The West in the Contemporary Era New Encounters and T.docx

The West in the
Contemporary Era:
New Encounters and
Transformations
• Economic Stagnation and Political Change: The 1970s and
1980s
a R e v o l u t i o n i n the East H I n the Wske of R e v o l u t i
o n H R e t h i n k i n g the West
O N THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 9 , 1 9 8 9 , EAST
GERMAN
BORDER g u a r d s at t h e Berlin W a l l w a t c h e d n e r v o
u s l y
as t h o u s a n d s of East Berliners c r o w d e d i n f r o n t of
t h e m a n d d e m a n d e d t o b e a l l o w e d i n t o W e s t B
e r l i n .
T h i s d e m a n d w a s e x t r a o r d i n a r y : In t h e 2 8
years t h a t
t h e Berlin W a l l h a d s t o o d , s o m e 2 0 0 p e o p l e h a d
b e e n s h o t t r y i n g t o cross f r o m east t o w e s t . B u t t
h e
a u t u m n of 1 9 8 9 w a s n o o r d i n a r y t i m e . A r e f o r
m i s t
r e g i m e h a d e m e r g e d i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d
p r o -
c l a i m e d t h a t e a s t e r n E u r o p e a n g o v e r n m e n t
s c o u l d
n o l o n g e r rely o n t h e Red A r m y t o c r u s h d o m e s t i
c
d i s s e n t . P o l a n d a n d H u n g a r y w e r e i n t h e p r o

c e s s o f
r e p l a c i n g c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t s w i t h p l u
r a l i s t
p a r l i a m e n t a r y s y s t e m s . A n d i n East G e r m a n y
, o v e r
o n e m i l l i o n d i s a f f e c t e d c i t i z e n s h a d j o i n e d
i l l e g a l
p r o t e s t d e m o n s t r a t i o n s .
In r e s p o n s e t o t h i s o v e r w h e l m i n g p u b l i c p r e
s -
s u r e , t h e East G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d d e c i d e
d t o
relax t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r o b t a i n i n g a n e x i t
visa t o
v i s i t W e s t G e r m a n y . B u t a t a press c o n f e r e n c e
o n
t h e m o r n i n g o f N o v e m b e r 9 , t h e East B e r l i n C o
m -
m u n i s t Party b o s s G u n t e r S c h a b o w s k i s t a t e d ,
w r o n g l y , t h a t a n y o n e w h o w a n t e d t o h e a d t o t
h e
W e s t c o u l d o b t a i n a n a u t o m a t i c e x i t visa at t h e
b o r -
der. As h u g e c r o w d s g a t h e r e d a t t h e c h e c k p o i n
t s
t h a t d o t t e d t h e B e r l i n W a l l , t h e b o r d e r g u a r
d s h a d
n o i d e a w h a t t o d o . P a n i c k e d , t h e y o p e n e d t h
e
g a t e s . W h i l e t e l e v i s i o n c a m e r a s b r o a d c a s t
t h e scene
t o a n a s t o n i s h e d w o r l d , t e n s o f t h o u s a n d s o f
East
B e r l i n e r s w a l k e d , r a n , a n d d a n c e d across t h e b

o r d e r
t h a t h a d f o r so l o n g l i t e r a l l y a n d s y m b o l i c a l
l y
d i v i d e d W e s t f r o m East. E l a t e d w i t h t h e i r n e w
f r e e -
d o m a n d e n e r g i z e d w i t h a sense o f p o w e r a n d p o
s -
s i b i l i t y , t h e y j u m p e d u p o n t h e W a l l . A n i n s t
r u m e n t
o f c o e r c i o n a n d d i v i s i o n b e c a m e a p l a t f o r m f
o r p a r -
t y i n g . W i t h i n a f e w d a y s , a n d a g a i n w i t h o u t a
n y
o f f i c i a l a p p r o v a l , o r d i n a r y G e r m a n s , e q u i
p p e d w i t h
h a m m e r s a n d chisels, b e g a n t o d i s m a n t l e t h e W
a l l
e r e c t e d a l m o s t t h r e e d e c a d e s earlier.
T h e f a l l o f t h e Berlin W a l l has c o m e t o s y m b o l i z
e
t h e d r a m a t i c e v e n t s t h a t c l o s e d t h e t w e n t i e t
h c e n -
t u r y : t h e c o l l a p s e of c o m m u n i s t r e g i m e s t h r
o u g h o u t
e a s t e r n E u r o p e , t h e e n d of t h e C o l d War, t h e d i
s i n t e -
g r a t i o n of t h e Soviet U n i o n , a n d t h e o n s e t o f
civil w a r
9 2 8
le West

) h e a d t o t h e
sa a t t h e b o r -
; c h e c k p o i n t s
T g u a r d s h a d
o p e n e d t h e
ast t h e s c e n e
i a n d s o f East
ss t h e b o r d e r
s y m b o l i c a l l y
eir n e w f r e e -
z e r a n d pos-
1 i n s t r u m e n t
' o r m f o r par-
w i t h o u t a n y
u i p p e d w i t h
i t l e t h e W a l l
t o s y m b o l i z e
e n t i e t h cen-
t h r o u g h o u t
t h e d i s i n t e -
t o f civil w a r
A N D T H E WALL C A M E
T U M B L I N G D O W N
Events in H u n g a r y h e l p e d t o p p l e t h e
Berlin Wall in East Germany. In t h e
s u m m e r of 1 9 8 9 , t h e H u n g a r i a n
g o v e r n m e n t , already well a l o n g t h e
road f r o m c o m m u n i s m t o democracy,
assisted t h e a n t i - c o m m u n i s t m o v e -
m e n t in East G e r m a n y by o p e n i n g
Hungary's borders w i t h Austria. The

repressive East G e r m a n c o m m u n i s t
r e g i m e d i d n o t p e r m i t its citizens to
travel t o t h e West; it d i d , however,
a l l o w t h e m t o vacation in Hungary.
The n e w H u n g a r i a n b o r d e r policy
m e a n t t h a t East Germans seeking t o
escape c o m m u n i s m h a d o n l y t o
b o o k a holiday in H u n g a r y and t h e n
walk, drive, or take a train across t h e
H u n g a r i a n b o r d e r i n t o Austria, a n d
i n t o f r e e d o m . In just three days in
September, 1 3,000 East Germans d i d
exactly t h a t . This mass exodus f o r c e d
t h e East G e r m a n c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n -
m e n t t o promise r e f o r m s — t o o little,
t o o late.
i n Y u g o s l a v i a a n d i n m a n y f o r m e r l y S o v i e t r
e g i o n s .
In t h e s u b s e q u e n t d e c a d e s , g o v e r n m e n t s a n d
o r d i -
n a r y p e o p l e — n o t o n l y i n E u r o p e b u t across t h e
g l o b e — s t r u g g l e d t o b u i l d n e w s t r u c t u r e s t o
s u i t t h e
t r a n s f o r m e d g e o p o l i t i c a l l a n d s c a p e . W h a t
, t h e n ,
w e r e t h e causes a n d c o n s e q u e n c e s o f these d e v e l
-
o p m e n t s ? A n d w h a t w e r e t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s
f o r
W e s t e r n i d e n t i t y — a n d f o r t h e f u t u r e o f W e s
t e r n
c i v i l i z a t i o n ?
E C O N O M I C STAGNATION
A N D POLITICAL C H A N G E :

