Brandenburg's view

2. T h e F i r s t Wo r l d Wa r wa s s o h o r r i b l y c o s t l y i n
b l o o d , t r e a s u r e , a n d c u l t u r e t h at i m m e d i at e l y
a t T h e W a r ’s c o n cl u s i o n h i s t o r i a n s s t r ove t o
u n d e r s t a n d t h e r o o t c a u s e s o f i t .

3. Outstanding inter-war histories of the origins of WW1 include,
(1) Erich Brandenburg (Germany): From Bismarck to the World War [1924];
(2) Sidney Fay (USA): The Origins of the World War [1928];
(3) Bernadotte Schmitt (USA): The Coming of the War, 1914 [1930];
(4) Luigi Albertini (Italy): Origins of the War of 1914 [1942].

4. T h e s e h i s t o r i e s a r e
b a s e d o n p r i m a r y
s o u r c e d o c u m e n t s
a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y
a c c o u n t s ; a l l a r e
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y
o b j e c t i v e a s
p o s s i b l e ; b u t
B r a n d e n b u r g ’ s s t u d y
a s s i m i l a t e s t h e
i n t e g r i t y o f G e r m a n
h i s t o r i o g r a p h y
e m a n a t i n g f r o m
R a n k e a n d M o m m s e n
p l u s t h e v i e w p o i n t o f
T h e W a r ’ s l o s e r - -
s i g n i f i c a n t , o f
c o u r s e , d u e t o t h e
‘ W a r - G u i l t Q u e s t i o n ’
a n d t h e s u b s e q u e n t
S e c o n d W o r l d W a r .

5. European cultural-
g r o u p s h a d b e e n
c o m p e t i n g f o r
l a n d a n d
resources at least
s i n c e t h e R o m a n
R e p u b l i c ( 6 t h C
B . C . ) ; b u t i n
m o d e r n t i m e s t h e
l e g a c y o f
N a p o l é o n w a s
i n e s c a p a b l e ,
beginning with the
Fr ench loss of the
Depar tment of the
S a r r e t o P r u s s i a
( A . D . 1 8 1 5 ) .

6. Under Bismarck, France fur ther lost
A l s a c e - L o r r a i n e t o P r u s s i a ( 1 8 7 1 ) - -
a p a i n f u l g e o p o l i t i c a l w o u n d
w h i c h r e f u s e d t o b e h e a l e d .
Hen c efo r th, “ Ger man pol i cy ha d t o r e ckon
t h a t i n a n y s e r i o u s c o n f l i c t w i t h a n o t h e r
P o w e r , F r a n c e w o u l d b e a g a i n s t h e r . ”

7. F r o m t h e n o n , “ B i s m a r c k ’ s p o l i c y a i m e d
a t t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f p e a c e ” - - ( b y q u a r a n t i n i n g
F r a n c e , a n d k e e p i n g f r i e n d l y w i t h E n g l a n d a n d
R u s s i a ) - - c o m p l i c a t e d b y A u s t r i a n - R u s s i a n
a n t a g o n i s m w h i c h t h r e a t e n e d t o d r a w
G e r m a n y i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h R u s s i a .

8. William II is rather a tragic figure: neither unintelligent nor evilly-
m i n d e d , h e w a s p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y i m b u e d w i t h t h e
‘divine-right of kings’ which made it difficult for anyone to
c o n t r a d i c t h i m w h i l e i n d u l g i n g i n p e r p e t u a l
s e l f - d e c e p t i o n a b e t t e d b y t h e p a m p e r i n g f l at t e r y o f
obsequious courtiers: some matters he saw quite clearly;
t o o t h e r m a t t e r s h e w a s i n e l u c t a b l y
b l i n d : a b r i l l i a n t f a i l u r e .
This situation continued to ripen when
Kaiser William II dismissed Bismarck in
1890 and inaugurated a policy of world-
p ow e r c o m p e t i t i o n fo r G e r m a n y.

9. H a d B i s m a r c k b e e n a l l o w e d b y W i l l i a m I I t o
r e m a i n a t h i s p o s t t i l l d e a t h i n 1 8 9 8 , w o r l d
h i s t o r y w o u l d s u r e l y h a v e t a k e n a d i f f e r e n t
c o u r s e - - p o s s i b l y a v o i d i n g t h e W o r l d W a r s .
S a d l y h o w e v e r , t h e a r m y o f f i c e r s a n d c i v i l
b u r e a u c r a t s w h o w e r e t a s k e d w i t h B i s m a r c k ’ s
p o r t f o l i o i n 1 8 9 0 w e r e u t t e r l y u n a b l e
t o l e v e r a g e m a t t e r s a s h e h a d d o n e .

10. Blunder followed upon blunder, and infighting ensued with an
aimless policy of general aggrandizement, poisoned by the back-
stairs machinations of the invidious character of Friedrich von
Holstein who allowed Bismarck’s cornerstone Reinsurance Treaty
with Russia to lapse--whereupon France immediately broke
quarantine and allied herself with Russia against Germany (1891).

11. Preparing for a two-front war on continental Europe, Germany was
anxious to r each a neutrality a g r eement with Britain.
Sadly, neither party was really willing to meet the other half-way.
Britain feared Germany’s rising economic-industrial-military power,
and suspected Germany’s unlimited ambitions towards world-power.

12. B r i t a i n a l s o f e a r e d
r i s i n g R u s s i a n w o r l d -
p o w e r, b u t r e c o g n i z e d
t h a t G e r m a n y - A u s t r i a
c o u l d p r o b a b l y d e f e a t
R u s s i a - F r a n c e i n a
E ur op ea n Gener al War.
I f t h i s h a p p e n e d ,
B r i t a i n w o u l d n o t o n l y
b e b l o ck a d e d f r o m t h e
C o n t i n e n t , b u t w o u l d
e v e n t u a l l y l o s e
i m p o r t a n t o v e r s e a s
c l i e n t s v i z . E g y p t ,
S o u t h A f r i c a , I r a q ,
I r a n , I n d i a , a n d C h i n a

13. As the English Channel borders on
Holland, Belgium, and France, it
w a s i m p e r a t i v e f o r B r i t a i n
t o k e e p t h o s e c o u n t r i e s
independent from the crushing
w e i g h t o f G e r m a n y .
And so was born the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France
(1904), followed by the Anglo-Russian Convention (1907) which,
along with the aforementioned Franco-Russian Alliance completed
t h e g e o p o l i t i c a l - s e c u r i t y c o n t a i n m e n t o f G e r m a n y.

14. But even this
“encirclement”
of Germany was
not the direct
c a u s e o f
T h e W a r .
A t l e a s t t w o
other precarious
issues were at
pl a y : (1 ) ar ms
race, and (2) the
u n s t a b l e
s i t u a t i o n
b e t w e e n t h e
B l a c k a n d
A e g e a n S e a s .

15. Control of the Straits between the Black and Aegean Seas
was of critical geostrategic concer n to Russia,
while Austrian geopolitical activity in the Balkan
Peninsula (still much under Ottoman suzerainty) was a
p o i n t o f u r g e n t a n t a g o n i s m .
After the Bosnian Annexation crisis (1909) and the Balkan
Wars (1912-13), Russia was determined to fight any further
d i mi n u t i o n o f i ts i n f l u en c e a l o n g t h e S tr a i t s .

16. C. 1913, the military balance of power between Germany,
F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a s t i l l f a v o r e d G e r m a n y.
Soon however, France and Russia would become more
p o w e r f u l : s o , t h e r e w a s
strong reason for Germany to engage the struggle
w h i l e t h e o d d s s t i l l f a v o r e d .