SlideShare a Scribd company logo
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection
Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
Man-Ki Yoon, Sibin Mohan, Jaesik Choi, Jung-Eun Kim, Lui Sha
Dept. of Computer Science, UIUC
Information Trust Institute, UIUC
Lawrence Berkeley National Lab
Apr 9th, 2013
Rethinking Real-Time Embedded System Security
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
2
Increased
Capability
More
Networked
Open,
Standard
Platform
More
Vulnerable to
Security Attacks
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
3
SecureCore Architecture
Intrusion Detection, not prevention
•Most critical component: control application
•System recovery upon detection
Behavior monitoring
•Predictable timing behaviors of real-time apps
•Profile using statistical learning
Multicore-based core-to-core monitoring
•On-chip HW for processor state inspection
•Hypervisor-based protection/isolation
Rest of the Talk
• System and Application Model
• Timing-based Intrusion Detection (Overview)
• SecureCore
– Architecture Design
– Timing-based Intrusion Detection (Detail)
• Implementation and Evaluation
• Limitations and Future Work
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
4
• Multicore-based Real-Time Control System
System and Application Model
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
5
Physical plant
Time
Controller
Sensor data
Sensor data
Actuation cmd
Actuation cmd
SecureCore MonitoredCore
SecureCore Architecture
• Multicore-based Real-Time Control System
System and Application Model
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
6
Physical plant
Time
Controller
Sensor data
Sensor data
Actuation cmd
Actuation cmd
Threat Model: Malicious code execution
• Embedded in the control code
• Activated after system initialization
• Irrelevant how it gained entry
SecureCore MonitoredCore
SecureCore Architecture
Timing-Based Intrusion Detection
• Idea: Deterministic timing of real-time applications
– Any malicious activity consumes finite time to execute
– Deviation from expected timing → Suspicious!
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
7
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4 Block 5
Block 6
𝒆 𝟏
𝒆 𝟐
𝒆 𝟑
𝒆 𝟒 𝒆 𝟓
𝒆 𝟔
Malicious
Code
𝑒3
∗
≠ 𝑒3
Observed Legitimate
Timing-Based Intrusion Detection
• Idea: Deterministic timing of real-time applications
– Any malicious activity consumes finite time to execute
– Deviation from expected timing → Suspicious!
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
8
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4 Block 5
Block 6
𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ1 = 3𝑚𝑠
𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2 = 7𝑚𝑠
𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ3 = 5𝑚𝑠
𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑋 = 7 𝑚𝑠
𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑌 = 9 𝑚𝑠
𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑋 =? 𝑚𝑠
Execution time
variations
Control
flow path Input values
System effects
(e.g., shared
resource)
𝒆 𝟏
𝒆 𝟐
𝒆 𝟑
𝒆 𝟒 𝒆 𝟓
𝒆 𝟔
Timing-Based Intrusion Detection
• Idea: Deterministic timing of real-time applications
– Any malicious activity consumes finite time to execute
– Deviation from expected timing → Suspicious!
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
9
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4 Block 5
Block 6
𝑒1
𝑒2
𝑒3
𝑒4 𝑒5
𝑒6
𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ1 = 3𝑚𝑠
𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2 = 7𝑚𝑠
𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ3 = 5𝑚𝑠
𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑋 = 3 𝑚𝑠
𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑌 = 2 𝑚𝑠
𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑋 =? 𝑚𝑠
Execution time
variations
Control
flow path Input values
System effects
(e.g., shared
resource)
• Profile probabilistic execution time model
• Estimate Prob(e*)
• Capture even legitimate variations
Statistical learning-based
profiling/detection
0.0000
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.0010
0.0012
0.0014
0.0016
0.0018
0.0020
272000 274000 276000 278000 280000 282000
Prob.Density
Execution Time
Outline
• System and Application Models
• Timing-based Intrusion Detection (Overview)
• SecureCore
– Architecture Design
– Timing-based Intrusion Detection (Detail)
• Implementation and Evaluation
• Limitations and Future Work
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
10
SecureCore Architecture
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
11
