The document analyzes how advances in military technology enabled aspects of total war such as the blurring of combatants and non-combatants, mass mobilization of troops, and increased range and scale of conflicts. It discusses how new artillery and firearms in the French Revolutionary Wars and American Civil War allowed less trained citizen-soldiers to be effective in battle. In particular, it describes how improved artillery during the Civil War enabled Union forces to bombard civilians in Columbia, South Carolina from over two miles away. The document argues that total war would not have been possible without technological developments that increased lethality and the physical and emotional distance between enemies from the late 1700s onward.
Doctrine is an army’s game plan. Doctrine not only tells an army how to fight but it communicates intent from the institutional Army to the fighting forces. The progression that leads to doctrine stretches across a temporal “reverse highway” that begins well into the future with a vision of how future wars will be fought. At some point along the highway visioning solidifies into warfighting concepts. All too often, the concept phase of this journey is where dead ends and misleading road signs appear. Visioning is cheap and ephemeral. Concepts, on the other hand, tend to ossify ideas that eventually turn into opinions. Opinions, even false ones, are defended by those whose influences are at stake. Opinions lead to investments that launch programs. Eventually the highway ends at the doctrinal present as organizations and weapons emerge to provide the tools and formations to fight wars
Hello..!! its my first presentation...please keep support me ..i will provide your subjects related meterial..i want to teach or understand each and basic knowledge of our world ..
The document discusses how the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked a turning point where total war was no longer tolerated by Western societies due to the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons. This led to the emergence of narrative warfare, where public opinion and media coverage can influence the outcome of conflicts more than military force. Guerrilla groups recognized they did not need to match an enemy's military strength and instead used propaganda and media to undermine public support for wars. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, rise of the UN and human rights, end of colonialism, and growth of global populations have all contributed to narratives becoming more important in warfare.
The Soviet forces defeated the Wehrmacht through a combination of political, tactical, strategic, and logistical factors:
1) Hitler made several strategic blunders that weakened the Wehrmacht, including interfering with its structure and issuing brutal orders targeting civilians.
2) Stalin's purges had decimated the Red Army officer corps but survivors later proved effective commanders.
3) Stalin was able to rally the Soviet people to total war through patriotic speeches and brutal policies, mobilizing the entire nation and limiting German gains.
4) The Wehrmacht's blitzkrieg tactics were ineffective in prolonged campaigns, and it suffered heavy attrition and equipment losses on the vast Eastern Front.
Freedom Betrayed - Herbet Hoover's Secret History of the Second World War and...Peter Hammond
This document summarizes the book "Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover's Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath". The book is a critical analysis of FDR and Churchill's actions before, during, and after WWII. It argues that FDR deliberately led the US into WWII against public opinion and betrayed Eastern European nations to Stalin. It also asserts that FDR provoked Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor by imposing sanctions. The book challenges conventional views of WWII and the actions of FDR and Churchill. It provides extensive documentation through footnotes to support its claims and interpretations of events.
This document discusses propaganda during World War 1. It describes how the British government set up the Wellington House propaganda bureau in 1914, headed by Charles Masterman, to secretly recruit famous British authors to write pro-war books, articles, and pamphlets. The goal was to generate support for the war and Britain's war aims while denigrating Germany. Many outrageous lies and atrocity stories about German actions were produced and distributed worldwide under the guise of objective reports. The propaganda bureau was highly effective in manipulating public opinion and rewriting the narrative of the war in Britain for decades after.
The Project Gutenberg EBook of On War, by Carl von Clausewitz
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
Title: On War
Author: Carl von Clausewitz
Release Date: February 25, 2006 [EBook #1946]
Last Updated: January 26, 2013
Language: English
Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ON WAR ***
Produced by Charles Keller and David Widger
Schlacht Ohne Morgen: The Success and Failure of German's Blitzkrieg - World ...Joel Kindrick
The success and failure of Germany's Blitzkrieg doctrine is summarized in 3 sentences:
Germany developed the Blitzkrieg doctrine of rapid movement and quick victories to overcome its disadvantages in resources and manpower, allowing it to achieve several stunning victories in the early years of World War 2. However, the Blitzkrieg was unable to overcome opponents with comparable skill and vastly greater strength, like the Soviet Union, leading to Germany's eventual defeat as the war dragged on. The Blitzkrieg worked against neighbors but could not overcome major powers for an extended conflict that Germany was not prepared to fight.
Doctrine is an army’s game plan. Doctrine not only tells an army how to fight but it communicates intent from the institutional Army to the fighting forces. The progression that leads to doctrine stretches across a temporal “reverse highway” that begins well into the future with a vision of how future wars will be fought. At some point along the highway visioning solidifies into warfighting concepts. All too often, the concept phase of this journey is where dead ends and misleading road signs appear. Visioning is cheap and ephemeral. Concepts, on the other hand, tend to ossify ideas that eventually turn into opinions. Opinions, even false ones, are defended by those whose influences are at stake. Opinions lead to investments that launch programs. Eventually the highway ends at the doctrinal present as organizations and weapons emerge to provide the tools and formations to fight wars
Hello..!! its my first presentation...please keep support me ..i will provide your subjects related meterial..i want to teach or understand each and basic knowledge of our world ..
The document discusses how the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked a turning point where total war was no longer tolerated by Western societies due to the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons. This led to the emergence of narrative warfare, where public opinion and media coverage can influence the outcome of conflicts more than military force. Guerrilla groups recognized they did not need to match an enemy's military strength and instead used propaganda and media to undermine public support for wars. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, rise of the UN and human rights, end of colonialism, and growth of global populations have all contributed to narratives becoming more important in warfare.
The Soviet forces defeated the Wehrmacht through a combination of political, tactical, strategic, and logistical factors:
1) Hitler made several strategic blunders that weakened the Wehrmacht, including interfering with its structure and issuing brutal orders targeting civilians.
