Doctrine is an army’s game plan. Doctrine not only tells an army how to fight but it communicates intent from the institutional Army to the fighting forces. The progression that leads to doctrine stretches across a temporal “reverse highway” that begins well into the future with a vision of how future wars will be fought. At some point along the highway visioning solidifies into warfighting concepts. All too often, the concept phase of this journey is where dead ends and misleading road signs appear. Visioning is cheap and ephemeral. Concepts, on the other hand, tend to ossify ideas that eventually turn into opinions. Opinions, even false ones, are defended by those whose influences are at stake. Opinions lead to investments that launch programs. Eventually the highway ends at the doctrinal present as organizations and weapons emerge to provide the tools and formations to fight wars
Horatio Lord Nelson's Warfighting Style and the Maneuver Warfare Paradigm, by...Professor Joel Hayward
Readers seeking to analyze Maneuver Warfare’s applicability to combat on the seas that cover most of the globe can be forgiven for noticing the absence of scholarly interest in this theme and thinking that, in short, Maneuver Warfare must have no applicability at sea. One can, however, easily find many fine examples of what is now called Maneuver Warfare in seapower’s long history. This article draws from one such example – splendidly manifest in the person of Britain’s greatest fighting seaman, Vice-Admiral Horatio, Lord Nelson (1758–1805) – to demonstrate that students of maneuver need not fear turning their attention occasionally from land battles towards those fought at sea. They may indeed be greatly enriched by doing so. While being mindful to avoid anachronism (Maneuver Warfare’s conceptual framework, after all, is very recent), this article shows that Lord Nelson’s warfighting style closely resembles the modern Maneuver Warfare paradigm. He was not fighting according to any paradigm, of course, much less one that dates from almost 200 years after his death. He understood naval tactics and battle according to the norms and behavioral patterns of his own era and continuously experimented and tested ideas, rejecting some, keeping others. The article naturally makes no claim that Nelson’s warfighting style was unique among sea warriors or that he contributed disproportionately to conceptual or doctrinal developments in tactics or operational art. Even a cursory glance at the careers of John Paul Jones, Edward Hawke and John Jervis (one of Nelson’s mentors), to mention but a few, reveals that their names fit almost as aptly as Nelson’s alongside Napoleon Bonaparte’s, Erwin Rommel’s and George S. Patton’s in studies of effective maneuverists. Yet Lord Nelson makes an ideal focus for a case study of Maneuver Warfare at sea. Extant sources pertaining to his fascinating life are unusually abundant and reveal that he raised the art of war at sea to unsurpassed heights, all the while perfecting the highly maneuverist warfighting style that gave him victory in several of naval history’s grandest battles.
A Case Study in Early Joint Warfare: An Analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean C...Professor Joel Hayward
Military theorists and commentators believe that joint operations prove more effective in most circumstances of modern warfare than operations involving only one service or involving two or more services but without systematic integration or unified command. Many see Nazi Germany's armed forces, the Wehrmacht, as early pioneers of 'jointness'. This essay demonstrates that the Wehrmacht did indeed understand the value of synchronizing its land, sea and air forces and placing them under operational commanders who had at least a rudimentary understanding of the tactics, techniques, needs, capabilities and limitations of each of the services functioning in their combat zones. It also shows that the Wehrmacht's efforts in this direction produced the desired result of improved combat effectiveness. Yet it argues that the Wehrmacht lacked elements considered by today's theorists to be essential to the attainment of truly productive jointness - a single tri-service commander, a proper joint staff and an absence of inter-service rivalry - and that, as a result, it often suffered needless difficulties in combat.
Horatio Lord Nelson's Warfighting Style and the Maneuver Warfare Paradigm, by...Professor Joel Hayward
Readers seeking to analyze Maneuver Warfare’s applicability to combat on the seas that cover most of the globe can be forgiven for noticing the absence of scholarly interest in this theme and thinking that, in short, Maneuver Warfare must have no applicability at sea. One can, however, easily find many fine examples of what is now called Maneuver Warfare in seapower’s long history. This article draws from one such example – splendidly manifest in the person of Britain’s greatest fighting seaman, Vice-Admiral Horatio, Lord Nelson (1758–1805) – to demonstrate that students of maneuver need not fear turning their attention occasionally from land battles towards those fought at sea. They may indeed be greatly enriched by doing so. While being mindful to avoid anachronism (Maneuver Warfare’s conceptual framework, after all, is very recent), this article shows that Lord Nelson’s warfighting style closely resembles the modern Maneuver Warfare paradigm. He was not fighting according to any paradigm, of course, much less one that dates from almost 200 years after his death. He understood naval tactics and battle according to the norms and behavioral patterns of his own era and continuously experimented and tested ideas, rejecting some, keeping others. The article naturally makes no claim that Nelson’s warfighting style was unique among sea warriors or that he contributed disproportionately to conceptual or doctrinal developments in tactics or operational art. Even a cursory glance at the careers of John Paul Jones, Edward Hawke and John Jervis (one of Nelson’s mentors), to mention but a few, reveals that their names fit almost as aptly as Nelson’s alongside Napoleon Bonaparte’s, Erwin Rommel’s and George S. Patton’s in studies of effective maneuverists. Yet Lord Nelson makes an ideal focus for a case study of Maneuver Warfare at sea. Extant sources pertaining to his fascinating life are unusually abundant and reveal that he raised the art of war at sea to unsurpassed heights, all the while perfecting the highly maneuverist warfighting style that gave him victory in several of naval history’s grandest battles.
