This document provides a summary of the forthcoming book "Call to Glory" which analyzes the strategic and economic value of the Convair B-58 Hustler supersonic bomber during the Cold War. The B-58 packed more nuclear firepower than the entire Soviet bomber force, carried 5 nuclear weapons per aircraft rather than the commonly reported one, and set numerous aviation records. Though more expensive than other bombers, its capabilities increased the effectiveness of Strategic Air Command and deterred the Soviet Union during critical events like the Cuban Missile Crisis. The book argues the B-58's value was greater than perceived based on traditional accounting and that it helped preserve US freedom during a dangerous era, though its service was cut short by new
An unclassified bimonthly publication of the Director, Air Warfare Division, Naval Aviation News covers all aspects of naval air operations. Articles review the latest technological advances in aircraft and weapon systems and the influence of U.S. naval air power in global events. Issues include historical profiles of aircraft, aviation ships, important aviators, and organizations that affected the Navy’s control of the air.
An unclassified bimonthly publication of the Director, Air Warfare Division, Naval Aviation News covers all aspects of naval air operations. Articles review the latest technological advances in aircraft and weapon systems and the influence of U.S. naval air power in global events. Issues include historical profiles of aircraft, aviation ships, important aviators, and organizations that affected the Navy’s control of the air.
USNavy part i the Atlantic war study guideJim Powers
A revised and expanded version based on what I learned by presenting the class. Some of the new titles came from student suggestions. It's such a pleasure to teach adults!
Hello..!! its my first presentation...please keep support me ..i will provide your subjects related meterial..i want to teach or understand each and basic knowledge of our world ..
The nature of the war seen from his social and political implications was perhaps for the first time described by the general Carl von Clausewitz in the pages of “On War”. In terms of popularity, it seems undeniable that Clausewitz’s work has fueled hundreds of comments and criticisms that among all the XIX and XX century have shelled and analyzed his thought. “Not simply the greatest book On War but the one truly great book on that subject yet written” says Bernard Brody about “On War” (Brody: 1973, v.25:2).
This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training
Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damag...Professor Joel Hayward
Even before Operation Barbarossa petered out in December 1941, Germany's oil reserves were severely depleted. Adolf Hitler worried that his armed forces would soon grind to a halt for want of petroleum products. During the last months of 1941 and the first of 1942, economic considerations played as much of a role in the formulation of a new strategy as did the run-down state of the eastern armies and air fleets. Hitler feared heavy Soviet bombing attacks on Rumanian oilfields, his main source of oil, and knew that the Reich's reserves were almost exhausted. Consequently, he considered the protection of the Rumanian oilfields and the acquisition of new sources of oil crucial if he were to wage a prolonged war against the growing list of nations he opposed.1 He therefore formulated Fall Blau (Case Blue), a major campaign for summer 1942. This aimed first, through preliminary offensives in the Crimea, to protect Rumanian oil centres from Soviet air attacks, and second, through a powerful thrust to the Don River and then into the Caucasus, to deliver that oil-rich region into German hands. The capture of the Caucasus oilfields, he believed, would relieve Germany's critical oil shortages and deliver a massive, and hopefully mortal, blow to the Soviet economy and war effort. The consequences of that ill-fated campaign are well known, and need little discussion here. Hitler became distracted by Stalingrad (which was not even a main campaign objective) and lost an entire army trying to take it. Soviet forces also drove his armies from the Caucasus and pushed them back to the line they had held before Blau started nine months earlier. This study analyses a little-known and poorly documented aspect of the 1942 campaign: Hitler's employment of airpower in the Caucasus region. It focuses on his reluctant admission in October that his ground forces would probably not reach the main oilfields before adverse weather conditions forced them to take up winter positions, and on his subsequent decision to have the Luftwaffe attempt the oilfields' destruction. He believed that if he could not have the oilfields (at present, anyway), he should at least deny Josef Stalin's agriculture, industry, and armed forces their vast output. The essay argues for the first time that the Luftwaffe could have dealt the Soviet economy a major blow, from which it would have taken at least several months to recover, if Hitler had not been so obsessed with Stalingrad and wasted his airpower assets on its destruction. During August and early September 1942, the Luftwaffe possessed the means to inflict heavy damage on Baku, the Caucasus oil metropolis that alone accounted for 80 percent of all Soviet production. The Luftwaffe still possessed a strong bomber force and airfields within striking range and the Soviet Air Force's presence in the Caucasus was still weak. By October, however, when Hitler finally ordered attacks on oilfields, the Luftwaffe's eastern bomber fleet was ...
