
cratering charge to AMTP standards (task: Create a
Crater Obstacle with Explosives) within the past 6
months." However, there is no mention of the M180 in
ARTEP 5-145-11 MTP (Combat Engineer Platoon), or in any
of the other MTPs listed above. The M180 Technical
Manual (TM 9-1375-213-12-1) is not included in any of

Page 56
the MTP references.
2. The only MTPs to include explosives tasks are 5-
145-11 (Combat Engineer Platoon) and 5-415-17 (Engineer
Construction Platoon). They both include "Disable a
Bridge with Explosives, 05-4-0202".

Page 57
Appendix H

Page 58
Survey Results of CONUS Engineer Battalions
Unit M270 M270 Trained On Order
in at last 12
Unit TASC months
1st En Bn ? ? NO ?
(Div)(Mech)
Ft Riley, KS
3rd En Bn NO NO NO NO
(Div)(Mech)
Ft Stewart, GA
5th En BN NO ? NO NO
(Corps)(Cbt) (Mech)
Ft Leonard Wood, MO
11th En Bn NO NO NO NO
(Div)(Mech)
Ft Stewart, GA
17th En Bn NO ? NO NO
(Div)(Mech)
Ft Hood, TX
19th En Bn ? ? NO ?
(Corps)(Cbt)(Mech)
Ft Knox, KY
20th En Bn NO YES YES ?
(Div)(Mech)
Ft Hood, TX
(Corps)(Cbt)(Abn)
Ft Bragg, NC
34th En Bn NO ? NO ?
(Combat)(Heavy)
Ft Riley, KS
(Corps)(Cbt)(Abn)
Ft Bragg, NC

Page 59
Unit M270 M270 Trained On Order
in at last 12
Unit TASC months
41st En Bn NO ? NO NO
(Div)(Light)
Ft Drum, NY
46th En Bn ? ? ? ?
(Combat)(Heavy)
Ft Rucker, AL
62nd En Bn NO ? NO ?
(Combat)(Heavy)
Ft Hood, TX
92nd En Bn NO NO NO ?
(Combat)(Heavy)
Ft Stewart, GA
(Div)(Mech)
Ft Carson, CO
(Div)(Airborne)
Ft Bragg, NC
317th En Bn NO ? NO ?
(Div)(Mech)
Ft Benning, GA
(Div)(Air Assault)
Ft Campbell, KY
864th En Bn NO NO NO ?
(Combat)(Heavy)
Ft Lewis, WA
Notes:
1. Survey was limited to CONUS Battalions only. Training
Battalions (AIT/OSUT/EOBC/Staff and Faculty/Training Support)
were omitted from the survey.

Page 60
2. The intent of the survey was to determine if units were
conducting training with the inert M270 trainer. Question marks
(?) indicate questions that units could not answer.
3. Results represent 73.6 percent of the CONUS Combat Engineer
Battalions (14 of 19 total), and 71.4 percent of the CONUS Combat
Heavy Battalions (5 of 7).

Page 61
Appendix I

Page 62
Locations of M270 Inert Trainers
Location Quantity
Available
Fort Devens 15
Fort Dix 9
Fort Meade 21
Fort Eustis 3
Fort Lee 3
Fort Belvoir 6
Fort Drum * 9
Fort Bucanhan 3
Fort McPherson 3
Fort McCellan 12
Fort Rucker 3
Fort Benning 9
Fort Stewart 9
Fort Campbell 4
Fort Bragg * 9
Fort Jackson 6
Fort Chaffee 6
Fort Polk * 15 (13 according to
Fort Polk TASC)
Fort Sill 4
Fort Hood 9
Fort Sam Houston 9
Fort Knox 18
Fort Riley * 15
Fort Leonard Wood * 40 (12 TRADOC issued;
28 locally
fabricated)
Fort McCoy 18
Fort Ord 9
Fort Carson * 9
Fort Richardson 3
Persidio 6
Fort Irwin 3
USAEUR 47
EUSA 6
TOTAL 338
Notes:
1. Data provided by Ms Juanita Davis, Training
Devices, Fort Eustis, (804) 878-4771, on 1 February
1994. M270s are reported as DVC-T 05-42. Data as of
January 1994.