A Case Study in Early Joint Warfare: An Analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean C...Professor Joel Hayward
Military theorists and commentators believe that joint operations prove more effective in most circumstances of modern warfare than operations involving only one service or involving two or more services but without systematic integration or unified command. Many see Nazi Germany's armed forces, the Wehrmacht, as early pioneers of 'jointness'. This essay demonstrates that the Wehrmacht did indeed understand the value of synchronizing its land, sea and air forces and placing them under operational commanders who had at least a rudimentary understanding of the tactics, techniques, needs, capabilities and limitations of each of the services functioning in their combat zones. It also shows that the Wehrmacht's efforts in this direction produced the desired result of improved combat effectiveness. Yet it argues that the Wehrmacht lacked elements considered by today's theorists to be essential to the attainment of truly productive jointness - a single tri-service commander, a proper joint staff and an absence of inter-service rivalry - and that, as a result, it often suffered needless difficulties in combat.
This treatise on the recent shortcomings of the Army organizational culture challenges leaders at all levels to evaluate their personal leadership practices and their application of Army policies.
Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damag...Professor Joel Hayward
Even before Operation Barbarossa petered out in December 1941, Germany's oil reserves were severely depleted. Adolf Hitler worried that his armed forces would soon grind to a halt for want of petroleum products. During the last months of 1941 and the first of 1942, economic considerations played as much of a role in the formulation of a new strategy as did the run-down state of the eastern armies and air fleets. Hitler feared heavy Soviet bombing attacks on Rumanian oilfields, his main source of oil, and knew that the Reich's reserves were almost exhausted. Consequently, he considered the protection of the Rumanian oilfields and the acquisition of new sources of oil crucial if he were to wage a prolonged war against the growing list of nations he opposed.1 He therefore formulated Fall Blau (Case Blue), a major campaign for summer 1942. This aimed first, through preliminary offensives in the Crimea, to protect Rumanian oil centres from Soviet air attacks, and second, through a powerful thrust to the Don River and then into the Caucasus, to deliver that oil-rich region into German hands. The capture of the Caucasus oilfields, he believed, would relieve Germany's critical oil shortages and deliver a massive, and hopefully mortal, blow to the Soviet economy and war effort. The consequences of that ill-fated campaign are well known, and need little discussion here. Hitler became distracted by Stalingrad (which was not even a main campaign objective) and lost an entire army trying to take it. Soviet forces also drove his armies from the Caucasus and pushed them back to the line they had held before Blau started nine months earlier. This study analyses a little-known and poorly documented aspect of the 1942 campaign: Hitler's employment of airpower in the Caucasus region. It focuses on his reluctant admission in October that his ground forces would probably not reach the main oilfields before adverse weather conditions forced them to take up winter positions, and on his subsequent decision to have the Luftwaffe attempt the oilfields' destruction. He believed that if he could not have the oilfields (at present, anyway), he should at least deny Josef Stalin's agriculture, industry, and armed forces their vast output. The essay argues for the first time that the Luftwaffe could have dealt the Soviet economy a major blow, from which it would have taken at least several months to recover, if Hitler had not been so obsessed with Stalingrad and wasted his airpower assets on its destruction. During August and early September 1942, the Luftwaffe possessed the means to inflict heavy damage on Baku, the Caucasus oil metropolis that alone accounted for 80 percent of all Soviet production. The Luftwaffe still possessed a strong bomber force and airfields within striking range and the Soviet Air Force's presence in the Caucasus was still weak. By October, however, when Hitler finally ordered attacks on oilfields, the Luftwaffe's eastern bomber fleet was ...
An unclassified bimonthly publication of the Director, Air Warfare Division, Naval Aviation News covers all aspects of naval air operations. Articles review the latest technological advances in aircraft and weapon systems and the influence of U.S. naval air power in global events. Issues include historical profiles of aircraft, aviation ships, important aviators, and organizations that affected the Navy’s control of the air.
Graham, Stephen. "War and the city." New Left Review 44 (2007): 121. APA Stephen Graham
Western military strategy was long premised on the avoidance of urban combat, with air strikes the preferred method of subduing large conurbations. Cities were seen as targets, not battlefields. But today, the cityscapes of the global South have emerged as paradigmatic conflict zones. Since the end of the Cold War, America’s militarized thrust into the Middle East and Central Eurasia has focused Pentagon planners’ attention on the burgeoning Arab and Third World cities that are now deemed de facto sites of current and future warfare for us forces. While the ‘revolution in military affairs’ emphasized overhead dominance, the losing battle for the streets of Iraq has sharpened the Pentagon’s focus on battles within the micro-geographies of slums, favelas, industrial districts and casbahs, as well as on globe-spanning stealth and surveillance technologies.....
Means of WarfareThough we have no records of ancient man’s iAbramMartino96
Means of Warfare
Though we have no records of ancient man’s interest in flight we definitely can go back to the great Leonardo Da Vinci and sketches of a mechanical winged device and the Ornithopter. In the ensuing years, man developed hot air balloons. First used during the Napoleonic Wars, the US Army used them during the Civil War, and the French government used them while the Prussians laid siege to Paris in 1870. With such a graphic demonstration of the new options they presented, the British, French, Austrians and Germans developed Balloon Corps within their military establishments. Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin developed the first dirigible with a rigid frame—the zeppelin—in 1900. All these are lighter than air inventions. Simultaneous to their development, scientists and inventors examined the possibilities for heavier than air flight. Sir George Cayley studied the physics of flight and developed a practical glider. Sir William Henson built on Cayley’s work and developed a prototype for a steam-driven aircraft. Francis Wenham built the first wind tunnel. Alphonse Penaud and Victor Tatin developed monoplanes and Russian Alexander Mozhaiski flew a steam-powered monoplane 98 feet.[1]However, all these models had significant difficulties with the controls and were subject to the vagaries of the atmosphere and terrain.