Plant
Complex
Controller
Safety
Ctrl.
Decision
Module
Sensor
Data
Actuation
Command
Monitored Core Secure Core
OS OS
Hypervisor
I/O
Proxy
Inter-Core
Communication
Timing
Trace
Module
Scratch
Pad
Memory
Secure
Monitor
Timing-Based Intrusion Detection
• Block-level monitoring
– Narrowing estimation domain
• Less variation, better accuracy
– Block boundary: check point
• Detect unexpected flow deviations
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
12
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4 Block 5
Block 6
How to Get Timing Profiles
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
13
Raw Traces Trace Tree Profiles
Block
1
Block
2
Block
3
Block
4
Block
5
Block
6
Block
6
Block
6
Block
1
Block
2
Block
3
Block
4
Block
5
Block
6
Block
6
Block
6
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
272000 274000 276000 278000 280000 282000
Statistical Learning
Timing Trace Module
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
14
rlwimi 0,0,0,0,1
rlwimi 0,0,0,0,2
rlwimi 0,0,0,0,3
rlwimi 0,0,0,0,4
INST_REG_PID
INST_ENABLE_TRACE
INST_DISABLE_TRACE
INST_TRACE
foo() {
INST_TRACE;
Do_something();
INST_TRACE;
Do_something();
INST_TRACE;
}
main() {
INST_REG_PID;
…
INST_ENABLE_TRACE;
…
foo();
...
INST_DISABLE_TRACE;
}
Trace Instructions
Timestamp i+2
PID BA AddrHead
Timestamp i Addr i
Timestamp i+1 Addr i+1
Addr i+2
...
...
AddrTail
0x000
Timestamp j Addr j
Timestamp j+1 Addr j+10x010
0xFF0
4 Bytes
0x8a0
0x8b0
0x8c0
SPM Layout
- PID registration for preventing traces from being forged
- BA: Base Address ( = PC of INST_REG_PID)
Timing Trace Module
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
15
rlwimi 0,0,0,0,1
rlwimi 0,0,0,0,2
rlwimi 0,0,0,0,3
rlwimi 0,0,0,0,4
INST_REG_PID
INST_ENABLE_TRACE
INST_DISABLE_TRACE
INST_TRACE
foo() {
INST_TRACE;
Do_something();
INST_TRACE;
Do_something();
INST_TRACE;
}
main() {
INST_REG_PID;
…
INST_ENABLE_TRACE;
…
foo();
...
INST_DISABLE_TRACE;
}
Trace Instructions
Timestamp i+2
PID BA AddrHead
Timestamp i Addr i
Timestamp i+1 Addr i+1
Addr i+2
...
...
AddrTail
0x000
Timestamp j Addr j
Timestamp j+1 Addr j+10x010
0xFF0
4 Bytes
0x8a0
0x8b0
0x8c0
SPM Layout
- Read Timestamp and Program Counter from the processor registers
- Addri = BA – PCi (i.e., relative address from BA)
Raw Traces
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
16
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
Block 4 Block 5
Block 6
INST_TRACE
INST_TRACE
INST_TRACE
INST_TRACE
INST_TRACE INST_TRACE
INST_TRACE
Addr1
Addr2
Addr3
Addr4
Addr6
Addr5
Addr7
(Addr1, t5)
(Addr2, t6)
(Addr4, t7)
(Addr6, t8)
(Addr7, t9)
(Addr1, t10)
(Addr2, t11)
(Addr4, t12)
(Addr5, t13)
(Addr7, t14)
…
(Addr1, t1)
(Addr3, t3)
(Addr7, t4)
(Addr2, t2)
Trace Tree
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
17
(Addr1, t5)
(Addr2, t6)
(Addr4, t7)
(Addr6, t8)
(Addr7, t9)
(Addr1, t10)
(Addr2, t11)
(Addr4, t12)
(Addr5, t13)
(Addr7, t14)
…
(Addr1, t1)
(Addr3, t3)
(Addr7, t4)
(Addr2, t2)
Addr1
Addr3
Addr2
Addr7
Block1
Block2Block6
Addr4
Addr5
Addr7
Block6Block4
Addr2
Addr6
Addr7
Addr4
Block6
Block3
Block5
t2-t1
t3- t2
t4- t3
t6-t5
t11-t10
t7-t6
t12-t11
t13-t12
t9-t8
t8-t7
t14-t13
……
…
…
…
……
Trace Tree
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
18
(Addr1, t5)
(Addr2, t6)
(Addr4, t7)
(Addr6, t8)
(Addr7, t9)
(Addr1, t10)
(Addr2, t11)
(Addr4, t12)
(Addr5, t13)
(Addr7, t14)
…
(Addr1, t1)
(Addr3, t3)
(Addr7, t4)
(Addr2, t2)
Addr1
Addr3
Addr2
Addr7
Block1
Block2Block6
Addr4
Addr5
Addr7
Block6Block4
Addr2
Addr6
Addr7
Addr4
Block6
Block3
Block5
t2-t1
t3- t2
t4- t3
t6-t5
t11-t10
t7-t6
t12-t11
t13-t12
t9-t8
t8-t7
t14-t13
……
…
…
…
……
Same execution block,
but on different paths.
Each has its own timing profile
From a trace tree, we can get
• Execution time samples (each node)
• Legitimate execution flows
Timing Profile
• What is a good estimation of execution times?
– Min & max, mean, …
• Not representative
• Cannot capture variations well
– Probabilistic timing model
• Estimate the likelihoods of execution times!
– Probability distribution
• Parametric vs. Non-parametric distribution
– Unknown shape
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
19
(FigureisfromCSCE666PatternAnalysisbyRicardoGutierrez-OsunaatTAMU)
Example
Execution Time Profile Using
Kernel Density Estimation (KDE)
• Non-parametric Probability Density Function Estimation
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
20
1
2
3
1. Given samples of execution times
2. Draw scaled distribution at each sample point
3. Sum them up
- Kernel & bandwidth affect shape and smoothness
- Gaussian kernel
Estimated pdf
Kernel function