Hitler's Quest for Oil: The Impact of Economic Considerations on Military Str...Professor Joel Hayward
When asked by his Allied captors in 1945 to what extent German military strategy had been influenced at various stages by economic considerations, Albert Speer, Hitler's outstanding Armaments Minister, replied that in the case of Operation BARBAROSSA the need for oil was certainly a prime motive.' Indeed, even during the initial discussions of his plan to invade the Soviet Union, Hitler stressed the absolute necessity of seizing key oilfields, particularly those in the Caucasus region, which accounted for around 90 per cent of all oil produced in the Soviet Union. For example, during a war conference at the Berghof on 31 July 1940, Hitler revealed to high-ranking commanders his intention to shatter Russia 'to its roots with one blow'2 After achieving the 'destruction of Russian manpower', he explained, the German Army must drive on towards the Baku oilfield, by far the richest of those in the Caucasus and one of the most productive in the world. Despite Hitler's optimism, the 1941 campaign - which opened along a 2,000 km front and involved 148 combat divisions - failed to shatter Russia 'to its roots with one blow'. Consequently, it failed to bring the huge oil region of the Caucasus under German control. After reverses in the winter of 1941/42, it was no longer possible for the Wehrmacht to undertake wide-ranging offensives along the entire front, by then over 2,500 km in length. The summer campaign of 1942, although still immense, was necessarily less ambitious. It opened along a front of around 725 km, and involved 68 German and 25 allied combat divisions. Soviet oil remained a major attraction for Hitler. The offensive's objectives were to destroy the main Russian forces between the Donets and the Don river, capture the crossings into the mountainous Caucasus region and then deliver the rich oilfields into German hands. The perceived importance of these oilfields to the German economy, and hence the war effort, cannot be overstated. On 1 June 1942, four weeks to the day before the summer campaign began, Hitler told the assembled senior officers of Army Group South that 'If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grozny then I must end this war'.3 The purpose of this study is not to provide a narrative description of the planning of the 1942 campaign, but, rather, to reveal the central role which economic considerations played in the planning of that ill-fated endeavor. In the following pages I shall appraise Hitler's preoccupation with the Caucasus region and its oilfields, and describe how Germany's own oil situation in the first two years of the war led him to believe that the capture of those oilfields was an essential prerequisite to waging a prolonged war of economic attrition. I shall then outline and explain the lengthy planning of the 1942 campaign, which aimed first at protecting the vulnerable Rumanian oilfields - upon which the German war economy was already heavily reliant - and secondly (and more importantly) at possessing the far ...
Describe U.S. response to the invasion of South Korea by North KorLinaCovington707
Describe U.S. response to the invasion of South Korea by North Korean and subsequently Chinese troops.
write a min 100 word paragraph answer. present your thoughts in three complete paragraphs.
Learning Unit 15.2
Korea, a former Japanese possession, had been divided into zones of occupation following World War II. U.S. forces accepted the surrender of Japanese forces in southern Korea, while Soviet forces did the same in northern Korea. Like in Germany, however, the "temporary" division soon became permanent. The Soviets assisted in the establishment of a communist regime in North Korea, while the United States became the main source of financial and military support for South Korea.
For more on Korea, please visit these sites:
· Korean War Begins [link]
· President Truman Orders U.S. Forces to Korea [link]
Learning Unit 15.3
"Atoms for Peace" was the title of a speech delivered by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the UN General Assembly in New York City on December 8, 1953.
