The document discusses the mismanagement of military operations in Iraq after Baghdad was secured. It argues that the chain of command and operational levels were destroyed, with the corps and combat service support abolished. Key aspects like close air support suffered as a result. Additionally, the total force concept of aligning all military units to specific war plans was undermined, weakening readiness. This was done through reclassifying reserve units and breaking up the proven "capstone" alignment process in order to retain Pentagon control over combat operations.

1. OH, FOR A MAC ATTACK
There are two arguments related to the invasion of Iraq of interest to self: 1) Was it justifiable by any standard?,
and 2) Regardless, was it done to the best of the US ability. Only the second argument is relevant since all wars,
save those of direct ground invasion really demand a response.
As to the second argument, it is harder to find a worst example of military mismanagement once Baghdad had
been secured. Baghdad was taken in a fine example of military prowess, but concurrent fatal moves had already
been taken that made the seizure of Iraq a doomed affair.
The key aspects of military screw up were taken at levels far above the battle field (or below if common sense
were applied).
One aspect of note is the destruction of the time tested and battle proven chain of command by general officers in
the operational levels of command (Theater, Army, Corps and Division). The Corps was the center of gravity for
operational levels of maneuver, all fires, and all combat service support (logistics). The Corps has been abolished
as has Combat Service Support. It is place have been the favored contractors whose employees came from
reserve or retired personnel who ordinarily been there anyway, but with a contract instead of a five paragraph field
order as guidance.
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2. These vital agencies of command and control were slowly replaced by necessity by an array of Support and Fires
brigades not embedded as needed. These however, can be woven back into a rational and professional
operational chain of command:
The concept of an operational level of war had under the Air Land battle concept, and all before, was centered at
the Corps and Field Army levels. The term "operational" has become neutered by the Eunuch branch of the
Pentagon (aka REMFCOM) as proper and proven operations outside the Pentagram are, just that, outside the E-
Ring.
There was, an still is, a serious strategic deception plan aimed at deceiving the American people and the troops in
the field. The thrust of the deception is as above, the emasculation of American military might. The identify of the
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3. culprits and their true motivations are above my level of magic. Their footprints, however, are as obvious as cat
piss in the snow.
The agencies whose tentacles are yellow stained include DARPA and the Office of Net Assessment who came up
with the cover story for the deception plan, and that is and was "transformation" in part described in QDR 2006
with a fine example of dichotomous confusion.
http://gordonswar.blogspot.com/2006/12/quadrennial-defense-rubbish.html
As an old hand in the propaganda business, the themes and symbols that were associated with AirLand Battle,
which itself was an attempt to focus on the fine points of war, included the concepts of a "Total Force" consisting
of units and personnel from all of services and components of the services linked to specific war contingency
plans. This linkage was called the "Capstone Program".
As an Intelligence Battalion Commander (304th MI USAR), I had a "Capstone Mission" of supporting the 49th
Armored Division which was "capstoned" to III Corps at Ft Hood, to deploy to northern Germany in NORTHAG to
operate against expected break through by hordes of Soviet forces on the North German swamp.
The combined effects of working towards a real measurable combat mission brought all the components, and
services to working on a common problem and glitches in doctrine were fixed in the field by those with bullets in
the game. This included the doctrine for Rear Area Combat Operations (RACO) which were to be managed by
RAOC's operated by the National Guard. The doctrine was developed by the 75th Maneuver Command in
Houston for its exercises, and the document outlining the doctrine was borrowed by USGSC (Leavenworth) with
their jacket on.
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4. Rear Area operations including Military Police and Medical in at levels at and above Corps became
commonplace. Leavenworth was a little slow on picking up what the field was doing, but they stayed abreast of
things, hence Air Land. Most RAOC's were CAPSTONE'd to Corps which is why they Corps had to go, along with
the Air Ground Operations Center
One of the most galling realizations of OIF is the almost complete absence of close air support, a factor incident to
the destruction of the Corps central fire control centers in which any request from some butter bar mixed with hot
lead would go straight to Corps for execution. Silence of those in between was approval. This air strike
(1968) came about as the result of friendly FAC looking for business for a brace of F-100's. We had had some
problems with the VC blowing up too many of our troops that day,
One key aspect of the Capstone aligned Total Force was that every unit in the Reserve Components had to have
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5. a combat mission in order to be funded, as required by the Congress. This put all Guard, Reserve and Standing
components of all the Services tied to a battlefield that was tied to the realities of the battlefield in question. I was
working at Reserve Officers Association headquarters as Legislative Liaison to the Congress during these
deliberations and decisions at the time.