Page 63
2. Numbers for locations marked with asterisk (*)
were verified by contacting the local TASCs. All
agreed with Fort Eustis data, except Fort Polk and Fort
Leonard (as noted).
3. Exact demand data was not available from any of
the TASCs interviewed. The use of the item can be
generalized as marginal, at best. The TASC at Fort
Bragg noted one problem with the M270 trainer is that
it does not come with a technical manual.
4. Mr John Russell, from Mrs Davis' office, provided
the following additional information at
011550 February. The USAES contacted Fort Eustis in
late 1987 to produce inert M180s (M270) as a result of
the accident in Europe. The USAES checked the
availability of the M270 from AMCCOM (the item
manager), but there were only 10-12 in the system.
They chose to procure the inert trainers through TASC
channels in lieu of the regular supply channels. The
TASC M270s were built at Fort Gordon, and were fielded
from December 1987 through early 1988. TASC obtained
tripods and M57 devices through supply channels for the
M270s. Mr Russell did not know from where the
electrical connections for the trainers were obtained.
His POC at Fort Leonard Wood was Mr Goode (ATSA-TD-
NE).

Page 64
Appendix J

Page 65
RESULTS TO THE SURVEY ARE INDICATED BY EACH QUESTION IN BOLD
PRINT OR HANDWRITING. DATA INCLUDES THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGES
OF RESPONSES TO EACH QUESTION. CORRECT RESPONSES INDICATED BY
ASTERISK (****).
This survey measures your familiarity and opinions
concerning the M180, Demolition Kit, Cratering. Your answers
will be used to make recommended changes to training and
procurement programs for the M180. Participation in this survey
is entirely voluntary. Please circle the appropriate response to
each question. This is an individual effort; do not discuss the
survey questions with your peers, simply answer the questions to
the best of your ability.
1. In which component do you serve?
a. Active Army. (41) (61.2%)
b. National Guard. (25) (37.3%)
c. Army Reserve. (1) (1.5%)
2. What was your last unit of assignment (NG/USAR officers
indicate your current unit of assignment). Please include the
type of unit (ie. Combat Engineer, Combat Heavy, Bridge,
Topographic, etc).
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
3. Have you ever fired, or observed the firing, of a live M180?
a. Yes (please provide details of when, where, how
many, how often, demonstration or training). (36) (54.5%)
EOBC - 30 SAPPER LDR COURSE - 3 KOREA - 2 CP MCCOY - 1
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
INSTRUCTOR - 1 DESSERT STORM - 1 FT DEVENS - 1
ÄÄÄÄ ÄÄ ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
b. No. (30) (45.5%)
4. The M180 can be initiated:
**** a. Electrically only. (30) (48.4%)
b. Non-electrically only. (0)
c. Either electrically or non-electrically.
(32) (51.6%)
5. The M180 can be configured:
a. In single kits only. (5) (8.1%)
**** b. In single or multiple kits. (55) (88.7%)
c. In multiple kits only. (2) (3.2%)

Page 66
6. The M180 can be dual-initiated.
a. True. (37) (60.7%)
**** b. False. (24) (39.3%)
7. The safe distance for exposed personnel using the M180 is:
a. 300 meters. (14) (23.3%)
b. 600 meters. (17) (28.3%)
c. 900 meters. (15) (25.0%)
**** d. 1200 meters. (14) (23.3%)
8. The safe distance for covered personnel firing the M180 is:
a. 100 meters. (10) (15.9%)
**** b. 150 meters. (14) (22.2%)
c. 200 meters. (7) (11.1%)
d. 300 meters. (32) (50.8%)
9. The M180 has fewer misfires than standard shape charges and
cratering charges:
a. Strongly agree. (1) (1.6%)
b. Agree. (11) (17.7%)
c. No opinion (Neither agree or disagree).(30) (48.4%)
d. Disagree. (17) (27.4%)
e. Strongly disagree. (3) (4.8%)
10. Misfires with the M180 may be investigated:
**** a. Immediately after the misfire. (6) (10.5%)
b. Not sooner than 30 minutes after the misfire.
(51) (89.5%)
11. The M180 is ineffective against the following targets
(select one or more):
(5) a. Compacted soil road surface, with compacted sub-
base.
(8) b. Arctic tundra.
(13) c. Sandy soil.
(4) d. Asphaltic Concrete pavements on a compacted sub-
base.
(21) e. Reinforced Concrete surfaces over six inches in
thickness.
(26) f. All reinforced concrete surfaces.
DATA SHOWN FOR QUESTION 11 IS NUMBER OF RESPONSES, NOT
PERCENTAGES. ARMY DOCTRINE IS INCONSISTENT IN DISCUSSING
OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS FOR THE M180.