The Wrightflyer
It was the Wright brothers who finally developed mechanical means of controlling pitch, role and yaw. Rather than looking at a steam engine, they developed a light-weight internal combustion engine for their plane. They succeeded in conducting the first controlled flight of a powered engine at Kill Devil Hills in North Carolina on December 17, 1903.[2] The years between that first flight and the outbreak of the Great War saw tremendous development of aircraft throughout Europe, and most of the Armies kept close tabs on those developments, many of them operating their own aircraft programs.
Aircraft were a part of the arsenals of all the belligerents in the Great War, but they had very limited use. One of the most important of their capabilities was intelligence gathering. Able to fly above the battlefield, and behind enemy lines, pilots could provide important information on enemy troop movements and artillery placement to their headquarters. Occasionally they dropped hand grenades on the enemy. Once they had developed proper gun synchronization (to prevent the pilot from destroying the propeller as he fired his machine gun) pilots of the various belligerents engaged in “dog fights.” Flyers became the new heroes of the 20th century, though regardless of the “romance” of the airman, aircraft had little impact on the outcome of World War I. Take a look at some of the early planes and pilot training in this documentary from World War I.
Kresha Kopik
2.14K subscribers
World War I Aircraft (WWI Documentary, 1953)
Watch later
Share
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This treatise on the recent shortcomings of the Army organizational culture challenges leaders at all levels to evaluate their personal leadership practices and their application of Army policies.
Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damag...Professor Joel Hayward
Even before Operation Barbarossa petered out in December 1941, Germany's oil reserves were severely depleted. Adolf Hitler worried that his armed forces would soon grind to a halt for want of petroleum products. During the last months of 1941 and the first of 1942, economic considerations played as much of a role in the formulation of a new strategy as did the run-down state of the eastern armies and air fleets. Hitler feared heavy Soviet bombing attacks on Rumanian oilfields, his main source of oil, and knew that the Reich's reserves were almost exhausted. Consequently, he considered the protection of the Rumanian oilfields and the acquisition of new sources of oil crucial if he were to wage a prolonged war against the growing list of nations he opposed.1 He therefore formulated Fall Blau (Case Blue), a major campaign for summer 1942. This aimed first, through preliminary offensives in the Crimea, to protect Rumanian oil centres from Soviet air attacks, and second, through a powerful thrust to the Don River and then into the Caucasus, to deliver that oil-rich region into German hands. The capture of the Caucasus oilfields, he believed, would relieve Germany's critical oil shortages and deliver a massive, and hopefully mortal, blow to the Soviet economy and war effort. The consequences of that ill-fated campaign are well known, and need little discussion here. Hitler became distracted by Stalingrad (which was not even a main campaign objective) and lost an entire army trying to take it. Soviet forces also drove his armies from the Caucasus and pushed them back to the line they had held before Blau started nine months earlier. This study analyses a little-known and poorly documented aspect of the 1942 campaign: Hitler's employment of airpower in the Caucasus region. It focuses on his reluctant admission in October that his ground forces would probably not reach the main oilfields before adverse weather conditions forced them to take up winter positions, and on his subsequent decision to have the Luftwaffe attempt the oilfields' destruction. He believed that if he could not have the oilfields (at present, anyway), he should at least deny Josef Stalin's agriculture, industry, and armed forces their vast output. The essay argues for the first time that the Luftwaffe could have dealt the Soviet economy a major blow, from which it would have taken at least several months to recover, if Hitler had not been so obsessed with Stalingrad and wasted his airpower assets on its destruction. During August and early September 1942, the Luftwaffe possessed the means to inflict heavy damage on Baku, the Caucasus oil metropolis that alone accounted for 80 percent of all Soviet production. The Luftwaffe still possessed a strong bomber force and airfields within striking range and the Soviet Air Force's presence in the Caucasus was still weak. By October, however, when Hitler finally ordered attacks on oilfields, the Luftwaffe's eastern bomber fleet was ...
An unclassified bimonthly publication of the Director, Air Warfare Division, Naval Aviation News covers all aspects of naval air operations. Articles review the latest technological advances in aircraft and weapon systems and the influence of U.S. naval air power in global events. Issues include historical profiles of aircraft, aviation ships, important aviators, and organizations that affected the Navy’s control of the air.
Graham, Stephen. "War and the city." New Left Review 44 (2007): 121. APA Stephen Graham
Western military strategy was long premised on the avoidance of urban combat, with air strikes the preferred method of subduing large conurbations. Cities were seen as targets, not battlefields. But today, the cityscapes of the global South have emerged as paradigmatic conflict zones. Since the end of the Cold War, America’s militarized thrust into the Middle East and Central Eurasia has focused Pentagon planners’ attention on the burgeoning Arab and Third World cities that are now deemed de facto sites of current and future warfare for us forces. While the ‘revolution in military affairs’ emphasized overhead dominance, the losing battle for the streets of Iraq has sharpened the Pentagon’s focus on battles within the micro-geographies of slums, favelas, industrial districts and casbahs, as well as on globe-spanning stealth and surveillance technologies.....