The speech was part of a carefully orchestrated media campaign, called "Operation Candor", to enlighten the American public on the risks and hopes of a nuclear future. It was a component of the Cold War strategy of containment. Eisenhower's speech opened a media campaign that would last for years and that aimed at "emotion management", balancing fears of continuing nuclear armament with promises of peaceful use of uranium in future nuclear reactors.
For more on the Atoms for Peace, please visit this site:
· Atoms for Peace [link]
https://youtu.be/2B8R-umE0s0
Eisenhower adopted a get-tough policy toward the communists in Korea. He suggested that he would "unleash" the Nationalist Chinese forces on Taiwan against communist China, and he sent only slightly veiled messages that he would use any force necessary (including the use of nuclear weapons) to bring the war to an end unless peace negotiations began to move forward. The Chinese, exhausted by more than two years of war, finally agreed to terms and an armistice was signed on July 27, 1953. The United States suffered over 50,000 casualties in this "forgotten war," and spent nearly $70 billion. The most frustrating war in U.S. history had come to an end.
For more on Einsenhower's visit to Korea, please visit these sites:
· Eisenhower goes to Korea [link]
Please watch these videos on the Armistice Agreement.
https://youtu.be/HuSyYJsJZD8
Korean War Armistice Signed - 1953 | Today In History | 27 July 17 (Duration 1:23)
Learning Unit 15.4
Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star
The Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star was the first jet fighter used operationally by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF). Designed with straight wings, the type saw extensive combat in Korea with the United States Air Force (USAF) as the F-80.
The Shooting Star was the first U.S. Air Force aircraft to exceed 500 mph in level flight, the first American jet airplane to be manufactured in large quantities, and the first USAF jet to be used in combat.
...
USNavy part i the Atlantic war study guideJim Powers
A revised and expanded version based on what I learned by presenting the class. Some of the new titles came from student suggestions. It's such a pleasure to teach adults!
Hello..!! its my first presentation...please keep support me ..i will provide your subjects related meterial..i want to teach or understand each and basic knowledge of our world ..
The nature of the war seen from his social and political implications was perhaps for the first time described by the general Carl von Clausewitz in the pages of “On War”. In terms of popularity, it seems undeniable that Clausewitz’s work has fueled hundreds of comments and criticisms that among all the XIX and XX century have shelled and analyzed his thought. “Not simply the greatest book On War but the one truly great book on that subject yet written” says Bernard Brody about “On War” (Brody: 1973, v.25:2).
This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training
Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damag...Professor Joel Hayward
Even before Operation Barbarossa petered out in December 1941, Germany's oil reserves were severely depleted. Adolf Hitler worried that his armed forces would soon grind to a halt for want of petroleum products. During the last months of 1941 and the first of 1942, economic considerations played as much of a role in the formulation of a new strategy as did the run-down state of the eastern armies and air fleets. Hitler feared heavy Soviet bombing attacks on Rumanian oilfields, his main source of oil, and knew that the Reich's reserves were almost exhausted. Consequently, he considered the protection of the Rumanian oilfields and the acquisition of new sources of oil crucial if he were to wage a prolonged war against the growing list of nations he opposed.1 He therefore formulated Fall Blau (Case Blue), a major campaign for summer 1942. This aimed first, through preliminary offensives in the Crimea, to protect Rumanian oil centres from Soviet air attacks, and second, through a powerful thrust to the Don River and then into the Caucasus, to deliver that oil-rich region into German hands. The capture of the Caucasus oilfields, he believed, would relieve Germany's critical oil shortages and deliver a massive, and hopefully mortal, blow to the Soviet economy and war effort. The consequences of that ill-fated campaign are well known, and need little discussion here. Hitler became distracted by Stalingrad (which was not even a main campaign objective) and lost an entire army trying to take it. Soviet forces also drove his armies from the Caucasus and pushed them back to the line they had held before Blau started nine months earlier. This study analyses a little-known and poorly documented aspect of the 1942 campaign: Hitler's employment of airpower in the Caucasus region. It focuses on his reluctant admission in October that his ground forces would probably not reach the main oilfields before adverse weather conditions forced them to take up winter positions, and on his subsequent decision to have the Luftwaffe attempt the oilfields' destruction. He believed that if he could not have the oilfields (at present, anyway), he should at least deny Josef Stalin's agriculture, industry, and armed forces their vast output. The essay argues for the first time that the Luftwaffe could have dealt the Soviet economy a major blow, from which it would have taken at least several months to recover, if Hitler had not been so obsessed with Stalingrad and wasted his airpower assets on its destruction. During August and early September 1942, the Luftwaffe possessed the means to inflict heavy damage on Baku, the Caucasus oil metropolis that alone accounted for 80 percent of all Soviet production. The Luftwaffe still possessed a strong bomber force and airfields within striking range and the Soviet Air Force's presence in the Caucasus was still weak. By October, however, when Hitler finally ordered attacks on oilfields, the Luftwaffe's eastern bomber fleet was ...