2) Stalin's purges had decimated the Red Army officer corps but survivors later proved effective commanders.
3) Stalin was able to rally the Soviet people to total war through patriotic speeches and brutal policies, mobilizing the entire nation and limiting German gains.
4) The Wehrmacht's blitzkrieg tactics were ineffective in prolonged campaigns, and it suffered heavy attrition and equipment losses on the vast Eastern Front.
Freedom Betrayed - Herbet Hoover's Secret History of the Second World War and...Peter Hammond
This document summarizes the book "Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover's Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath". The book is a critical analysis of FDR and Churchill's actions before, during, and after WWII. It argues that FDR deliberately led the US into WWII against public opinion and betrayed Eastern European nations to Stalin. It also asserts that FDR provoked Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor by imposing sanctions. The book challenges conventional views of WWII and the actions of FDR and Churchill. It provides extensive documentation through footnotes to support its claims and interpretations of events.
This document discusses propaganda during World War 1. It describes how the British government set up the Wellington House propaganda bureau in 1914, headed by Charles Masterman, to secretly recruit famous British authors to write pro-war books, articles, and pamphlets. The goal was to generate support for the war and Britain's war aims while denigrating Germany. Many outrageous lies and atrocity stories about German actions were produced and distributed worldwide under the guise of objective reports. The propaganda bureau was highly effective in manipulating public opinion and rewriting the narrative of the war in Britain for decades after.
The Project Gutenberg EBook of On War, by Carl von Clausewitz
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
Title: On War
Author: Carl von Clausewitz
Release Date: February 25, 2006 [EBook #1946]
Last Updated: January 26, 2013
Language: English
Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ON WAR ***
Produced by Charles Keller and David Widger
Schlacht Ohne Morgen: The Success and Failure of German's Blitzkrieg - World ...Joel Kindrick
The success and failure of Germany's Blitzkrieg doctrine is summarized in 3 sentences:
Germany developed the Blitzkrieg doctrine of rapid movement and quick victories to overcome its disadvantages in resources and manpower, allowing it to achieve several stunning victories in the early years of World War 2. However, the Blitzkrieg was unable to overcome opponents with comparable skill and vastly greater strength, like the Soviet Union, leading to Germany's eventual defeat as the war dragged on. The Blitzkrieg worked against neighbors but could not overcome major powers for an extended conflict that Germany was not prepared to fight.
Clausewitz's concept of the trinity of war - comprising the emotional element of the population, the rational element of political objectives, and the element of chance and military skill - remains relevant for understanding modern war according to the author. While technology and new actors like non-state groups have changed warfare, wars still involve rational goals, popular support, and military decision-making. The author argues Clausewitz helps analyze how the nature of war links to its social and political implications, and his concepts of friction and the possibility of absolute war still apply despite new weapons like nuclear arms. Therefore, On War remains useful for comprehending wars in the 21st century.
This document examines Clausewitz's categories of war and argues that his concept of "absolute war" was abandoned and replaced by his later concept of "ideal war". It discusses how Clausewitz's thinking evolved over time as he revised his manuscripts, but the published version of On War retained discussions of "absolute war" that did not reflect his final views. It argues this has led to much confusion about Clausewitz's framework and categories of war. The document analyzes issues of translation, categorization of war, and Clausewitz's conceptual development to better understand his strategic theory.
James j. martin a memoir of globaloney, orwellianism, and dead sea fruit- j...RareBooksnRecords
This document provides a review of the book "Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace" which was originally published in 1953 and republished in 1982. It summarizes the political and historical context in which the book was written and received, as well as the contents and impact of the book. The review discusses the climate in the early 1950s following World War 2 and the Korean War, and how this led to greater interest in revisionist histories that questioned the official narratives around FDR and US foreign policy. It also summarizes some of the key arguments and contributors to the original book.
The writer sets out to study excerpted samples of the war speeches made across the world between the World War eras and the present with a view to finding out the linguistic choices favoured by war leaders over time to drum up support for wars. It is argued here that there may be something unique in the linguistic choices made in war speeches which convince people to support the prosecution of wars despite the wanton destruction that follows them. Framed on a descriptive research design, with stylistics as the theoretical framework, the study examines the excerpts chosen by deliberate sampling so as to identify and analyze the features they share. The analysis reveals that the speeches share many linguistic features in common, all of which may be responsible for the control of the minds and actions of the people.
The document discusses the role of media framing and propaganda in shaping public perceptions of war, using the 2003 Iraq War and Al-Jazeera as case studies. It explores how the US military embedded journalists to control the narrative and open their operations to reduce perceptions of spin. In contrast, Al-Jazeera's independent reporting from Iraq provided alternative perspectives that countered the Western narrative and gave voice to Iraqi civilians. The document questions whether global news can be fit for purpose or if alternatives like Al-Jazeera are needed to balance hegemonic media versions of reality.
A Case Study in Early Joint Warfare: An Analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean C...Professor Joel Hayward
Military theorists and commentators believe that joint operations prove more effective in most circumstances of modern warfare than operations involving only one service or involving two or more services but without systematic integration or unified command. Many see Nazi Germany's armed forces, the Wehrmacht, as early pioneers of 'jointness'. This essay demonstrates that the Wehrmacht did indeed understand the value of synchronizing its land, sea and air forces and placing them under operational commanders who had at least a rudimentary understanding of the tactics, techniques, needs, capabilities and limitations of each of the services functioning in their combat zones. It also shows that the Wehrmacht's efforts in this direction produced the desired result of improved combat effectiveness. Yet it argues that the Wehrmacht lacked elements considered by today's theorists to be essential to the attainment of truly productive jointness - a single tri-service commander, a proper joint staff and an absence of inter-service rivalry - and that, as a result, it often suffered needless difficulties in combat.
