The document provides an overview of the evolution of air power from its origins in World War I through the modern era. It discusses early air power theorists like Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell and how their ideas influenced development. It then examines employment of air power in major conflicts like World War II, the Cold War, post-Cold War, and future potential uses. Key lessons discussed include the importance of air superiority, how technology and tactics have continually evolved air power capabilities, and the need for a balanced air strategy integrated with land and naval forces.

1. Bismillah

3. EVOLUTION OF AIR
POWER

4. Sequence
• Evolution
• Airpower theories
• Evolution & employment in WW-II
• Evolution & employment post WW-II
• Evolution & employment post cold war era
• Future environment
• Conclusion
• Lessons
• Conclusion

5. Evolution
• Birth of Air Power
• Battle face transformation
• Enthusiastic pioneers
• Militarizing the aircraft
• Conception of phrase “Air Power”

6. Definition of Air Power
“Combat Power delivered through the medium of air”
“The use of the air medium to enforce the National Will”
“The ability to project military forces by or from a platform in the
third dimension, above the surface of the earth.”

7. Evolution of Air Strategy
• First World War
• Interwar period
• World War-II
• Cold War period
• Contemporary world

8. First World War
• The outbreak of war
• Reconnaissance
• Trench Fighters
• Aircraft as attack weapon

9. Interwar Period
• Experience of WW-I
• Serious thoughts for battlefield and beyond

10. CLASSICAL THEORIES OF AIR POWER

11. General Guillio Douhet
• Early advocate of Air Power use
• His book “Command of the Air” in 1921
• Air Power should act independently
• Strengthen all possible resources
• Conquest the command of air
• No diversion of enemy resources
• Organized Civil aviation
• Only offense no defensive attitude
• Quick mobility
• Air alone could win the war.

12. Lord Trenchard
• Offensive Bomber Action
• Key concepts
• Continuously fighting for mastery of air
• Destroy means of production and communication
• Maintain battle without any interference by enemy
• Prevent enemy being able to maintain the battle

13. General Billy Mitchell
• His books “The Winged Defence” 1925 & “Sky Ways” 1930
• Airpower can hold of any hostile air force or shipping
• Any power in future be deprived of its air force
• Nothing can stop the attack of aircraft except other aircraft
• Aircraft possess the most destructive weapons ever
• Aerial siege can starve sea lanes
• Air force attacking the Heartland of enemy
• Air threat of bombing leads to shutdown of factories
• Airpower in peace time
• Airpower should not be an auxiliary to army or navy
• Centralize all aeronautical efforts

14. Common Aspects of Air Theorists
• Airpower would dominant future wars
• Air arm a separate autonomous service
• Air power can attack enemy’s population or industry
• Air power would not be an auxiliary service to army and navy

15. Outcome of Common Theories
• Ideas of Douhet, Billy Mitchel and Trenchard
• Americans developed B-17 long-range bomber
• Europeans developed Radar, Hurricane, Spitfire & ME-109
• General Wever became the first CAS of Luftwaffe

16. Air Power Employment in WW-II

17. German Air Strategy
• To support the land and naval forces in Blitzkrieg operations and
carry out strategic bombing while achieving air superiority over
the battlefield and maintaining control of own airspace

18. German Air Strategy Against Poland
• Destroy the Polish Air Force, attain Air Superiority
• 01 September 1939, Luftwaffe launched surprise attacks
• Luftwaffe demolished the Polish Air Force

19. German Air Strategy Against France
• 3000 Luftwaffe aircraft struck over 70 airfields
• Europe and the Germans enjoyed complete Air Supremacy

20. German Air Strategy Against Britain
• 10 July 1940 Operations Sea Lion
• Battle did not develop as visualised by Germans
• Churchill planned to play with Hitler’s psyche
• Diversion of aim was a strategic mistake
• Luftwaffe could not establish control of the Air
• Battle of Britain identified limitations of a tactical air force
• Cancelation of Operation Sea Lion

21. Allied Air Strategy
• British Air strategists did not falter
• British “Bomber Offensive” ineffective till 1943
• American strategy of precise bombing
• “Progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military,
industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale
of German people to a point where their capacity for armed
resistance is fatally weakened”

22. The Bomber Offensive
• Against Germany from failure to success
• Firebombs attack in Hamburg
• 1000 lbs bomber raids against Cologne with 1100 aircraft