Hitler's Quest for Oil: The Impact of Economic Considerations on Military Str...Professor Joel Hayward
When asked by his Allied captors in 1945 to what extent German military strategy had been influenced at various stages by economic considerations, Albert Speer, Hitler's outstanding Armaments Minister, replied that in the case of Operation BARBAROSSA the need for oil was certainly a prime motive.' Indeed, even during the initial discussions of his plan to invade the Soviet Union, Hitler stressed the absolute necessity of seizing key oilfields, particularly those in the Caucasus region, which accounted for around 90 per cent of all oil produced in the Soviet Union. For example, during a war conference at the Berghof on 31 July 1940, Hitler revealed to high-ranking commanders his intention to shatter Russia 'to its roots with one blow'2 After achieving the 'destruction of Russian manpower', he explained, the German Army must drive on towards the Baku oilfield, by far the richest of those in the Caucasus and one of the most productive in the world. Despite Hitler's optimism, the 1941 campaign - which opened along a 2,000 km front and involved 148 combat divisions - failed to shatter Russia 'to its roots with one blow'. Consequently, it failed to bring the huge oil region of the Caucasus under German control. After reverses in the winter of 1941/42, it was no longer possible for the Wehrmacht to undertake wide-ranging offensives along the entire front, by then over 2,500 km in length. The summer campaign of 1942, although still immense, was necessarily less ambitious. It opened along a front of around 725 km, and involved 68 German and 25 allied combat divisions. Soviet oil remained a major attraction for Hitler. The offensive's objectives were to destroy the main Russian forces between the Donets and the Don river, capture the crossings into the mountainous Caucasus region and then deliver the rich oilfields into German hands. The perceived importance of these oilfields to the German economy, and hence the war effort, cannot be overstated. On 1 June 1942, four weeks to the day before the summer campaign began, Hitler told the assembled senior officers of Army Group South that 'If I do not get the oil of Maikop and Grozny then I must end this war'.3 The purpose of this study is not to provide a narrative description of the planning of the 1942 campaign, but, rather, to reveal the central role which economic considerations played in the planning of that ill-fated endeavor. In the following pages I shall appraise Hitler's preoccupation with the Caucasus region and its oilfields, and describe how Germany's own oil situation in the first two years of the war led him to believe that the capture of those oilfields was an essential prerequisite to waging a prolonged war of economic attrition. I shall then outline and explain the lengthy planning of the 1942 campaign, which aimed first at protecting the vulnerable Rumanian oilfields - upon which the German war economy was already heavily reliant - and secondly (and more importantly) at possessing the far ...
Describe U.S. response to the invasion of South Korea by North KorLinaCovington707
Describe U.S. response to the invasion of South Korea by North Korean and subsequently Chinese troops.
write a min 100 word paragraph answer. present your thoughts in three complete paragraphs.
Learning Unit 15.2
Korea, a former Japanese possession, had been divided into zones of occupation following World War II. U.S. forces accepted the surrender of Japanese forces in southern Korea, while Soviet forces did the same in northern Korea. Like in Germany, however, the "temporary" division soon became permanent. The Soviets assisted in the establishment of a communist regime in North Korea, while the United States became the main source of financial and military support for South Korea.