Means of WarfareThough we have no records of ancient man’s iAbramMartino96
Means of Warfare
Though we have no records of ancient man’s interest in flight we definitely can go back to the great Leonardo Da Vinci and sketches of a mechanical winged device and the Ornithopter. In the ensuing years, man developed hot air balloons. First used during the Napoleonic Wars, the US Army used them during the Civil War, and the French government used them while the Prussians laid siege to Paris in 1870. With such a graphic demonstration of the new options they presented, the British, French, Austrians and Germans developed Balloon Corps within their military establishments. Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin developed the first dirigible with a rigid frame—the zeppelin—in 1900. All these are lighter than air inventions. Simultaneous to their development, scientists and inventors examined the possibilities for heavier than air flight. Sir George Cayley studied the physics of flight and developed a practical glider. Sir William Henson built on Cayley’s work and developed a prototype for a steam-driven aircraft. Francis Wenham built the first wind tunnel. Alphonse Penaud and Victor Tatin developed monoplanes and Russian Alexander Mozhaiski flew a steam-powered monoplane 98 feet.[1]However, all these models had significant difficulties with the controls and were subject to the vagaries of the atmosphere and terrain.
The Wrightflyer
It was the Wright brothers who finally developed mechanical means of controlling pitch, role and yaw. Rather than looking at a steam engine, they developed a light-weight internal combustion engine for their plane. They succeeded in conducting the first controlled flight of a powered engine at Kill Devil Hills in North Carolina on December 17, 1903.[2] The years between that first flight and the outbreak of the Great War saw tremendous development of aircraft throughout Europe, and most of the Armies kept close tabs on those developments, many of them operating their own aircraft programs.
Aircraft were a part of the arsenals of all the belligerents in the Great War, but they had very limited use. One of the most important of their capabilities was intelligence gathering. Able to fly above the battlefield, and behind enemy lines, pilots could provide important information on enemy troop movements and artillery placement to their headquarters. Occasionally they dropped hand grenades on the enemy. Once they had developed proper gun synchronization (to prevent the pilot from destroying the propeller as he fired his machine gun) pilots of the various belligerents engaged in “dog fights.” Flyers became the new heroes of the 20th century, though regardless of the “romance” of the airman, aircraft had little impact on the outcome of World War I. Take a look at some of the early planes and pilot training in this documentary from World War I.
Kresha Kopik
2.14K subscribers
World War I Aircraft (WWI Documentary, 1953)
Watch later
Share
Share
Watch on
<div class="player-unavailable"><h1 class="message">A ...
We all have good and bad thoughts from time to time and situation to situation. We are bombarded daily with spiraling thoughts(both negative and positive) creating all-consuming feel , making us difficult to manage with associated suffering. Good thoughts are like our Mob Signal (Positive thought) amidst noise(negative thought) in the atmosphere. Negative thoughts like noise outweigh positive thoughts. These thoughts often create unwanted confusion, trouble, stress and frustration in our mind as well as chaos in our physical world. Negative thoughts are also known as “distorted thinking”.
Leaders are often faced with ethical conundrums(a confusing and difficult problem or question). So how can they determine when they’re inching toward dangerous territory? There are three main psychological dynamics that lead to crossing moral lines.
There’s omnipotence: when someone feels so aggrandized and entitled that they believe the rules of decent behavior don’t apply to them.
Consider cultural numbness: when others play along and gradually begin to accept and embody deviant norms.
Finally, when people don’t speak up because they are thinking of more immediate rewards, we see justified neglect.
Generally most people mean well, but simply execute their job poorly sometimes and sometimes, there are BAD bosses. We must learn “to Work "on Bad Boss
According to dictionary.com, “to work” something or someone is to put them into effective operation, to operate that thing or person for productive purposes.
Put your Bad Boss into effective operation to get whatever you want in your job or career by learning your boss’s secret desire and secret fear
Two biggest issues of Bad Boss are:
They can negatively impact our work performance.
They can make life miserable
We often hear “being difficult.” about Bad Boss. It’s hard to know exactly where the difficulty lie. All we know is it is difficult to work successfully with this person.
An incompetent person is someone who is
Functionally inadequate or
Insufficient in Knowledge, Skills, Judgment, or Strength
Mindset is a mental attitude that determines how we interpret and respond to situations.
Dweck has found that it is your mindset that plays a significant role in determining achievement and success.
A mindset refers to whether you believe qualities such as intelligence and talent are fixed or changeable traits.
People with a fixed mindset believe that these qualities are inborn, fixed, and unchangeable.
Those with a growth mindset, on the other hand, believe that these abilities can be developed and strengthened by way of commitment and hard work.
Story of Katalin Karikó, a researcher who won the Nobel prize for medicine for her work on modifying the RNA molecule to avoid triggering a harmful immune response is a classical example of mindset.
Yet, her life was full of rejection and doubt.
Her achievement had much to do with her mindset.
A theory is a based upon a hypothesis and backed by evidence.
A theory presents a concept or idea that is testable.
In science, a theory is not merely a guess.
A theory is a fact-based framework for describing a phenomenon.
In psychology, theories are used to provide a model for understanding human thoughts, emotions, and behaviors.
