This study investigates the sinking of the Titanic from the theory of Brittle Fracture and Engineering Failures. This study offers a subjectivist perspective of mental inertia to understand the Titanic Disaster. Specifically, this study argue that the fall of the Titanic was mainly due to Brittle Fracture of Rivets and the Hull Steel. Metallurgical and Mechanical Analysis were performed on steel and rivet samples recovered from the wreck of the RMS Titanic. It is found that the steel possessed a ductile-to-brittle transition temperature that was very high with respect to the service temperature, making the material very brittle at ice-water temperatures. This had been attributed to both chemical and microstructural factors. It is also been found that the wrought iron rivets used in the construction of Titanic contained an elevated amount of incorporated slag, and that the orientation of the slag within the rivets may hold an explanation for how the ship accumulated damage during its encounter with the iceberg. Keywords- Brittle fracture, Rivets, Hull Steel, Metallurgical Failure, Titanic Disaster.

1. 1
Chapter 1 Introduction
Whenever a force is applied to an object, that object deforms. That seems pretty
obvious since we’ve all seen the process in action. However, that deformation also occurs
on microscopic or even atomic levels that we can’t see and, from an engineering
perspective, these “invisible” changes are extremely significant. If the object returns, or
“springs back”, to its original shape when the force is removed, the deformation is elastic.
If the deformation remains and is permanent when the force is removed, the deformation is
plastic. Fractures that plastically deform – bend, twist, stretch, etc, - are classified as
ductile fractures. Fractures that don’t exhibit plastic deformation – often the two halves
can be fit back together like puzzle pieces – are classified as brittle fractures.
“Brittle” brings to mind materials that have little or no flexibility or strength and
fracture easily. These characteristics, however, are more accurately described as
embrittlement, a subtle but important difference. Embrittlement in metals results from
defects or degradation that occur in production or in service such as defective heat
treatment, hydrogen absorption, and exposure to specific chemical environments or molten
metals. Brittleness implies lack of ductility. A material is said to be brittle when it cannot
be drawn out by tension to smaller section. In a brittle material, failure takes place under
load without significant deformation. Brittle fracture takes place without warning and the
property is generally highly undesirable.
Examples of brittle materials are-
1) Cast iron
2) High carbon steel
3) Concrete
4) Stone
5) Glass
6) Ceramic materials
It is common at high strain rates and low temperatures. Stages of brittle fracture are-
I. Plastic deformation concentrates dislocation along slip planes.
II. Micro-cracks nucleate where dislocations are blocked.
III. Cracks propagates to fracture.

2. 2
Crack may propagate through grains (Trans granular) or along grain boundaries
(inter granular). Fractography [1] is an active research area and has benefited from a
closely related interest in quantitative assessment of load carrying capability as predicted
by fracture mechanics (and vice versa). The coupling probably first became obvious when
Griffith's model for brittle fracture was applied to the study of cleavage fracture in metallic
materials in 1954. It was then realized that cleavage fracture in crystalline materials could
not be based simply on a normal stress criterion.
Perhaps most importantly, the question of whether a fracture is ductile or brittle is
almost always addressed in a failure analysis. Ductile and brittle are terms often used to
describe the amount of macro-scale plastic deformation that precedes fracture. The
presence of brittle fracture is a concern, because catastrophic brittle fracture occurs due to
the elastic stress that is present and usually propagates at high speed, sometimes with little
associated absorbed energy. Fracture occurring in a brittle manner cannot be anticipated by
the onset of prior macro-scale visible permanent distortion to cause shut down of operating
equipment, nor can it be arrested by a removal of the load except for very special
circumstances.
It must be pointed out, however, that the terms ductile and brittle also can be and
are applied to fracture on a microscopic level. At the macro-scale, ductile fracture by the
micro-scale ductile process of micro-void formation and coalescence is characterized by
plastic deformation and expenditure of considerable energy, while micro-scale brittle
Figure 1.1 Ductile Fracture [1].

3. 3
fractures by cleavage are characterized by rapid crack propagation with less expenditure of
energy than with ductile fractures and without macro-scale evidence of plastic deformation.
The point is that the terms ductile and brittle are used to describe both appearance (macro-
scale behaviour) and mechanism (micro-scale behaviour). The macro scale view of
ductility is neither more nor less correct than the micro-scale definition for the fracture
mechanism.
The specific meaning of ductile and brittle may carry different connotations depending
on background, context, and perspective of the reader. It is therefore important to clearly
identify whether a ductile or brittle fracture is being described in terms of macro-scale
appearance or micro-scale mechanisms. It is also important to note that there is no
universally accepted dividing line for macro-scale ductile and brittle behaviour in terms of
strain at fracture nor in terms of energy absorption. For example, large fracture strain is
desirable for forming operations, and material selection may be based on the relative
ductility observed during tensile testing. Materials that do not show obvious necking in a
tensile test are sometimes described as brittle, but that is not a generally accepted or valid
meaning of the term. For example, the absence of obvious necking may be due to the
geometry of the specimen.
1.1 Brittle Trans granular fracture (Cleavage)
Macroscopic brittle fracture may occur by cleavage fracture, inter granular (IG)
fracture, or geometrically constrained ductile fracture (i.e., plane-strain micro-void
coalescence). Brittle fracture can occur in all materials, amorphous and crystalline, by
cleavage. Additionally, in polycrystalline poly-phase metallic materials, fracture may occur
at or adjacent to grain boundaries, and cleavage fracture may occur in large second phases
present in the microstructure, which then provide crack nuclei for ductile crack propagation
in the matrix.
Cleavage fracture at a macro-scale (low magnification) is characterized by high light
reflectivity and a relatively flat surface. At the micro-scale, it is a series of flat regions or
ledges that are often faceted. Higher magnification shows the ledges to be connected by
ligaments described as river lines (Fig. 1.2) or fans (Fig. 1.3).The river lines coalesce as
they propagate and have the appearance of water flowing downstream. However, river lines
cannot always propagate across grain boundaries in crystalline material, and at the micro-
scale, crack initiation may occur in more than one location. Thus the river lines only

4. 4
indicate the local direction of crack propagation, which can be opposite that of the crack
propagation at the macro-scale [1].
Figure 1.3 Fans. (a) Examples of fans in a two-stage TEM replica of a cleavage fracture surface of iron. The
river lines point back to the crack initiation site. (b) Fans on SEM image [1].
Cracks initiate at some region of stress concentration, where loading condition cause
the local stress to exceed the local strength of the material. Regions of stress concentrations
Figure 1.2 Schematic of a river pattern. Crack growth is in the direction of crack coalescence. River patterns may be
visible at the macro-scale in organic glasses and brittle polymers but are visible only at the micro-scale in metallic
materials [1].