T H E 1970s A N D 1980s
n H o w d i d economic and p o l i t i c a l
developments i n the 1970s and 1980s
destabilize p o s t - W o r l d War I I n a t i o n a l
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l structures?
9 2 9
9 3 0 C H A P T E R 2 9 The West in the Contemporary Era:
Hew Encounters and Transformations
The 1970s and 1980s saw the post-World War I I
political settlement, in national and international
terms, begin to collapse. The stark clarity—the
" T h e m versus Js"—oi the C o l d War grew more
opaque at the same time that economic crisis
widened divisions w i t h i n Western societies and
eroded the social democratic political consensus.
The 1970s: A More Uncertain Era
I n the early 1970s, the West entered a new era.
Detente, the effort to stabilize superpower rela-
tions through negotiations and arms control,
shifted the Cold War status quo while the easy
affluence of the postwar period abruptly ended.
T H E ERA OF DIITENTE West German diplomacy
caused the first shift in Cold War relations. I n
1969 the West Berlin mayor and Social Democra-
tic Party (SPD) leader W i l l y Brandt (1913-1992)
became chancellor. For the first time in its history.
West Germany had a government not led by a
Christian Democrat. Brandt proceeded to imple-

ment a new Ostpolitik or "Eastern policy"—the
opening of diplomatic and economic relations
between West Germany and the Soviet Union and
its satellite states. Ostpolitik reached its climax
when East and West Germany recognized the legit-
imacy of each other's existence in 1972 and both
Germanys entered the United Nations in 1973.
Economic pressures led the leaders of the
superpowers to embrace a much wider version of
Ostpolitik: detente. By the end of the 1960s, the
Soviet and the American economies were stag-
nating. W i t h both states spending colossal sums
on nuclear weapons, their leaders looked for a
new approach to the Cold War. Thus, in Novem-
ber 1969 Soviet and American negotiators began
the Strategic Arms L i m i t a t i o n Talks (SALT).
Signed i n 1972, the agreement froze the existing
weapons balance. SALT left the superpowers
w i t h sufficient nuclear weaponry to destroy the
globe several times over, but it helped slow the
armaments spiral and ease Cold War tensions.
Detente also extended to U.S. relations w i t h
the other great corrununist power: China. I n 1971
President Richard N i x o n (1913-1994) announced
the lifting of travel and trade restrictions w i t h
China and then visited China himself. "East versus
West" had formed a basic building block of inter-
national relations throughout the 1950s and
1960s. I n the era of detente, however, the shape o:
international politics became more f l u i d .
E C O N O M I C Oms m T H E W E S T The economic
outlook also blurred in this era as the 1970s

brought an unprecedented combination of high
inflation and high unemployment rates. Com-
mentators labeled this new reality stagflation—
escalating prices combined w i t h the joblessness
of a stagnant economy. Between 1974 and 1976
the average annual g r o w t h rate w i t h i n western
European nations dropped to zero.
War and o i l helped create this economic c r i -
sis. I n October 1973, the Y o m K i p p u r War began
when Egyptian and Syrian armies attacked
Israel. I n retaliation for American assistance to
Israel, the oil-producing Arab states in OPEC
(the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries) imposed an embargo on sales to the United
States and quintupled the price of a barrel of o i l .
I n 1979 political revolution in Iran doubled the
price again. These t w o " o i l crises" vastly acceler-
ated the inflationary spiral.
Two other factors also contributed the eco-
nomic crisis. First, in 1973 President N i x o n
acted to defend the weakening dollar by letting i t
" f l o a t . " M a r k e t forces rather than fixed
exchange rates now determined the dollar's value
against other currencies. This decision gutted the
Bretton Woods Agreement, which had governed
international economic affairs since W o r l d War
I I (see Chapter 28), and introduced a less regu-
lated, more volatile economic era. In the t w o
decades after the collapse of Bretton Woods,
69 countries experienced serious banking crises
as currency speculators destabilized national
economies and the annual economic g r o w t h
rates of the developing nations fell by one-third.

A second factor in the economic crisis of the
1970s was international competition as Asian,
South American, and Latin American economies
industriaUzed. Because Western societies possessed
a politicized workforce that demanded relatively
Economic Stagnation and Political Change; The 1970s and
1980s 9 3 1
restrictions w i t h
self. "East versus
•Lg block of inter-
the 1950s and
ever, the shape of
:e f l u i d .
The economic
i-a as the 1970s
bination of high
ent rates. Com-
lity stagflation—
a the joblessness
1 1974 and 1976
; w i t h i n western
:ro.
his economic cri-
I p p u r War began
armies attacked
can assistance to
states in OPEC
Exporting Coun-
ales to the United
of a barrel of o i l .

Iran doubled the
;s" vastly acceler-
itributed the eco-
President N i x o n
dollar by letting i t
her than fixed
the dollar's value
ecisiou gutted the
ich had governed
since W o r l d War
iuced a less regu-
era. In the t w o
Bretton Woods,
lus banking crises
abilized national
;conomic g r o w t h
fell by one-third,
lomic crisis of the
petition as Asian,
iierican economies
societies possessed
;manded relatively
high wages and extensive social services, manufac-
turing firms began to move south and east to take
advantage of the lack of labor regulation and pro-
tection in the developing w o r l d .
CowsEQUEf'JCES OF THE CRISIS As the economic
pie appeared smaller, competition for slices
increased. The 1970s saw a resurgence of indus-
trial unrest. Conflict w i t h unions brought d o w n

three successive British governments in a decade.
Throughout the West images of picketing w o r k -
ers, often fighting w i t h police, dominated tele-
vised news broadcasts.
Racial conflict also escalated, w i t h the nine
m i l l i o n immigrants residing in northern and
western Europe making easy targets for those
individuals and groups w h o sought someone to
blame for their economic hardships. By 1975
West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Britain,
Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland had all
banned further immigration, but ironically, this
legislation actually increased the size of i m m i -
grant communities. Foreign workers scrambled
to get into western Europe before the doors shut,
and those already established hastened to bring
i n family members. By 1991, 25 percent of the
inhabitants of France were either immigrants or
the children or grandchildren of immigrants.
The resulting encounters among peoples of dif-
ferent religious and ethnic traditions transformed
European cultures and raised questions about
national identiries. In Britain, for example, Afro-
Caribbean styles of dress and music reshaped white
working-class youth culture. A t the same time,
however, journalists often described an individual
born in Britain to British citizenship as a " t h i r d -
generation immigrant," a label that revealed the
"whiteness" of popular notions of British identity.
A t least in Britain, as well as in France, immigrants
could become or already were legal citizens, h i
contrast, in West Germany, Switzerland, and the
Scandinavian countries, immigrants remained " f o r -
eign," w i t h no chance of obtaining citizenship.