For more on Korea, please visit these sites:
· Korean War Begins [link]
· President Truman Orders U.S. Forces to Korea [link]
Learning Unit 15.3
"Atoms for Peace" was the title of a speech delivered by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the UN General Assembly in New York City on December 8, 1953.
The speech was part of a carefully orchestrated media campaign, called "Operation Candor", to enlighten the American public on the risks and hopes of a nuclear future. It was a component of the Cold War strategy of containment. Eisenhower's speech opened a media campaign that would last for years and that aimed at "emotion management", balancing fears of continuing nuclear armament with promises of peaceful use of uranium in future nuclear reactors.
For more on the Atoms for Peace, please visit this site:
· Atoms for Peace [link]
https://youtu.be/2B8R-umE0s0
Eisenhower adopted a get-tough policy toward the communists in Korea. He suggested that he would "unleash" the Nationalist Chinese forces on Taiwan against communist China, and he sent only slightly veiled messages that he would use any force necessary (including the use of nuclear weapons) to bring the war to an end unless peace negotiations began to move forward. The Chinese, exhausted by more than two years of war, finally agreed to terms and an armistice was signed on July 27, 1953. The United States suffered over 50,000 casualties in this "forgotten war," and spent nearly $70 billion. The most frustrating war in U.S. history had come to an end.
For more on Einsenhower's visit to Korea, please visit these sites:
· Eisenhower goes to Korea [link]
Please watch these videos on the Armistice Agreement.
https://youtu.be/HuSyYJsJZD8
Korean War Armistice Signed - 1953 | Today In History | 27 July 17 (Duration 1:23)
Learning Unit 15.4
Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star
The Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star was the first jet fighter used operationally by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF). Designed with straight wings, the type saw extensive combat in Korea with the United States Air Force (USAF) as the F-80.
The Shooting Star was the first U.S. Air Force aircraft to exceed 500 mph in level flight, the first American jet airplane to be manufactured in large quantities, and the first USAF jet to be used in combat.
...
A presentation by Global HeavyLift Managing Member Myron D. Stokes at the Jonathan Club, Los Angeles, in May 2007 outlining a comprehensive and long-term strategy for establishing a US/NATO-controlled heavylift industry -- the movement of goods via air too large or outsized to fit in any door of any 747 or similar size freighter -- using commercial/military variants of the Boeing C-17 Globemaster III airlifter. The Heavy and Outsized sector is currently controlled by Russian and Ukraine utilizing commercial versions of the Antonov AN-124 military airlifter
Bomber aircraft market size is projected to soar in the upcoming years, powered by procuring new tactical and long range strategic bombers. Noteworthy programs such as the B21. strategic long range stealth bomber are moving along, with test planes already being constructed. What’s more remarkable about the latter program is its open architecture hardware and software system – setting it apart from existing models. As an experienced enthusiast on this topic, Bomber aircraft market analysis the prospects for growth in this market are auspicious. It would not be a stretch to deem these developments paradigm-shifting and believe me, there will be nothing monotonous about their implementation!
“There is a certain feeling of courage and hope when you work
in the field of the air. You instinctively look up, not down. You
look ahead, not back. You look ahead where the horizons are
absolutely unlimited.”
– Robert E. Gross, Lockheed Chairman/CEO 1932–1961
On a summer day in 1955, ominous clouds darkened the skies over a remote
desert valley in the Western United States, reflecting international tensions
between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In what had
become known as the Cold War, the two superpowers vied for supremacy in
the wake of World War II, waging a high-stakes game of brinksmanship as
each strove to discover the other’s strengths and weaknesses through overt and
covert means. The next bold step for the U.S. involved a spindly silver airplane,
innocuously designated U-2, undergoing preparations for its maiden flight in
the skies above central Nevada. Although this event took place without fanfare
and in utter obscurity, it heralded the beginning of an aeronautical technology
program that spanned more than six decades and showcased innovative aircraft
design and manufacturing techniques. Little did anyone realize at the time that
what had begun as a tool of Cold War necessity would evolve into a versatile
reconnaissance and research aircraft.
