The document analyzes the policy decisions of Al Gore and George W. Bush's campaigns during the 2000 Florida vote recount. It finds that both campaigns pursued manipulation but in different ways. Bush's campaign strictly used manipulation to attack Gore and achieve its goals. Gore's campaign took a multi-framework approach to manipulation, using efficiency and equity considerations to make defensive and expedient decisions, like requesting recounts in only four counties. The document concludes the campaigns showed two distinct strategies of manipulation focused on ultimately winning the presidency.
Dictatorships do not survive by repression alone. Rather, dictatorial rule is often explained as an ― authoritarian bargain by which citizens relinquish political rights for economic security. The applicability of the authoritarian bargain to decision-making in non-democratic states, however, has not been thoroughly examined. We conceptualize this bargain as a simple game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic transfers and political influence are simultaneously determined. Our model yields precise implications for the empirical patterns that are expected to exist. Tests of a system of equations with panel data comprising 80 non-democratic states between 1975 and 1999 confirm the predictions of the authoritarian-bargain thesis, with some variation across different categories of dictatorship.
1.. Islamic Rule and the Emancipation of the Poor and Pious
I estimate the impact of Islamic rule on secular education and labor market outcomes with a new and unique dataset of Turkish municipalities. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare elections where an Islamic party barely won or lost municipal mayor seats. The results show that Islamic rule has had a large positive effect on education, predominantly for women. This impact is not only larger when the opposing candidate is from a secular left-wing, instead of a right-wing party; it is also larger in poorer and more pious areas. The participation result extends to the labor market, with fewer women classified as housewives, a larger share of employed women receiving wages, and a shift in female employment towards higher-paying sectors. Part of the increased participation, especially in education, may come through investment from religious foundations, by providing facilities more tailored toward religious conservatives. Altogether, my findings stand in contrast to the stylized view that more Islamic in‡uence is invariably associated with adverse development outcomes, especially for women. One interpretation is that limits on religious expression, such as the headscarf ban in public institutions, raise barriers to entry for the poor and pious. In such environments, Islamic movements may have an advantage over secular alternatives.
2. Islam and Long-Run Development
I show new evidence on the long-run impact of Islam on economic development. Using the proximity to Mecca as an instrument for the Muslim share of a country's population, while holding geographic factors fixed, I show that Islam has had a negative long-run impact on income per capita. This result is robust to a host of geographic, demographic and historical factors, and the impact magnitude is around three times that of basic cross-sectional estimates. I also show evidence of the impact of Islam on religious influence in legal institutions and women's rights, two outcomes seen as closely associated with the presence of Islam. A larger Islamic influence has led to a larger religious influence in legal institutions and lower female participation in public institutions. But it has also had a positive impact on several measures of female health outcomes relative to men. These results stand in contrast to the view that Islam has invariably adverse consequences for all forms of women's living standards, and instead emphasizes the link between lower incomes and lower female participation in public institutions.
3. The Rise of China and the Natural Resource Curse in Africa
We produce a new empirical strategy to estimate the causal impact of selling oil to China on economic and political development, using an instrumental variables design based on China's economic rise and consequent demand for oil in interaction with the pre-existence of oil in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Lobbying, understood as all actions performed by or on behalf of interest
groups directed at influencing of the process of policy formation and implementation,
occurs in every political regime. The article examines whether the illiberal type of
democracy that exists in Hungary (2010–2014) exerts an influence on the effectiveness of lobbying control.
Illiberal democracy differs from liberal democracy with regard to five systemic core
principles, such as the rule of law, government control and accountability, the integrity
of political elites, media freedom and civil rights and protection of minorities. This
article shows that all of these systemic criteria constituting illiberal democracy were
met in Hungary between 2010–2014. Examination of the case of Hungary with regard
to lobbying control suggests that illiberal democracy had diminished the effectiveness
of lobbying control in this country.
Dictatorships do not survive by repression alone. Rather, dictatorial rule is often explained as an ― authoritarian bargain by which citizens relinquish political rights for economic security. The applicability of the authoritarian bargain to decision-making in non-democratic states, however, has not been thoroughly examined. We conceptualize this bargain as a simple game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic transfers and political influence are simultaneously determined. Our model yields precise implications for the empirical patterns that are expected to exist. Tests of a system of equations with panel data comprising 80 non-democratic states between 1975 and 1999 confirm the predictions of the authoritarian-bargain thesis, with some variation across different categories of dictatorship.
1.. Islamic Rule and the Emancipation of the Poor and Pious
I estimate the impact of Islamic rule on secular education and labor market outcomes with a new and unique dataset of Turkish municipalities. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare elections where an Islamic party barely won or lost municipal mayor seats. The results show that Islamic rule has had a large positive effect on education, predominantly for women. This impact is not only larger when the opposing candidate is from a secular left-wing, instead of a right-wing party; it is also larger in poorer and more pious areas. The participation result extends to the labor market, with fewer women classified as housewives, a larger share of employed women receiving wages, and a shift in female employment towards higher-paying sectors. Part of the increased participation, especially in education, may come through investment from religious foundations, by providing facilities more tailored toward religious conservatives. Altogether, my findings stand in contrast to the stylized view that more Islamic in‡uence is invariably associated with adverse development outcomes, especially for women. One interpretation is that limits on religious expression, such as the headscarf ban in public institutions, raise barriers to entry for the poor and pious. In such environments, Islamic movements may have an advantage over secular alternatives.
