Early Air Power Theorists: Major General Walter Wever
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Major General Walther Wever was an early theorist of air power in Germany. As the de facto chief of staff of the fledgling Luftwaffe, he advocated for establishing the air force as an independent branch of the military. Wever emphasized the importance of strategic bombing and prioritized developing long-range bombers to conduct strategic attacks that could influence the outcome of a war. However, Wever died in 1936 before his strategic vision for the Luftwaffe could be fully realized.
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This document proposes a contract between the GCMF and Holm Center to develop three Leader Development Seminars (LDS) on the evolution of air-ground cooperation using GCMF's Virtual Staff Ride (VSR) technology. The three LDS would cover: (1) the U.S. Army Air Service in World War I, (2) the Battle of Mons Pocket in 1944, and (3) Operation Anaconda in 2002. For each LDS, two historians/authors would be hired (three new, paid $60k each) and AETC would provide two active duty authors. Afterwards, AETC would be able to access the LDS through GCMF's Beyond Campus platform,
D Day Invasion
On June 6, 1944, over 160,000 Allied troops stormed five beaches along the Normandy coastline in Nazi-occupied northern France, marking the largest seaborne invasion in history. Codenamed Operation Overlord, the D-Day invasion involved airborne drops and naval bombardments to support the infantry soldiers landing on the heavily fortified beaches, where over 9,000 Allied troops were killed or wounded that day. However, the invasion succeeded in gaining a foothold for the Allies in continental Europe and helped turn the tide of World War II against Nazi Germany.
140820 adventures of sgt zercher and other crew members karen b
The reason for this paper is twofold: when writing the book ` Apeldoorn ' 40 - ' 45 the story behind the Apeldoorn’s war monuments' it appeared that on the monument at 's Heerenloo Midden-Nederland (formerly Groot Schuylenburg) the name of sergeant Zercher had been misspelled: Zurcher instead of Zercher. This mistake has been corrected. Moreover the story about Sergeant Robert W. Zercher and the crew he belonged to was unknown. In the ‘official’ source we consulted we found no more information than: `In spite of many investigations in America the names of these aviators could not be found’. Meanwhile further information has become available – especially internet has proven to be an invaluable asset - and that’s the reason why the story could be reconstructed.
02 Seitz (co-author) - Op Overlord and the Principles of War - Jun 02
This document summarizes Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of Normandy during World War II. It discusses the origins of the plan, including lessons learned from the failed Dieppe Raid. The COSSAC planning team selected the beaches of Normandy as the invasion site. Extensive planning took place over many months involving deception operations, troop movements, and strategic bombing. The overall objective was to establish a foothold in Normandy to launch further attacks toward Germany. Specific objectives included taking Cherbourg, St Lo, Caen, and expanding the beachhead. Airborne forces would land the night before to secure key objectives. Five divisions would storm five beaches on D-Day under an overall simple objective to breach German defenses.
The Evolution of Integrated Air Power (air-land integration), 1, by Professor...
The Evolution of Integrated Air Power (air-land integration), 1, by Professor...Professor Joel Hayward
The document discusses the evolution of air-land integration during World War I. It notes that while independent air operations made up a tiny portion of total air efforts during WWI, the war prompted novel ideas about using air power and removing battle from traditional war. After WWI, the concept of "independent" versus "integrated" air power emerged, where integrated referred to close air support of ground forces and control of the air.The Evolution of Integrated Air Power (air-land integration), 3, by Professor...
The Evolution of Integrated Air Power (air-land integration), 3, by Professor...Professor Joel Hayward
By the end of this lecture student will be able to understand that, in any return to conventional air-land integration, air forces will face:
Vastly improved precision capabilities
Greater intolerance of harm to civilian objects and infrastructure
Greater demands for ubiquity
Greater intolerance of fratricide
A return to conventionally contested airspace
The Evolution of Integrated Air Power (air-land integration), 2, by Professor...
The Evolution of Integrated Air Power (air-land integration), 2, by Professor...Professor Joel Hayward
By the end of this lecture students should be able to understand:
Different approaches to air-land integration between 1939-1953
The challenges of coordinating air power and land power
Some of the efforts made to overcome these challenges
The enduring importance of battle to strategic decisionCharles lutton the miracle of dunkirk reconsidered - journal of historical ...