The document discusses the role of public relations and framing in wartime, with a focus on the Iraq War in 2003. It examines how the US military shaped public perception of the war by embedding journalists and controlling the narrative. It also looks at the role of Al-Jazeera in providing an alternative perspective by reporting directly from the ground in Iraq. The challenges of separating fact from propaganda are explored.
Shared Challenges Unique Solutions. Russia & France in the Great War and AfterDave Von Nearing
The document compares how France and Russia handled the challenges of World War I and why only France survived after the war ended. Both countries did not expect a long war of attrition, but France adapted its strategy over time under competent leadership while Russia failed to modernize. The French army fought for national honor and to erase the disgrace of 1870, while Russian soldiers lacked motivation and faced poor conditions, incompetent officers, and a weak command structure. Ultimately, France survived because its army had reason to fight and hope of success, unlike Russia where soldiers merely fought without purpose for a cause they no longer believed in.
The document analyzes the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and Egypt through the lens of the "Conflict Narrative Hypothesis". This hypothesis posits that for war to occur, both sides must have a narrative of their own superiority, the other side's inferiority, and a call to patriotic action. The document finds evidence that these narratives existed in both Israel and Egypt prior to the war. In Egypt, a political rally featured speeches proclaiming superiority over Israel and calling for war, as well as visual propaganda depicting an Egyptian soldier dominating Israel. Egyptian popular culture also reflected these narratives of superiority and demeaning of Israel. When the Strait of Tiran was closed, this ambiguous trigger event aligned with Egypt's conflict narrative
Collins was inspired to write The Hunger Games after channel surfing between reality TV shows and war coverage, noticing similarities between the young people competing for money and those fighting in actual wars. She draws on her own experiences growing up in a military family and her father's efforts to educate her about the realities of war at a young age. The Hunger Games aims to make warfare personal for adolescent readers and force them to contemplate their roles as desensitized observers of violence.
This document provides definitions and explanations of key terms related to the concept of war. It begins by defining war as an armed conflict between two or more opposing entities aimed at achieving a geopolitical goal. Various types of war are described, including civil wars and proxy wars. Motivations for war are discussed, including imperialism, misperceptions between sides, and three universal reasons according to the Talmud: economic reasons, power/pride/personal reasons, and ideology/religion. Economic theories for the causes of war are also outlined, suggesting wars can arise from pursuit of markets and resources. The document serves as an introductory chapter establishing definitions and concepts to understand the discussion of war that will follow.
The document summarizes and compares the arguments made by James McPherson in Battle Cry of Freedom and those made in Donald's collection of essays Why the North Won the Civil War. It finds the contingency theory argued by McPherson, that the outcome of the war was not inevitable and depended on a few key battles, to be flawed and not convincing. In contrast, it presents the essay by T. Harry Williams in Why the North Won as having a more persuasive argument that the North's superior military leadership, especially that of Grant and Sherman, ensured Northern victory as they adapted their strategies to modern war in a way Confederate generals like Lee did not. The document concludes that Why the North Won has a more convincing overall argument about the reasons for Northern victory
This treatise on the recent shortcomings of the Army organizational culture challenges leaders at all levels to evaluate their personal leadership practices and their application of Army policies.
- Aerial reconnaissance flights conducted by the US during the Cold War provided important intelligence but also inflamed tensions with the Soviet Union.
- Early flights involved ferret missions along borders to detect Soviet radar systems, but the US soon began overflights deep into Soviet territory using modified bombers and later the U-2 spy plane.
- These overflights violated Soviet sovereignty and provoked an angry response, though they provided valuable intelligence, especially on new military sites and technology. It remained a challenge for diplomacy between the two superpowers.
Americas second crusade-william_henry_chamberlain-1950-379pgs-pol-usaRareBooksnRecords
This chapter discusses America's entry into World War I as a "crusade" to promote righteousness. Initially, President Wilson and many Americans wanted to remain neutral in the war between European powers. Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare against passenger ships, culminating in the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915, increased pressure on the US to join the Allies. Wilson unsuccessfully tried to mediate a peace agreement. As the war continued with enormous costs, the prospects for negotiated peace faded. Germany was initially militarily successful but faced dwindling resources due to the Allied blockade. The US eventually entered the war in 1917 after Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare.
This review summarizes and critiques three books about Cold War history and American foreign policy:
1) Richard Saull's "The Cold War and after: capitalism, revolution and superpower politics" which takes a Marxist view of the Cold War but is difficult to follow due to lengthy sentences and parentheses.
2) Don Munton and David Welch's "The Cuban Missile Crisis: a concise history" which provides a clear overview of the crisis and its causes/aftermath but could be strengthened by discussing additional context points.
3) Christopher Layne's "The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to the present" which argues US foreign policy has long been driven by economic
This document summarizes the reactions of various British Radical publicists to President Woodrow Wilson's reply to Pope Benedict XV's peace initiative in August 1917. Some key figures, like Henry Massingham of The Nation, were highly critical of Wilson's reply, seeing it as a rejection of a negotiated peace and an endorsement of continuing the war until victory. Others, like Philip Snowden and Henry Brailsford, shared these concerns and doubts about Wilson's strategy prolonging the war. However, some publicists still maintained confidence in Wilson's liberal internationalist goals. The document analyzes the divisions among British Radicals and challenges the view that Wilson's reply relieved their anxieties about the direction of the war.