23. Summary of Air Strategies
• German Air strategy
• “To employ Air Power in an effective and bold manner to gain air superiority
and support land forces”
• Allied air strategy
• “Gain air superiority, support land forces and destroy through strategic
bombardment, the war-making capacity of Germany and break the will of
her people to continue the war”

24. Lessons of WW-II
• Balanced Air Strategy
• Technology has a marked influence on the Air Power
• Importance of Air Superiority was proved

25. EVOLUTION & EMPLOYMENT POST WW-II ERA

26. Airpower Development in Cold War Era
• Arms Race lead to airpower development
• Military development in space

27. Airpower Employment in Cold War Era
• Airpower participated in numerous operations during this era
• Korean War
• Vietnam War
• Arab-Israel Wars
• Israel Air force strategy of pre-emption
• Superior technology, better training, topography, climate ideal and satellite
intelligence

28. Airpower Employment in Cold War Era
• Bekaa Valley Conflict
• One-sided air victory in the history of airpower
• Air Power is an offensive instrument of warfare
• Limited assets can be maximized through training and intense efforts
• Use of Better Technology
• Good C3I forms

29. EVOLUTION & EMPLOYMENT POST COLD WAR ERA

30. Airpower Development
• Lean, mean and hard-hitting air forces
• Space militarization

31. Low Intensity Conflict
• Definition of LIC
• John F. Kennedy’s LIC point of view 1962
• Unique characteristics of LIC
• Restricted Level of Combat
• Absence of a Recognizable Enemy
• Emphasis on Psychological War
• Protracted Nature of Conflict
• British LIC in Somaliland 1920
• Army estimated 12 months, two divisions & millions of pounds
• Air force took three weeks with just six aircraft & 77,000 pounds to quell

32. Low Intensity Conflict
• Role of Air Power vis-à-vis modern LIC
• Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo LIC
• IAF against Palestinian Liberation Organization and HAMAS
• Space satellites, AWACS and air-to-air refuelers
• Precision engagement into enemy’s heartland

33. Bosnian Conflict
(30 Aug – 14 Sep, 1995)
• Airpower employment
• Cause maximum attrition to Serb forces
• Minimum collateral damage
• Analysis
• PGMs became weapons of choice
• Real-time and accurate intelligence
• Air power in LIC as compared to a conventional war

34. Chechnya Conflict
(1994-1996)
• Airpower Employment
• RuAF’s conducted Offensive missions at First stage
• Rough terrain, harsh weather, aged equipment & poor stocks of supplies
• Analysis
• Hasty and random application of air power
• Lack of coordination in Air-Land operations

35. Kosovo Air Campaign
(24 March – 10 June, 1999)
• Airpower Employment
• Phase-I : Destroy Yugoslavia air defence networks
• Phase-II : Isolate the troops in the field
• Analysis
• Air superiority is essential for any military operations
• Effectiveness of PGMs
• Strict rules of engagement for air and ground forces
• Decision of operation and viability of campaign

36. Airpower Employment
Gulf War-I (1991)
• Practical manifestation of new theories and resultant strategies
• Birth of ‘Instant Thunder’
• Major facets of employment
• Parallel Operations
• Classic Military Strategy of Annihilation
• Coalition Air Campaign Plan
• Kosovo Air Campaign (1999)
• Afghan War (2001)
• Gulf War-II (2003)

37. Sub Conventional Operations
(Afghanistan, Iraq & Pakistan)
• Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorist operations
• Non-kinetic applications to kinetic employment
• Air power provides five distinct advantages
• More directly supportive in COIN ops
• Applied extensively in Non-Kinetic domains
• Precision Munitions necessity to avoid collateral damage
• Jointness is the key to efficient employment of forces

38. Future Environment

39. Future Environment

40. Nature and Character of War
• Liddell Hart
• “Nature of war is constant, while every war exhibits a new and unique
character”
• Clausewitz
• “All wars are things of same nature; however, every age has indeed been
marked with its own kind of war”
• Colin Gray
• Objective that is permanent and subjective that is liable to change
• Subjective nature of war can be considered as character of war

41. Prediction of Character of Future Warfare
• Professor Sir Michael Howard
• “No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely
the character of future conflict. The key is, not to be so far off the mark
that it becomes impossible to adjust once that character is revealed”