This document provides a summary and review of Nicholas Harmon's book "Dunkirk: The Patriotic Myth" which challenges the widely held beliefs about the British evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940. The summary reveals that Harmon's research uncovered that:
1) Contrary to myth, the British were not betrayed by their allies but deliberately deceived the French and Belgians about their retreat.
2) The British were responsible for war crimes against German and civilian populations near Dunkirk.
3) The role of civilian boats in the evacuation has been exaggerated, with most troops being evacuated by Royal Navy vessels.
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air power
This document summarizes the evolution of air power from its origins in the late 19th century to modern times. It traces major developments such as the establishment of independent air forces during World War I, the rise of strategic bombing theories in the interwar period, the integration of air power into combined arms operations during World War II, and post-war innovations like the US AirLand Battle doctrine. Throughout history, air power concepts and employment have adapted to technological advances and lessons from conflicts. The document aims to provide context for how air power capabilities and roles have changed over time.
Evolution of air power
The document provides an overview of the evolution of air power from its origins in World War I through the modern era. It discusses early air power theorists like Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell and how their ideas influenced development. It then examines employment of air power in major conflicts like World War II, the Cold War, post-Cold War, and future potential uses. Key lessons discussed include the importance of air superiority, how technology and tactics have continually evolved air power capabilities, and the need for a balanced air strategy integrated with land and naval forces.
The great duality and the future of the army
Doctrine is an army’s game plan. Doctrine not only tells an army how to fight but it communicates intent from the institutional Army to the fighting forces. The progression that leads to doctrine stretches across a temporal “reverse highway” that begins well into the future with a vision of how future wars will be fought. At some point along the highway visioning solidifies into warfighting concepts. All too often, the concept phase of this journey is where dead ends and misleading road signs appear. Visioning is cheap and ephemeral. Concepts, on the other hand, tend to ossify ideas that eventually turn into opinions. Opinions, even false ones, are defended by those whose influences are at stake. Opinions lead to investments that launch programs. Eventually the highway ends at the doctrinal present as organizations and weapons emerge to provide the tools and formations to fight wars
Military History
This document provides a summary of major military events from World War I to the Vietnam War. It discusses the key battles, leaders, and turning points of both World Wars including trench warfare and chemical weapons used in WWI and Hitler's rise to power in Germany preceding WWII. For Vietnam, it outlines the US involvement from 1945 to 1973, key terminology used, the impact of the 1968 Tet Offensive, America's use of napalm and Agent Orange, and several major battles and operations throughout the war.
2015 anti access area denial
The document discusses China's development of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities designed to disrupt U.S. power projection in the western Pacific. It analyzes the operational implications of Chinese A2/AD, including ballistic missiles threatening air bases, anti-ship missiles restricting carriers, and integrated air defenses challenging air superiority. It argues the U.S. must address any imbalance between the military objective to defend Taiwan and its ability to achieve that objective against China's A2/AD systems, such as by developing joint concepts like Air-Sea Battle to ensure freedom of movement in contested areas.
Shared Challenges Unique Solutions. Russia & France in the Great War and After
The document compares how France and Russia handled the challenges of World War I and why only France survived after the war ended. Both countries did not expect a long war of attrition, but France adapted its strategy over time under competent leadership while Russia failed to modernize. The French army fought for national honor and to erase the disgrace of 1870, while Russian soldiers lacked motivation and faced poor conditions, incompetent officers, and a weak command structure. Ultimately, France survived because its army had reason to fight and hope of success, unlike Russia where soldiers merely fought without purpose for a cause they no longer believed in.
The Greatest Generation
The document is a collection of artwork depicting various scenes from World War 2 aviation. It includes paintings showing dogfights between Allied and Axis planes over places like Germany, the English Channel, North Africa and the Pacific. The paintings portray famous pilots and battles like the Dambusters raid and the shooting down of Admiral Yamamoto.