Stalingrad: An Examination-of Hitler's Decision to Airlift, by Professor Joel...Professor Joel Hayward
After February 1943, the shadow of Stalingrad ever lengthened ahead of Adolf Hitler. The battle for that city had ended in disastrous defeat, shattering the myth of his military "Midas touch," ending his chances of defeating the Red Army, permanently damaging relations with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, and other allied nations, and, of course, inflicting heavy losses on his eastern armies. More than 150,000 Axis soldiers, most of them German, had been killed or wounded in the city's approaches or ruins; 108,000 others stumbled into Soviet captivity, 91,000 in the battle's last three days alone. (Although Hitler never learned of their fate, only six thousand ever returned to Germany.) The battle has attracted considerable scholarly and journalistic attention. Literally scores of books and articles on Stalingrad have appeared during the 50 years since Stalin's armies bulldozed into Berlin, bringing the war in Europe to a close. Most have been published in Germany and, to a lesser degree, Russia, where the name "Stalingrad" still conjures up powerful and emotional imagery. Comparatively few have been published in the English-speaking world, and this is understandable. Because no British, Common wealth, or American forces took part in the battle, they can number none of their own among its many heroes, martyrs, prisoners, and victims. Moreover, although the German defeat at Stalin grad was immediately seen in the West as a turning point, its effects were not directly felt by the Anglo- - American nations. The main focus of Stalin grad historiography, including the dozen books published in 1992 and 1993 to commemorate the battle's 50th anniversary, has been the fighting, encirclement, suffering, and destruction of Generalfeldmarschall Friedrich Paulus's Sixth Army. Few books and articles have devoted adequate attention to the activities of the Luftwaffe, although it made substantial contributions to all battles throughout the 1942 summer campaign—of which Stalingrad was the climax—and it alone was responsible for the maintenance of Sixth Army after Marshal G. K. Zhukov's forces severed it from all but radio contact with other German army formations. Even fewer works—and none in English—have analyzed in depth Hitler's decision to supply the forces trapped at Stalin grad from the air, even though this decision led to the destruction of those forces after the Luftwaffe failed to keep them adequately supplied.
The document is a report on war and terrorism submitted by students of mechanical engineering. It begins with an introduction to the topics of war and terrorism, including definitions, history and types. It then discusses some major wars in world history, the effects of war, and ongoing conflicts. It also covers the topics of terrorism, wars and terrorist attacks in India, Naxalism in India, and concludes with a bibliography.
The document discusses the importance and lessons of history, providing quotes from various historical figures. It then summarizes the development of Britain's strategic bombing campaign during World War II, including the philosophy that bombing alone could win wars, early failures of bombing campaigns, and the devastating firebombing of German cities like Hamburg and Dresden that killed hundreds of thousands of civilians. While resources were poured into the bombing campaign, it failed to achieve its goals of quick victory and instead caused tremendous loss of civilian life.
Clausewitz's concept of the trinity of war - comprising the emotional element of the population, the rational element of political objectives, and the element of chance and military skill - remains relevant for understanding modern war according to the author. While technology and new actors like non-state groups have changed warfare, wars still involve rational goals, popular support, and military decision-making. The author argues Clausewitz helps analyze how the nature of war links to its social and political implications, and his concepts of friction and the possibility of absolute war still apply despite new weapons like nuclear arms. Therefore, On War remains useful for comprehending wars in the 21st century.
This document examines Clausewitz's categories of war and argues that his concept of "absolute war" was abandoned and replaced by his later concept of "ideal war". It discusses how Clausewitz's thinking evolved over time as he revised his manuscripts, but the published version of On War retained discussions of "absolute war" that did not reflect his final views. It argues this has led to much confusion about Clausewitz's framework and categories of war. The document analyzes issues of translation, categorization of war, and Clausewitz's conceptual development to better understand his strategic theory.
James j. martin a memoir of globaloney, orwellianism, and dead sea fruit- j...RareBooksnRecords
This document provides a review of the book "Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace" which was originally published in 1953 and republished in 1982. It summarizes the political and historical context in which the book was written and received, as well as the contents and impact of the book. The review discusses the climate in the early 1950s following World War 2 and the Korean War, and how this led to greater interest in revisionist histories that questioned the official narratives around FDR and US foreign policy. It also summarizes some of the key arguments and contributors to the original book.
The writer sets out to study excerpted samples of the war speeches made across the world between the World War eras and the present with a view to finding out the linguistic choices favoured by war leaders over time to drum up support for wars. It is argued here that there may be something unique in the linguistic choices made in war speeches which convince people to support the prosecution of wars despite the wanton destruction that follows them. Framed on a descriptive research design, with stylistics as the theoretical framework, the study examines the excerpts chosen by deliberate sampling so as to identify and analyze the features they share. The analysis reveals that the speeches share many linguistic features in common, all of which may be responsible for the control of the minds and actions of the people.
The document discusses the role of media framing and propaganda in shaping public perceptions of war, using the 2003 Iraq War and Al-Jazeera as case studies. It explores how the US military embedded journalists to control the narrative and open their operations to reduce perceptions of spin. In contrast, Al-Jazeera's independent reporting from Iraq provided alternative perspectives that countered the Western narrative and gave voice to Iraqi civilians. The document questions whether global news can be fit for purpose or if alternatives like Al-Jazeera are needed to balance hegemonic media versions of reality.
A Case Study in Early Joint Warfare: An Analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean C...Professor Joel Hayward
Military theorists and commentators believe that joint operations prove more effective in most circumstances of modern warfare than operations involving only one service or involving two or more services but without systematic integration or unified command. Many see Nazi Germany's armed forces, the Wehrmacht, as early pioneers of 'jointness'. This essay demonstrates that the Wehrmacht did indeed understand the value of synchronizing its land, sea and air forces and placing them under operational commanders who had at least a rudimentary understanding of the tactics, techniques, needs, capabilities and limitations of each of the services functioning in their combat zones. It also shows that the Wehrmacht's efforts in this direction produced the desired result of improved combat effectiveness. Yet it argues that the Wehrmacht lacked elements considered by today's theorists to be essential to the attainment of truly productive jointness - a single tri-service commander, a proper joint staff and an absence of inter-service rivalry - and that, as a result, it often suffered needless difficulties in combat.