The U-2 program originated with a national requirement, an unsolicited
proposal, and studies championed by a panel of notable scientists tasked with
advising President Dwight D. Eisenhower on how the Nation might defend
itself against the threat of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack. To do this required as
much intelligence as possible on Soviet capabilities, but the Russian-dominated
USSR was a closed society that was virtually inaccessible to the outside world.1
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once described Russia as “a riddle,
wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.”2
1. CALL TO GLORY
How the Convair B58 Hustler Helped Win the
Cold War
By George A. Haloulakos, MBA, CFA
This is a summary preview of
my forthcoming book CALL
TO GLORY and is solely for
use as prep material given to
media professionals doing
interviews with the author.
2. TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
Introduction
Part 1: The Back Story of the Hustler
Call to Glory: Raison d’être for the B-58 Hustler
Performance, Development and Deployment
Quiet Triumph: Stopping the Enemy Without Dropping Bombs in Anger
Economic Considerations versus Accounting Data: There is a Difference!
Game Theory and Politics: An Intriguing Mixture
Part 2: Reappraising the Hustler
What is Game Theory? How Does It Apply in Assessing Value of Military Assets?
Three Strategic Weapons Systems Viewed Through the Prism of Game Theory
o Case 1: North American XB-70 Valkyrie
o Case 2: Douglas Skybolt Missile
o Case 3: Convair B-58 Hustler
The Human Factor: Playing To Win
Part 2: Reappraising the Hustler - continued
How the B-58 Reduced Risk and Increased SAC’s Expected Success Rate
Ultimate Gamesmanship: Cuban Missile Crisis
Further Quantifying How the Hustler’s Versatility Increased SAC’s Effectiveness
The $64,000 Question: What About the So Called High Accident Rate?
Part 3: Voices of the Cold War Warriors
Frequently Asked Questions [FAQs]
Afterword: The Legacy – Ahead of its Time at the Right Time
Appendix: Encapsulated Cockpit and its 3 Escape Capsules
Bonus Section: Dialogue Between Analyst and Journalist
Bibliography
Acknowledgements
About the Author
3. A Synopsis of CALL TO GLORY
This slim volume is a strategic analysis on the Convair B-58 Hustler, a
supersonic USAF bomber that was an integral part of our nation’s Strategic Air
Command [SAC] from 1960-1970. In this book I analyze the contribution of
this iconic Cold War aircraft in economic and strategic terms. My purpose is to
inform, educate and inspire people to preserve military aviation heritage
because it offers insights into our nation’s history as well as lessons on the
subjects of Finance, Strategy and Game Theory. Among Cold War bombers
the B-58 was truly an elite aircraft. In the words of Major Victor Mayer –
USAF [Ret] – who served as a B-58 Defense Service Operator [DSO]: “We
were a special group, the Black Sheep of SAC because we were limited to
nuclear weapons delivery. “ Regrettably most people are largely unaware of the
B-58 and its role during a crucial period of American history. In fact, most
people associate this aircraft in its role as the fictional Vindicator Bomber in the
1964 film “Fail Safe” and in the 2000 made-for-TV remake of that same film.
Stock footage of the B-58 was incorporated into both films as the bombers
were flying to their targets. Based on main stream, encyclopedic authoritative
sources such as Britannica and World Book from 1960-1970, one might infer that
the B-58 was a costly Cold War relic that lacked versatility, firepower and
adaptability. But those historic accounts lack context – crucial information that
presents a much different perspective.
I write about military aviation as a teaching tool for the aforementioned
subjects of Finance, Strategy and Game Theory. In conducting extensive
primary and secondary research on the B-58 Hustler it became apparent that
this was an aircraft that was both underappreciated and misunderstood. At
first glance the earlier negative inferences seem reasonable based on examining
this aircraft solely through the prism of traditional accounting practices and
defensive rather than offensive minded approaches; but such approaches omit
the strategic value and total economic return of this unique, specialized aircraft.