2. Islam and Long-Run Development
I show new evidence on the long-run impact of Islam on economic development. Using the proximity to Mecca as an instrument for the Muslim share of a country's population, while holding geographic factors fixed, I show that Islam has had a negative long-run impact on income per capita. This result is robust to a host of geographic, demographic and historical factors, and the impact magnitude is around three times that of basic cross-sectional estimates. I also show evidence of the impact of Islam on religious influence in legal institutions and women's rights, two outcomes seen as closely associated with the presence of Islam. A larger Islamic influence has led to a larger religious influence in legal institutions and lower female participation in public institutions. But it has also had a positive impact on several measures of female health outcomes relative to men. These results stand in contrast to the view that Islam has invariably adverse consequences for all forms of women's living standards, and instead emphasizes the link between lower incomes and lower female participation in public institutions.
3. The Rise of China and the Natural Resource Curse in Africa
We produce a new empirical strategy to estimate the causal impact of selling oil to China on economic and political development, using an instrumental variables design based on China's economic rise and consequent demand for oil in interaction with the pre-existence of oil in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Lobbying, understood as all actions performed by or on behalf of interest
groups directed at influencing of the process of policy formation and implementation,
occurs in every political regime. The article examines whether the illiberal type of
democracy that exists in Hungary (2010–2014) exerts an influence on the effectiveness of lobbying control.
Illiberal democracy differs from liberal democracy with regard to five systemic core
principles, such as the rule of law, government control and accountability, the integrity
of political elites, media freedom and civil rights and protection of minorities. This
article shows that all of these systemic criteria constituting illiberal democracy were
met in Hungary between 2010–2014. Examination of the case of Hungary with regard
to lobbying control suggests that illiberal democracy had diminished the effectiveness
of lobbying control in this country.
Human rights in developing countries and its relationship with country’s econ...AI Publications
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship of human rights and economic development in the developing countries. A quantitative method used in order to analyze data gathered by the researcher. The researcher used questionnaire in order to be able to analyze the current study. A random sampling method used, where almost all participants will have equal chances of being selected for the sample. The researcher gathered 161 questionnaires, however 12 questionnaires were invalid and 149 questionnaires were properly completed. The questionnaire structured in the form of multiple choice questions. The finding of this study showed that there is a strong and positive relationship between human right and economic development in developing countries, according the research hypothesis was found to be supported which stated that a developed economic in developing country will have a positive relationship with the protection of human rights.
In this paper I examine the development effects of military coups. Whereas previous economic literature has primarily viewed coups as a form of broader political instability, less research has focused on its development consequences independent of the factors making coups more likely. Moreover, previous research tends to group coups together regardless of whether they overthrew autocratic or democratically-elected leaders. I first show that coups overthrowing democratically elected leaders imply a very different kind of event than those overthrowing autocratic leaders. These differences relate to the implementation of authoritarian institutions following a coup in a democracy, which I discuss in several case studies. Second, I address the endogeneity of coups by comparing the growth consequences of failed and successful coup as well as matching and panel data methods, which yield similar results. Although coups taking place in already autocratic countries show imprecise and sometimes positive effects on economic growth, in democracies their effects are distinctly detrimental to growth. When overthrowing democratic leaders, coups not only fail to promote economic reforms or stop the occurrence of economic crises, but they also have substantial negative effects across a number of standard growth-related outcomes including health, education, and investment.
Read more: https://www.hhs.se/site
Does Islamic political control affect women's empowerment? Several countries have recently experienced Islamic parties coming to power through democratic elections. Due to strong support among religious conservatives, constituencies with Islamic rule often tend to exhibit poor women's rights. Whether this relationship reflects a causal or a spurious one has so far gone unexplored. I provide the first piece of evidence using a new and unique dataset of Turkish municipalities. In 1994, an Islamic party won multiple municipal mayor seats across the country. Using a regression discontinuity (RD) design, I compare municipalities where this Islamic party barely won or lost elections. Despite negative raw correlations, the RD results reveal that over a period of six years, Islamic rule increased female secular high school education. Corresponding effects for men are systematically smaller and less precise. In the longer run, the effect on female education remained persistent up to 17 years after and also reduced adolescent marriages. An analysis of long-run political effects of Islamic rule shows increased female political participation and an overall decrease in Islamic political preferences. The results are consistent with an explanation that emphasizes the Islamic party's effectiveness in
overcoming barriers to female entry for the poor and pious.
Leniency policies and asymmetric punishment are regarded as potentially powerful anticorruption
tools, also in the light of their success in busting price-fixing cartels. It has been
argued, however, that the introduction of these policies in China in 1997 has not helped
fighting corruption. Following up on this view, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party passed, in November 2015, a reform introducing heavier penalties, but also
restrictions to leniency. Properly designing and correctly evaluating these policies is difficult.
Corruption is only observed if detected, and an increase in convictions is consistent
with both reduced deterrence or improved detection. We map the evolution of the Chinese
anti-corruption legislation, collect data on corruption cases for the period 1986-2010, and
apply a new method to identify deterrence effects from changes in detected cases developed
for cartels by Miller (2009). We document a large and stable fall in corruption cases
starting immediately after the 1997 reform, consistent with a negative effect of the reform
on corruption detection, but under specific assumptions also with increased deterrence. To
resolve this ambiguity, we collect and analyze a random sample of case files from corruption
trials. Results point to a negative effect of the 1997 reform, linked to the increased leniency
also for bribe-takers cooperating after being denounced. This likely enhanced their ability
to retaliate against reporting bribe-givers – chilling detection through whistleblowing – as
predicted by theories on how these programs should (not) be designed.
SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COUNTRY CATEGORIZATION AND THE LOOPHOLES OF DEFINING DEMOCRACY: Freedom House
The aim of this study is three-fold: First, it aims to evaluate how Freedom House defines democracy and whether the critics make valid points regarding potential score implications on ‘different’ democratic structures. Second, the study will review the instrumental players who use the scores, and repercussions regarding aid, policy, trade, or investment for the country. And thirdly, the study will look into the impact of Freedom House scores; the actions a country takes as a result and whether there are positive measureable impacts that can substantiate the consequences of the scores.