The document discusses the role of public relations and framing in wartime, with a focus on the Iraq War in 2003. It examines how the US military shaped public perception of the war by embedding journalists and controlling the narrative. It also looks at the role of Al-Jazeera in providing an alternative perspective by reporting directly from the ground in Iraq. The challenges of separating fact from propaganda are explored.
Shared Challenges Unique Solutions. Russia & France in the Great War and AfterDave Von Nearing
The document compares how France and Russia handled the challenges of World War I and why only France survived after the war ended. Both countries did not expect a long war of attrition, but France adapted its strategy over time under competent leadership while Russia failed to modernize. The French army fought for national honor and to erase the disgrace of 1870, while Russian soldiers lacked motivation and faced poor conditions, incompetent officers, and a weak command structure. Ultimately, France survived because its army had reason to fight and hope of success, unlike Russia where soldiers merely fought without purpose for a cause they no longer believed in.
The document analyzes the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and Egypt through the lens of the "Conflict Narrative Hypothesis". This hypothesis posits that for war to occur, both sides must have a narrative of their own superiority, the other side's inferiority, and a call to patriotic action. The document finds evidence that these narratives existed in both Israel and Egypt prior to the war. In Egypt, a political rally featured speeches proclaiming superiority over Israel and calling for war, as well as visual propaganda depicting an Egyptian soldier dominating Israel. Egyptian popular culture also reflected these narratives of superiority and demeaning of Israel. When the Strait of Tiran was closed, this ambiguous trigger event aligned with Egypt's conflict narrative
Collins was inspired to write The Hunger Games after channel surfing between reality TV shows and war coverage, noticing similarities between the young people competing for money and those fighting in actual wars. She draws on her own experiences growing up in a military family and her father's efforts to educate her about the realities of war at a young age. The Hunger Games aims to make warfare personal for adolescent readers and force them to contemplate their roles as desensitized observers of violence.
This document provides definitions and explanations of key terms related to the concept of war. It begins by defining war as an armed conflict between two or more opposing entities aimed at achieving a geopolitical goal. Various types of war are described, including civil wars and proxy wars. Motivations for war are discussed, including imperialism, misperceptions between sides, and three universal reasons according to the Talmud: economic reasons, power/pride/personal reasons, and ideology/religion. Economic theories for the causes of war are also outlined, suggesting wars can arise from pursuit of markets and resources. The document serves as an introductory chapter establishing definitions and concepts to understand the discussion of war that will follow.
The document summarizes and compares the arguments made by James McPherson in Battle Cry of Freedom and those made in Donald's collection of essays Why the North Won the Civil War. It finds the contingency theory argued by McPherson, that the outcome of the war was not inevitable and depended on a few key battles, to be flawed and not convincing. In contrast, it presents the essay by T. Harry Williams in Why the North Won as having a more persuasive argument that the North's superior military leadership, especially that of Grant and Sherman, ensured Northern victory as they adapted their strategies to modern war in a way Confederate generals like Lee did not. The document concludes that Why the North Won has a more convincing overall argument about the reasons for Northern victory
This treatise on the recent shortcomings of the Army organizational culture challenges leaders at all levels to evaluate their personal leadership practices and their application of Army policies.
- Aerial reconnaissance flights conducted by the US during the Cold War provided important intelligence but also inflamed tensions with the Soviet Union.
- Early flights involved ferret missions along borders to detect Soviet radar systems, but the US soon began overflights deep into Soviet territory using modified bombers and later the U-2 spy plane.
- These overflights violated Soviet sovereignty and provoked an angry response, though they provided valuable intelligence, especially on new military sites and technology. It remained a challenge for diplomacy between the two superpowers.
Americas second crusade-william_henry_chamberlain-1950-379pgs-pol-usaRareBooksnRecords
This chapter discusses America's entry into World War I as a "crusade" to promote righteousness. Initially, President Wilson and many Americans wanted to remain neutral in the war between European powers. Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare against passenger ships, culminating in the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915, increased pressure on the US to join the Allies. Wilson unsuccessfully tried to mediate a peace agreement. As the war continued with enormous costs, the prospects for negotiated peace faded. Germany was initially militarily successful but faced dwindling resources due to the Allied blockade. The US eventually entered the war in 1917 after Germany resumed unrestricted submarine warfare.
This review summarizes and critiques three books about Cold War history and American foreign policy:
1) Richard Saull's "The Cold War and after: capitalism, revolution and superpower politics" which takes a Marxist view of the Cold War but is difficult to follow due to lengthy sentences and parentheses.
2) Don Munton and David Welch's "The Cuban Missile Crisis: a concise history" which provides a clear overview of the crisis and its causes/aftermath but could be strengthened by discussing additional context points.
3) Christopher Layne's "The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to the present" which argues US foreign policy has long been driven by economic
This document summarizes the reactions of various British Radical publicists to President Woodrow Wilson's reply to Pope Benedict XV's peace initiative in August 1917. Some key figures, like Henry Massingham of The Nation, were highly critical of Wilson's reply, seeing it as a rejection of a negotiated peace and an endorsement of continuing the war until victory. Others, like Philip Snowden and Henry Brailsford, shared these concerns and doubts about Wilson's strategy prolonging the war. However, some publicists still maintained confidence in Wilson's liberal internationalist goals. The document analyzes the divisions among British Radicals and challenges the view that Wilson's reply relieved their anxieties about the direction of the war.