Hence study of Psychology theory is essential for SSB and all types of Interviewas it helps us to understand our own developmental psychology.k
Personality theorists should study normal individuals
All behavior is interactive
The person must be studied in terms of interactions with their environment
The brain is the locus of personality
There is a biological basis to personality
Definition of Personality
1- Personality is an abstraction formulated by a theorist.
2- It refers to series of events that ideally span over life time from childhood to adulthood
3-It reflects novel, unique, recurrent and enduring patterns of behaviours – his education and training .
4- Personality is located in brain- imagination, perception
5.Personality comprises the person’s central organizing and governing processes, whose function is to
Resolve conflicts,
Satisfy needs, and
Plan for future goals.
” Emotions are complex psychological states involving three distinct components: a subjective experience, a physiological response, and a behavioral or expressive response”
"Discovering Psychology," by Don Hockenbury and Sandra E. Hockenbury
In 1972, psychologist Paul Ekman suggested that there are six basic emotions that are universal throughout human cultures: fear, disgust, anger, surprise, joy, and sadness.
In the 1980s, Robert Plutchik introduced another emotion classification system known as the wheel of emotions. This model demonstrated how different emotions can be combined or mixed together, much like the way an artist mixes primary colors to create other colors.
Plutchik proposed eight primary emotional dimensions: joy vs. sadness, anger vs. fear, trust vs. disgust, and surprise vs. anticipation.
These emotions can then be combined to create others, such as happiness + anticipation = excitement.
In 1999, Ekman expanded his list to include a number of other basic emotions, including embarrassment, excitement, contempt, shame, pride, satisfaction, and amusement
Anger is an intense emotion you feel when
Something has gone wrong or
Someone has wronged you.
It is typically characterized by feelings of
Stress,
Frustration, and
Irritation.
Anger is a perfectly normal response to frustrating or difficult situations.
Anger only becomes a problem when
It’s excessively displayed and
Begins to affect your daily functioning and the way you relate with people.
Anger can range in intensity, from a slight annoyance to rage.
It can sometimes be excessive or irrational.
In these cases, it can be hard to keep the emotion in check and could cause you to behave in ways you wouldn’t otherwise behave.
Cognitive distortions are
Negative or irrational patterns of thinking.
Simply ways that Impostor Syndrome convinces us to believe things that aren’t really true.
Inaccurate thought patterns that
Reinforce our negative self perception and
Keep us feeling bad about ourselves
These negative thought patterns can play a role in
Diminishing our motivation,
Lowering our self-esteem
Contributing to problems like
Anxiety,
Depression, and
Substance use.
Trauma Bonding is the attachment an abused person feels for their abuser, specifically in a relationship with a cyclical pattern of abuse.
Is created due to a cycle of abuse and positive reinforcement
After each circumstance of abuse, the abuser professes love, regret, and trying to make the relationship feel safe and needed for the abused person.
Hence Abused
Finds leaving an abusive situation confusing and overwhelming
Involves positive and/or loving feelings for an abuser
Also feel attached to and dependent on their abuser.
Emotional abuse involves controlling another person by using emotions to Criticize , Embarrass ,Shame ,Blame or
Manipulate .
To be abusive there must be a consistent pattern of abusive words and bullying behaviours that Wear down a person’s Self-esteem and Undermine Their mental health.
Most common in married relationships,
Mental or emotional abuse can occur in any relationship—including among
Friends
Family members and
Co-workers
Attachment-related patterns that differ between individuals are commonly called "attachment styles."
There seems to be an association between a person’s attachment characteristics early in life and in adulthood, but the correlations are far from perfect.
Many adults feel secure in their relationships and comfortable depending on others (echoing “secure” attachment in children).
Others tend to feel anxious about their connection with close others—or prefer to avoid getting close to them in the first place (echoing “insecure” attachment in children).
Borderline personality disorder, characterized by a longing for intimacy and a hypersensitivity to rejection, have shown a high prevalence and severity of insecure attachment.
Attachment styles in adulthood (similar to attachment patterns in children):
Secure
Anxious-preoccupied (high anxiety, low avoidance)
Dismissing-avoidant (low anxiety, high avoidance)
Fearful-avoidant (high anxiety, high avoidance)
Conduct disorder is an ongoing pattern of behaviour marked by emotional and behavioural problems.
Ways in which Children with conduct disorder behave are
Angry,
Aggressive,
Argumentative, and
Disruptive ways.
It is a diagnosable mental health condition that is characterized by patterns of violating
Societal norms and
Rights of others
It's estimated that around 3% of school-aged children have conduct disorder and require professional treatment .
It is more common in boys than in girls.
Oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) is a psychiatric disorder that typically emerges in childhood, between ages 6 and 8, and can last throughout adulthood.
ODD is more than just normal childhood tantrums
Frequency and severity of ODD causes difficulty at home and at school.
Children with ODD also struggle with learning problems related to their behavior.
Two types of oppositional defiant disorder:
Childhood-onset ODD:
Present from an early age
Requires early intervention and treatment to prevent it from progressing into a more serious conduct disorder
Adolescent-onset ODD:
Begins suddenly in the middle- and high-school years, causing conflict at home and in school
There have been at least 13 different types of intelligence that have been identified so far.
These different ways of being smart can help people perform in different areas from their personal life, business, to sports and relationships.