We argue that the tilt towards donor interests over recipient needs in aid allocation and practices may be particularly strong in new partnerships. Using the natural experiment of Eastern transition we find that commercial and strategic concerns influenced both aid flows and entry in the first half of the 1990s, but much less so later on. We also find that fractionalization increased and that early aid to the region was particularly volatile, unpredictable and tied. Our results may explain why aid to Iraq and Afghanistan has had little development impact and serve as warning for Burma and Arab Spring regimes.
Dov Levin - Partisan electoral interventions by the great powers: Introducing...Davide J. Mancino
ABSTRACT: Recent studies indicate that partisan electoral interventions, a situation where a foreign power
tries to determine the election results in another country, can have significant effects on the election results in the targeted country as well as other important influences. Nevertheless, research
on this topic has been hindered by a lack of systematic data of electoral interventions. In this article, I introduce the Partisan Electoral Intervention by the Great Powers dataset (PEIG), which provides data on all such interventions by the US and the USSR/Russia between 1946 and 2000. After
describing the dataset construction process, I note some interesting patterns in the data, a few of
which stand in contrast to claims made about electoral interventions in the public sphere and give
an example of PEIG’s utility. I then describe some applications of PEIG for research on electoral
interventions in particular and for peace research in general.
Corruption Political Party System and Nigerian Democracy An Historical Analys...ijtsrd
Liberal democracy all over the world is a welcome phenomenon. In every modern society the game of politics is influenced tremendously by the elite class that projects the political culture which could make or mar democracy, as a result of the activities of the political parties. The adoption of western democracy is a mixed bag of blessing and catastrophes in the body politics of the country. Today, it is difficult to reconcile Nigerian democracy with that of the advanced democratic Countries. In Nigeria, politics is regarded as a “dirty game” which scares away the down trodden people. It has been noted that the level of socio economic development in the country is significantly related to the nature of politics in vogues. Political parties are primarily aimed at primitive accumulation of wealth. Where, “the end justifies the means” . The prevailing election rigging, thuggery, corruption, fear and intimidation by security agencies as well as hate speech in the campaigns of the politicians reflect value degeneration with the attendant instability in the country’s democracy. To this send, the paper examined political parties in Nigeria An historical Perspective from 1960 – 2019 looking at the roles of political parties as they affect the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. Three 3 theoretical frameworks were used in the study namely Social learning theory SLT , Social Disorganization theory SDT and Corruption Permissiveness theory CPT .The study noted that Nigeria’s political parties from 1960 2019 has witnessed some challenging situation like ethnicity, corruption, violence, military intervention, civil and electoral deficiencies. Based on the findings, the study recommended among others that registered political parties should not be vehicles for the articulation and implementation of ethnic, religious or regional projects and programmes and that they should remain national in scope, courage and orientation. Aristotle Isaac Jacobs | Tarabina Veronica Pamo | Abidde Kilegha Victoria "Corruption, Political Party System and Nigerian Democracy: An Historical Analysis from 1960 – 2019" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-5 | Issue-1 , December 2020, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd38079.pdf Paper URL : https://www.ijtsrd.com/humanities-and-the-arts/social-science/38079/corruption-political-party-system-and-nigerian-democracy-an-historical-analysis-from-1960-– -2019/aristotle-isaac-jacobs
Environmental Racism and Social Policy: Risk and Weight of History in the Uni...sebhancock
A comparative analysis of three social policy regimes and their effects on the incidence of environmental racism and environmental justice movements in those countries.
When are international organisations effective in international politicsAmougou Aristide Agbor
For international organisations to be effective, their leadership must be able to consolidate the trust of member states and secure sufficient resources from them to fulfil assigned mandates and objectives. As entities devoid of autonomous enforcement capabilities, international institutions are effective when they build credibility, strengthen appropriate agency relationships and avoid mission creep.
Human rights in developing countries and its relationship with country’s econ...AI Publications
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship of human rights and economic development in the developing countries. A quantitative method used in order to analyze data gathered by the researcher. The researcher used questionnaire in order to be able to analyze the current study. A random sampling method used, where almost all participants will have equal chances of being selected for the sample. The researcher gathered 161 questionnaires, however 12 questionnaires were invalid and 149 questionnaires were properly completed. The questionnaire structured in the form of multiple choice questions. The finding of this study showed that there is a strong and positive relationship between human right and economic development in developing countries, according the research hypothesis was found to be supported which stated that a developed economic in developing country will have a positive relationship with the protection of human rights.
In this paper I examine the development effects of military coups. Whereas previous economic literature has primarily viewed coups as a form of broader political instability, less research has focused on its development consequences independent of the factors making coups more likely. Moreover, previous research tends to group coups together regardless of whether they overthrew autocratic or democratically-elected leaders. I first show that coups overthrowing democratically elected leaders imply a very different kind of event than those overthrowing autocratic leaders. These differences relate to the implementation of authoritarian institutions following a coup in a democracy, which I discuss in several case studies. Second, I address the endogeneity of coups by comparing the growth consequences of failed and successful coup as well as matching and panel data methods, which yield similar results. Although coups taking place in already autocratic countries show imprecise and sometimes positive effects on economic growth, in democracies their effects are distinctly detrimental to growth. When overthrowing democratic leaders, coups not only fail to promote economic reforms or stop the occurrence of economic crises, but they also have substantial negative effects across a number of standard growth-related outcomes including health, education, and investment.