Thus, their children grew up in a society in which
they had no pohtical rights. These "foreigners"
experienced widespread discrimination i n educa-
tion, housing, and employment.
E x p l i c i t l y racist p o l i t i c a l parties capitalized
on a n t i - i m m i g r a t i o n sentiment. The most
i m p o r t a n t such p a r t y emerged i n France i n
1974 when Jean-Marie Le Pen (b. 1928) cre-
ated the Front National. I n Le Pen's view,
" E v e r y t h i n g comes f r o m i m m i g r a t i o n . Every-
t h i n g goes back to i m m i g r a t i o n . " Unemploy-
ment, rising crime rates, an increase i n
illegitimate births, crowded schools, AIDS—Le
Pen blamed i t all on n o n w h i t e immigrants.
Appealing particularly to young, male w o r k i n g -
class voters, Le Pen's party remained a p o l i t i -
cal presence i n France for the next three
decades.
The 1980s: The End of Political
Consensus in the West
The economic crisis cracked the postwar p o h t i -
cal consensus. T w o offshoots of the protests of
the 1960s—new feminism and environmental-
ism—demanded a reorientation of social demo-
cratic politics, while New Conservatives rejected
social democratic fundamentals.
N E W CHALLKWCES A N D N E W iDENXiTiEs; N E W
FEMiNisry: N e w feminism (also called "Second
Wave feminism") emerged directly out of the stu-
dent protest movement of the 1960s, when
female activists grew frustrated w i t h their limited
role—"We cook while the men talk of revolu-
t i o n . " ^ Their efforts to hberate women f r o m

political and cultural Umits gave b i r t h to an
international feminist movement.
Although new feminists worked for the elec-
tion of female candidates and other such pohtical
goals, they refused to confine their efforts to par-
liamentary politics. Asserting that "the personal
is p o l i t i c a l , " new feminists attacked beauty pag-
eants, critiqued the fashion industry, and
demanded equal access for girls to sporting funds
and facilities. They also sought to outlaw spousal
rape and to legalize abortion. Abortions became
legal first i n northern Europe: i n Britain in 1967,
in Denmark in 1970. Catholic Europe followed:
I n Italy abortions became legally available in
1978, in France in 1979.
9 3 2 C H A P T E R 29 The West in the Contemporary Era:
New Encounters and Transformations
N e w feminism extended its critique of gen-
der inequalities to the economic and educational
spheres. Feminists demanded equal pay for equal
w o r k and greater access for women to profes-
sional opportunities. They pressed for more gen-
erous parental leave policies, family allowances,
and child care provisions. W i t h women account-
ing for approximately half of the universiry stu-
dents i n many Western countries, feminists also
began to alter the content of the curriculum.
Challenging the biases that had regarded women's
contributions as irrelevant and women's lives as
insignificant, feminists brought to light the
"hidden h i s t o r y " of women.

N E W CHALLENGES mo M E W IDENTITIES: Ew^moN-
MENTALISM Environmentalists added their voice
to the political cacophony of the 1970s and
1980s. A t the heart of environmentalism was the
idea of natural limits, often conceptualized as
"Spaceship E a r t h , " the vision of the planet as a
"single spaceship, w i t h o u t unlimited reservoirs
of a n y t h i n g . " - This vision led environmentalists
to question the fundamental structures of indus-
trial economies (capitalist and communist), par-
ticularly their inherent emphasis on "more,
bigger, faster, n o w . " The movement argued that
quantitative measures of economic g r o w t h (such
as the GNP) failed to factor in environmental
destruction and social dislocation and that in
many contexts, "small is beautiful."
The environmentahst movement's concern
w i t h ecological susta inability helped create
" G r e e n " pohtical parties. Green politics drew on
two other sources: new feminism and the N e w
Left. The Greens contended that the degradation
of the natural environment stemmed from the
same root as discrimination against women—an
obsession w i t h physical power and an unwilling-
ness to tear d o w n hierarchical structures. Green
pohtics also championed the key N e w Leftist
goal of participatory democracy (see Chapter 28)
and so articulated a basic challenge to the p o l i t i -
cal status quo: "We are neither left nor right; we
are in f r o n t . " By the late 1980s Green Parties
had sprouted in 15 western European countries.
The Greens were the most successful i n West
Germany, where they sat in the legislature f r o m

1983 and formed an important voting bloc.
T H E N ^ W CONSERVATIVES Discontented by the
economic crisis and social unrest of the 1970s,
voters throughout the West looked for new
answers. In Spain, Portugal, and Greece, they
turned to socialist parties. Throughout most of
western Europe and in the United States, how-
ever, N e w Conservatism dominated pohtical
society. Three leaders epitomized the N e w Con-
servatism: the Republican Ronald Reagan i n the
United States (1911-2004), the Christian Demo-
crat H e l m u t K o h l in West Germany (b. 1930),
and the Conservative Margaret Thatcher in
Britain (b. 1925). New Conservatives rejected
the postwar emphasis on social improvement in
favor of individual achievement. They argued
that rising social expenditures, funded by rising
taxes, bore the blame for surging inflation and
declining economic g r o w t h rates. As K o h l
demanded during his 1983 campaign, "Less
state, more market; fewer collective burdens,
more personal performance; fewer encrusted
structures, more mobility, self-initiative, and
competition."
The N e w Conservative agenda included l i f t -
ing regulations on business, privatizing national-
ized or state-owned industries, and reining in the
welfare state. M o s t dramatically. N e w Conserva-
tives abandoned the central feature of the post-
war social democratic consensus: the conviction
that the state has the responsibility to ensure f u l l
employment. By imposing high interest rates on
their economies, N e w Conservative leaders such
as Thatcher lowered damaging double-digit

i n f l a t i o n rates. But high interest rates hurt
domestic manufacturing and led to rising unem-
ployment numbers. I n Britain, 13 percent of the
workforce was unemployed by 1984. I n West
Germany, too, Kohl's policies of holding down
taxes and government expenditures accompa-
nied unemployment rates over 9 percent in the
mid-1980s.
T H E E H D OF Dtrimt Like the emergence of
N e w Conservatism, rising superpower tensions
NEW C
British P
press aft
powers e
fives of 3
States, an
Accords,
ders, agrt
military e
dental nu
human r i j
The F
detente—;
European
human r i
Economic Stagnation and Poiitical Change: The 1970s and
1980s 9 3 3
lire from

iloc.
i by the
le 1970s,
for new
ece, they
t most of
tes, how-
political
Jew Con-
;an in the
i n Demo-
b. 1930),
atcher in
s rejected
vement in
;y argued
. by rising
ation and
As K o h l
gn, "Less
burdens,
encrusted
itive, and
:luded l i f t -
; national-
ning i n the
Conserva-
f the post-
conviction
ensure f u l l