5. 5
may be due to macroscopic discontinuities (a geometric notch or other change in cross
section) and/or microscopic discontinuities (an inclusion or second phase). Some
imperfections introduced during primary or secondary metal working cause a local
elevation of the stress, and therefore are common locations of crack initiation.
1.2 Mechanisms of Deformation and Fracture
At homologous temperatures low enough that creep deformation does not contribute
to strain prior to or accompanying crack propagation (TH < ~0.4), the mechanism of
permanent deformation in metallic materials is by slip or deformation twinning. The micro-
scale brittle fracture mechanism is by cleavage. In metallic materials, slip and twinning
deformation processes thus compete with the brittle fracture process of cleavage. All
mechanisms may not operate in a given lattice (material), and the activation of a given
mechanism depends on the temperature, loading rate, and degree of constraint. In an ideal
material containing neither inclusions nor second phases, ductile fracture would be
expected to occur by slip and possibly twinning and result in complete reduction in area
(Fig. 1.4). Alternately, cleavage across a grain on a single plane would be expected to result
in smooth fracture surfaces. Such results are sometimes observed in high-purity single-
crystal specimens but are seldom seen in commercial engineering materials. Commercial
engineering materials contain both a distribution of inclusions and often second-phase
particles and constituents as well as grain boundaries, all of which impact the fracture
nucleation and growth process [1].
Figure 1.4 Single-Crystal Chisel Point [1].

6. 6
1.3 Brittle Overload Fracture
Brittle overload failures, in contrast to ductile overload failures, are characterized by
little or no macroscopic plastic deformation. The fracture features and mechanisms on a
microscopic scale may have components of ductile or brittle crack propagation, but the
macroscopic process of fracture is characterized by little or no work being expended in the
form of permanent (i.e., plastic) deformation. The macroscopic behaviour is essentially
elastic up to the point of failure. The energy of the failure is principally absorbed by the
creation of new surfaces, that is, cracks. For this reason, brittle failures often contain
multiple cracks and separated pieces, which are less common in ductile overload failures.
Brittle overload failures are sometimes be identified as “catastrophic” because there may
be no warning signs such as war page or distortion prior to the final fracture, and these
failures may cause substantial collateral damage. Energy released during brittle fracture in
these failures can be very loud and in some cases explosive [1].
Brittle fractures are characterized by relatively rapid crack growth to final fracture.
The cracking process is sometimes referred to as being “unstable” or “critical” because the
crack propagation leads quickly to final fracture. Brittle fracture initiates and propagates
more readily than ductile fracture (or for so-called “subcritical” crack propagation
processes such as fatigue or stress-corrosion cracking). Representative crack extension
rates for brittle and ductile fracture have been measured at 1000 and 6 m/s (3000 and 20
ft/s), respectively. In addition, no supplemental or continuously applied energy may be
necessary to continue the brittle crack propagation once it is initiated. The elastic strain
energy may be sufficient [1].
Brittleness does not necessarily imply material flaws or processing mistakes, although
this is very often the case. Brittle fracture in some circumstances is the expected overload
failure mode. This is true for inherently brittle materials, such as extremely high-strength
materials where ductility is sacrificed for maximum deformation or wear resistance.
Additionally, embrittling conditions and metallurgical phenomena can impose brittle
fracture characteristics on materials that would generally evince the more desirable ductile
overload behaviour. Brittle overload failures are typically differentiated by a primary crack
that occurs from either Trans granular or inter granular crack propagation. These categories
indicate whether the cracks propagate through the grains or around them, respectively. The
use of the infrequently encountered term “inter granular” to describe Trans granular
features is discouraged due to its similarity in pronunciation to inter granular.

7. 7
All brittle fracture mechanisms can exhibit chevron or herringbone patterns that
indicate the fracture origin and direction of rapid fracture progression. Ductile cracking by
MVC cannot have a herringbone pattern, although a macro-scale radial pattern and
chevrons can occur from MVC. River lines on a macroscopic scale may be revealed in
glassy polymers, but not on a macroscopic scale in a metallic material. With regard to
fatigue, materials with poor ductility can still experience crack initiation and growth since
some slight plasticity may by present. Relatively brittle metals such as hardened steel and
grey cast iron do not always form microscopically identifiable striations and macroscopic
beach marks in cyclic failures.
1.4 Transgranular Cleavage
Transgranular cleavage is cracking through the discrete grains. Intra crystalline is an
equally descriptive term, but is not preferred terminology. Crystallographic cleavage occurs
preferentially in individual grains in directions that do not readily deform, by slip processes,
under strain. Therefore, specifically oriented grains tend to crack, leaving a shiny, faceted
appearance easily differentiated from dull and fibrous, dimple-rupture features. Cleavage
in a steel sample is shown in Fig. 1.5. Face-centred-cubic (FCC) metals (for example,
copper, aluminium, nickel, and austenitic steels) exhibit the greatest ductility during rapid
fracture and in benign environments do not normally fracture via cleavage, as described
further in the section “Atomic and Crystalline Structure” in this article. However, brittle
cracking of fcc metals may occur under conditions of environmentally-assisted cracking
(for example, trans granular stress-corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steels). High-
nitrogen austenitic stainless may also be less ductile during rapid crack growth [1].
Figure 1.5 A Cleavage Fracture in a Carbon Steel Component is shown. Scanning Electron Micrograph.
593× [1].

8. 8
Cleavage initiates via micro-crack nucleation at the leading edge of piled-up
dislocations. The crack propagates through the grain in which it initiated. The crack then
continues across the grain boundaries very rapidly as the critical crack size is exceeded.
The fracture surface continues across the grain boundary, but during the cracking process
it is very unlikely that the crossing is strictly continuous across the grain boundary.
Cleavage cracks cannot cross a grain boundary if the body has a twist component. The
crack must reinitiate, and therefore the classic fine-scale convergence of multiple river lines
develop as the crack progresses. Cleaved grains often exhibit river patterns, further
confirming Trans granular cleavage as the mechanism of crack propagation. Cleavage
occurs in materials with a high strain-hardening rate and relatively low cleavage strength,
or when a geometric constraint (i.e., large hydrostatic stresses) acts as an initiator of
cleavage fracture. It also occurs in materials that are embrittled within the grains rather than
at the grain boundaries. All materials are sensitive to hydrostatic stresses, which may also
induce brittle fracture. Fractographically, it is very unlikely that cleavage facet size can
exceed the grain size, and thus the size of the fracture facets can be a measure of the grain
size if there is only one cleavage facet per grain. There is also a possibility of sub-grain
boundaries and therefore multiple growth directions in a single grain for those cleavage
cracks that cannot propagate across a boundary that has a twist component. In lath
martensitic and bainitic microstructures, cleavage facet size correlates with packet size, not
prior-austenite grain size.
The term quasi-cleavage applies when significant dimple rupture and/or tear ridges
accompany the cleavage morphology. Grains oriented favourably with respect to the axis
of loading may slip and exhibit ductile behaviour, whereas those oriented unfavourably
cannot slip and will exhibit Trans granular brittle behaviour.
1.5 Inter granular Fracture
Inter granular brittle fracture occurs by separation at or adjacent to the grain
boundaries. In some cases it can occur at previous grain boundaries, such as in the case of
martensitic steels where fracture can occur at prior-austenite grain boundaries, which may
also coincide with some of the boundaries in the martensite. Inter granular cracking has
been documented in nearly all engineering metals and alloys and is caused by a wide variety
of mechanical and environmental factors such as grain-boundary embrittlement and de-
cohesive separation along the grain boundaries at elevated (creep-regime) temperatures.