Read more: https://www.hhs.se/site
Does Islamic political control affect women's empowerment? Several countries have recently experienced Islamic parties coming to power through democratic elections. Due to strong support among religious conservatives, constituencies with Islamic rule often tend to exhibit poor women's rights. Whether this relationship reflects a causal or a spurious one has so far gone unexplored. I provide the first piece of evidence using a new and unique dataset of Turkish municipalities. In 1994, an Islamic party won multiple municipal mayor seats across the country. Using a regression discontinuity (RD) design, I compare municipalities where this Islamic party barely won or lost elections. Despite negative raw correlations, the RD results reveal that over a period of six years, Islamic rule increased female secular high school education. Corresponding effects for men are systematically smaller and less precise. In the longer run, the effect on female education remained persistent up to 17 years after and also reduced adolescent marriages. An analysis of long-run political effects of Islamic rule shows increased female political participation and an overall decrease in Islamic political preferences. The results are consistent with an explanation that emphasizes the Islamic party's effectiveness in
overcoming barriers to female entry for the poor and pious.
Leniency policies and asymmetric punishment are regarded as potentially powerful anticorruption
tools, also in the light of their success in busting price-fixing cartels. It has been
argued, however, that the introduction of these policies in China in 1997 has not helped
fighting corruption. Following up on this view, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party passed, in November 2015, a reform introducing heavier penalties, but also
restrictions to leniency. Properly designing and correctly evaluating these policies is difficult.
Corruption is only observed if detected, and an increase in convictions is consistent
with both reduced deterrence or improved detection. We map the evolution of the Chinese
anti-corruption legislation, collect data on corruption cases for the period 1986-2010, and
apply a new method to identify deterrence effects from changes in detected cases developed
for cartels by Miller (2009). We document a large and stable fall in corruption cases
starting immediately after the 1997 reform, consistent with a negative effect of the reform
on corruption detection, but under specific assumptions also with increased deterrence. To
resolve this ambiguity, we collect and analyze a random sample of case files from corruption
trials. Results point to a negative effect of the 1997 reform, linked to the increased leniency
also for bribe-takers cooperating after being denounced. This likely enhanced their ability
to retaliate against reporting bribe-givers – chilling detection through whistleblowing – as
predicted by theories on how these programs should (not) be designed.
SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF COUNTRY CATEGORIZATION AND THE LOOPHOLES OF DEFINING DEMOCRACY: Freedom House
The aim of this study is three-fold: First, it aims to evaluate how Freedom House defines democracy and whether the critics make valid points regarding potential score implications on ‘different’ democratic structures. Second, the study will review the instrumental players who use the scores, and repercussions regarding aid, policy, trade, or investment for the country. And thirdly, the study will look into the impact of Freedom House scores; the actions a country takes as a result and whether there are positive measureable impacts that can substantiate the consequences of the scores.
We argue that the tilt towards donor interests over recipient needs in aid allocation and practices may be particularly strong in new partnerships. Using the natural experiment of Eastern transition we find that commercial and strategic concerns influenced both aid flows and entry in the first half of the 1990s, but much less so later on. We also find that fractionalization increased and that early aid to the region was particularly volatile, unpredictable and tied. Our results may explain why aid to Iraq and Afghanistan has had little development impact and serve as warning for Burma and Arab Spring regimes.
Dov Levin - Partisan electoral interventions by the great powers: Introducing...Davide J. Mancino
ABSTRACT: Recent studies indicate that partisan electoral interventions, a situation where a foreign power
tries to determine the election results in another country, can have significant effects on the election results in the targeted country as well as other important influences. Nevertheless, research
on this topic has been hindered by a lack of systematic data of electoral interventions. In this article, I introduce the Partisan Electoral Intervention by the Great Powers dataset (PEIG), which provides data on all such interventions by the US and the USSR/Russia between 1946 and 2000. After
describing the dataset construction process, I note some interesting patterns in the data, a few of
which stand in contrast to claims made about electoral interventions in the public sphere and give
an example of PEIG’s utility. I then describe some applications of PEIG for research on electoral
interventions in particular and for peace research in general.
Corruption Political Party System and Nigerian Democracy An Historical Analys...ijtsrd
Liberal democracy all over the world is a welcome phenomenon. In every modern society the game of politics is influenced tremendously by the elite class that projects the political culture which could make or mar democracy, as a result of the activities of the political parties. The adoption of western democracy is a mixed bag of blessing and catastrophes in the body politics of the country. Today, it is difficult to reconcile Nigerian democracy with that of the advanced democratic Countries. In Nigeria, politics is regarded as a “dirty game” which scares away the down trodden people. It has been noted that the level of socio economic development in the country is significantly related to the nature of politics in vogues. Political parties are primarily aimed at primitive accumulation of wealth. Where, “the end justifies the means” . The prevailing election rigging, thuggery, corruption, fear and intimidation by security agencies as well as hate speech in the campaigns of the politicians reflect value degeneration with the attendant instability in the country’s democracy. To this send, the paper examined political parties in Nigeria An historical Perspective from 1960 – 2019 looking at the roles of political parties as they affect the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. Three 3 theoretical frameworks were used in the study namely Social learning theory SLT , Social Disorganization theory SDT and Corruption Permissiveness theory CPT .The study noted that Nigeria’s political parties from 1960 2019 has witnessed some challenging situation like ethnicity, corruption, violence, military intervention, civil and electoral deficiencies. Based on the findings, the study recommended among others that registered political parties should not be vehicles for the articulation and implementation of ethnic, religious or regional projects and programmes and that they should remain national in scope, courage and orientation. Aristotle Isaac Jacobs | Tarabina Veronica Pamo | Abidde Kilegha Victoria "Corruption, Political Party System and Nigerian Democracy: An Historical Analysis from 1960 – 2019" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-5 | Issue-1 , December 2020, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd38079.pdf Paper URL : https://www.ijtsrd.com/humanities-and-the-arts/social-science/38079/corruption-political-party-system-and-nigerian-democracy-an-historical-analysis-from-1960-– -2019/aristotle-isaac-jacobs
Environmental Racism and Social Policy: Risk and Weight of History in the Uni...sebhancock
A comparative analysis of three social policy regimes and their effects on the incidence of environmental racism and environmental justice movements in those countries.
