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Security in Serverless world
The document discusses various security challenges in the serverless architecture, highlighting the shared responsibility model where vulnerabilities can stem from code, third-party dependencies, and user behavior. It emphasizes the significance of implementing security best practices, such as sanitizing inputs, maintaining least privilege access, and securing sensitive data both at rest and in transit. The presentation also covers potential attack vectors like DDoS and the importance of monitoring and managing functions carefully to prevent breaches.
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Security in Serverless world
- 1. the Many-Faced Threats tothe serverless world
- 2.
- 3. “Netflix for sports” officesin London, Leeds, Katowice and Tokyo
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- 5. AWS user since2009
- 8. recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s4L5wjFlFzA slides: http://bit.ly/2tHYFAM blogposts: http://theburningmonk.com/yubls-road-to-serverless-architecture
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- 11. protection from OSattacks Amazon automatically apply latest patches to host VMs
- 14. still have topatch your code vulnerable code, 3rd party dependencies, etc.
- 16.
- 17. https://snyk.io/blog/owasp-top-10-breaches Known Vulnerable Componentscause 24% of the top 50 data breaches in 2016
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- 23.
- 24. sanitise inputs &outputs (standardise and encapsulate into shared lib)
- 26. http://bit.ly/2gSHtay Broken Access Control InsecureDirect Object Reference Information Leakage GraphQL Injection
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- 29. app dependency isa large attack surface
- 30. further compounded by transientdependencies
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- 34. security updates areoften bundled with unrelated feature and API changes
- 35. your security isas strong as its weakest link
- 36. OS Application Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runsin runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
- 37. OS Application Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runsin runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Networking needs runs on this is where an attacker will target in a movie Source Code has maintains
- 40. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runsin runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application A9 Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains A1, A3, …
- 41. people are oftenthe WEAKEST link in the security chain
- 43. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runsin runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application phishing… Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
- 44. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runsin runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application brute force, known account leaks, … Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
- 45. OS Dependencies physical infrastructure NPM Authors Container runs in runsin runs in has hosted by published by pushes to Developers develops uses Users guardsprotects Application brute force, known account leaks, … Networking runs on needs Source Code has maintains
- 46. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX …obtained publish accessto 14% of npm packages…
- 47. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX debug, request, react,co, express, moment, gulp, mongoose, mysql, bower, browserify, electron, jasmine, cheerio, modernizr, redux, …
- 48. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX total downloads/month ofthe unique packages which I got myself publish access to was 1 972 421 945, that's 20% of the total number of d/m directly.
- 49. 20% of allmonthly NPM downloads…
- 50. brute force known accountleaks from other sources leaked NPM credentials (github, etc.)
- 51.
- 52. http://bit.ly/2sFDwYX 662 users hadpassword “123456” 172 — “123” 124 — “password”
- 55.
- 58. oh god, thatwas too easy…
- 61. compromised package isa transient dependency sigh…
- 62.
- 65.
- 67. rm -rf /!!!
- 68. NPM default -get latest “compatible” version, ie. 1.X.X
- 69. clean install (eg.on CI server) will download the latest, compromised package without any code change… NPM default - get latest “compatible” version, ie. 1.X.X
- 71. use npm shrinkwrap orupgrade to NPM 5
- 72.
- 73. not specific toNode.js or NPM
- 75.
- 76. who can invokethe function?
- 77. what can thefunction access?
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- 80.
- 82. always public implement authenticationwith API keys, Cognito, or custom authorizer functions
- 83. compromised servers allow attackerto access all of your sensitive data!
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- 92. IAM policies notversioned with Lambda functions
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- 94. AWS Lambda docs Write yourLambda function code in a stateless style, and ensure there is no affinity between your code and the underlying compute infrastructure. http://amzn.to/2jzLmkb
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- 96. secure sensitive databoth at rest and in-transit
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- 101.
- 102. Disposability is avirtue
- 103. AWS Lambda docs Delete oldLambda functions that you are no longer using. http://amzn.to/2jzLmkb
- 104. easier said thandone…
- 105. identifying component ownership ina big IT organization is challenging
- 106. identifying ownership of individualfunctions is much harder
- 107.
- 108. more likely toscale through DoS attacks
- 109. DoS + perexec billing = Denial of Wallet problem
- 110. have to choosebetween a DoS and a DoW problem…
- 112. AWS Shield Advancedalso gives you access to the AWS DDoS Response Team (DRT) and protection against DDoS related spikes in your ELB, CloudFront or Route 53 charges.
- 113. async sync S3 SNS SES CloudFormation CloudWatch Logs CloudWatchEvents Scheduled Events CodeCommit AWS Config http://amzn.to/2vs2lIg Cognito Alexa Lex API Gateway streams DynamoDB Stream Kinesis Stream Lambda handles retries (twice, then DLQ)
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- 116. DoS attack Regex DoSattack long Lambda timeout 2+ Retries+ ?
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- 122. containers are reused,avoid sensitive data in /tmp
- 126.
- 130.
- 131. monitor activities in unusedregions using CloudWatch Events
- 133. set up billingalarms in unused regions
- 134. watertight compartments thatcan contain water in the case of hull breach or other leaks
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- 141. App dependencies isa much BIGGER attack surface than you probably realise
- 143. sanitise inputs andoutputs
- 144.
- 145. here’s your perfunction policy NEXT!
- 146. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j GoogleBigQuery encrypt data at rest
- 147. S3 AWS IoT DynamoDB RDS EventStore Elasticsearch Couchbase Redshift Neo4j GoogleBigQuery and in-transit
- 148.
- 149. DoS DoW* * Denialof Wallet
- 153. no server* no OSattacks no long lived compromised servers * I know I know, there’s still a server somewhere, but it’s managed and secured by AWS engineers who can do a much better job of it than most of us can; and the servers are ephemeral and short-lived
- 154. don’t be anunwilling bit miner
- 155. don’t be anunwilling bit miner safeguard your credentials…
- 156.
- 157. people are oftenthe WEAKEST link in the security chain
- 158.