9. 9
For service temperatures below the creep regime (i.e., about 0.4 to 0.5 the melting
temperature of the alloy) and with appropriate materials selection and design, inter granular
brittle fracture is often (but not always) indicative of improper material processing.
Transgranular cleavage is usually the brittle mode anticipated in normal conditions for
brittle materials. Inter granular brittle fracture is atypical, as the grain boundaries are
usually stronger than the grains at temperatures below the creep regime [1].
Grain-boundary fracture can occur both with and without evident MVC on the grain
surfaces. Inter granular fracture exhibiting dimple-rupture features is often referred to as
de-cohesive rupture or more generally as “inter granular dimpled fracture.” Grain boundary
fracture exhibiting no grain surface ductile rupture is identified as inter granular brittle
fracture. In failure analysis, the investigator must distinguish which type of inter granular
fracture has occurred as the causes and corrective actions can be substantially different. De-
cohesive rupture is inter granular fracture mechanism that is macroscopically brittle yet
microscopically ductile. Visual and low magnification stereomicroscopic examination
typically reveal the facets of the individual grains along which cracking occurred. The
appearance of this morphology could be easily mistaken for pure brittle inter granular
fracture if high-magnification fractography is not performed to examine for microscopic
void formation in the grain boundaries. This mechanism of MVC in the grain boundaries
can also result in a greater level of secondary cracking than evidenced by ductile overload
failures. In some circumstances, dimple rupture occurs along the interface between the
matrix and a relatively weak inter granular phase (for example, at high temperatures).
Weakening of the grain boundary may occur at elevated temperatures and result in creep
stress rupture. It may also occur adjacent to the grain boundary due to elemental segregation
causing a denuded zone. As materials with this inherent or imposed tendency are stressed,
normal MVC initiates at inclusions, second phases, or other crystallographic imperfections
(For example, the grain boundaries). Due to the pre-existing crack path provided by the
grain boundaries, de-cohesive rupture requires less energy to effect separation than that for
typical trans-granular ductile rupture [1].

10. 10
Figure 1. 6 Metallographic Image showing the Weak Grain-Boundary Phase in the Weld. Potassium
Dichromate etch. 297× [1].

11. 11
Chapter 2 Titanic Disaster
2.1 Historical Overview
The Titanic was a White Star Line steamship built in the early nineteen hundreds
by Harland and Wolff of Belfast, Ireland. At the time of her construction, she was the
largest moving object ever built. With a weight of more than 46,000 tons, a length of nearly
900 feet, and a height of more than 25 stories, she was the largest of three sister ships owned
by the White Star Line. The Titanic was also equipped with the ultimate in turn-of-the-
century design and technology, including sixteen major watertight compartments in her
lower section that could easily be sealed off in the event of a punctured hull. Because of
her many safety features and a comment by her designer that she was nearly unsinkable,
the Titanic was immediately deemed an unsinkable ship [2].
On April 10, 1912, the Titanic commenced her maiden voyage from Southampton,
England, to New York, with 2227 passengers and crew aboard. The passengers included
some of the wealthiest and most prestigious people at that time. Captain Edward John
Smith, one of the most experienced shipmasters on the Atlantic, was navigating the Titanic.
On the night of April 14, although the wireless operators had received several ice warnings
from others ships in the area, the Titanic continued to rush through the darkness at nearly
full steam.
A time line of the events that followed is shown in Table 1. At 11:35 p.m., the
lookouts spotted a massive iceberg less than a quarter of a mile off the bow of the ship.
Immediately, the engines were thrown into reverse and the rudder turned hard left. Because
of the tremendous mass of the ship, slowing and turning took an incredible distance, more
than that available. At 11:40, without enough distance to alter her course, the Titanic
sideswiped the iceberg, damaging nearly 300 feet of the right side of the hull above and
below the water line [2].
The damage caused by the collision allowed water to flood six of the sixteen major
watertight compartments. As water rushed into the starboard side of the ship's bow, the ship
began to tilt down in front and slightly to the right. By midnight, water in the damaged
compartments began to spill over into others because the compartments were watertight
only horizontally and the walls extended only a few feet above waterline [2].
By 1:20 a.m., water began flooding through anchor-chain holes. Around 2:00, as
the bow continued submerging, the propellers in the stern were lifted out of the water.

12. 12
Flooding progressed until, at about 2:10, the bow of the ship was under water and the stern
was lifted out of the water almost 45 degrees.
Table 1. Timeline of the Sinking of the Titanic [2].
Time Event
23:35 Lookouts spot the iceberg 0.25 mile away.
23:40 The titanic sideswipes the iceberg, damaging nearly 300 feet of the hull.
Midnight
Water tight compartments are filling; water begins to spill over the tops
of the transverse bulkheads.
1:20
The bow pitches; water floods through anchor-chain
holes.
2:00 The bow continues to submerge; propellers lift out of the water.
2:10
The Titanic tilts 45 degrees or more; the upper structure steel
disintegrates.
2:12
The stern raises up out of the water; the bow, filling with water, grows
heavier.
2:18
Weighing 16,000 tons, the bow rips loose; the stern rises to almost
vertical.
2:20 The stern slips beneath the surface
2:29 Coasting at about 13 mph, the bow strikes the ocean floor.
Because of the tremendous weight of the three large propellers in the stern of the
ship, the stresses in the ship's midsection increased immensely as the stern was lifted out
of the water. At an angle of 45 degrees or more, the stresses in the midsection exceeded the
ultimate stresses of the steel and the steel failed. Stresses at failure were estimated at nearly
15 tons per square inch. [2]
This noise can be attributed to the tearing and disintegration of the Titanic's upper
structure. By 2:12, with the bow and stern attached by only the inner bottom structure, the
stern angled high out of the water. The bow, dangling beneath, continued to fill with water.
At 2:18, when the bow reached a weight of about 16,000 tons, it ripped loose from the
stern. [2]
Free from the weight of the bow, the stern rose again sharply to an almost vertical
position. Slowly filling with water, the stern began to sink into the water. At 2:20, the stern