I have written this book as a reappraisal of the Convair B-58 Hustler to help
the reader develop a greater appreciation for the historic contribution of this
aircraft and to pay tribute to all of the people associated with its design,
development, deployment and operation.
As an exclusive nuclear strike weapon, the B-58 Hustler has been shrouded
in mystery compared to other major bombers from the same era. Since the B-
52 Stratofortress and B-47 Stratojet both had nuclear and conventional roles
they were more visible to the general public. The B-52 and B-47 were
essentially jet-powered versions of the renowned World War II B-29
4. Superfortress, which made them more easily understood, if not appreciated, by
the general public and policy makers.
Call to Glory will share first-hand insights and information about the Convair B-
58 Hustler not widely known. The reader may find that these observations will
be in conflict with some of the conventional wisdom regarding the B-58,
especially with regards to its capabilities, economic return and overall strategic
value. This is not to suggest that the mainstream account of the B-58 and its
retirement after only one decade of service is false but rather it lacks context.
In the ensuing pages, the reader will learn that during its 10-year service life the
two Convair B-58 Hustler Bomb Wings [80 aircraft in total or 40 per wing]:
Packed the most nuclear firepower of the SAC strategic bombers
Equaled and then surpassed the nuclear bomber weapons [392] of the
entire enemy Soviet bomber force in late 1962 / early 1963
Each Hustler carried five nuclear weapons per aircraft -- not just one [as
popularly inferred in various aircraft encyclopedias] – which meant 400
nuclear weapons were from the two Hustler Bomb Wings
Demonstrated versatility with photo reconnaissance capability plus low-
level flying over extended distances [700 mph for extended on-the-deck
missions at 500 feet]
Set more records than any fighter or bomber aircraft in history while
serving as a technology driver for advanced aeronautics [14 world speed
records in international competition]
Won five aeronautical trophies -- Thompson, Bleriot, Mackay, Bendix
and Harmon – the most prestigious awards in aviation
Were combat-ready on ground-alert to strike any enemy target at Mach
2+ supersonic speed with the elements of surprise and unpredictability
Provided a complementary fit to the total portfolio of SAC bombers as
the B-58 supersonic capability increased overall effectiveness of the
subsonic B-52 and B-47 aircraft while reducing overall risk for SAC
The B-58 accident rate [26 aircraft destroyed out of 116] was actually
50% less than comparable military Mach 2+ aircraft in the same era
making it a much safer aircraft than popularly perceived
Served as impetus for creating an elite group of pilots, defense service
operators, navigators/bombardiers, and ground crew maintenance that
would form the template for future advanced military aircraft programs
Never launched weapons in anger but was the decisive factor in the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis - the biggest showdown of all during the Cold War
5. Was ahead of its time at the right time with its unique combination of
being a supersonic jet bomber with the maneuverability of a fighter
All of this and more largely slipped under the radar of general public awareness.
While the Hustler carried a higher price tag versus other strategic bombers of
its day the intrinsic value outweighed the accounting figures. As a technology
driver it created a foundation for the advancement of aeronautics that presaged
multiple generations of advanced, fly-by-wire aircraft. As a front-line strategic
bomber it upgraded overall fleet capability while reducing risk for SAC. Its
potential service life was curtailed by 10 years as its retirement occurred in the
midst of the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitations Talks] negotiations in the 1960s
and 1970s. Yet in its relatively brief service life the B-58 was among the most
dangerous weapons in SAC and thereby an effective deterrent in keeping the
enemy at bay. The B-58 helped preserve the liberty and freedom of the USA at
a time when the stakes were as high at any time in our nation’s history. On this
basis, its strategic and economic value might be inferred as immeasurable.
The Cold War was not merely a period of diplomatic tension between the USA
and USSR. It was a clash of liberty and freedom versus totalitarianism and
subjugation. Both nations had their armed forces on full alert in the event of
an Emergency War Order. For all those associated with the B-58 Hustler
[including their families and loved ones] these Cold War warriors experienced a
harsh reality that at a moment’s notice they would be ordered to carry out their
mission to protect and defend our nation in which their goal was not
containment but annihilation of the enemy. The B-58 was an integral part of
an American offensive-minded / play-to-win strategy rather than a defensive-
minded / play-not-to-lose approach. It was this type of American
gamesmanship -- with the B-58 as one of its most lethal assets to back it up --
that forced the USSR to accept a “draw” rather than risk engaging in all-out
war with the USA in the high-risk Chess game that was the October 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis.