Attachment is an emotional bond with another person. John Bowlby described attachment as a "lasting psychological connectedness between human beings.“
Earliest bonds formed by children (with caregivers) have a tremendous impact that continues throughout life and Attachment so developed
Serves to keep the infant close to the mother, thus improving the child's chances of survival.
Are innate drive Children are born with and is a product of evolutionary processes
Emerges and are regulated through the process of natural selection,
Are characterized by clear behavioural and motivation patterns.
Nurturance and responsiveness were the primary determinants of attachment.
Children who maintained proximity to an attachment figure were more likely to
Receive comfort and protection, and
More likely to survive to adulthood.
e-RUPI is a person and purpose-specific cashless e-voucher designed to guarantee
that the stored money value reaches its intended beneficiary and can only be used for
the specific benefit or purpose for which it was intended. The idea is to create a minimal
logistics, leak-proof delivery mechanism for a wide range of government Direct Benefit
Transfer (DBT) programs across the country. The digital e-voucher platform can also
be used by organizations who wish to support welfare services through e-RUPI instead
of cash
The term ‘Moonlighting’ became popular in America when people started working a second job in addition to their regular 9-to-5 jobs. Since the rise of the work-from-home concept during the pandemic, employees got free time after work hours. While some took up their hobby in their free time, others started searching for part-time jobs. Especially in the IT industry, employees took up two jobs simultaneously and took advantage of the remote working model. This concept of working for two companies/organisations is referred to as moonlighting.
Exploiting Artificial Intelligence for Empowering Researchers and Faculty, In...Dr. Vinod Kumar Kanvaria
Exploiting Artificial Intelligence for Empowering Researchers and Faculty,
International FDP on Fundamentals of Research in Social Sciences
at Integral University, Lucknow, 06.06.2024
By Dr. Vinod Kumar Kanvaria
Normal Labour/ Stages of Labour/ Mechanism of LabourWasim Ak
Normal labor is also termed spontaneous labor, defined as the natural physiological process through which the fetus, placenta, and membranes are expelled from the uterus through the birth canal at term (37 to 42 weeks
Introduction to AI for Nonprofits with Tapp NetworkTechSoup
Dive into the world of AI! Experts Jon Hill and Tareq Monaur will guide you through AI's role in enhancing nonprofit websites and basic marketing strategies, making it easy to understand and apply.
Acetabularia Information For Class 9 .docxvaibhavrinwa19
Acetabularia acetabulum is a single-celled green alga that in its vegetative state is morphologically differentiated into a basal rhizoid and an axially elongated stalk, which bears whorls of branching hairs. The single diploid nucleus resides in the rhizoid.
Safalta Digital marketing institute in Noida, provide complete applications that encompass a huge range of virtual advertising and marketing additives, which includes search engine optimization, virtual communication advertising, pay-per-click on marketing, content material advertising, internet analytics, and greater. These university courses are designed for students who possess a comprehensive understanding of virtual marketing strategies and attributes.Safalta Digital Marketing Institute in Noida is a first choice for young individuals or students who are looking to start their careers in the field of digital advertising. The institute gives specialized courses designed and certification.
for beginners, providing thorough training in areas such as SEO, digital communication marketing, and PPC training in Noida. After finishing the program, students receive the certifications recognised by top different universitie, setting a strong foundation for a successful career in digital marketing.
1. The Great Duality and the Future of the Army: Does Technology Favor the Offensive or
Defensive?
Robert Scales
September 3, 2019
Commentary
Doctrine is an army’s game plan. Doctrine not only tells an army how to fight but it
communicates intent from the institutional Army to the fighting forces. The progression that
leads to doctrine stretches across a temporal “reverse highway” that begins well into the future
with a vision of how future wars will be fought. At some point along the highway visioning
solidifies into warfighting concepts. All too often, the concept phase of this journey is where
dead ends and misleading road signs appear. Visioning is cheap and ephemeral. Concepts, on the
other hand, tend to ossify ideas that eventually turn into opinions. Opinions, even false ones, are
defended by those whose influences are at stake. Opinions lead to investments that launch
programs. Eventually the highway ends at the doctrinal present as organizations and weapons
emerge to provide the tools and formations to fight wars.
The length of the temporal highway depends on how quickly technological variables affect
battlefield dynamics. During the agricultural age, the pace of change was measured in
generations. The musket and field gun of Gustavus Adolphus’ 17th-century army was little
changed from the weapons used by European armies in the mid-19th century. The pace of
societal innovation in the late-19th century accelerated technological change by an order of
magnitude. A veteran of late Civil War battles would have recognized the horrors of trench
warfare on the Western Front in World War I. But he would have been mystified by the
technologies that caused the slaughter: the machine gun, the small-bore rifle, quick firing, long-
range artillery, and aircraft.
The past century gave us two catastrophic world wars and a Cold War that ended bloodlessly.
But the bloodshed of the world wars was, in large measure, induced by military theorists who
2. failed adequately to navigate the temporal highway from visioning to concepts to doctrine. The
story of the failure of military theory from World War I to the present is a torturous one filled
with false detours and misread signs that still confound theorists today. It’s necessary to retrace
our travels down that past, painful highway because the Army is returning again to the prospect
of fighting big, catastrophic wars, this time with the United States and Western Europe facing off
against Russia or China.