13. 13
slid beneath the surface. Meanwhile, the bow had been coasting down at about 13 miles per
hour (mph). At 2:29, the bow struck the bottom of the ocean. Falling nearly vertical at about
4 mph, the stern crashed into the ocean floor 27 minutes later. [2]
The two pieces of the Titanic lie 2,000 feet apart, pointing in opposite directions
beneath 12,500 feet of water. The bow section remains mostly intact, although the damaged
portion of the hull is covered with a 35-foot high wall of silt and mud that plowed up when
the Titanic hit bottom, so the point of fracture cannot be seen. The stern section is a tangled
wreck, as implosions occurred during the descent due to air trapped within the structure
succumbing to the increased water pressure at greater depths. Between the two sections is
a wide field of debris. [2]
For 73 years, the Titanic remained undisturbed on the ocean floor. On September
1, 1985, oceanographer Bob Ballard and his crew discovered the wreck of the Titanic about
350 miles southeast of Newfoundland, Canada [Gannon, 1995]. Since then, four more
expeditions have visited the Titanic. In 1991, the first purely scientific team visited the site.
The dive was called the Imax dive because the purpose was to create a film for Imax
theatres. The Soviet submersibles used in the dive were capable of staying submerged for
twenty hours and were equipped with 110,000-lumen lamps. With this equipment,
scientists were able to take pictures of the Titanic wreck and eventually uncover new
evidence into the cause of the Titanic disaster. [2]
2.2 Design and Construction of the Titanic
Vessel Particulars [3]
LOA: 882ft 9 in
Breadth: 92ft 6 in
Depth: 64ft 3 in
Draft: 34ft 7 in
Gross Tonnage: 46,328 GT
Displacement: 52,310 LT
Passengers & Crew: 3,547
Design Speed: 21 knots
Builder: Harland and Wolff, Belfast, Ireland
Year Built: 1912
Flag: United Kingdom

14. 14
Registered Owner: White Star Line
Vessel Type: Passenger Liner
Hull Material: Riveted Steel
Figure 2.1 The RMS Titanic
The three White Star Line steamships were 269.1 meters long, 28.2 meters
maximum wide, and 18 meters tall from the water line to the boat deck (or 53 meters from
the keel to the top of the funnels), with a gross weight of 46,000 tons. Because of the size
of these ships, much of the Harland and Wolff shipyard in Belfast, Ireland, had to be rebuilt
before construction could begin; two larger ways were built in the space originally occupied
by three smaller ways. A new gantry system with a larger load-carrying capacity was
designed and installed to facilitate the construction of the larger ships. The Titanic under
construction at the shipyard is shown in Figure 2.2. The ships were designed to provide
accommodations superior to the Cunard ships, but without greater speed.
The first onboard swimming pools were installed as was a gymnasium that included
an electric horse and an electric camel, a squash court, a number of rowing machines, and
stationary bicycles, all supervised by a staff of professional instructors. The public rooms
for the first-class passengers were large and elegantly furnished with wood paneling,
stained-glass windows, comfortable lounge furniture, and expensive carpets. The decor of

15. 15
the first class cabins, in addition to being luxurious, differed in style from cabin to cabin.
As an extra feature on the Titanic, the Café Parisienne offered superb cuisine.
Figure 2.2 The Titanic under Construction at the Harland and Wolff Shipyard in Ireland [4].
The designed speed for these ships was 21–22 knots, in contrast to the faster Cunard
ships. To achieve this speed, each ship had three propellers; each outboard propeller was
driven by a separate four-cylinder, triple expansion, reciprocating steam engine.2 The
center propeller was driven by a low-pressure steam turbine using the exhaust steam from
the two reciprocating engines. The power plant was rated at 51,000 I.H.P. To provide the
necessary steam for the power plant, 29 boilers were available, fired by 159 furnaces. In
addition to propelling the ship, steam was used to generate electricity for various purposes,
distill fresh water, and refrigerate the perishable food, cook, and heat the living space. Coal
was burned as fuel at a rate of 650 tons per day when the ship was underway. Stokers moved
the coal from the bunkers into the furnaces by hand. The bunkers held enough coal for a
ten-day voyage. The remodelled shipyard at Harland and Wolff was large enough for the
construction of two large ships simultaneously. The keel of the Olympic was laid December

16. 16
16, 1908, while the Titanic‘s keel followed on March 31, 1909. The Olympic was launched
on October 20, 1910, and the Titanic on May 31, 1911. In the early 20th century, ships
were constructed using wroughtiron rivets to attach steel plates to each other or to a steel
frame. The frame itself was held together by similar rivets. Holes were punched at
appropriate sites in the steel-frame members and plates for the insertion of the rivets. Each
rivet was heated well into the austenite temperature region, inserted in the mated holes of
the respective plates or frame members, and hydraulically squeezed to fill the holes and
form a head. Three million rivets were used in the construction of the ship.
The construction of the Titanic was delayed due to an accident involving the
Olympic. During its fifth voyage,3 the Olympic collided with the British cruiser, HMS
Hawke, damaging its hull near the bow on the port (left) side. This occurred in the Solent
off Southampton on September 20, 1911. The Olympic was forced to return to Belfast for
repairs. To accomplish the repairs in record time and to return the ship to service promptly,
workmen were diverted from the Titanic to repair the Olympic. On April 2, 1912, the
Titanic left Belfast for Southampton and its sea trials in the Irish Sea. After two days at sea,
the Titanic, with its crew and officers, arrived at Southampton and tied up to Ocean Dock
on April 4. During the next several days, the ship was provisioned and prepared for its
maiden voyage.
2.3 Causes of Rapid Sinking of Titanic
The following is a discussion of the material failures and design flaws that
contributed to the disaster.
Material Failures
When the titanic collided with the iceberg, the hull steels and the wrought iron rivets
failed because of brittle fracture. A type of catastrophic failure in structural materials, brittle
fracture occurs without prior plastic deformation and at extremely high speeds. The causes
of brittle fracture include low temperature, high impact loading, and high sulphur content.
On the night of the titanic disaster, each of three factors were present: the water temperature
was below freezing, the titanic was travelling at a high speed impact with the iceberg, and
the hull steel contained high levels of sulphur.