When are international organisations effective in international politicsAmougou Aristide Agbor
For international organisations to be effective, their leadership must be able to consolidate the trust of member states and secure sufficient resources from them to fulfil assigned mandates and objectives. As entities devoid of autonomous enforcement capabilities, international institutions are effective when they build credibility, strengthen appropriate agency relationships and avoid mission creep.
Hochzeitsfotografie Infos & Tipps für BrautpaareDeCoSeo GmbH
Alles was Brautpaare über Hochzeitsfotos wissen müssen! Infos zu den Fotoshootings, Preis-Statistiken & Tipps zum Fotografenvertrag. Wir helfen Paaren dabei das richtige Shooting und den passenden Hochzeitsfotografen zu finden!
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BT Webinar: Unified Comms. What's in it for me?Sei Mani
BT & Sei Mani discuss the importance of creating a compelling value proposition for end users when deploying unified communications technologies. How do you answer the question: What's in it for me? We also describe how to design and deliver a communications campaign that gets users crawling over broken glass to use the technologies in their daily work .
Oligarchy rules democracy: Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Int...Sadanand Patwardhan
Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics – which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic Elite Domination, and two types of interest group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism – offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented. A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recently it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. This paper reports on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues. Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism. The study is by Martin Gilens, Princeton University and Benjamin I. Page, Northwestern University.
WHYPARTIESFORM 45 equilibrium the ordinary circumstance, t.docxgauthierleppington
WHYPARTIESFORM 45
equilibrium the ordinary circumstance, there would be no incentive
to form a party based on the social choice problem. But even when an
equilibrium exists, the political party need not make its members
worse off than without the parry; they can always choose to take no
"partisan" actions. With PIEs generally considered impossible, there
is a strong incentive for parties to form, precisely because of the likeli-
1altves hood of disequilibrium. Riker's dismal conclusion turns out to provide
a strong case for the formation of political parties.
The new institutionalism (e.g., Shepsle 1979) emerged in response
to the ordinary absence of (pure) voting equilibria. Two points
discussed below and in later chapters are also relevant here. First,
':ss transactions many different institutional arrangements can be sufficient to yield
Wus making C (structure-induced) equilibria, such as committee systems, agenda
designs, and even separated powers. None of these are necessary—
l)ority coalition like parties, all yield possibility results. Second, partisan institutions
cs" of C. Sup- are one of those sets of sufficient institutions.
• id B find more
sa. As Axelrod
nal conflict of .i
•nnected, hay-
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND ELECTORAL
coalition must
MOBILIZATION
A-B-D, in- The Problem of Collective Action in Elections
2-C or B-C-D,
cong C's ideal The Federalist and Jeffersonian Republican parties began with the
government as a means of solving a social choice problem (see chap.
ihere is an equi- 3). Such parties-in-government may also become electoral parties.
ijine we should The most obvious motivation lies with the minority. The examples
ci preferences, above demonstrated incentives for some majority to form a party. If
Incentives to this happens, some or all of those excluded might form a parry in reac-
he disequilib- tion, seeking to become the legislative majority. Failing to reach major-
) has formed ity size, the minority would naturally turn to the public, seeking to
2.1 sometime elect more of its members. That is essentially what the Jeffersonians
agree on C's did when facing a Hamiltonian majority. Later parties, notably the
n on this pol- Jacksonian Democratic party, formed more directly for electoral pur-
e
would have poses (see chap. 4). The question for this section and the next, then,
t Won at least is what set of incentives candidates for elective office might have that
Presumably would lead them to form or join a political party. In this section we
at of prefer- examine incentives that arise from attempting to mobilize the elector-
ate. Mobilizing the electorate by definition is getting the public to turn
that PIEs are out to vote for, or otherwise support, a candidate. Examining the logic
Indeed, were of voting among citizens introduces the second form in which prob-
46 Political Parties and Democracy
lems of collective action are studied, and in this case turno.
273
PRODUCING DEMOCRATIC VIBRANCY^
K. Sabeel Rahman*
INTRODUCTION
In the years since Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,1 the contours of the debates over the First
Amendment,2 free speech, and democracy are by now familiar. On
the one hand, there is the anxiety that economic wealth—whether
from corporations or wealthy individuals—could effectively
purchase political influence through the mechanism of unregulated
campaign contributions and expenditures or independent
expenditures on electoral advocacy. On the other hand, there are
concerns about attempts to regulate such campaign contributions
^ This short comment is adapted from remarks presented at the Brooklyn Law
School Symposium, “Free Speech Under Fire: The Future of the First
Amendment,” February 2016. I am grateful to Joel Gora, Nick Allard, Rick
Hasen, and Bradley Smith for our excellent panel discussion on Money and
Speech. Thanks also to Heath Brown, Jacob Hacker, and the Scholars Strategy
Network for a parallel discussion on “Purchasing Power” and the future of
research in money and politics, held at the Ford Foundation in June 2016.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School;
PhD, Harvard University Department of Government; M.Sc Economics for
Development, University of Oxford; M.St Sociolegal Studies, University of
Oxford; A.B. Harvard University.