Bandwidth
(Smoothing constant)
Intrusion Detection Using Timing Profiles
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
21
0.0000
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.0010
0.0012
0.0014
0.0016
0.0018
0.0020
272000 273000 274000 275000 276000 277000 278000 279000 280000 281000 282000
Prob.Density
Execution Time
PDF of the Execution Time of an example block
Highly likely
Multiple peaks: different inputs or system effects
How much deviation
should we consider malicious?
Threshold test
Prob(𝑒∗
) < 𝜽
Prob(𝑒∗
) ≥ 𝜽
Malicious
Legitimate
•E.g., 𝜃 = 0.01 or 0.05
•At least 𝜃 of measurements were close to 𝑒∗
Summary of Timing-Based Intrusion Detection
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
22
Complex
Controller
Secure
Monitor
Monitored Core Secure Core
Timing
Trace
Module
Scratch
Pad
Memory
Addr1
Addr3
Addr2
Addr7
Block1
Block2Block6
Addr4
Addr5
Addr7
Block6Block4
Addr2
Addr6
Addr7
Addr4
Block6
Block3
Block5
[Profile]
Block
1
Block
2
Block
3
Block
4
Block
5
Block
6
[Run-time Execution]
(Addr1, ti)
(Addr2, ti+1)
(Addr4, ti+2)
(Addr6, ti+3)
(Addr7, ti+4)
Trace
Traverse and
check
Outline
• System and Application Models
• Timing-based Intrusion Detection (Overview)
• SecureCore
– Architecture Design
– Timing-based Intrusion Detection (Detail)
• Implementation and Evaluation
• Limitations and Future Work
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
23
Implementation
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
24
CC SC
DM
SM
Monitored Core Secure Core
IOP
LWE Linux 2.6.34
TTM
SPM
Hypervisor
Inverted
Pendulum (IP)
Dynamics
Simics (P4080)
Host PC
Serial (tty) Pseudo Terminal (pts)Byte channel
Freescale P4080 on Simics
• Only two cores (Core 0 and 1)
• Cache (L1 and L2) and bus models for system effects
• ISA modification for trace instruction
Implementation
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
25
CC SC
DM
SM
Monitored Core Secure Core
IOP
LWE Linux 2.6.34
TTM
SPM
Hypervisor
Inverted
Pendulum (IP)
Dynamics
Simics (P4080)
Host PC
Serial (tty) Pseudo Terminal (pts)Byte channel
Inverted Pendulum Control
• Controller and dynamics (cart position, rod’s angle)
• Generated from Simulink IP model
Application Model
• IP Control + FFT (EEMBC)
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
26
FFT
Init
FFT
Phase #1
FFT
Phase #2
FFT
Phase #3
IP
Control
PathID = 1, 2
PathID = 0
1 run if PathID = 0, 1
2 runs if PathID = 2
0 + 1 meter
Malicious code
• Injected at the end of FFT Phase #3
• Simple loop (some array copy)
• 440, 720, 1000 cycles for 1,3,5 loops
• (FFT Phase#3: ~260,000 cycles)
• Activated when the cart passes +0.7 m
• Execute randomly thereafter
• Loop execution
• Sends old actuation cmd
Timing Profile
• ~10,000 runs (no malicious code activation)
• ‘ksdensity’ (Matlab) for Gaussian KDE
• Total exec time: 850,000 ~ 1,200,000 cycles (~1ms)
• Control period: 10 ms
Early Detection
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
27
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
Time (sec)
Cartposition(meter)
No attack
𝜽: 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 (1%)
Loop count: 3 ( ~ 720 cycles)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
Time (sec)
Cartposition(meter)
No attack
No protection
Attack activated
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
Time (sec)
Cartposition(meter)
No attack
No protection
Simplex only
Attack activated
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
Time (sec)
Cartposition(meter)
No attack
No protection
Simplex only
Our methodAttack activated
Intrusion Detection Accuracy
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
28
• Criteria: False prediction rates
– False positive: predict “malicious” when not
– False negative: fail to detect a real attack
PredictedReal
1/1024 (0.10%)
7/1015 (0.69%)
1 loop 3 loops 5 loops
827/1022 (81%) 574/1046 (55%) 130/1098 (12%)
578/1050 (55%) 117/1011 (12%) 0/1024 (0%)
False positive rates False negative rates
Trade off: Low 𝜽? High 𝜽?
Detect well More false alarms
Miss often Fewer false alarms
272000 274000 276000 278000 280000 282000
Probability
Execution Time
Low 𝜽
High 𝜽
Limitations and Future Work
• Limitations
– Low detection accuracy for short malicious code
→ More deterministic execution
– Still high false positive
→ Long-term monitoring
• Other future work
– Monitoring multiple applications on multiple cores
– Monitoring of other behavioral aspects (e.g., Memory, I/O)
– Multi-dimensional monitoring
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
29
Thank you
SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems
30