17. 17
2.3.1 The Hull Steel
The first hint that brittle fracture of the hull steel contributed to the Titanic disaster
came following the recovery of a piece of the hull steel from the Titanic wreck. After
cleaning the piece of steel, the scientists noted the condition of the edges. Jagged and sharp,
the edges of the piece of steel appeared almost shattered, like broken china. Also, the metal
showed no evidence bending or deformation. Typical high-quality ship steel is more ductile
and deforms rather than breaks [2].
Similar behaviour was found in the damaged hull steel of the Titanic's sister ship,
Olympic, after a collision while leaving harbor on September 20, 1911. A 36-foot high
opening was torn into the starboard side of the Olympic's hull when a British cruiser
broadsided her. Failure of the riveted joints and ripping of the hull plates were apparent in
the area of impact. However, the plate tears exhibited little plastic deformation and the
edges were unusually sharp, having the appearance of brittle fractures [2].
Figure 2.3 Mechanics of Long’s Theory [3].
Further evidence of the brittle fracture of the hull steel was found when a cigarette-
sized coupon of the steel taken from the Titanic wreck was subjected to a Charpy test. Used
to measure the brittleness of a material, the Charpy test is run by holding the coupon against

18. 18
a steel backing and striking the coupon with a 67 pound pendulum on a 2.5-foot-long arm
[2].
The pendulum's point of contact is instrumented, with a readout of forces
electronically recorded in millisecond detail. A piece of modern high-quality steel was
tested along with the coupon from the hull steel. Both coupons were placed in a bath of
alcohol at -1°C to simulate the conditions on the night of the Titanic disaster [2].
When the coupon of the modern steel was tested, the pendulum swung down and
halted with a thud; the test piece had bent into a "V." However, when the coupon of the
Titanic steel was tested, the pendulum struck the coupon with a sharp "ping," barely slowed,
and continued up on its swing; the sample, broken into two pieces, sailed across the room
[2].
Pictures of the two coupons following the Charpy test are shown in Fig. 2.4. What
the test showed, and the readout confirmed, is the brittleness of the Titanic's hull steel.
When the Titanic struck the iceberg, the hull plates did not deform. They fractured.
A microstructural analysis of the Titanic steel also showed the plausibility of brittle
fracture of the hull steel. The test showed high levels of both oxygen and sulphur, which
implies that the steel was semi-kilned low carbon steel, made using the open-hearth process.
High oxygen content leads to an increased ductile-to-brittle transition temperature, which
was determined as 25 to 35°C for the Titanic steel [2].
Most modern steels would need to be chilled below -60°C before they exhibited
similar behaviour. High sulphur content increases the brittleness of steel by disrupting the
grain structure. The sulphur combines with magnesium in the steel to form stringers of
magnesium sulphide, which act as "highways" for crack propagation. Although most of the
steel used for shipbuilding in the early 1900s had a relatively high sulphur content, the
Titanic's steel was high even for the times.
Figure 2.4 Results of the Charpy test for Modern Steel and Titanic Steel [5].

19. 19
2.3.2 The Rivets
The wrought iron rivets that fastened the hull plates to the Titanic's main structure
also failed because of brittle fracture from the high impact loading of the collision with the
iceberg and the low temperature water on the night of the disaster. Figure 2.5 shows the
Titanic’s rivets failure mechanism. With the ship travelling at nearly 25 mph, the contact
with the iceberg was probably a series of impacts that caused the rivets to fail either in shear
or by elongation [5].
Figure 2.5 The Rivets Failure Mechanism [4].

20. 20
As the iceberg scraped along sections of the Titanic's hull, the rivets were sheared
off, which opened up riveted seams. Also, because of the tremendous forces created on
impact with the iceberg, the rivet heads in the areas of contact were simply popped off,
which caused more seams to open up. Normally, the rivets would have deformed before
failing because of their ductility, but with water temperature below freezing, the rivets had
become brittle [5].
When the iceberg tore through the hull plates, huge holes were created that allowed
water to flood the hull of the ship. As a result, rivets not in the area of contact with the
iceberg were also subjected to incredible forces. Like a giant lever, the hull plates
transferred the inward forces, applied to the edges of the cracked plates by the water rushing
into the hull, to the rivets along the plate seams. The rivets were then either elongated or
snapped in two, which broke the caulking along the seams and provided another inlet for
water to flood the ship [5].
2.3.3 Design Flaws
Along with the material failures, poor design of the watertight compartments in the
Titanic's lower section was a factor in the disaster. The lower section of the Titanic was
divided into sixteen major watertight compartments that could easily be sealed off if part
of the hull was punctured and leaking water. After the collision with the iceberg, the hull
portion of six of these sixteen compartments was damaged, as shown in Fig. 2.9. Sealing
off the compartments was completed immediately after the damage was realized, but as the
bow of the ship began to pitch forward from the weight of the water in that area of the ship,
the water in some of the compartments began to spill over into adjacent compartments [2].
Although the compartments were called watertight, they were actually only
watertight horizontally; their tops were open and the walls extended only a few feet above
the waterline. If the transverse bulkheads (the walls of the watertight compartments that are
positioned across the width of the ship) had been a few feet taller, the water would have
been better contained within the damaged compartments. Consequently, the sinking would
have been slowed, possibly allowing enough time for nearby ships to help. However,
because of the extensive flooding of the bow compartments and the subsequent flooding of
the entire ship, the Titanic was gradually pulled below the waterline.
The thick black lines below the waterline indicate the approximate locations of the
damage to the hull.

21. 21
The watertight compartments were useless to countering the damage done by the
collision with the iceberg. Some of the scientists studying the disaster have even concluded
that the watertight compartments contributed to the disaster by keeping the flood waters in
the bow of the ship. If there had been no compartments at all, the incoming water would
have spread out, and the Titanic would have remained horizontal.
Figure 2.6 Moment of Initial Failure [6].
Figure 2.7 Initial Failure of the Double Bottom [6].

22. 22
Figure 2.8 The Bow Section pulls down on the Stern Section [6].
Eventually, the ship would have sunk, but she would have remained afloat for another six
hours before foundering. This amount of time would have been sufficient for nearby ships
to reach the Titanic's location so all of her passengers and crew could have been saved.
Figure 2.9 A layout of the watertight compartments and the damage from the collision [2].