1 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2 U.S. Const. amend. I. Compare Bradley A. Smith, Citizens United gives
freedom back to the people, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/01/16/citizens-united-gives-freedom-
of-speech-back-to-the-people/ (arguing that the holding in Citizens United is
consistent with the principles of the First Amendment), with Liz Kennedy, 10
Ways Citizens United Endangers Democracy, DEMOS (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://www.demos.org/publication/10-ways-citizens-united-endangers-
democracy (arguing that Citizens United has been detrimental to the democratic
process, let alone the First Amendment).
274 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
and expenditures as governmental interference with the freedom of
speech. I share in both these concerns—that economic wealth
generates disparities in political power and influence, and that we
need a variety of legal protections and structures to secure the
political freedoms that make democracy possible. But in this short
essay, I suggest that we need to broaden how we conceptualize the
elements of democratic vibrancy and responsiveness, while
recognizing that this changewillhave important implications for the
legal andpolicydebates arounddemocracy reform. In short, I argue
that avibrant democracy isnot just one that protects free speechand
electoral accountability; it is also one that empowers a wide range
anddiversity of constituencies to not only consumespeech, but also
to produce it, to be fully empowered political actors with the
opportunity to shape and participate in the politic.
273
PRODUCING DEMOCRATIC VIBRANCY^
K. Sabeel Rahman*
INTRODUCTION
In the years since Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,1 the contours of the debates over the First
Amendment,2 free speech, and democracy are by now familiar. On
the one hand, there is the anxiety that economic wealth—whether
from corporations or wealthy individuals—could effectively
purchase political influence through the mechanism of unregulated
campaign contributions and expenditures or independent
expenditures on electoral advocacy. On the other hand, there are
concerns about attempts to regulate such campaign contributions
^ This short comment is adapted from remarks presented at the Brooklyn Law
School Symposium, “Free Speech Under Fire: The Future of the First
Amendment,” February 2016. I am grateful to Joel Gora, Nick Allard, Rick
Hasen, and Bradley Smith for our excellent panel discussion on Money and
Speech. Thanks also to Heath Brown, Jacob Hacker, and the Scholars Strategy
Network for a parallel discussion on “Purchasing Power” and the future of
research in money and politics, held at the Ford Foundation in June 2016.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School;
PhD, Harvard University Department of Government; M.Sc Economics for
Development, University of Oxford; M.St Sociolegal Studies, University of
Oxford; A.B. Harvard University.
1 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
2 U.S. Const. amend. I. Compare Bradley A. Smith, Citizens United gives
freedom back to the people, REUTERS (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/01/16/citizens-united-gives-freedom-
of-speech-back-to-the-people/ (arguing that the holding in Citizens United is
consistent with the principles of the First Amendment), with Liz Kennedy, 10
Ways Citizens United Endangers Democracy, DEMOS (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://www.demos.org/publication/10-ways-citizens-united-endangers-
democracy (arguing that Citizens United has been detrimental to the democratic
process, let alone the First Amendment).
274 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
and expenditures as governmental interference with the freedom of
speech. I share in both these concerns—that economic wealth
generates disparities in political power and influence, and that we
need a variety of legal protections and structures to secure the
political freedoms that make democracy possible. But in this short
essay, I suggest that we need to broaden how we conceptualize the
elements of democratic vibrancy and responsiveness, while
recognizing that this changewillhave important implications for the
legal andpolicydebates arounddemocracy reform. In short, I argue
that avibrant democracy isnot just one that protects free speechand
electoral accountability; it is also one that empowers a wide range
anddiversity of constituencies to not only consumespeech, but also
to produce it, to be fully empowered political actors with the
opportunity to shape and participate in the politic ...
Public Choice. Political economic digest series - 5 Akash Shrestha
In this series we’ll be discussing about Public Choice. Public Choice Theory is directed toward the study of politics based on ecomonic principles. We generally, tend to think that politicians and government officials are benevolent “public servants” who faithfully carry out the “will of the people.” In tending to the public’s business, voters, politicians, and policymakers are supposed somehow to rise above their own self-interests. However it is not true at all.
1. 720133896 PLCY 340
Case Study Paper: Statesman or Sap? Al Gore in Florida in the 2000 election
The 2000 Presidential election ended with the controversial decision of recounting the votes in
the state of Florida. Such an unprecedented conclusion to the long electoral season insured that
both political campaigns would carry out carefully designed courses of policy action to
accomplish the objective of winning the presidency. However, a significant distinction between
the two political campaign strategies emerged. While the manipulation framework was utilized
in both political campaigns, Al Gore sought to incorporate multiple moralistic frameworks in his
manipulative political agenda, particularly efficiency and equity, whereas George W. Bush
pursed a solely manipulative political approach. To detail these different utilizations of
manipulation, this paper will organize around presenting the particular issues of interest,
explaining the relevant frameworks, and applying those frameworks to the case’s issue itself.
Issue: The issue of interest in this case study is regarding the policy decisions taken by the Gore
and Bush campaign groups during voter recounting processes in the state of Florida.
This issue came into significance when Gore pursued manual recounts in only four of Florida’s
total 67 counties. While this policy option lacked assertiveness, opposing this was the Bush
campaign’s “willingness to play hardball” (Kiron, 2000, p. 188). The Bush campaign filed a
lawsuit against Gore, asserting Gore violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection
section, by favoring specific voters, from choosing a recount of only four counties. Bush’s
allegations severely “undermined the public support that Gore truly wanted to count every vote”
(Kiron, 2000, p. 185), when instead the Gore campaign believed its decision was doing a service
to the state by not requesting a recount of all counties. This political confrontation shaped the
way the Bush and Gore campaigns approached the remaining recounting process.