More Related Content

What's hot

Velocity 2015 linux perf tools
Velocity 2015 linux perf toolsVelocity 2015 linux perf tools
Velocity 2015 linux perf tools
Brendan Gregg
 
Broken Linux Performance Tools 2016
Broken Linux Performance Tools 2016Broken Linux Performance Tools 2016
Broken Linux Performance Tools 2016
Brendan Gregg
 
AOS Lab 4: If you liked it, then you should have put a “lock” on it
AOS Lab 4: If you liked it, then you should have put a “lock” on itAOS Lab 4: If you liked it, then you should have put a “lock” on it
AOS Lab 4: If you liked it, then you should have put a “lock” on it
Zubair Nabi
 
Computing Performance: On the Horizon (2021)
Computing Performance: On the Horizon (2021)Computing Performance: On the Horizon (2021)
Computing Performance: On the Horizon (2021)
Brendan Gregg
 
AOS Lab 11: Virtualization
AOS Lab 11: VirtualizationAOS Lab 11: Virtualization
AOS Lab 11: Virtualization
Zubair Nabi
 
RTOS on ARM cortex-M platform -draft
RTOS on ARM cortex-M platform -draftRTOS on ARM cortex-M platform -draft
RTOS on ARM cortex-M platform -draft
Jou Neo
 
High Performance Storage Devices in the Linux Kernel
High Performance Storage Devices in the Linux KernelHigh Performance Storage Devices in the Linux Kernel
High Performance Storage Devices in the Linux Kernel
Kernel TLV
 
From DTrace to Linux
From DTrace to LinuxFrom DTrace to Linux
From DTrace to Linux
Brendan Gregg
 
ACM Applicative System Methodology 2016
ACM Applicative System Methodology 2016ACM Applicative System Methodology 2016
ACM Applicative System Methodology 2016
Brendan Gregg
 
AOS Lab 8: Interrupts and Device Drivers
AOS Lab 8: Interrupts and Device DriversAOS Lab 8: Interrupts and Device Drivers
AOS Lab 8: Interrupts and Device Drivers
Zubair Nabi
 
Speeding up ps and top
Speeding up ps and topSpeeding up ps and top
Speeding up ps and top
Kirill Kolyshkin
 