23. 23
2.4Mental Inertia and Coordination Failures
2.4.1 The Captain and the Speed
Captain Edward J. Smith was the most senior crewman of the White Star Line. He was
transferred from the Olympic to take charge of the Titanic. He had 40-year experience in
navigation, with 27-year in commander level. In 1907, SS Kronprinz Wilhelm, a German
liner, crashed into an iceberg but was still able to finish her voyage. No wonder Captain
Smith proudly claimed in an interview in the same year that he could not “imagine any
condition which would cause a ship to founder. Modern shipbuilding has gone beyond that”
(Butler 1998: 48; Barczewski 2006: 13). Captain Smith was full of confidence of himself
and it is not too exaggerated to say that he suffered from overconfidence bias.
Overconfidence bias is an over-inflated belief in one’s skills as a leader. Accordingly, if
people ever find themselves that they have everything figured out, then they will feel that
they need not learn further nor put their minds into full alert. In many cases, they will easily
miss out some hidden dangers. Overconfidence led Captain Smith to fail to pay proper
attention to six ice warnings! Under his command, the Titanic moved near maximum speed,
resulting in insufficient time to steer the ship away from icebergs. Eventually, the voyage
ended in a disaster [7].
2.4.2 The Fatal Collision
The Titanic sailed at 22.5 knots, just 0.5 knot from her maximum speed capacity while
cruising through the water which was floated with icebergs. The collision occurred at 11:40
pm on Sunday, April 14, 1912. First Officer W.M. Murdoch ordered the engines to be
reversed which arguably sealed the Titanic's fate. If the Titanic maintained its speed and
turned, it was more likely that she would have avoided hitting the iceberg all together.
Although the damage size in the hull of the Titanic was 220 to 245 feet long, recent evidence
shows that the hull had only a 12 square foot opening (approximately the size of a
refrigerator), allowing water to flow into the ship. Unfortunately, the so-called "watertight"
compartments of the Titanic's hull were not actually watertight. They were open at the tops,
which led to her demise [7].
2.4.3 Lifeboats Underprovided
Lifeboats can be regarded as redundancy if everything goes well. However, the function
of lifeboats is a precautionary backup against unexpected incidents such as fire or collision,

24. 24
just like a car carrying a spare tyre. It is reported that the regulations on the number of
lifeboats that ships required to carry were outdated and inadequate. The Titanic had a total
of 20 lifeboats, comprising 16 wooden boats on davits, 8 on either side of the ship, and 4
collapsible boats with wooden bottoms and canvas sides. On average, each lifeboat could
take up to 68 people. Altogether they could accommodate 1,178 people, near half the
amount of people on the Titanic. The shortage of lifeboats was not because of lacking
space7, nor of cost consideration. Rather, the White Star Line Company preferred to have
the deck with grand views of the sea, which would have been blocked by installing more
lifeboats [7].
More importantly, senior management team of the company committed a serious error
due to mental inertia. They never thought that all crew and passengers would have to be
evacuated at the same time as the Titanic was considered unsinkable. In their views,
lifeboats were intended to be used for transferring passengers off the ship and onto a nearby
vessel in case of an emergency. It was a common practice for ocean liners to have lifeboats
less than the quantity required to load all passengers in a sea disaster, implying that people
would never expect the ship would sink completely in such a short time. They took their
past experiences for granted. No wonder it is easier to remove a tooth than abolishing an
old concept, as saying goes [7].
2.5 Effects of the Disaster
In an effort to prevent repeating their mistakes, the White Star Line modified several of
their existing ships following the Titanic disaster. The changes were based on the design
flaws that were assumed to have contributed to the disaster. Along with these design
changes, the White Star Line, and all shipbuilding companies at the time, had newly
established safety regulations, agreed upon by both the British and American governments,
that they had to follow. Developing safety regulations for ships at sea was another attempt
to avoid accidents similar to the Titanic. The following is a discussion of the changes made
in the design of ships and the safety regulations implemented as a result of the Titanic
disaster.
2.5.1 Ship Design
Following the Titanic disaster, the White Star Line modified the design of the Titanic's
sister ships in two ways: the double bottoms were extended up the sides of the hull and the

25. 25
transverse bulkheads of the watertight compartments were raised. The double bottom on
ships is constructed by taking two layers of steel that span the length of the ship and
separating them by five feet of space [2]. When a ship runs aground or strikes something
in the water, the bottom plate of the hull can be punctured without damage incurred to the
top plate.
With a double bottom, the chance that a punctured hull would allow water into the
watertight compartments is minimized. By extending the double bottoms up the sides of
the hull, which adds another layer of steel to the sides of the ship, a similar event can be
prevented. If an iceberg, or a collision with another ship, barely punctures the hull, only the
space between the inner and outer sidewalls would flood with water. The watertight
compartments would remain undamaged.
The ends of the transverse bulkheads of the watertight compartments were raised to
prevent a tragedy similar to the Titanic. When the hull of the Titanic was torn open in the
collision with the iceberg, water began to flood the damaged compartments in the bow. As
the ship pitched forward under the weight of the water in the bow compartments, water
began to spill over the tops of the bulkheads into adjacent, undamaged compartments.
Although called watertight, the watertight compartments were actually only watertight
horizontally; their tops were open and the walls extended only a few feet above the
waterline. By raising the ends of the transverse bulkheads, if a ship were taking in water
through the bow compartments and the ship began to pitch forward, the water in the
compartments could not flow over the tops of the bulkheads into the next compartments.
As a result, flooding of the damaged compartments could be controlled and isolated to only
the damaged sections [2].
At the 1948 Convention on Safety of Life at Sea, specifications for the orientation,
length, and number of watertight compartments in passenger ships were established. The
watertight compartments, which improve a ship's ability to withstand the effects of
underwater damage, are used to control flooding in the hull of the ship. To maintain a nearly
level position, the walls of the watertight compartments are to be oriented horizontally, or
across the width of the ship, rather than vertically. If one side of the hull is damaged, the
water that fills the hull will even out across the width of the ship.
With vertical walls, the water in the hull would remain on the damaged side of the ship,
causing the ship to lean to that side. The length of the watertight compartments is
determined by the length of the ship. Shorter ships should have shorter compartments while
longer ships should have longer compartments. The number of compartments is also