st rates on
;aders such
ouble-digit
rates hurt
sing unem-
cent of the
4. In West
ding down
, accompa-
cent i n the
lergence of
fer tensions
NEW CONSERVATIVES AT W O R K
British Prime Minister M a r g a r e t T h a t c h e r a n d G e r
m a n Chancellor H e l m u t Kohl address t h e
press after a m e e t i n g in L o n d o n in 1 9 8 8 .
accelerated the breakdown of the post-World
War I I political consensus w i t h i n Western soci-
eties. Those tensions had appeared to be receding
i n the early 1970s as the leaders of the super-
powers embraced detente. In 1975 representa-
tives of 32 European states, Canada, the United
States, and the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki
Accords, which ratified existing European bor-
ders, agreed to the joint notification of major
military exercises (to reduce the chances of acci-
dental nuclear w a r ) , and promised to safeguard
human rights.
The Helsinki Accords came about because of
detente—yet they helped destroy it. Eastern
European and Soviet dissidents used the Helsinki
human rights clauses to publicize the abuses

committed by their governments and to demand
justice. Dissident activities expanded throughout
the Soviet bloc, as did efforts at repression.
When U.S. president Jimmy Carter took office in
1976, he placed human rights at the center of his
foreign policy. Carrer's approach infuriated
Soviet leaders. Detente finally died in December
1979, when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan.
Calling the invasion "the most serious threat to
peace since the Second W o r l d War," Carter
warned that if the Soviets moved toward the
M i d d l e East, he w o u l d use nuclear weapons.
The election of New Conservatives such as
Thatcher in 1979 and Reagan in 1980 intensified
the rejection of detente and the renewal of the
Cold War. Reagan labeled the Soviet Union the
" E v i l Empire"—a reference to the popular Star
Wars f i l m series released in the 1970s—and
revived the anticommunist attitudes and rhetoric
of the 1950s. Thatcher strongly supported Rea-
gan's decision to accelerate the arms buildup
begun by Carter. Her hard-line anticommunism
w o n her the nickname " I r o n L a d y " f r o m Soviet
policymakers.
9 3 4 C H A P T E R 2 9 The West in the Contemporary Era:
New Encounters and Transformations
T H E G R E E N H A M C O M M O N PROTESTS
In t h e s p r i n g of 1 9 8 3 , protesters f o r m e d a 14-mile h
u m a n chain across G r e e n h a m C o m m o n
in England to p r o t e s t against NATO's d e p l o y m e n t of

cruise missiles. The protest was p a r t of a
m u c h w i d e r m o v e m e n t in w e s t e r n Europe a n d t h
e U n i t e d States against t h e intensification of
t h e C o l d War after t h e collapse of d e t e n t e . The G r e e
n h a m C o m m o n p r o t e s t also played a
p i v o t a l role in British f e m i n i s m , as f e m a l e activists
established a w o m e n - o n l y c a m p at t h e
G r e e n h a m C o m m o n m i l i t a r y base.
R E V O L U T I O N M T H E EAST
• W h a t factors explain n o t o n l y the
outbreak b u t also the success of the
revolutions of 1989-1991 ?
Between 1989 and 1991, revolution engulfed
eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and set in
m o t i o n a series of breathtaking changes: Soviet
control over eastern Europe ended, the Cold War
came to an abrupt halt, the Soviet Union itself
ceased to exist. M i k h a i l Gorbachev
(1985-1991), appointed Soviet Communist
Party secretary in 1985, played a pivotal role in
these events. But Gorbachev did not control the
story. Ordinary people developed their o w n plot
lines. What the Czech dissident (and future pres-
ident) Vaclav Havel called "the power of the
powerless" proved powerful indeed.
The Crisis of Legitimacy in the East
While Western cotmtries in the 1970s struggled
w i t h stagflation, the Soviet U n i o n posted record-
breaking production figures. But Soviet statistics
ignored the quality of goods produced, the actual
demand for a product, or the cost of producing

i t . A n d while Soviet leaders boasted that they
Revolution in the East 9 3 5
had completed the heavy industrial expansion
planned by Khrushchev i n the early 1960s,
microchips now counted for more than i r o n ore,
and fiber optics, not steel, buttressed the new
modernity. The r i g i d Soviet command economy
could not keep up. By the 1980s, its only g r o w t h
sectors were oil and vodka—and then the bot-
t o m dropped out of the oil market. After peaking
i n 1981, oil prices began a steady decade-long
fall—and so, too, did the Soviet economy.
The Soviet Union's satellite states i n eastern
Europe also lurched f r o m apparent prosperity
into economic crisis durmg this period. D u r i n g
the 1970s, t w o factors cushioned eastern Europe
f r o m the economic crisis in the West. First, east-
ern governments could purchase Soviet oil at
prices below market value. (In return these
states had to sell their o w n products to the Sovi-
ets at similar discounts.) Second, loans f r o m
Western banks helped mask fundamental prob-
lems such as over-centralization and under-
productivity. But i n the 1980s, the Soviet U n i o n ,
strugghng w i t h its o w n faltering economy,
began charging higher oil prices at the same time
that debt loads overwhelmed eastern European
economies.
T H E EjEGi!'Ji''>iiNC. OF THE E N D : SOUDARITV Events i
n

Poland indicated the fragility of the communist
system and initiated the process that led to the sys-
tem's collapse. Faced w i t h negative economic
growth rates, the Pohsh government announced
in July 1980 a rise i n prices for meat and other
essentials. Workplace strikes protesting the price
rises spread throughout Poland. Then, workers at
the Lenin Shipyard i n Gdansk, led by a charis-
matic electrician named Lech Walfsa (b. 1943),
demanded the right to f o r m a trade union inde-
pendent of communist control. One month later,
they did so—Solidarity was born. M o r e than a
trade union, Sohdarity demanded the liberation of
pohtical prisoners, an end to censorship, and a
rollback of governmental power. W i t h i n just a few
months, more than eleven miUion Poles joined
Solidarity.
H o w could Solidarity become such a power-
f u l political and social presence so quickly? The
answer rests in the concept of civil society: pub-
he organizations and activities separate f r o m the
state, commerce, or the family. Ranging f r o m
church and charitable groups to sports and
hobby clubs, f r o m theater companies to rock
bands to radio stations, these organizations and
activities help create community life—and i n
such communities, an individual creates his or
her o w n sense of independent identity. In Soviet-
style communism, where the state aimed to con-
t r o l not only public life but even private
consciousness, such a self-identity, forged out-
side state c o n t r o l , threatened the entire political
system. (See Encounters and Transformations in
this chapter.)