Page 67
12. Rank order (1-4) your preference for installing a road
crater in a combat environment (1 is first choice, 2 is second,
etc):
3.2 (1.1) Non-explosive techniques (dozer/loader/ACE/SEE/etc).
1.3 (0.5) Shaped charges and 40-lb cratering charges.
2.5 (0.8) Shaped charges and expedient explosives (Ammonium
nitrate fertilizer).
2.9 (1.0) M180 Cratering Kit.
FIRST NUMBER IN QUESTION 12 AND 13 IS AVERAGE RESPONSE. NUMBER
IN ( ) IS STANDARD DEVIATION.
13. Rank order (1-5) your preference for denying a captured
enemy airfield in a combat environment (1 is first choice, 2 is
second, etc):
3.8 (1.3) Non-explosive techniques (dozer/loader/ACE/SEE/etc).
2.4 (0.9) Shaped charges and 40-lb cratering charges.
3.2 (1.0) Shaped charges and expedient explosives (Ammonium
nitrate fertilizer).
3.7 (1.1) M180 Cratering Kit.
1.8 (1.5) US Air Force bombing.
14. Army engineers are proficient with the M180:
a. Strongly agree. (0)
b. Agree. (2) (3.2%)
d. Disagree. (24) (38.7%)
e. Strongly disagree.(10) (16.1%)
15. Did your last unit have inert M180 trainers (M270) (current
unit for NG/USAR Officers)?
a. Yes (continue with question 16). (10) (16.1%)
b. No (continue with question 17). (52) (83.9%)
16. How often did squads train with the inert M180 (M270)?
a. None. (1) (10%)
b. Once a year. (6) (60%)
c. Twice a year. (1) (10%)
d. Once a quarter. (2) (20%)
17. Select the one choice below which best describes the Army's
training requirements (DA Pam 350-38, Standards in Weapons
Training) for the M180 (assuming resources are available)?
a. Live fire annually for all engineer squads. (5) (8.5%)

Page 68
b. Live fire annually for all combat engineer and bridge
(12B/12C) squads. Inert training for all other
engineer squads. (5) (8.5%)
c. Live fire annually for all Active Component squads.
Inert training annually for all Reserve Component
squads. (12) (20.3%)
d. Inert training every 6 months for all Active units;
every 12 months for all Reserve units. (4) (6.8%)
**** e. Inert training every 6 months for Active 12B/12C squads;
every 12 months for all other engineer squads
(Active -and Reserve). (7) (11.9%)
f. None of the above. (5) (8.5%)
g. No standard exists in the DA Pam for the M180.
(21) (35.6%)
18. The M180 is safer to use than standard shape charges and
cratering charges:
b. Agree. (5) (8.2%)
c. No opinion (Neither agree or disagree).(25) (41%)
d. Disagree. (22) (36.1)
e. Strongly disagree. (8) (13.1)
19. The M180 is more effective at cratering roads than standard
shape charges and cratering charges:
a. Strongly agree. (2) (3%)
b. Agree. (11) (16.7%)
d. Disagree. (16) (24.2%)
20. The M180 is an essential munition for Army engineers:
b. Agree. (13) (21%)
d. Disagree. (12) (19.4%)
Please make any additional comments below:

Page 69
Appendix K

Page 70
Operational Restrictions for the M180 Cratering Kit
1. FM 5-250, Explosives and Demolitions,
15 June 1992. "The M180 is designed to produce a large
crater in compacted soil or road surfaces, but not in
reinforced concrete, arctic tundra, bedrock, or sandy
soil."
2. ARTEP 5-145-DRILL, Engineer Drills,
22 October 1990. "The M180 is only good for soft,
unfrozen soils and unreinforced concrete."
3. TM 9-1375-213-12-1, Demolition Kit, Cratering:
M180 (thru Change 5, 29 June 1990). "...the kit is
designed to produce a large crater in compacted soil or
road surface, including reinforced concrete up to 6
inches thick. The only exceptions are the tundra of
the arctic and bed rock or sandy soil in other
regions."
4. FM 5-34, Engineer Field Data, 14 September 1987.
"The M180 is only good for soft, unfrozen soils, and
nonreinforced concrete. Test shots are advised."
5. FM 5-102, Countermobility, 14 March 1985. "The
M180 demolition cratering kit is specifically designed
to produce craters in all types of soil and road
surfaces, to include reinforced concrete."
6. Miscellaneous Paper SL-83-10, U.S. Army Waterways
Experiment Station, Explosive Ditching and Pavement
Breaching Tests at Yuma Proving Ground, 1978-1980, June
1983. "...Paragraph 60. Cratering with the M180 was
of limited success, with only three successful
detonations of the warhead (of five attempts). The
craters were small and appeared to offer little or no
obstacle value against a tracked vehicle."
7. TM 43-0001-38, Army Ammunition Data Sheets for
Demolition Materials, 28 June 1981" Use: The M180
demolition kit quickly makes an effective crater in all
types of roads to obstruct the movement of wheeled and
tracked vehicles. It can be used for (packing)
airfields."

Thesis

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (12)

Similar to Thesis

Similar to Thesis (20)

Thesis