26. 26
determined by the size of the ship. One criteria that must be met, however, is that the ship
must remain afloat with two of the watertight compartments flooded [2].
2.5.2 Safety Regulations
Along with the changes in ship design that resulted from the Titanic disaster, safety
regulations were established to govern passenger ships while at sea. Many of these
regulations were established at the 1948 Convention on Safety of Life at Sea. The
mandatory use of the wireless, the increased lifeboat capacity, and the implementation of
the ice patrol-each of these was developed to prevent accidents similar to the sinking of the
Titanic [2].
Wireless is the means of communication for ships at sea. The regulations require that
ships exceeding 1600 tons be equipped with wireless apparatus. Use of the wireless is
beneficial for ships because they are able to receive weather reports, check their positions,
and call for help in emergencies [2]. On the night of the Titanic disaster, several warnings
were called in to the Titanic from ships aware of her position. Following her collision with
the iceberg, the Titanic was able to send out distress signals to other ships with her position
and the status of her damage so help was on the way immediately.
Although there was room on deck for twice as many lifeboats, the Titanic carried
lifeboats for just over half of the passengers and crew on board. The designer of the Titanic
had allowed room on deck for two rows of lifeboats, but one row was removed before the
voyage began to make the deck more aesthetically pleasing [Rogers and others, 1998]. With
outdated British Board of Trade regulations, the Titanic's twenty lifeboats actually
exceeded requirements by 10 percent capacity [2].
The new safety regulations increased the required number of lifeboats to a number that
would accommodate all passengers and crew aboard the ship. Based on the length of the
ship, a given number of davits, which are the mechanism used to raise and lower the
lifeboats, are mounted along the perimeter of the lower deck.
Figure 3.6 shows the davits and lifeboats on the deck of the Titanic. If the minimum
lifeboat capacity is not met, additional lifeboats must be stowed under other boats.
Regulations also specify that each of the lifeboats must carry oars, sails, a compass,
signalling devices, food, and water. In addition, for large ships, two of the boats need to be
motorboats [2].
The United States Government began the ice patrol so that ships traveling between
England and the United States could be alerted of approaching ice fields. The ice patrol

27. 27
studies and observes the ice conditions in the North Atlantic in order to keep track of where
the ice fields are in relation to nearby ships [2].
Ice fields, large expanses of floating ice that are more than five miles in their greatest
dimension, shift around depending on weather conditions. Therefore, without the ice patrol,
ships would need to constantly monitor the positions of the ice fields. For the Titanic, the
ice patrol could have informed the captain of the ice fields and surrounding icebergs and
instructed him to stop the ship until morning.
Figure. 2.10 The deck of the Titanic. The davits and life boats are on the left. The people are walking
through the extra space on the deck that was designed to hold the additional lifeboats [2].

28. 28
Chapter 3 Engineering Failures
3.1 The Sinking of the Titanic-Engineering Failures
Although it was considered a technology masterpiece of her time, the sinking of the
Titanic had many engineering flaws (both in the design of the ship and the implementation
of safety procedures) that lead to her catastrophic failure and the loss of over 1500
passengers. The naivety of many involved, believed that the R.M.S Titanic was so great,
that it could never sink. Even the Captain, Edward Smith, admitted “I cannot imagine any
condition which could cause a ship [the Titanic] to founder” (1907). However, the flawed
ship collided with poor environmental conditions and insufficient rescue equipment, ending
the voyage and resulting in one of the most catastrophic marine failures in history.
The Titanic was a British passenger ship sailing her maiden voyage from
Southampton, England on April 10, 1912 route to New York City. On April 14th, a large
iceberg was spotted at 11:40 PM, and it collided with the ship’s starboard side 40 seconds
later. By 2:20 AM, the ship had sunk into the Atlantic Ocean and over half of the ship’s
passengers perished with the ship. Although there are significant environmental factors,
several of the factors leading to the failure of the ship can be attributed to design flaws,
which pose ethical issues for the safety of the passengers.
3.1.1 Engineering Flaws
The Titanic collided with a 150,000-300,000 ton iceberg at 11:40 PM on April 14th,
which, although many argue is an unpredictable environmental condition, other ships in the
area had been sending warnings of ice for 60 hours before collision. The warnings were not
uncommon, but they were sent frequently and it was known that ice lay in the Titanic’s
path. However, the ship was cruising at maximum speed (22 knots), on a moonless night,
which made it difficult for the crews to spot icebergs. This was another decision that
strongly influenced the sinking of the Titanic, as the crews were not emphasizing safety for
the passengers.
The original design of the Titanic had two rows of lifeboats, enough for every
passenger on the ship. However, one row was removed in order to improve the aesthetic
appeal of the ship. This decision supported the concept of the „unsinkable ship‟ and the
designer should not have approved this change that directly lead to the death of many
passengers. This decision also did not have the safety and the needs of the passengers at
best interest.

29. 29
Another engineering flaw that was directly related to the sinking of the ship, was
the design of the „watertight‟ compartments that were located in the hull of the boat. There
were 16 compartments that were supposed to seal, in the chance of water intake onto the
Titanic. However, these compartments were not sealed and the walls between them did not
connect with the ceiling. Therefore, if a sufficient amount of water was filled into the
compartment, the water would flow over the wall and begin to fill the adjacent
compartment. Unfortunately, the portion of the hull that was damaged by the iceberg filled
with water quickly and tipped the bow forward, and water filled the other compartments.
This design was not watertight, and the engineers/designers made clear assumptions of the
amount of water they predicted would enter the hull. Because the water spilled over the
walls, the compartments all filled and the ship was no longer able to remain afloat.
After the Titanic sank, several investigations and inquiries were held, although many
of the ship's senior crew as well as the Naval Architect/Engineer, Thomas Andrews,
perished in the ship. The International Convention for Safety of Life on the Sea was held
in 1913, it changed the laws of passenger ships, enforcing each ship to carry enough
lifeboats for every passenger.
3.2 The Steel
3.2.1 The Composition
During an expedition to the wreckage in the North Atlantic on August 15, 1996,
researchers brought back steel from the hull of the ship for metallurgical analysis. After the
steel was received at the University of Missouri-Rolla, the first step was to determine its
composition. The chemical analysis of the steel from the hull is given in Table II. The first
item noted is the very low nitrogen content. This indicates that the steel was not made by
the Bessemer process; such steel would have a high nitrogen content that would have made
it very brittle, particularly at low temperatures. In the early 20th century, the only other
method for making structural steel was the open-hearth process.
The fairly high oxygen and low silicon content means that the steel has only been
partially deoxidized, yielding a semi-killed steel. The phosphorus content is slightly higher
than normal, while the sulphur content is quite high, accompanied by a low manganese
content. This yielded a Mn:S ratio of 6.8:1—a very low ratio by modern standards. The
presence of relatively high amounts of phosphorous, oxygen, and sulphur has a tendency
to embrittle the steel at low temperatures [4].