I n Poland, however, communist control had
never entirely destroyed civil society, i n part
because of the key role of the Roman Catholic
Church. Participation i n the Church had long
been a way for Poles to express not only their
religious faith but also their Pohshness—an iden-
tity not controlled by the communist govern-
ment. The power of this Catholic identity
became clear i n 1979, when Pope John Paul I I
(r. 1978-2005) visited Poland. This visit marked
the first time any pope traveled to a communist
c o u n t r y - b u t John Paul I I was not just any pope.
Born Karol Wojtyla, he was the first non-Italian
pope since 1523 and the first Pohsh pope ever.
Twelve m i l l i o n people—one-third of the Polish
population—greeted the pope during his visit.
M a n y Solidarity members testified to the impor-
tance of this visit i n empowering them to chal-
lenge the communist order.
Solidarity's growing popularity soon threat-
ened communist control of Poland. I n December
1981 Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski
declared martial law and arrested more than
10,000 Solidarity members (including Wal^a).
Like the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the
Prague Spring of 1968, Solidarity seemed to be
one more noble but defeated protest i n eastern
Europe.
But Solidarity refused to be defeated. I t
remained a pohtical presence and a moral force
in Polish society throughout the 1980s. Solidar-
ity members met i n small groups, published

9 3 6 Ci-iAPTER 29 The West in the Contemporary Era: New
Encounters and Transformations
[i THE M O M E N T OF SOLIDARITY
Pope John Paul II greets Lech Wa-tqsa. The Polish pope's visit t
o his h o m e l a n d in 1 9 7 9 helped
energize t h e a n t i c o m m u n i s t protests t h a t coalesced i
n t o Solidarity the f o l l o w i n g year.
n e w s p a p e r s , a n d o r g a n i z e d e l e c t i o n b o y c o t
t s . A t
t h e same t i m e , activists t h r o u g h o u t H u n g a r y ,
C z e c h o s l o v a k i a , East G e r m a n y , a n d the Soviet
U n i o n itself d r e w o n S o l i d a r i t y f o r i n s p i r a t i o
n
a n d p r a c t i c a l lessons i n resistance.
B e f o r e 1 9 8 9 n o o t h e r eastern E u r o p e a n state
e x p e r i e n c e d a p r o t e s t m o v e m e n t as d r a m a t i
c as
S o l i d a r i t y , yet t h r o u g h o u t m u c h o f the r e g i o n
t w o i m p o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t s m a r k e d the l a t e
r
1970s a n d the 1 9 8 0 s . F i r s t , e c o n o m i c h a r d s h i p
fed w i d e s p r e a d p o l i t i c a l a l i e n a t i o n a n d a
deepen-
i n g l o n g i n g f o r r a d i c a l change. A n d second,
activists a n d o r d i n a r y p e o p l e w o r k e d t o create
the s t r u c t u r e s o f c i v i l society.
Ef<V!RONMENT.£..L pROTE;vr F o r m a n y eastern
E u r o p e a n s , e n v i r o n m e n t a l a c t i v i s m h e l p e
d create
at least the b e g i n n i n g s o f c i v i l society. F o r

decades, the c o n q u e s t o f n a t u r e h a d been a k e y
p a r t o f c o m m u n i s t i d e o l o g y : " W e c a n n o t w a i
t
f o r f a v o r s f r o m n a t u r e ; o u r task is t o t a k e f r o m
her."-" G o v e r n m e n t s t h r o u g h o u t the Soviet b l o c
i g n o r e d the m o s t basic e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r e c a u -
t i o n s , d u m p i n g u n t r e a t e d sewage a n d n u c l e a r
w a s t e i n t o lakes a n d r i v e r s a n d p u m p i n g poisons
i n t o the air. B u t because c o m m u n i s t o f f i c i a l s
r e g a r d e d the n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t as i n s i g n i
f i -
c a n t , t h e y t e n d e d t o v i e w e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t
p r o t e s t as u n i m p o r t a n t , a " s a f e " o u t l e t f o r p
o p u -
l a r f r u s r r a t i o n . T h u s , by the later 1970s, m a n y
Soviet a n d eastern E u r o p e a n citizens h a d j o i n e d
e n v i r o n m e n t a h s t g r o u p s . E n v i r o n m e n t a l a
c t i v i s m
w o r k e d h k e a t e r m i t e i n f e s t a t i o n , n i b b l i n g
a w a y
at c o m m u n i s t s t r u c t u r e s . I n H u n g a r y , p u b l i
c o u t -
rage over a C z e c h - H u n g a r i a n c o l l a b o r a t i o n t o
d a m the D a n u b e R i v e r resulted i n the f o r m a t i o n
o f e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t e n c
o u r -
aged H u n g a r i a n s t o q u e s t i o n n o t o n l y the
Danube project, but also the priorities and poh-
cies of the entire communist system.

Environmentalism also fueled nationalist
protest among the non-Russian peoples w i t h i n
the Soviet U n i o n . The various national and eth-
nic groups of the Soviet empire watched their
forests disappear, their lakes dry up, and their
ancient cities bulldozed as a result of decisions
made in faraway Moscow by men they regarded
as foreigners—as Russians rather than comrades
or fellow Soviets. By the 1980s, for example,
w i t h schools i n Latvia forced to issue gas masks
as a routine safety precaution because of the dan-
gers of chemical spills, many Latvians concluded
that they w o u l d be better off in an independent
Latvia.
Gorbachev and Radical Reform
As these discontents simmered among the peo-
ples of the Soviet bloc, a series of deaths ushered
i n an era of dramatic change. I n 1982, the
decrepit Leonid Brezhnev died—and so, i n rapid
succession, d i d his successors, Y u r i Andropov
(1914-1984) and Konstantin Chernenko
(1911-1985). The time had come for a genera-
tional shift. When M i k h a i l Gorbachev succeeded
Chernenko, he was 54 years o l d . Compared w i t h
his elderly colleagues on the Politburo, he looked
like a teenager.
Gorbachev's biography encompassed the
drama of Soviet history. Born in 1931 Gor-
bachev experienced Stalinism at its worst. One-
t h i r d of the inhabitants of his native village i n
Stavropol were executed, imprisoned, or died
f r o m famine or disease i n the upheavals of collec-
tivization. Both of his grandfathers were arrested
during the Great Purge. His father served i n the

Red A r m y during W o r l d War I I and was
wounded twice. Yet Gorbachev's family contin-
ued to beheve in the communist dream. I n 1948
Gorbachev and his father together w o n the
Order of Red Banner of Labor for harvesting
almost S I X times the average crop. This achieve-
ment, and his clear ability, w o n Gorbachev a uni-
versity education. After earning degrees i n
economics and law, Gorbachev rose through the
ranks of the provincial and then the national
Communist Party.
A l t h o u g h an ardent communist, Gorbachev
became convinced that the Soviet system was ail-
ing, and that the only way to restore i t to health
was through radical surgery. What he did not
anticipate was that such surgery w o u l d , i n fact,
k i l l the patient. Gorbachev's surgical tools were
glasnost and perestroika, t w o Russian terms
w i t h o u t direct English equivalents.
G L A S N O S T AI-JD PERESTROIKA Glasnost, some-
times translated as "openness," " p u b l i c i t y , " or
"transparency," meant abandoning the decep-
t i o n and censorship that had always character-
ized the Soviet system for a policy based o n
open admission of failures and problems.
According to Gorbachev, " B r o a d , timely, and
frank i n f o r m a t i o n is testimony of faith in peo-
ple , . . and for their capacity to w o r k things out
themselves."''
Soviet citizens remained wary of Gor-
bachev's talk of glasnost—until A p r i l 1986 and
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster.