Stalingrad: An Examination-of Hitler's Decision to Airlift, by Professor Joel...Professor Joel Hayward
After February 1943, the shadow of Stalingrad ever lengthened ahead of Adolf Hitler. The battle for that city had ended in disastrous defeat, shattering the myth of his military "Midas touch," ending his chances of defeating the Red Army, permanently damaging relations with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, and other allied nations, and, of course, inflicting heavy losses on his eastern armies. More than 150,000 Axis soldiers, most of them German, had been killed or wounded in the city's approaches or ruins; 108,000 others stumbled into Soviet captivity, 91,000 in the battle's last three days alone. (Although Hitler never learned of their fate, only six thousand ever returned to Germany.) The battle has attracted considerable scholarly and journalistic attention. Literally scores of books and articles on Stalingrad have appeared during the 50 years since Stalin's armies bulldozed into Berlin, bringing the war in Europe to a close. Most have been published in Germany and, to a lesser degree, Russia, where the name "Stalingrad" still conjures up powerful and emotional imagery. Comparatively few have been published in the English-speaking world, and this is understandable. Because no British, Common wealth, or American forces took part in the battle, they can number none of their own among its many heroes, martyrs, prisoners, and victims. Moreover, although the German defeat at Stalin grad was immediately seen in the West as a turning point, its effects were not directly felt by the Anglo- - American nations. The main focus of Stalin grad historiography, including the dozen books published in 1992 and 1993 to commemorate the battle's 50th anniversary, has been the fighting, encirclement, suffering, and destruction of Generalfeldmarschall Friedrich Paulus's Sixth Army. Few books and articles have devoted adequate attention to the activities of the Luftwaffe, although it made substantial contributions to all battles throughout the 1942 summer campaign—of which Stalingrad was the climax—and it alone was responsible for the maintenance of Sixth Army after Marshal G. K. Zhukov's forces severed it from all but radio contact with other German army formations. Even fewer works—and none in English—have analyzed in depth Hitler's decision to supply the forces trapped at Stalin grad from the air, even though this decision led to the destruction of those forces after the Luftwaffe failed to keep them adequately supplied.
The document is a report on war and terrorism submitted by students of mechanical engineering. It begins with an introduction to the topics of war and terrorism, including definitions, history and types. It then discusses some major wars in world history, the effects of war, and ongoing conflicts. It also covers the topics of terrorism, wars and terrorist attacks in India, Naxalism in India, and concludes with a bibliography.
The document discusses the importance and lessons of history, providing quotes from various historical figures. It then summarizes the development of Britain's strategic bombing campaign during World War II, including the philosophy that bombing alone could win wars, early failures of bombing campaigns, and the devastating firebombing of German cities like Hamburg and Dresden that killed hundreds of thousands of civilians. While resources were poured into the bombing campaign, it failed to achieve its goals of quick victory and instead caused tremendous loss of civilian life.
This document provides a research guide for students studying the military operations of Operation Barbarossa and the Battle of Moscow. It is divided into three sections: 1) Preparations, which examines sources on how Germany and the Soviet Union prepared militarily for the invasion; 2) Operations, which presents works analyzing specific battles and the overall military operations; and 3) Primary Accounts, featuring memoirs from leaders on both sides. The guide includes books, papers, and an online database to help students understand the disaster of the German invasion of the Soviet Union from a military perspective.
HY 2000, American Military History I 1 Course Learnin.docxaryan532920
This document summarizes the key developments in 3D printing technology and its potential impacts. It describes how 3D printing was invented in the 1980s, allowing for layer-by-layer production of objects from digital designs. The inventor, Chuck Hull, obtained the first 3D printing patent and founded 3D Systems. In 2013, Toys'R'Us used an on-site 3D printer to produce and sell mini rubber duck souvenirs in Hong Kong, demonstrating how 3D printing could transform manufacturing and supply chains by producing goods on-demand near points of consumption. While 3D printing may disrupt traditional Chinese manufacturing, China aims to leverage the technology to strengthen its industry.
Prisoner Taking and PrisonerKilling in the Age of TotalWar.docxChantellPantoja184
Prisoner Taking and Prisoner
Killing in the Age of Total
War: Towards a Political
Economy of Military Defeat1
Niall Ferguson
Compared with the First World War, which ended quite quickly once the
position of Germany became strategically hopeless, the Second World War
proved exceedingly difŽ cult to end even after the overwhelming economic
advantage of the Allied powers had turned the strategic tide decisively
against the Axis. Both German and Japanese forces continued to Ž ght
tenaciously long after any realistic chance of victory had disappeared. Part
of the explanation lies in the extremely violent battleŽ eld culture that
developed in two key theatres of the war, which deterred soldiers from sur-
rendering, even when they found themselves in hopeless situations. This cul-
ture had its origins on the Western Front during the First World War. But
in the Second World War it became ofŽ cial policy on both sides, not only
on the Eastern Front but in the PaciŽ c theatre as well. Only when the Allied
authorities adopted techniques of psychological warfare designed to encour-
age rather than discourage surrender did German and Japanese resistance
end.
‘Pochemu? Why did you continue to Ž ght?’ This was the question oneRed Army ofŽ cer asked of a German commander after accepting
his surrender in May 1945.2 This article seeks to answer that question
by sketching a hypothesis about the dynamics of military defeat, and
in particular the phenomenon of surrender. It seeks to explain why
it proved so difŽcult to end the Second World War, even after the
overwhelming economic advantage of the Allied powers had turned
1 The article was originally given as a lecture for the Second World War Experience
Centre at the State Apartments, Royal Hospital, Chelsea, on 17 October 2000, and at
a seminar at the Harvard History Faculty on 27 November 2001. I would like to
thank (inter alia) David Blackbourn, Hugh Cecil, John Keegan, William Kirby,
Charles Maier, Ernest May, Roger Owen and the editors of War in History for their
comments. I would also like to thank Alex Watson for his assistance with the
research.
2 G.H. Bidermann, In Deadly Combat: A German Soldier’s Memoir of the Eastern Front
(Lawrence, KS, 2000), p. 291.