Modern Linux Tracing Landscape
Modern Linux Tracing LandscapeModern Linux Tracing Landscape
Modern Linux Tracing Landscape
Kernel TLV
 
Block I/O Layer Tracing: blktrace
Block I/O Layer Tracing: blktraceBlock I/O Layer Tracing: blktrace
Block I/O Layer Tracing: blktrace
Babak Farrokhi
 
AOS Lab 6: Scheduling
AOS Lab 6: SchedulingAOS Lab 6: Scheduling
AOS Lab 6: Scheduling
Zubair Nabi
 
YOW2021 Computing Performance
YOW2021 Computing PerformanceYOW2021 Computing Performance
YOW2021 Computing Performance
Brendan Gregg
 
Kernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologies
Kernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologiesKernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologies
Kernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologies
Anne Nicolas
 
HKG15-100: What is Linaro working on - core development lightning talks
HKG15-100:  What is Linaro working on - core development lightning talksHKG15-100:  What is Linaro working on - core development lightning talks
HKG15-100: What is Linaro working on - core development lightning talks
Linaro
 
BPF: Tracing and more
BPF: Tracing and moreBPF: Tracing and more
BPF: Tracing and more
Brendan Gregg
 
Vxworks
VxworksVxworks
SREcon 2016 Performance Checklists for SREs
SREcon 2016 Performance Checklists for SREsSREcon 2016 Performance Checklists for SREs
SREcon 2016 Performance Checklists for SREs
Brendan Gregg
 

What's hot (20)

Velocity 2015 linux perf tools
Velocity 2015 linux perf toolsVelocity 2015 linux perf tools
Velocity 2015 linux perf tools
 
Broken Linux Performance Tools 2016
Broken Linux Performance Tools 2016Broken Linux Performance Tools 2016
Broken Linux Performance Tools 2016
 
AOS Lab 4: If you liked it, then you should have put a “lock” on it
AOS Lab 4: If you liked it, then you should have put a “lock” on itAOS Lab 4: If you liked it, then you should have put a “lock” on it
AOS Lab 4: If you liked it, then you should have put a “lock” on it
 
Computing Performance: On the Horizon (2021)
Computing Performance: On the Horizon (2021)Computing Performance: On the Horizon (2021)
Computing Performance: On the Horizon (2021)
 
AOS Lab 11: Virtualization
AOS Lab 11: VirtualizationAOS Lab 11: Virtualization
AOS Lab 11: Virtualization
 
RTOS on ARM cortex-M platform -draft
RTOS on ARM cortex-M platform -draftRTOS on ARM cortex-M platform -draft
RTOS on ARM cortex-M platform -draft
 
High Performance Storage Devices in the Linux Kernel
High Performance Storage Devices in the Linux KernelHigh Performance Storage Devices in the Linux Kernel
High Performance Storage Devices in the Linux Kernel
 
From DTrace to Linux
From DTrace to LinuxFrom DTrace to Linux
From DTrace to Linux
 
ACM Applicative System Methodology 2016
ACM Applicative System Methodology 2016ACM Applicative System Methodology 2016
ACM Applicative System Methodology 2016
 
AOS Lab 8: Interrupts and Device Drivers
AOS Lab 8: Interrupts and Device DriversAOS Lab 8: Interrupts and Device Drivers
AOS Lab 8: Interrupts and Device Drivers
 
Speeding up ps and top
Speeding up ps and topSpeeding up ps and top
Speeding up ps and top
 
Modern Linux Tracing Landscape
Modern Linux Tracing LandscapeModern Linux Tracing Landscape
Modern Linux Tracing Landscape
 
Block I/O Layer Tracing: blktrace
Block I/O Layer Tracing: blktraceBlock I/O Layer Tracing: blktrace
Block I/O Layer Tracing: blktrace
 
AOS Lab 6: Scheduling
AOS Lab 6: SchedulingAOS Lab 6: Scheduling
AOS Lab 6: Scheduling
 
YOW2021 Computing Performance
YOW2021 Computing PerformanceYOW2021 Computing Performance
YOW2021 Computing Performance
 
Kernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologies
Kernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologiesKernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologies
Kernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologies
 
HKG15-100: What is Linaro working on - core development lightning talks
HKG15-100:  What is Linaro working on - core development lightning talksHKG15-100:  What is Linaro working on - core development lightning talks
HKG15-100: What is Linaro working on - core development lightning talks
 