The failure of first-world armies to get visioning and concepts right was due in large measure to
a failure to anticipate the eternal duality of ground warfare: the shifting balance between
firepower and maneuver induced primarily by the accelerated pace of technological change. In
the 1980s, I witnessed how the pendulum of shifting dualities altered the course of battle when
Gen. Jack Woodmansee, then V Corps Commander, asked me to lead a series of staff rides in
France, one to the Battle of the Somme fought in 1916 and the other to Sedan fought in 1940. In
war, firepower favors the defensive and maneuver favors the offensive. Technologies that
matured decades prior to World War I swung the pendulum toward firepower by extending the
tactical and operational killing zone by an order of magnitude. Unfortunately, the technologies of
the Industrial Revolution did nothing to accelerate the speed of maneuver. It remained in 1916 as
it had been since the days of the legion: at a walk. This tragic misreading of the firepower-
maneuver duality cost the British Army 24,000 dead in a single day on the Somme.
Fast forward a generation. During our second staff ride we paused to gaze from the heights of La
Marfee, a commanding vertical mass that dominated the Meuse River crossing sites at Sedan.
Experience in battles like the Somme and Verdun convinced the French to put their faith in
firepower and the defensive. Had they been right the overwhelming mass of French artillery
scattered across the heights could have easily stopped the Germans at the river’s edge. But
French visionaries and conceptualizers had failed to anticipate that, in a mere 20 years since the
Great War, the internal combustion engine and wireless had shifted the duality of war from fire
to maneuver, from the defensive to the offensive. The speed of the German advance
overwhelmed the ability of the French command to comprehend that the speed of maneuver had
increased from a walk to 20 miles per hour. France would lose the Battle of France in six days.
The Battle of France signaled the pendulum’s swing toward maneuver and the offensive. Later in
the war the Soviet Union and the United States would borrow blitzkrieg doctrine from the
Wehrmacht and apply it on a heretofore unimaginable scale. From the Oder to Berlin, from the
Rhine to the Elbe, both mechanized armies raced at unprecedented speeds toward each other. In
the midst of these triumphant times neither army could have foreseen that the end of the
European war marked the pendulum’s apogee. It was then that the pendulum began reversing. It
continues its countervailing path to this day.
***
A confluence of circumstances has restored the dominance of the defensive. The greatest single
influencer has been technology. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work has
characterized this transformational period as the “second offset.” Work’s thesis contends that the
United States has sought to avoid matching an enemy’s advantage in mass by seeking
technological “offsets” that allow a smaller force to prevail against a larger one. The first offset
3. begun during the Eisenhower administration focusing on nuclear weapons as a means to cancel
Soviet superiority in conventional forces.
The second offset, begun after Vietnam, sought to develop conventional technologies to achieve
the same objective. The subsequent surge in technological innovation was enormously decisive.
Sometime during the Reagan administration, the Soviet Union realized that unprecedented
advances in American killing power expressed as range, lethality, and precision, doomed the
Communist Party’s dreams of crushing NATO in a blitzkrieg-like invasion across the inter-
German border. The second “conventional” offset was responsible to some degree for
accelerating the decline and fall of the Soviet Empire.
But the second offset was flawed in that it favored only one dimension: firepower, delivered
principally from the air. Technology favored airpower because transformative weapons of the
period were most effective when delivered from the air. The aerial second offset began
symbolically with the bombing of the Than Hoa bridge in North Vietnam in the spring of 1972.
The bridge had withstood thousands of dumb bombs before it collapsed when struck by four
laser-guided bombs. The path toward firepower dominance from the air continued with
development of GPS-guided bombs and cluster munitions that increased the lethality of aerial
ordnance enormously. Stealth arrived in time for Desert Storm and the effectiveness of F-117
fighters over Baghdad ended the debate over the worth of radar evading technologies. More
recently, the exploitation of unmanned aircraft and the inclusion of cyber weapons as part of our
air service’s arsenal has made American aerial killing power unmatched on the planet.
The Army’s contribution to the second offset was the realization that the ground and aerial
domains of war needed to be merged into a single cohesive fighting doctrine, AirLand Battle.
The doctrine contained two brilliantly conceived ideas for defeating a larger enemy by a
firepower intensive force. First, was the imperative to destroy armored formations at a rate faster
than the Soviets could “present” them at the forward battle area. Gen. Donn Starry, commander
of V Corps in Europe and later “father” of AirLand Battle doctrine, once recalled the “I Love
Lucy” candy stuffing scene as evidence of the problem. Lucy could only keep up if she and Ethel
stuffed the boxes all along the conveyor belt rather than at the point where the candies fell off the
end. Thus, the secret of AirLand Battle was to attack deeply all across three maneuver echelons
of the Soviet offensive. Only tactical and operational aircraft and long-range missiles could get
far enough to kill the Russians in depth.
The second imperative of AirLand Battle was to slow or even culminate the Russian advance
using maneuver forces supported by land- and air-delivered firepower. Wargames conducted at
Ft. Leavenworth in the early 1980s revealed that tracking and sensing technologies of the time
were unable to kill moving targets. If Soviet forces could be slowed, the killing power of
supporting arms would be magnified considerably, enough perhaps to halt Soviet forces before
they reached the Rhine. At the time, no one in the Army seriously considered AirLand Battle as
an inclusive doctrine for both offensive and defensive maneuver. It was intended solely for battle
along the German border. The development of AirLand Battle was significant because, for the
first time in the annals of American military history, a doctrine, an idea, was responsible for
deterring war. AirLand Battle was equally transformational in that, also for the first time, an idea
4. was powerful enough to break the constrictions of service vanities to interconnect two separate
domains, air and land.