War in History 2004 11 (2) 148–192 10.1191/0968344504wh291oaÓ 2004 Arnold
Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing in the Age of Total War 149
the strategic tide decisively against the Axis. In particular, it offers a
suggestion as to why both Germany and Japan continued to Ž ght so
tenaciously – and so lethally – long after any realistic chance of victory
had disappeared.
A signiŽ cant part of the explanation, it is argued, lies in the
extremely violent battleŽ eld culture that developed in two key theatres
of the war, which deterred soldiers from surrendering, even when they
found themselves in hopeless situations. This culture had its origins
on the Western Front during the First World War.3 But in the Second
World War it became ofŽ cial pol.
Air Power, Ethics and Civilian Immunity during the Great War and its Aftermat...Professor Joel Hayward
Little has been published on the ethical and legal basis of air attacks on non-combatants during the First World War. Existing works have focused mainly on the injustice of the German Zeppelin and Gotha raids on British towns. They present British air campaigns on German towns and the formation of the Royal Air Force as a reasoned self-defensive response. This article breaks new ground as it attempts to paint a richer picture by explaining the influence of retributive passions – vengeance – on British thinking about how best to respond to the villainy of German air raids. By using unpublished primary sources to uncover the moral and legal rationale used by British decision-makers, it shows that they (as their German counterparts had) exploited ambiguities or "loopholes" in the ethical and legal prohibitions on the bombardment of non-combatants and explained away their own air attacks on civilian towns and villages as legitimate acts of reprisal. It ends by demonstrating that, far from feeling grave concerns about the inhumanity of targeting civilians and their environs, the most influential air power thinkers after the war were relatively uninterested in moral concepts of proportionality and discrimination. They saw air power's ability to punish the strong and culpable by attacking the weak and vulnerable as a way of making wars shorter and therefore less expensive.
Similar to Total War Through the Advancement of Military Technology Final Draft (6)
Air Power, Ethics and Civilian Immunity during the Great War and its Aftermat...
Total War Through the Advancement of Military Technology Final Draft
1. -TOTAL WAR THROUGH THE ADVANCEMENT OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY-
Zach Wilson
History 352: History of Total War
March 21, 2016
2. Wilson1
There is no singular definition for total war, nor are there set parameters for what truly
defines total war. As Jeremy Black states, “Total war is a continuous phenomenon across time,
the forms of which change in particular environments”.1 With this in mind, the most agreed
upon aspects of total war include the blurring of distinction between combatants and non-
combatants, the mass mobilization of troops, and the range and degree of conflict. Some of
these aspects are straight-forward, others need more explaining. The blurring of combatants
and non-combatants can be viewed in two regards; the first being that states involved in total
war view both civilians and soldiers as viable targets in conflict. The second angle is the
elimination of the professional soldier and the advent of citizen soldier, which also gives way to
the mass mobilization of troops. During total war, anyone and everyone is absorbed into the
mechanism of war, be it soldier or support personnel. The range and degree of conflict is the
sheer area the war consumes along with the absolution of the war objectives. The conflicts
that will be used to analyze these aspects are the French Revolutionary Wars and the American
Civil War.
There are many different perspectives that can be used to view total war: political,
cultural, economic, social, religious, gender, legal and military. Total war needs to be analyzed
through all of these perspectives, although the most influential aspect is the advancement of
military technology which allows for the blurring of distinction between combatants and non-
combatants, the mass mobilization of troops, and the range and degree of conflicts. Total wars
1 Jeremy Black, The Age of Total War 1860-1945 (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Publishers, 2006), 3.
3. Wilson2
would not be possible without the development of weapons that emerged in the late 1700’s
and onward.
The Battle of Valmy during the French Revolutionary Wars provides one of the earliest
examples of citizen-soldiers defeating a professional army in battle due to the advancement of
military technology. In September 1792 the Prussian forces lead by the Duke of Brunswick
(October 9, 1735 – November 10, 1806) marched through the Argonne forest on their way to
Paris. Under orders from Charles Dumouriez (25 January 1739 – 14 March 1823), Francois
Kellermann (28 May 1735 – 23 September 1820) seized the high ground near a windmill in the
small village of Valmy and placed his army there to meet the advancing Prussians. Kellermann
was taking an extreme risk because “half [of] the infantry were new volunteers, and half of the
others had enlisted since the start of the Revolution”.2 The armies that met at Valmy on
September 20th, 1792 were extremely close in numbers: 32,000 troops for the French and
34,000 for the Prussians, although “the French could not compare with the Prussians for
discipline, but their very indiscipline could give them a degree of bravura”.3 Given the situation
at hand, the novice French army was able to force the well trained Prussians to retreat, leading
to the first victory for France in the Revolutionary Wars. “French artillerymen had ample
opportunity to demonstrate recent technological improvements in their art—especially the
development of light, maneuverable, easily reloadable guns”.4 These new developments were
the use of bronze cannon over wrought and cast iron cannon, which greatly reduced the weight
2 David Bell, The First Total War (New York, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2007), 133.
3 David Bell, The First Total War (New York, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2007), 135.
4 David Bell, The First Total War (New York, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2007), 134.
4. Wilson3
of the artillery pieces. The victory for the French citizen-soldiers would not have been possible
had it not been for the new advantages in military technology that the Prussians did not
possess at the Battle of Valmy.
The French Revolutionary Wars shed light on the mass mobilization of troops by taking
place during the Industrial Revolution; not only did advances in weaponry allow citizen-soldiers
to be a reality, but the improvement of manufacturing techniques allowed these masses to be
armed effectively. In September of 1793, the main French armory was producing 9,000
muskets a year.5 One year later, by “setting up a workshop to improve the precision of
machine tools, which increasingly allowed for interchangeable parts—a crucial innovation given
the tendency of musket parts to fail under battlefield conditions... By October 1794, five
thousand munitions workers were making guns at the rate of 145,000 per year”5 Not only did
technological advances allow for citizen-soldiers to be a successful fighting force, but the
innovations in the way firearms were produced allowed more and more combatants to enter
the battlefield. Producing 24 muskets a day versus 397 is a 1500% increase in productivity per
day; this mass mobilization had never been seen before in warfare, and is an important
distinction in the definition of total war.