This had a devastating impact on these in and around the Pentagon as it decertified those in that cesspool from
the font of all knowledge including the shape of wars to come. As it has been a deep and abiding disease within
most Pentagons (Kremlin, Whitehall, et al) to see the future to bind the forces to the imaginations and ramblings
of those in the latest update of the Delphic Oracle.
The enemy of REMFCOM became a military force trained and ready to fight anywhere. The trick is that in the
preparation for a "capstone mission" in NORTHAG the preparation is more important than the operations order.
The proof of this, is the rapid deployment of US forces to Saudi Arabia instead of Germany. The place mattered
less than the procedures.
The process of breaking up the Capstone aligned combat ready force had to deal with the problem that all Guard
and Reserve units with their legally required combat missions tied to specific pieces of terrain (mine near the
battleground were two Roman Legions were smashed) with a time line of being ready or not, to go within a few
short days, often hours of warning. Thus the Reserve Components were committed to tactical levels of operation.
The first step REMFCOM did was to announce that the Reserve Components were a come along later "Strategic
Force" when in fact they had already been committed tactically. Instead of mobilizing the units in their Capstone
alignment, cherry picking of individuals was done contrary to Federal Law which prohibited this, That part of the
Federal Law was swept into the garbage can by REMFCOM in an alleged clean up of the law. REMFCOM then
called the previously tactically committed Reserve Forces an "operational reserve" as in come soon although they
already had go now orders. In order to paper over the shuffle, the term "Capstone Principle" was invented as a
cover for the relegation of the "Capstone Program" to Buzz word bingo.
The methodology used by the forces to train up was to train at all levels of unit that were involved in an exercise
was concurrent training. That is, when my battalion was in the woods preparing to move to set up a direction
finding base line at Ft Hood, my sergeants were training their own troops in accordance with known and
documented training requirements. The division I supported now had a live LNO at their DTOC,.
Thus the Army (and other forces) had the bit in their teeth with a war to fight which bit was normally kept in a
locked garbage can in REMFCOM. It was then necessary to destroy the Capstone program, concurrent training,
combat service support and the Corps all at once in order to retain control of combat operations IAW the looking
glass and/or crystal (ball).
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6. The flash bang expeditionary war of Rummy's invention was predicated that all wars would henceforth be fought
by modular marginal brigades to deploy in ten days, win in thirty and recycle in thirty more. And how is the 10-
30-30 war doing in Iraq?
In summary, the Congress had demanded that all operational units had to be tied to combat operations plans and
order, and hence be ready to rock and roll before the next Mass. Desert Storm worked because of it, the Invasion
of Iraq worked because of it, The current failures in Iraq is due to the separation out of PSYOP, CA, MP,units
from the initial push and the sudden realization that the invading force had not been warned of the Mujahdeen.
That was because, those trained were left of the 10-30-30 order of battle.
Once the remains of Corps Artillery was penny packed out in driblets, the ability for Corps in fire support died, and
so have many brave souls for whom fire support was not there.
I am not sure the US Army is reparable at least from the top down. The top has been rotted by the insidious
presence of the Senior Eunuch Service (SES) whose battle positions in the bureaucracy are defended by the Civil
Service and contractors whose bread and butter are issued by said SES.
The General officer ranks of the Army have been essentially separated or restricted in the command and control
of the Army. It just might be simplest to remove the Dildos in office and replace the Flags. Every time a medal for
valor is awarded, it is the result of some else screwing up.
This, I cannot live with.
Gordon S Fowkes, KCTJ, M.Ed
LTC USA RET
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