Awesome aviation art_ww2
The document is a collection of artwork depicting various scenes from World War 2 aviation. It includes paintings showing dogfights between Allied and Axis planes over places like Germany, the English Channel, North Africa and the Pacific. The paintings portray famous pilots and battles like the Dambusters raid and the shooting down of Admiral Yamamoto.
The Bunker Newbury a History
The document provides a history of Greenham Common airbase in the UK from World War 2 through the Cold War. It describes how the site was originally constructed as an RAF base in 1941-1947 during WW2. It then outlines how the base was expanded in the early 1950s during the Cold War to host US Strategic Air Command bombers equipped with nuclear weapons through the 1960s. The final section discusses the local opposition to plans to reactivate the base in the late 1970s and its closure in the early 1990s.
WWII Part II Powerpoint 2-Updated
This document provides an overview of key events and battles in World War 2, including intelligence efforts, naval battles in the Atlantic, major land battles on the Eastern Front between German and Soviet forces, the Allied invasion of Europe on D-Day, and other major turning points that led to the defeat of Nazi Germany. It features images, maps, and brief explanations of strategic decisions and outcomes of major military engagements during the war.
What's hot (20)
140820 adventures of sgt zercher and other crew members karen b
140820 adventures of sgt zercher and other crew members karen b
02 Seitz (co-author) - Op Overlord and the Principles of War - Jun 02
02 Seitz (co-author) - Op Overlord and the Principles of War - Jun 02
The Evolution of Integrated Air Power (air-land integration), 1, by Professor...
The Evolution of Integrated Air Power (air-land integration), 1, by Professor...
The Evolution of Integrated Air Power (air-land integration), 3, by Professor...
The Evolution of Integrated Air Power (air-land integration), 3, by Professor...
The Evolution of Integrated Air Power (air-land integration), 2, by Professor...
The Evolution of Integrated Air Power (air-land integration), 2, by Professor...
Charles lutton the miracle of dunkirk reconsidered - journal of historical ...
Charles lutton the miracle of dunkirk reconsidered - journal of historical ...
Changes in Military Affairs: Revolution or Evolution?
Changes in Military Affairs: Revolution or Evolution?
Shared Challenges Unique Solutions. Russia & France in the Great War and After
Shared Challenges Unique Solutions. Russia & France in the Great War and After
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- 1. EARLY AIR POWER THEORISTS by S Q N L D R W A S H I R A S A K P O O S I T
- 2. MAJOR GENERAL WALTHER WEVER L U F T W A F F E
- 3. AIM BACKGROUND AIRPOWER IMPORTANCE STRATEGIES & DOCTRINE
- 4. MAJGEN WALTHER WEVER WW I Army Officer Early Hitler Devotee First Flight Age 46
- 5. LUFTWAFFE T h e E a r l y D a y s
- 6. LUFTWAFFE T h e E a r l y D a y s HERMAN GOERING Air Minister / Commander In Chief INDEPENDENT SERVICE ARM 1933 WEVER, DEFACTO CHIEF OF STAFF LUFTWAFFE GENERAL STAFF 1936
- 9. HERMAN WALTHER ERHARD GOERING WEVER MILCH
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- 12. DOCTRINE & STRATEGIES DR ROBERT KNAUSS REPORT Borrowed from Douhet WEVER Strategic Bomber High Priority
- 13. DOCTRINE & STRATEGIES DR ROBERT KNAUSS REPORT Borrowed from Douhet WEVER Strategic Bomber High Priority Aircraft Industry Lacked Capacity
- 14. DIELUFTKRIEGFUHRUNG(1935) Conduct Of The Air War LUFTWAFFE Complement Other Services National Strategy Will Determine Battle Form DOCTRINE & STRATEGIES
- 15. CRITICAL TASKS Air Superiority Army / Naval Support Strategic Attack Interdiction
- 16. STRATEGIC ATTACK Quickly Affect War’s Course Army / Naval Preparations Stalemate Economic Destruction Needed
- 17. OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS Specialist Training Air War Academy Air Technical Academy Luftwaffe General Staff Formed 1 August 1936
- 18. CONCLUSION
- 19. QUESTIONS
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