Improvements in field artillery during the American Civil War allowed combatants and
non-combatants alike to become targets at ranges over four thousand yards. In early 1865,
General WilliamT. Sherman (February 8, 1820 – February 14, 1891) marched his army to cut off
Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s (January 19, 1807 – October 12, 1870) supply lines and
capture the symbolic city of Columbia, South Carolina. Sherman’s army reached the shores of
5 David Bell, The First Total War (New York, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2007), 149.
5. Wilson4
the Congaree River on February 16th, 1865, much sooner than the Confederates had
anticipated.6 While Sherman’s army attempted to bridge the Congaree River into Columbia,
Union artillery terrorized the streets, soldiers and civilians alike. Captain Francis DeGress
(February 10, 1840 — 1883), a well-known artillery commander, “could not resist the target
that the city offered to a marksman. He unlimbered a section of his guns and began to drop
shells expertly along Main Street, among the cavalrymen and others loaded with loot”.7 The
Union army had a bitter resentment against the city of Columbia and they viewed it as the core
of the Confederacy, as it was in this city the decision to secede from the Union was made. The
battle-hardened Union soldiers wanted to burn it to the ground, and military technology
allowed them to begin their destruction from over two miles away. DeGress’s artillery rained
hell in the streets, unable to distinguish soldier or civilian; in this case the blurring of
combatants and non-combatants was a literal one due to the physical distance away. This also
leads to the degree of conflict due to dehumanizing effects of advanced weaponry and pushed
towards absolute destruction. According to Faust, “Physical distance between enemies
facilitates emotional distance from destructive acts”.8 The act of firing a cannon from
thousands of yards away is a lot less psychologically taxing than driving a sword through
another’s gut. After the bombardment in the streets had gone on for quite some time,
Sherman ordered DeGress to cease fire, although “the captain [DeGress] had just started to
6 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh, Stonewall Jackson and the Americans (New York,
New York: VintageBooks, 1993), 10-11.
7 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh, Stonewall Jackson and the Americans (New York,
New York: VintageBooks, 1993), 12.
8 Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York, New York:
Vintage Books, 2009), 12.
6. Wilson5
enjoy himself”.7 The separation allowed an experienced officer the ability to begin enjoying
bombarding civilians, a desensitizing aspect of total war that is brought on by improved
artillery.
The American Civil War also saw significant improvements in the handheld firearm that
allowed for increased separation between armies and lead to a greater range of conflict.
Muskets were awfully inaccurate at ranges over fifty yards because they typically shot round
lead balls down a smooth barrel. In 1849, French army officer Claude-Etienne Minié created his
minie bullet, a conical bullet that would expand to fit the newly added spiral grooves inside the
barrel, greatly improving the range and accuracy of the firearm. “Instead of the smoothbore
musket, almost all Civil War infantry North and South, were, by the middle of the war, equipped
with rifles with an effective range of three hundred yards”.9 The rifle’s first major testing
ground was the American Civil War, where it changed the battlefield forever by further
expanding the emotional void between violence. As one Yankee soldier explained, “when men
can kill one another at six hundred yards they generally would prefer to do it at that
distance”.10 The increased range and accuracy of cannon and rifles caused a shift in strategy
and tactics leading to larger battlefield, and thus a larger range of conflict. These shifts would
eventually lead to trench warfare towards the end of the Civil War that would return during the
First World War.
9 Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York, New York:
Vintage Books, 2009), 39.
10 Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York, New York:
Vintage Books, 2009), 41.
7. Wilson6
The improved effectiveness of the rifle allowed the citizen-soldier in the Civil War to be
extremely successful on the battlefield with relatively zero military understanding. Faust
explains the effects of the new technology:
This war generated a mass mobilization of common citizens and forces of
unprecedented size. The approximately three million Americans North and South who
ultimately served in the course of the conflict were not trained professionals, schooled
in drill and maneuver, but overwhelmingly volunteers with little military knowledge or
experience. (39)
The advent of these new technologies makes the average civilian more and more dangerous
while requiring less and less training. For muskets to be effective, extreme discipline and
organization was needed by companies of experienced men; the rifle could be effective as long
as a man could aimand pull the trigger before the enemy did the same. Then the further
development of the repeater allowed citizen-soldiers to fire dozens of rounds per minute
compared to the two or three an experienced rifleman could fire in the same time.
Total war is a concept that cannot be defined easily and must be viewed in a holistic
way, even if some perspectives are more important than others. As the great Prussian general
and military theorist Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz(1 June 1780 – 16 November 1831)
stated, “We must, therefore, be prepared to develop our concept of war as it ought to be
fought, not on the basis of its pure definition, but by leaving room for every sort of extraneous
matter”.11 The extraneous matters of warfare are the political, cultural, economic, social,
11 Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, On War. ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976), 580.
8. Wilson7
religious, gender, and legal ramifications, but the military is the core competency of war. War
does not exist without the military, and total war does not exist without the advancements of
military technology beginning in the 18th century.
9. Wilson8
Works Cited
Bell, David. The First Total War. New York, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2007.
Black, Jeremy. The Age of Total War 1860-1945. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Publishers, 2006.
Faust, Drew Gilpin. This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War. New York, New York:
Vintage Books, 2009.
Gottfried von Clausewitz, Carl Philipp. On War. ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), 580.
Royster, Charles. The Destructive War: William Tecumseh, Stonewall Jackson and the Americans. New York,
New York: VintageBooks, 1993.