Operator error at the Ukrainian power plant
led to the most serious nuclear accident i n his-
tory. I n the days f o l l o w i n g the accident, 35
plant workers died. Over the next five years the
cleanup effort claimed at least 7,000 lives. The
accident placed more than four m i l l i o n inhabi-
tants of Ukraine and Belarus at risk f r o m excess
r a d i a t i o n and spread a radioactive cloud that
extended all the way to Scotland. W h e n news of
the accident first reached Moscow, party o f f i -
cials acted as they had always done: They
denied i t . But after monitors i n Western coun-
tries recorded the radiation spewing into the
atmosphere, Gorbachev dared to release accu-
rate i n f o r m a t i o n to the public. I n 1986, 93 per-
cent of the Soviet p o p u l a t i o n had access to a
television set and what they saw on their
screens convinced them that glasnost was real.
A p o w e r f u l change had occurred in Soviet p o l i t -
ical culture.
T h r o u g h glasnost Gorbachev aimed to
overcome public alienation and apathy and so
convince Soviet citizens to participate i n
R O C K I N G T H E B L O C
In 1 9 7 7 , t h e Plastic
People of t h e Universe
play an illegal c o n c e r t in
Vaclav Havel's f a r m h o u s e .
PPU h a d s p l i t u p t w o years b e f o r e a n d so d i d n o t

s i n g in t h e n e w era, b u t f i t t i n g l y , o n e o f t h e f i r
s t
i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t President Vaclav Havel i n v i t e d t o
t h e n e w free Czechoslovakia w a s a n a g i n g psyche-
delic r o c k e r n a m e d Frank Z a p p a .
For Discussion
I m a g i n e t h a t t h e post-1968 C o m m u n i s t g o v e r n -
m e n t i n C z e c h o s l o v a k i a s i m p l y i g n o r e d t h e
PPU.
W o u l d e v e n t s h a v e u n f o l d e d a n y d i f f e r e n t l
y ? W h y
o r w h y n o t ?
reforming p o l i t i c a l and economic l i f e — o r
perestroika, often translated as " r e s t r u c t u r i n g "
or " r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . " Gorbachev believed he
could reverse Soviet economic decline by
restructuring the economy t h r o u g h moderniza-
t i o n , decentralization, and the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a
l i m i t e d market. Gorbachev knew, however, that
even limited economic reforms threatened the
vested interests of communist bureaucrats and
that these bureaucrats w o u l d block his reforms
i f they could. Thus, economic perestroika
w o u l d not succeed w i t h o u t political pere-
srroika—restructuring the political system,
opening i t up to limited competition to allow
new leaders and new ideas to t r i u m p h . So i n
1990 Gorbachev ended the Communist Parry's
m o n o p o l y on parliamentary power, and the
Soviet Union entered the brave new w o r l d of
m u l t i p a r t y politics.
E N D I N G T H E C O L D W A R Restructuring Soviet

economics and politics led almost inevitably to
restructuring i n t e r n a t i o n a l relations—and to
ending the C o l d War. By the 1980s, the arms
race absorbed at least 18 percent of the Soviet
GNP, as the Soviets scrambled to keep pace
w i t h the Reagan m i l i t a r y b u i l d - u p . Gorbachev
concluded that the Soviet U n i o n could not
a f f o r d the C o l d War. To signal to the West his
desire for a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l order, Gor-
bachev reduced Soviet m i l i t a r y commitments
abroad and asked to resume arms c o n t r o l
negotiations. I n December 1987, Gorbachev
and Reagan signed the I N F (Intermediate
940 C H A P T E R 2 9 The West in the Contemporary Era: New
G L A S N O S T
M i k h a i l G o r b a c h e v meets w i t h w o r k e r s in M o s
c o w in 1 9 8 5 .
-CHRO
1 9 8 0
1 9 8 1
1 9 8 3
1 9 8 5
1 9 8 8
1 9 8 9
J a n u a r
Februa

June
S e p t e n
N o v e n
D e c e r n
1 9 9 0
M a r c h
O c t o b
D e c e r n
1 9 9 3
Nuclear Forces) Treaty, agreeing to eliminate
all land-based intermediate-range nuclear mis-
siles. I n 1 9 9 1 , the Soviets and Americans
signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START I ) , in w h i c h they pledged to reduce
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The nuclear
arms race was over.
Gorbachev also moved to restructure
Soviet policies i n eastern Europe. He realized,
f i r s t , that western leaders w o u l d not end the
C o l d War as long as the Soviet U n i o n sought to
dictate eastern European affairs, and second,
that the Soviet U n i o n could no longer a f f o r d to
c o n t r o l its satellite states. I n his first i n f o r m a l
meetings w i t h eastern European communist
leaders i n 1985, Gorbachev t o l d these aging
communist stalwarts that the Red A r m y w o u l d
no longer enforce their w i l l o n rebellious pop-
ulations. By the time Gorbachev addressed the
U N General Assembly at the end of 1988 and
declared that the nations of eastern Europe
were free to choose their o w n paths, dramatic
changes were underway.

Revohition in Easicero Europe
Hungary and Poland were the first states to jetti-
son communist rule. Even before Gorbachev
took power, economic crisis and public discon-
tent had driven the Polish and Hungarian gov-
ernments to embrace reform. I n the early 1980s
Hungary moved toward a Western-oriented,
market-driven economy by joining the W o r l d
Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and establishing a stock market. I n 1985,
independent candidates for the first time
appeared on Hungarian ballots—and many w o n .
I n Poland, Jaruzelski's government also experi-
mented w i t h restoring some measures of a mar-
ket economy and w i t h limited political reform.
Once martial law ended in 1983, censorship
loosened. Newspapers published criticisms of
governmi
permittee
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1 9 8 0 Formation of Solidarity in Poland
1 9 8 1 Martial law declared in Poland; Solidarity made illegal
1 9 8 3 End of martial law in Poland, political and economic
reforms begin; political reforms
liberalize Hungarian elections
1 9 8 5 Independents allowed to run for election in Hungary;
Gorbachev becomes Soviet leader
1 9 8 8 Gorbachev's address to UN: Eastern European nations
free to choose their own paths
1 9 8 9
January Noncommunist parties and unions legalized in Hungary
February Roundtable talks between Polish government and
Solidarity
June Free elections in Poland
September Solidarity forms government in Poland
November Fall of Berlin Wall; reformist communists overthrow
Zhivkov in Bulgaria
December Collapse of communist government in
Czechoslovakia and East Germany; execution
of Ceau5escu in Romania
1 9 9 0
March Free elections in East Germany and Hungary
October Reunification of Germany