AirLand Battle’s greatest shortcoming, however, was that its effectiveness in Desert Storm (and
later on the march to Baghdad in 2003) convinced doctrine-makers that the doctrine was suitable
for offensive as well as defensive warfare. The doctrine’s success also seemed to validate the
long-term efficacy of weapons used in the execution of AirLand Battle: the M-1 Tank, Bradley
Fighting Vehicle, and the Multiple Launch Rocket System. Again, these were false takeaways.
As a new brigadier general, I headed the team that wrote Certain Victory, the Army’s official
history of Desert Storm in 1991. Our research revealed that Schwarzkopf’s 100-hour left hook
across the sands of Iraq and Kuwait was indeed magnificent. But it moved only slightly faster
than Patton’s march across France or even Guderian’s march from Amiens to the English
Channel. This cautionary tale is important because lessons drawn from battles against
incompetent enemies should always be treated as suspect.
Twenty-five years after Desert Storm, little in the conventional operational environment has
changed when it comes to preparing for war against a peer competitor. After the Sept. 11, 2001
attacks, the ground services took a doctrinal knee. Over nearly two decades, the military
spawned a generation of officers schooled in counterinsurgency. Today’s doctrine-makers have
only vicarious experience with fighting big wars. But while we still seek to find our doctrinal
legs for conventional wars, technology hasn’t taken a knee. And, absent a few exceptions,
emerging technologies continue to favor the defensive. Artificial intelligence in particular
promises to make the battlefield transparent allowing near perfect targeting of mechanized
forces. An enemy’s defensive cyber capability mated to a cutting-edge integrated air defense
network might well impede the ability of American airpower to conduct an offensive air
campaign. Russia has developed a sophisticated suite of long-range precision missiles networked
to unmanned sensors that would allow them to conduct their own version of AirLand Battle, but
in reverse.
The pendulum has hit the doctrinal stops. The three components of firepower dominance —
lethality, range, and precision — have all increased killing power by at least a factor of four or
five just in the past three decades alone while the speed of ground maneuver is exactly where it
was during the Battle of France in 1940.
***
The Army is currently positioned along the doctrinal highway somewhere between visioning and
concept development. Its emerging concept, multi-domain operations, rightfully recognizes that
the hidden hand of technological innovation has added new layers to the complexity of
operations. It was hard enough to add the air in AirLand battle. The challenge is much greater
when the Army seeks to add cyber and space to the calculus of battle. For the first time since the
Cold War, the Army has built a doctrine around a threat rather than capabilities. The Army’s
brain trust that developed AirLand Battle willingly limited the scope of its doctrine to fighting a
war in central Europe. The multi-domain concept, however, expands the scope of conflict to
embrace “competitive” phases of conflict against Russia and China. The thinkers behind multi-
domain operations seek to move warfare “beyond joint” with the concept of “convergence,” an
5. idea first expressed in Army After Next writings in the 1990s as “interdependence,” or “joint
interdependence.” The two terms together take multi-service integration to a new and higher
level in the hope that traditional service-specific friction might be reduced in future conflicts.
The concept, however, has a fatal flaw: It mirrors mistakes made when armies of the past failed
to keep pace with technological change. I’ve read and re-read the authoritative documents on
multi-domain operations many times. After receiving briefings on war games conducted by
Army Futures Command, I’m convinced that concept- and doctrine-writers now perceive the
battlefield as dominated by the offensive. To a degree, this bias is understandable. When the
Army hit the conventional war “pause button” in 2001 it was still under the embrace of Desert
Storm, America’s last successful big war. This experience was an intellectual lure because it
redeemed the Army from the stigma of Vietnam. It remains emotionally compelling because it
separates the Army’s intellectual community today from the frustrations of fighting unfulfilling
wars in the Middle East. Nonetheless, Desert Storm is a dead-end along the doctrinal highway. It
never would have succeeded had Russian forces been on the other side of the berm.
My thoughts are observations, not criticisms. I’m a student of the history of doctrine, not a bomb
thrower. I’ve been around a long time and tend to take a longer view of events. My concern is
that after 18 frustrating years of counterinsurgency warfare, the Army has pushed the “resume
play” button perhaps a bit precipitously. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the service’s
publication of The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028.
Let’s slow down. The Army has time to figure this out.
But one thing is certain: Any doctrine founded on a false premise cannot be sustained. The
services are fortunate in that the concept of multi-domain operations is still evolving somewhere
along the temporal highway short of the point where units are formed and systems funded. By all
accounts the capabilities of the Army’s big six priorities for weapons — long-range precision
fires, next-generation combat vehicles, future vertical lift, the network, air and missile defense,
and soldier lethality — remain viable regardless of which side of the duality they serve.
As mentioned above, the Army’s brain trust has time to decide where between the primal
dualities the answer lies. Does technology favor the offensive or defensive? I vote for the latter.
Only time will tell who is right. The Western powers voted wrong in 1914. The French voted
wrong in 1940. History’s cautionary tale is that the side that gets it wrong next time will suffer ill
consequences beyond imagining.
Robert Scales is a retired major general and former commandant of the Army War College. In
the 1990s he was director of Army doctrine at Training and Doctrine Command where he started
the Army After Next Project for the chief of staff of the Army. He is the author of eight books on
military history and theory and is a frequent contributor to major news outlets. He is a graduate
of West Point and holds a PhD in history from Duke University.