A new model elucidating when and when not to have legislative and presidential term limits. Case studies include: Russia, Columbia and South Korea. The presentation concludes that term limits are most necessary for presidential offices in developing countries, but could even harmful when used in legislatures in developed countries.

1. Terms Limits: Why or Why Not? Stephane Amoyel, Alexander Buchvald, Jonathon Flegg, Hee Jae Kim, William Oman, and Russell Saltz

5. Paradigms: Who Benefits from Term Limits * Source: Kurfist 1996 Term-Limit Political Actors Progressivism Populism Republicanism Libertarianism Presidents and Governors Unlikely Somewhat Disadvantaged Unlikely Executive Agencies Likely Somewhat Unlikely Unlikely Legislative Staff Likely Somewhat Likely Unlikely State and Local Politicians Likely Disadvantaged Somewhat Disadvantaged Party Organizations Likely Somewhat Unlikely Unlikely Interest Groups Likely Likely Disadvantaged Somewhat Lobbyists Likely Somewhat Disadvantaged Somewhat Likely to Benefit from Term Limits Unlikely to Benefit from Term Limits Somewhat Likely to Benefit from Term Limits Likely to be Disadvantaged by Term Limits

16. If p<π, term limits maximize welfare How do Term Limits Affect Expected Welfare? Expected Payoff of the Electorate No Term Limits Term limits Second Round π*1+(1- π)*0=π (In the last round, implementing his preferred policy strictly dominates implementing the non-preferred policy since R+G>R) π*1+(1- π)*0=π (In the last round, implementing his preferred policy strictly dominates implementing the non-preferred policy since R+G>R) First Round p*1+(1-p)*0=p The politician implements the “popular” policy a in first round to be reelected (regardless whether policy a is his preferred policy) since 2R+G> R+G π*1+(1- π)*0=π (In the last round(which is also his first), implementing his preferred policy strictly dominates implementing the non-preferred policy since R+G>R) Total Expected Utility π + p 2 π

27. When Should We Have Term Limits? Term limits reduce barriers to entry and are most effective where electoral screening processes are ineffective. However, generally career politicians adapt to, rather than are limited by, term limits. Legislature Executive Developed Countries Lowest barriers from incumbency. Electoral screening is most elective. Low information asymmetry. Moderate barriers from state resources. Electoral screening is most effective. Low information asymmetry. Developing Countries Lowest barriers from incumbency. Electoral screening is least effective. High information asymmetry. Greatest barriers from state resources. Electoral screening is least effective. High information asymmetry. Term Limits ineffective or harmful Term limits most effective and desirable