1
2. The recount process of absentee ballots represented the second major factor influencing the Bush
and Gore campaign policy decisions. The Republican Party’s handling of absentee ballots in
Florida’s Seminole and Martin counties, both favoring the Republican Party (Kiron, 2000, pg.
186) was extremely disputed. In Seminole County, the Republican Party members added missing
voter identification numbers to absentee ballot applications after such numbers were not present.
In Martin County, Republican Party members returned absentee ballot applications to voters to
add the identification numbers, later given back in their corrected form. These added absentee
ballots represented 7,500 additional votes in Bush’s favor. As Kiron notes, the Republican Party
stressed ballot compliancy in counties considered as Democratic strongholds, however in
counties supporting of their own party, ballots are counted as a way “to respect the intent of the
voter” (Kiron, 2000, pg. 186). More noteworthy, Gore did not respond to this ballot exploitation
by the Republican Party, “staying neutral” (Kiron, 2000, pg 186), feeling it was more important
to respect the notion of “counting all the votes.” These ideologies persisted regarding oversee
absentee ballots. Even with obvious electoral tampering that had taken place through Bush’s
political campaign, Gore, while “well aware of the tactics,” ”choose to ignore advice from
several quarters to challenge overseas military ballots on the grounds that Bush had benefited
from unequal treatment” (Kiron, 200, pg. 187), and did not pursue action against Bush.
The issue seen through these policy decisions is regarding why Gore and Bush felt the need to
act out in the manner that each candidate did. What provided both candidates the impetus to take
such policy options? Specific frameworks will be applied to the issue of interest above,
specifically the political actions each campaign took. This will allow for a greater understanding
and appreciation for this significant period in United States political discourse.
2
3. Rule: In this case study, the specific frameworks that are most applicable are manipulation,
efficiency, and equity. The manipulation framework, regarding personal values and the
policymaker, is most relevant amongst the three frameworks presented. Manipulation entails it is
acceptable for individuals in positions of political and social importance to utilize unethical
means and decisions, so long as these are justified by a positive result, and the policymaker holds
a sense of guilt in carrying out the action. The foundation of the manipulation framework is
established through Machiavelli’s work titled, “How a Prince Should Keep his Word.”
Machiavelli argues, “princes who have accomplished great deeds are those who have cared little
for keeping their promises and who have known how to manipulate the minds of men by
shrewdness.”1
Manipulation is used for when the “ends to justify the means,” (Bondanella and
Musa, 1979, pg. 135). Machiavelli states that “a wise ruler should not keep his word when such
an observance of faith would to be to his disadvantage,” (Bondanella and Musa, 1979, pg. 134)
giving rise to the idea that individuals of power should not be held to the same ethical standard as
normal individuals. Building upon this idea, Walzer, through his work “Political Action: The
Problem of Dirty Hands,” argues that the manipulation framework is commonplace in the realm
of political action2
. Manipulation for Walzer is in all political life, because the actions required
by public officials are much different to those in everyday settings. Walzer states that using
manipulation in politics “is a central feature of political life that it arises not merely as an
occasional crisis…but systematically” (Cohen, Nagel, Scanlon, 1974, pg. 66). Walzer notes that
“no one succeeds in politics without getting his hands dirty,” (Cohen, Nagel, & Scanlon, 1974,
pg. 66) giving credence to the belief that manipulation is an absolute necessary if an individual is
going to be successful as a politician. Getting hands dirty, through means of manipulation for
1
Bondanella, P., & Musa, M. (Eds.). (1979). The Portable Machiavelli. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
2
Cohen, M., & Nagel, T., & Scanlon, T. (Eds.). (1974). War and Moral Responsibility: A Philosophy and Public Affairs
reader. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press
3
4. example, is easy based on the nature of politics – because “politicians claim to act for others but
also themselves and they rule over others as well” (Cohen, Nagel, Scanlon, 1974, pg. 76).
Essentially, the manipulation framework involves the political actor going against his or her
private morality for the goal of achieving a greater public good.
The second relevant framework, efficiency, evaluates the policy option from the potential,
associated benefits and costs. This calculation is achieved through a cost-benefit analysis,
whereby alternative projects, identifying relevant stakeholders, listing and operationalizing
impacts, have to occur for the efficiency framework to be achieved. Efficiency involves utilizing
the utilitarianism rights framework, and imposes assumptions to make the policy identifiable,
namely through monetizing the benefits and cost of a proposed policy. As Rhoads notes, the
efficiency framework is useful especially in governmental and political scenarios, particularly
because costs are simple to calculate, and the cost benefit analysis allows policymakers to
consider all relevant constituents.3
However, the ability to calculate benefits is more difficult, as
it involves making estimates based on future expectations. In addition, using the efficiency
framework can lead to subjective or preferential estimates regarding the potential benefit or cost
of a policy option as well (Rhoads, S.E., 1985, pg. 130). Along with potential bias, and difficulty
in calculating specific policy benefits, efficiency often leaves out discussions of equity and does
a poor job at explaining certain costs or benefits, such as time, reduced illness, improved
environmental conditions (Rhoads, 1985, pg. 131), known as ultimate goods. Overall, the
efficiency framework utilizes the most quantifiable assessment of a policy option through the
utilitarian lens of using potential costs and benefits.