42. Facets of Future Warfare
• Future conflict will be hybrid in character
• Range of threats will spread to novel & irregular spheres
• Inter-communal violence, terrorism, insurgency, pervasive
criminality and widespread disorder
• Public support for success of operations

43. Principle Contours of Future War
• Violent Non-State Actors
• Space Warfare
• Shaping the Battlefield
• Battlefield Dispersion
• Complex Battle Space
• Congested Battle Space
• Cluttered Battle Space
• Contested Battle Space
• Constrained Battle Space
• Informational Complexity
• Impact of New Technologies

44. Future War
South Asian Perspective
• War is likely to be limited and not full scale
• Military forces engage in full spectrum of conflict
• Destruction through airpower
• Territory will remain important military objective
• Non-linear character of war

45. Conclusions

46. Conventional Warfare
• Airpower characteristics of dynamism, responsiveness and reach
• Airpower shall precede other firepower resources
• Initiation of war by air would present a paradox for airpower
• Importance of terrain as military objective
• Complex battle space would necessitate information management
• Battlefield dispersion, due to enhanced lethality of firepower
• Development of domestic industry rather than dependence
• Integrated ground air defense systems would challenge airpower employment
• Network centric and cyber warfare would necessitate indigenous technology
• Future warfare necessitates development of high-tech and multi-role aircraft

47. Sub Conventional Warfare (SCW)
• Employment of airpower remains the priority
• Involvement of population would entail their approval
• Collateral damage would need precision
• High technology in non-kinetic and kinetic domains
• Target acquisition would lead to over-reliance on technology
• Quick information would necessitate high tech communication system
• Human limitations would increase the reliance on aerial reconnaissance
• Precision, flexibility and range make airpower a necessity

48. Relevance of Airpower to Principal Notions of
Operational Strategy
• Conventional War COG
• land forces
• Airpower
• Maritime
• SCW COG
• Relevance of Airpower to COG
• Joint Warfare
• SCW (Case in point is Operation Rah-e-Nijat)
• Engagement of terrorist strong holds
• Engagement of Pre Ghar and surrounding heights

49. Balance
• Conventional War
• SCW
• Security Forces State of Balance
• Terrorist’s State of Balance
• Relevance of Airpower to Notion of Balance
• Concept of Balance in Airpower
• In joint warfare (Case in point is 1967 Arab-Israel war)
• In SCW

50. Culminating Point
• Conventional War
• SCW
• Relevance of Airpower to Notion of Culminating Point
• Concept of Culminating Point in Airpower
• Joint Warfare (Cases in point are IAF in 1967 & 1973 and Gulf War I
• In SCW (Cases in point are Operation Rah-e-Nijat & Rah-e-Rast)

51. Lessons

52. Lessons for Employment of Airpower
• Cardinal principles of airpower must be understood
• Airpower is a weapon of offence
• Air superiority is the prerequisite for success
• Unity of command is vital for airpower employment & development
• Airpower has the ability to influence time factor
• Airpower is technology sensitive

53. Lessons for Employment of Airpower
• Airpower employment needs clarity
• Jointness is vital to airpower employment
• Airpower cannot win a war alone
• Airpower may not necessarily break the will of a nation
• Airpower can accentuate the effects of shock and surprise
• Airpower can only be strategically decisive
• Airpower employment in SCW requires extensive coordination with land
forces
• Airpower in SCW can provide vital support in form of airlift, ISR, and precise
engagement
• smaller, though more potent, inventory of aircraft.

54. Options for Small Air Forces
• Attain the potential of operations at all levels
• Development strategy and employment

55. Airpower Development Strategy
• Availability, reliability and accuracy of hardware
• Weapons that provide meaningful intelligence
• Communication, navigation and command and control

56. Airpower Employment Strategy
• Denial through deep interdiction in rear areas
• Relatively basic air strike technologies
• Defensive air operations are essential

57. Conclusion

58. Conclusion
• Swing factor shaping the battle space
• UAV strikes and selective trans-border bombardments
• Evolve asymmetric responses and holistic approach
• Airpower has become a contemporary necessity for states
• Airpower possibilities
• Airpower as a facilitator of peace
• Airpower has shrunk the Globe
• Airpower alone cannot win wars but no war can be won without airpower

59. Questions