However, at a moment in history when the USA possessed overwhelming
force, a shift in public policy was already underway in which advanced weapon
systems were either dismantled or cancelled for reasons such as economy and
reduction of tension. Sophisticated aircraft and missile programs were
evaluated through the same accounting prism one might use when estimating
cost-benefit ratios for consumer products like automobiles or home appliances.
The problem with this passive, financial approach was that it ignored the
behavioral response of the enemy – namely that lack of American initiative was
perceived by the USSR as weakness and was to be exploited by increased
6. aggression and arms build-up of their own. With public policy now being
driven by the pursuit of negotiation rather than victory through a show of
strength and willingness to use it, reasons of economy or efficiency were
increasingly cited as the basis for curtailment in the deployment of advanced
weapons systems. The B-58 Hustler was among several military programs
negatively impacted by this development.
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, architect of the nuclear Navy, viewed this as an
exercise in using fraudulent cost-benefit studies to dismantle every advanced
technology program sponsored by the US military. Such cost-benefit studies
typically used in a normal business setting ignored economic returns such as
technology-driver benefits [including the high-caliber, versatile work force
associated with such advancement] and its positive cascade effect on various
other weapons programs, industries and sectors. The proper notion of
economy and national defense is that if a nation has deployed a weapons
system so powerful that it does not have to be used in anger, then the nation
has achieved victory -- the ultimate measure of Return on Investment for
military assets. Thus the use of financial accounting in this venue without
regard for behavioral response by the enemy and the importance of victory is a
focus on price rather than value. Liberty and freedom are of incalculable value.
They are not to be bargained or sacrificed on the basis of accounting data nor
marginalized in pursuit of settlements instead of victories. To do otherwise
would place our nation at the mercy of our enemies. Thus Admiral Rickover’s
aforementioned criticism has merit because for such decisions to be based on
inappropriate or incomplete metrics is an exercise of self-delusion that spells
danger for all concerned.
All of those directly and indirectly connected with the Convair B-58 Hustler
deserve to be remembered for the significant contributions they made through
service to our nation during the Cold War. They were aware of the grave threat
posed by our primary adversary -- the USSR – during their deployment. As
such the B-58 is a symbol of peace and freedom through display of American
courage and exceptionalism.
A pioneering aircraft that helped usher advancement in aeronautics while
providing object lessons in Finance, Strategy and Game Theory makes for a
compelling story. Finance explains how capital is employed to create added-
value. Strategy explains how resources are mobilized to capitalize on
opportunities while achieving victory. Game Theory embodies strategies and
tactics in situations of conflict or competition in which participants are faced
with choices of action in which they win or lose based on what others choose
7. to do or not to do. Statistics may provide guidelines or rules of thumb but in
the midst of conflict where human behavior comes into play, actions and
outcomes do not necessarily conform to a statistical norm or numeric formula.
The long-retired supersonic B-58 is a unique teaching tool for these disciplines
made all the more interesting by its remarkable achievements during its service
life. It is with a profound sense of gratitude to everyone associated with this
aircraft and to those who contributed to my research with their first-hand
accounts that I dedicate this book.
George Anthony Haloulakos
CALL TO GLORY takes you right into the cockpit to experience what it is like
to fly a nuclear armed aircraft awaiting the Emergency War Order, how flight
crews worked together and having to bail out at high altitude. In this historic
reappraisal of the Hustler you will learn from first-hand accounts by those who
flew this record-setting aircraft the importance of maintaining a strong national
defense plus how to go about assessing the strategic and economic value of
military assets in order to upgrade our nation’s global military capability.
CALL TO GLORY is scheduled for a 2015 summertime release. Please
contact the author to learn more. E-mail: Haloulakos@gmail.com