30. 30
Davies has shown that at the time the Titanic was constructed about two-thirds of
the open-hearth steel produced in the United Kingdom was done in furnaces having acid
linings. There is a high probability that the steel used in the Titanic was made in an acid-
lined open-hearth furnace, which accounts for the fairly high phosphorus and high sulphur
content. The lining of the basic open-hearth furnace will react with phosphorus and sulphur
to help remove these two impurities from the steel. It is likely that all or most of the steel
came from Glasgow, Scotland.
Included in Table 2 are the compositions of two other steels: steel used to construct
lock gates at the Chittenden Ship Lock between Lake Washington and Puget Sound at
Seattle, Washington and the composition of a modern steel, ASTM A36. The ship lock was
built around 1912, making the steel about the same age as the steel from the Titanic.
Table 2. Composition of Steels from the Titanic, a Lock Gate and ASTM 36 Steel [4].
C Mn p S Si Cu O N MnS:Ratio
Titanic
Hull
Plate
0.210 0.470 0.045 0.069 0.017 0.024 0.013 0.0035 6.8:1
Lock
Gate*
0.250 0.520 0.010 0.030 0.020 - 0.018 0.0035 17.3:1
ASTM
36
0.200 0.550 0.012 0.037 0.007 0.010 0.079 0.0032 14.9:1
*Steel from a lock gate at the Chittenden ship lock between Lake Washington and Puget
Sound, Seattle, Washington.
3.2.2 Shear Fracture Percent
At low temperatures where the impact energy required for fracture is less, a faceted
surface of cleaved planes of ferrite is observed, indicating brittle fracture. At elevated
temperatures, where the energy to cause fracture is greater, a ductile fracture with a shear
structure is observed. Figure is a plot of the shear fracture percent versus temperature.
Using 50% shear fracture area as a reference point, this would occur in ASTM A36 at -
3°C, while for the Titanic steel, this value would occur at 49°C in the longitudinal direction
and at 59°C in the transverse direction. At elevated temperatures, the impact-energy values

31. 31
for the longitudinal Titanic steel is substantially greater than the transverse specimens. The
difference between the longitudinal and transverse shear fracture percent from the Titanic
is much smaller. This suggests that the banding is a more important factor in the results for
the impact-energy experiment as compared with shear fracture percent [4].

32. 32
Chapter 4 Conclusions and Discussions
4.1 Conclusions and Discussions
The sinking of the Titanic has become one of the most well-known disasters in
history. Because of the terrible loss of life and the demise of what everyone believed was
an "unsinkable" ship, people are intrigued and curious about what caused the rapid sinking
of the Titanic. Several theories have developed since the sinking to explain the events that
occurred on that fateful night. This article has presented the most probable theory, which
has become dominant as a result of evidence acquired during several expeditions to the
Titanic site.
The failure of the hull steel resulted from brittle fractures caused by the high sulphur
content of the steel, the low temperature water on the night of the disaster, and the high
impact loading of the collision with the iceberg. When the Titanic hit the iceberg, the hull
plates split open and continued cracking as the water flooded the ship. Low water
temperatures and high impact loading also caused the brittle failure of the rivets used to
fasten the hull plates to the ship's main structure. On impact, the rivets were either sheared
off or the heads popped off because of excessive loading, which opened up riveted seams.
Also, the rivets around the perimeter of the plates elongated due to the stresses applied by
the water, which broke the caulking and provided another inlet for the water.
The rapid sinking of the Titanic was worsened by the poor design of the transverse
bulkheads of the watertight compartments. As water flooded the damaged compartments
of the hull, the ship began to pitch forward, and water in the damaged compartments was
able to spill over into adjacent compartments. Not only did the compartments not control
the flooding, but they also contained the water in the bow, which increased the rate of
sinking.
Following the Titanic disaster, double-sided hulls were added to ships to prevent
minor hull punctures from causing major damage. Also, the transverse bulkheads of the
watertight compartments were raised so that water could not spill over the tops if the ship
were pitched at a slight angle. Safety regulations established after the sinking include the
mandatory use of the wireless for large ships, the minimum lifeboat capacity equal to the
number of passengers and crew aboard, and the implementation of the ice patrol to warn
ships of nearby ice fields.
Understanding the causes for the rapid sinking of the Titanic is necessary to prevent
similar accidents in the future. The changes made in ship design and safety regulations

33. 33
following the disaster were effective in decreasing the casualties of accidents at sea.
Examples include the successful rescues of 1600 passengers and crew from the Andrea
Doria in 1956, 700 passengers from the Prinsendam in 1980, and all the passengers and
crew from Mikhail Lermentov in 1986 and the Oceanos in 1992. Other lessons need to be
learned, however. Just because shipbuilding companies have the technology to build
something does not mean that they should. In the case of the Titanic disaster, the causes for
the sinking indicate that shipbuilding technology was far more advanced than the
understanding which engineers had of the materials they were using to build the ships.

34. 34
GLOSSARY
1. Bow: the front section of a ship. (Back)
2. Bulkheads: the upright partitions dividing a ship into compartments. (Back)
3. Charpy test: a common test of brittleness in structural materials. A Charpy test is run by
placing a specimen against a steel backing and striking it with a large pendulum. (Back)
4. Coupon: a cigarette-sized sample of material. Coupons are the test specimens used with the
Charpy test. (Back)
5. Davits: the small cranes that project over the side of a ship and are used to raise and lower
lifeboats. (Back)
6. Grain structure: the arrangement or pattern of the particles composing a substance. (Back)
7. Ice field: a large, level expanse of floating ice that is more than 5 miles in its greatest
dimension. (Back)
8. Lumen: the unit of luminous flux equal to the light given off by one candle. (Back)
9. Stern: the rear section of a ship. (Back)
10. Wireless: a radio telegraph or radiotelephone system. (Back)

35. 35
REFERENCES
[1] W. T. Becker, Fracture Appearance and Mechanisms of Deformation and Fracture,
ASM International.
[2] Vicki Banssett, Causes and Effects of the Rapid Sinking of the Titanic, October
2000.
[3] Ship Structure Committee Case Study
http://www.shipstructure.org
[4] Katherine Felkins, H. P. Leighly, Jr., A Jankovic, The Royal Mail Ship Titanic: Did
a Metallurgical Failure cause a Night to Remember? (12-18), January 1998.
[5] Heather Kelly, The Sinking of Titanic, Journal of Undergraduate Engineering
Research and Scholarship (PT 13 Kelly P.1- PT 13 Kelly P.8), March 2013.
[6] Roy F. Mengot, Richard T. Woytowich, The Breakup of Titanic, Marine Forensics
Panel (SD-7) April 2009.
[7] Fu-Lai Tony Yu, The Sinking of Unsinkable Titanic: Mental Inertia and
Coordination Failures. Department of Economics and Finance, Hong Kong Shue
Yan University.
[8] Tim Foecke, Metallurgy of The RMS Titanic NIST-IR 6118