December Waf^sa elected president of Poland
1 9 9 3 Division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and
Slovakia
governmental policy that w o u l d never have been
permitted before 1980.
Once Gorbachev came to power, the pace
of reform i n these t w o states accelerated. I n
January 1989, H u n g a r y legalized noncommu-
nist p o l i t i c a l parties and trade unions. I n Feb-
ruary, Solidarity and Polish communist officials
began " r o u n d t a b l e t a l k s " aimed at restructur-
ing Poland's p o l i t i c a l system. I n June, Poland
held the first free elections in the Soviet bloc.
Solidarity swept the contest and formed the
first noncommunist government in eastern
Europe since 1948.
These remarkable events sparked revolutions
throughout the Soviet bloc. I n the f a l l of 1989,
mass protests toppled communist governments in
Czechoslovakia and East Germany. I n November,
as the introduction to this chapter detailed. East
Berliners succeeded in tearing d o w n the Berlin
Wall. One m o n t h later the w o r l d watched in
wonder as the dissident playwright Vaclav Havel
became Czechoslovakia's president.
Q u i c k l y the revolutionary fire spread to
Bulgaria and Romania. There, however, com-
munism was reformed rather than o v e r t h r o w n .
I n Bulgaria, reform-minded Communist Party
members ousted the government of Todor
Z h i v k o v , w h o had been i n power for 35 years.

The Romanian r e v o l u t i o n was similar i n
outcome—but much bloodier. I n December
1989, Romania's dictator N i k o l a e Ceau§escu
ordered his army to fire on a peaceful protest
and hundreds died. I n a matter of days, h o w -
ever, the soldiers turned against Ceau§escu. H e
and his wife went into h i d i n g , but on Christ-
mas Day they were caught and executed by a
f i r i n g squad. A new government formed under
Ion Iliescu (b. 1930), a communist reformer
TOPAPMIIJ.M
Mafiar Demokrata Forum
" C O M R A D E S , I T ' S O V E R ! "
This H u n g a r i a n political poster sums u p t h e revolutions
of 1 9 8 9 .
w h o had attended M o s c o w University w i t h
Gorbachev.
The final chapter of the eastern European
revolutions featured a redrawing of political
borders—and a corresponding shift of political
identities. In October of 1990, the line dividing
West and East Germany disappeared; Germany
was once again a single nation-state. But three
years later, the nation-state of Czechoslovakia
cracked apart, as President Havel was unable to
satisfy the demands of Slovakian nationahsts.
O u t of Czechoslovakia came t w o new states: the

Czech Republic and Slovakia.
The Disintegration of the Soviet Union
Western p o l i t i c a l leaders and ordinary people
praised Gorbachev for ending the Cold War
and removing the Soviet hold on eastern
Europe. Gorbachev, however, regarded these
changes as the international means to a domes-
tic end—freeing the Soviet economy for pros-
perity and thereby saving the communist
system. But prosperity eluded his grasp, and
the system Gorbachev sought to save disinte-
grated. Economic perestroika proved a failure.
By 1990, f o o d and other essential goods were
scarce, prices had risen by 20 percent since the
year before, and p r o d u c t i v i t y figures and
incomes were f a l l i n g . Dramatic increases i n the
number of prostitutes, abandoned babies, and
the homeless p o p u l a t i o n all signaled the eco-
nomic and social breakdown of the Soviet
U n i o n .
As these problems escalated, Gorbachev
faced g r o w i n g opposition f r o m hard-line com-
munists and f r o m reformers w h o wanted a
thoroughly capitalist economy. These r e f o r m -
ers f o u n d a spokesman i n Boris Yeltsin
(1931-2007), a charismatic, boisterous p o h t i -
cian w h o became the president of Russia (as
distinct f r o m the Soviet Union) in 1 9 9 1 . When
the hard-liners attempted to o v e r t h r o w Gor-
bachev in August 1 9 9 1 , Yeltsin led the popular
resistance that blocked the coup. From that
p o i n t o n , Yeltsin, not Gorbachev, dominated
Soviet politics.

Yet nationalism rather than the hard-liners
or Yeltsin's pro-capitalist movement toppled
Gorbachev—and destroyed the Soviet U n i o n .
The success of eastern European nations i n
freeing themselves f r o m Soviet d o m i n a t i o n
encouraged separatist nationalist movements
w i t h i n the Soviet U n i o n . A l t h o u g h Gorbachev
deployed troops to quell nationalist r i o t i n g i n
Azerbaijan and Georgia and to counter inde-
pendence movements i n the Baltic states, the
Soviet U n i o n broke apart anyway. O n Decem-
ber 25, 1991 Gorbachev resigned his office
as president of a state that no longer existed
(see M a p 29.1).
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In the Wake of Revolution 9 4 3
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The Former Soviet Union
• Capital cities
M A P 2 9 . 1
The Former Soviet Union
In D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 1 , t h e Soviet e m p i r e d i s i n t e g r
a t e d . In its place s t o o d 14 i n d e p e n d e n t republics, r
a n g i n g f r o m
t i n y a n d i m p o v e r i s h e d M o l d o v a to relatively a f f
l u e n t a n d Europeanized Latvia to Russia itself, still t h e d o
m i n a n t
p o w e r in t h e r e g i o n .
IN T H E WAKE OF R E V O L U T I O N
• W h a t were the consequences o f the
Revolutions of 1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 0 f o r the societies

of eastern Europe?
The collapse of communist regimes in eastern
Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet
U n i o n meant exhilarating yet exhausting change.
Democracy-building proved to be a colossal task
in societies burdened w i t h the communist lega-
cies of social division, political skepticism, and
economic stagnation.
Russia After the Revolutiosi
I n contrast to states such as Poland, where the
dismantling of communism came as the result of
popular protests, i n the Soviet U n i o n change had
been initiated f r o m above. Moreover, unlike i n
eastern Europe, Russians could p o i n t w i t h pride
to at least some achievements of communism:
They had created an industrial society, w o n
W o r l d War I I , and become a Superpower. I n the
1990s, then, Russians struggled to come to
terms w i t h their unexpected—and for some,
unwanted—revolution.
ICUSSiA'S EcONOSViSC AND S O C i A l CniSiS As the
first president of post-Soviet Russia, Boris Yeltsin
promised to accelerate his nation's transforma-
t i o n into a prosperous capitalist democracy. But
he proved unable to do so. Three interlocking
developments—continuing economic crisis,
widening corruption and criminality, and grow-
ing socioeconomic inequality—characterized the