3
Rhoads, S. E. (1985). The Economist’s View of the World: Government, Markets, and Public Policy. Cambridge,
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
4
5. The final relevant framework is equity, specifically John Rawls’s first principle regarding the
theory of justice as fairness. Equity deals with the distribution of primary goods through
governmental sources. To achieve this distribution one must enter the original position, which
involves individuals in the position “of free and equal persons who jointly agree upon and
commit themselves to principles of social and political justice.” 4
To reach the original position,
individuals must act having no knowledge of their personal characteristics or social position,
known as the veil of ignorance. Once the veil of ignorance is established, then Rawls’s first
principle of justice as fairness is achieved. This first principle framework of equity states, “each
person is the have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible
with a similar scheme of liberties for others” (Rawls, 1999, pg. 53). By basic liberties, Rawls is
referring to political liberty, such as the right to vote, and freedom of speech and assembly
(Rawls, 1999, pg. 53). Individuals should have access to these basic liberties and primary goods.
Overall, Rawls’s first principle framework of justice as fairness ensures that all individuals have
an equally protected and respected right, obligated to be recognized by both society at large and
the government, to the most basic set of social liberties and avenues of self autonomy.
These three detailed frameworks, manipulation, efficiency, and equity, will now explain the
policy decisions made by both Bush and Gore presidential campaigns during the Florida vote
recounting process.
Analysis: The political actions taken by the Bush and Gore campaigns provide an interesting
pattern that remained through the recounting process. Bush viewed this process as “an extension
of pre-election political campaign” whereas Gore took a more “high-minded approach” towards
the entire procedure (Kiron, 200, pg. 188). This difference in political ideology allowed the Bush
4
Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press.
5
6. and Gore campaigns to “carry out a distinctive strategies of manipulation” (Kiron, 2000, pg.
189). The use of the manipulation in the Bush campaign was much more influential compared to
the political campaign run by Gore. Bush’s aggressive campaign strategies were prime examples
of Walzer’s theory of manipulation, as his campaign acted in its own interests and agenda. The
manipulation framework states that political agents use manipulation in order to achieve a
greater overall good – in this case, winning the presidency. The Bush campaign filled legal cases
against the Gore campaign, objecting the four country manual recount, yet decided against a
statewide recount of Florida, completely aware that Gore would be the electorate winner if such
a recount were to take place – a prime example of being unethical for political success.
Moreover, through the federal cases filed, Bush’s campaign illustrated Gore as refusing to count
every vote, manipulating public opinion of Gore, when Gore really was pursing an efficient
political solution. In addition, the Bush campaign’s manipulative practice of adding voter
identification numbers to absentee ballot applications that supported the Republican Party, and
then claiming that these ballots were completely valid was questionable. These votes helped
Bush carried the state of Florida, but their legitimacy was without any doubt lacking. Regarding
the counting of absentee ballots, the Bush campaign advocated for lenient standards for
processing military oversea ballots while also demanding that regular absentee ballots, especially
those to favor Gore, be held to much higher standards of scrutiny. This was done through
claiming military oversea ballots were marked in the United States, which was clearly false, and
then producing a 52-page document focusing on detecting invalid civilian ballots. Bush
explicitly manipulated the entire Florida electorate process with the goal of using manipulation
to attack, as Kiron notes, “to induce others to do your bidding” (Kiron, 2000, pg. 160).
6
7. Unlike the Bush campaign, Gore took a multi-framework approach to manipulation, utilizing the
efficiency and equity frameworks, while also basing manipulation on deception. It becomes clear
that the Gore campaign was not nearly as manipulative as Bush’s political actions. Manipulation
in Gore’s campaign strategy was not used as an offensive means, rather through the defensive
means of deception, as Gore intended to deflect from others from interfering with his plans
(Kiron, 2000, pg, 160). Gore realized that he needed to take action, based on his responsibilities
to his close political allies, the Democratic Party, and the country in general. His manipulative
act of requesting that four counties be recounted, out of a possible 67 counties, was a politically
influenced decision, in part because the four counties selected were in Democratic favoring
territories, however; deception was involved in that Gore actually used the ethical framework of
efficiency in making his decision. Gore’s supporters likely thought the campaign was making a
sound strategic decision to count democratic favoring areas, when in reality the framework of
efficiency was the essential framework explaining the decision. Gore wanted “to expedite a
resolution to the election process and protect the country from a protracted battle over the
presidency” while feeling “reluctant to file 67 different lawsuits and appear litigious.” Gore
weighted out the potential benefits and costs of the various policy options available, and found
that unnecessarily prolonging the election was going to do more harm to his political future than
good. In addition, the inactivity that Gore showed in contesting the dubious absentee ballot
practices of the Bush campaign, seemed as a manipulative act based on the premise public
opinion would share Gore’s sentiment of the recounting process as merely a “adjudicative
procedure” (Kiron, 2000, pg. 188). Much of this decision was based on the equity framework,
through Gore’s campaign wanting to “focus on the message – count all the votes” (Kiron, 2000,
pg. 184). Gore wanted to maintain this framework of equity. However, the equity framework that
7
8. Gore employed in his manipulation did not extend to the point where he was perceived litigious
or controversial – he still wanted to maintain the efficiency framework at the same time, for
example by only requesting a manual recount in four counties. Gore’s campaign can be seen as
relying on various ethical views, particularly efficiency and equity, shaping his distinct strategy
of manipulation compared to that of the Bush campaign.
Conclusion: The 2000 vote recounting process in the state of Florida detailed two distinct
campaign strategies aimed towards the ultimate political goal – winning the presidency.
Manipulation determined how each candidate’s campaign planned approach developed
throughout the recounting process. However, as the policy actions indicated, both the Bush and
Gore campaigns sought to use their own version of manipulation. Gore’s campaign utilized
multiple ethical frameworks, namely efficiency and equity, as a means of achieving a
manipulative and deceptive political discourse. Bush’s campaign relied strictly on manipulation
to achieve the campaign’s policy goal. These differing approaches to manipulation show how
such a common phenomenon in politics can be much more distinct and unusual than expected.
8