Yeltsin era.
In January 1992, Yeltsin applied "shock
therapy" to the aihng Russian economy. He
lifted price controls, abohshed subsidies, and p r i -
vatized state industries. But the economy did not
prosper. Prices climbed dramatically, and the clo-
sure of unproductive businesses worsened unem-
ployment, at the same time that cuts in
government spending severed welfare lifelines.
By 1995, 80 percent of Russians were no longer
earning a living wage. Food consumption fell to
the same level as the early 1950s. The economic
situation worsened in 1998 when Russia effec-
tively went bankrupt. The value of the ruble col-
lapsed, and the state defaulted on its loans. Even
Russians w i t h jobs found it d i f f i c u l t to make
ends meet. M a n y resorted to barter and the black
market to survive.
This economic crisis worsened as a result of
widespread corruption and crime. I n the 1990s
Russians suddenly had the right to own private
property, but they could not count on the state to
protect that properry. Russia's policing and j u d i -
cial systems could not keep up w i t h the new
demands placed upon them. As a result, a new
force appeared i n Russian life—the "Russian
M a f i a , " crime syndicates that offered "protec-
t i o n " at a high price and used extortion and
intimidation to seize control of large sectors of
the economy.
Economic crisis, combined w i t h criminality
and c o r r u p t i o n , meant growing inequality. By
1997, seven individuals controlled an estimated

50 percent of the Russian economy.^ Clearly a
m i n o r i t y of p o w e r f u l and influential Russians
experienced the 1990s as years of extraordinary
o p p o r t u n i t y and wealth accumulation. For
many other Russians, however, the ending of the
Soviet regime meant freedom of the worst
kind—freedom to be hungry, homeless, and
afraid. I n 1999, almost 40 percent of Russians
fell beneath the official poverty line.
The end of the 1990s coincided w i t h the end
of the Yeltsin era. I n December of 1999 the for-
mer K G B ofhcer V l a d i m i r Putm (b. 1952)
became president of Russia. Well-manicured and
austere, Putin provided stable and competent
government—a welcome change to the roller-
coaster ride of the Yeltsin years. The economy
became stronger. Stabilization, however, came at
a political price: the return to authoritarianism.
Putin centralized political power and economic
decision-making under his o w n control and ran
roughshod over such key democratic touch-
stones as freedom of the press and the right to a
fair t r i a l . I n 2008 Putin gave up the Russian pres-
idency, but not executive power—he became
prime minister instead.
N A T I O N A O S T CHALIEWCES I N THE FoRtvitR
SOVIET
U N I O N The breakup of the Soviet U n i o n did not
bring an end to nationalist violence in the region.
Popular nationalist movements vaulted states
such as Georgia, Ukraine, and the Baltic
republics to independence, but many new gov-
ernments then found themselves facing their o w n

nationalist chaUenges. Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan all experienced civil war in the 1990s
as regions w i t h i n these new states sought to
break away and f o r m their o w n independent
states.
Russia, too, faced contmuing violent efforts
to redraw its boundaries. Russia remained an
enormous multinational federation—and not all
of its national minorities wanted to remain part
of Russia. The sharpest challenge came f r o m
Chechnya, one of 21 autonomous republics
w i t h i n the larger Russian Federation. When the
Soviet U n i o n broke up, Chechens saw no reason
that Chechnya should not f o l l o w the path of
Georgia or Azerbaijan toward independent
nation-statehood. In 1991 Chechnya declared
independence, but Russia refused to acknowl-
edge this declaration. The dispute simmered u n t i l
1994 when Yeltsin sent in the Russian army to
force Chechnya back w i t h i n Russia's embrace. In
In the Wake of Revolution 9 4 5
the ensuing 20-month conflict, 80,000 died and
240,000 were wounded—80 percent of these
Chechen civilians. Yeltsin negotiated a truce in
the summer of 1996, but four years later Putin
renewed the war. As of 2010, Russia retains con-
t r o l over Chechnya by m i l i t a r y force, but
Chechen nationalists continue to resist this con-
t r o l through terrorism.
Central and Eastern Europe: Toward

Democracy?
Like the former Soviet U n i o n , the states of east-
ern Europe found the path from communist rule
to democracy strewn w i t h obstacles. By the end
of the 1990s, much of the region—but not all of
i t — h a d successfully negotiated that path and
achieved pohtical and economic stability.
STRUGGLES W I T H I N THE REU^^!TED G E R M A N Y
Almost
half the population of East Germany crossed the
border into West Germany i n the first week after
the fall of the Berhn Wall. They returned home
dazzled by the consumer delights they saw in store
windows and eager for a chance to grab a piece of
the capitalist pie. The West German chancellor,
Helmut K o h l , recognized the power of these
desires and skillfully forced the pace of reunifica-
t i o n . When the two Germanys united at the end of
1990, K o h l became the first chancellor of the new-
German state.
K o h l trusted that West Germany's economy
was strong enough to pull its bankrupt new part-
ner into prosperity, but he proved overly o p t i -
mistic. The residents of the former East Germany
soon found their factories closing and their liveli-
hoods gone. These economic troubles leached
over into the western regions of Germany. By
1 9 9 7 , German xinemployn:ent stood at 12.8 per-
cent—the highest since W o r l d NJVar I I . E c o n o m i c
difficulties were most concentrated i n the former
East Germany, where over 20 percent of the pop-
ulation was out of w o r k in the later 1990s.
T h e divide between "Wessies" (West Ger-

mans) and "Ossies" (East Germans) sometimes
seemed unbridgeable. Women of the former East
Germany, for example, often found i t d i f f i c u l t to
adjust to a culture in which more conventional
gender roles and conceptions of sexual morahty
dominated. I n communist East Germany, women
had expected to w o r k f u l l time and to have
access to state-provided day care, contraceptives,
and abortion. I n contrast, i n West Germany the
concept of the male breadwinner/head of house-
hold was enshrined i n the legal code until the end
of the 1970s and prominent i n West German cul-
ture for a long time after.
I n 2005, however, the election of Angela
M e r k e l (b. 1954) as chancellor marked an
important symbolic moment for united Ger-
many. The first w o m a n to head the German
Christian Democrats (and a Protestant i n a heav-
ily Catholic party), M e r k e l was also the first East
German to hold such a prominent political office
i n the new Germany. Under M e r k e l , the divide
between East and West i n Germany began to
wane.
W I N N E R S Ai--iB LOSERS AFTER 1 9 S 9 East Germany,
of course, was unique among the former Soviet
bloc states because of its rapid unification w i t h
West Germany, but peoples throughout the
region experienced hard times immediately after
1989. Western advisers and the International
Monetary Eund ( I M F ) , which controlled access
to much-needed loans, insisted that the new gov-
ernments f o l l o w programs of "austerity" aimed
at cutting government spending and curbing

i n f l a t i o n . The result was economic hardship far
beyond what any Western electorate w o u l d have
endured.
I n the second half of the 1990s, however,
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the
Baltic countries saw their economies stabilize
and their overall standard of living rise rapidly.
In. 2 0 0 2 , the average Pole's purckasing power
w a s 40 percent higher than i n 1 9 8 9 . But in c o u n -
tries such as Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and
Albania, the economies continued to flounder. I n
Albania, conditions were so dire that some
40 ptmi of AMnms ol woiJiiiig â c i r c i
abroad for jobs between 1994 and 1998. A n
important divide opened up in eastern Europe

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