BPF: Tracing and more
BPF: Tracing and moreBPF: Tracing and more
BPF: Tracing and more
 
Vxworks
VxworksVxworks
Vxworks
 
SREcon 2016 Performance Checklists for SREs
SREcon 2016 Performance Checklists for SREsSREcon 2016 Performance Checklists for SREs
SREcon 2016 Performance Checklists for SREs
 

Viewers also liked

Cache-partitioning
Cache-partitioningCache-partitioning
Cache-partitioning
davidkftam
 
Cache, Set Associative, Write-Through, Write-Back
Cache, Set Associative, Write-Through, Write-BackCache, Set Associative, Write-Through, Write-Back
Cache, Set Associative, Write-Through, Write-Back
동호 이
 
RapidMRC
RapidMRCRapidMRC
RapidMRC
davidkftam
 
Abhik-Satish-dagstuhl
Abhik-Satish-dagstuhlAbhik-Satish-dagstuhl
Abhik-Satish-dagstuhl
Abhik Roychoudhury
 
Repair dagstuhl jan2017
Repair dagstuhl jan2017Repair dagstuhl jan2017
Repair dagstuhl jan2017
Abhik Roychoudhury
 
Repair dagstuhl
Repair dagstuhlRepair dagstuhl
Repair dagstuhl
Abhik Roychoudhury
 
Developing a University-Wide Integrated Employee Core Competency Framework
Developing a University-Wide Integrated Employee Core Competency FrameworkDeveloping a University-Wide Integrated Employee Core Competency Framework
Developing a University-Wide Integrated Employee Core Competency Framework
Asia Master Training آسيا ماسترز للتدريب والتطوير
 
Practical real-time operating system security for the masses
Practical real-time operating system security for the massesPractical real-time operating system security for the masses
Practical real-time operating system security for the masses
Milosch Meriac
 
Resilient IoT Security: The end of flat security models
Resilient IoT Security: The end of flat security modelsResilient IoT Security: The end of flat security models
Resilient IoT Security: The end of flat security models
Milosch Meriac
 
Binary Analysis - Luxembourg
Binary Analysis - LuxembourgBinary Analysis - Luxembourg
Binary Analysis - Luxembourg
Abhik Roychoudhury
 

Viewers also liked (10)

Cache-partitioning
Cache-partitioningCache-partitioning
Cache-partitioning
 
Cache, Set Associative, Write-Through, Write-Back
Cache, Set Associative, Write-Through, Write-BackCache, Set Associative, Write-Through, Write-Back
Cache, Set Associative, Write-Through, Write-Back
 
RapidMRC
RapidMRCRapidMRC
RapidMRC
 
Abhik-Satish-dagstuhl
Abhik-Satish-dagstuhlAbhik-Satish-dagstuhl
Abhik-Satish-dagstuhl
 
Repair dagstuhl jan2017
Repair dagstuhl jan2017Repair dagstuhl jan2017
Repair dagstuhl jan2017
 
Repair dagstuhl
Repair dagstuhlRepair dagstuhl
Repair dagstuhl
 
Developing a University-Wide Integrated Employee Core Competency Framework
Developing a University-Wide Integrated Employee Core Competency FrameworkDeveloping a University-Wide Integrated Employee Core Competency Framework
Developing a University-Wide Integrated Employee Core Competency Framework
 
Practical real-time operating system security for the masses
Practical real-time operating system security for the massesPractical real-time operating system security for the masses
Practical real-time operating system security for the masses
 
Resilient IoT Security: The end of flat security models
Resilient IoT Security: The end of flat security modelsResilient IoT Security: The end of flat security models
Resilient IoT Security: The end of flat security models
 
Binary Analysis - Luxembourg
Binary Analysis - LuxembourgBinary Analysis - Luxembourg
Binary Analysis - Luxembourg
 

Similar to SecureCore RTAS2013

Python on Rails - Victory Levy
Python on Rails - Victory LevyPython on Rails - Victory Levy
Python on Rails - Victory Levy
Hakka Labs
 
a framework for fingerprinting ICS honeypots
a framework for fingerprinting ICS honeypotsa framework for fingerprinting ICS honeypots
a framework for fingerprinting ICS honeypots
Mohammad Reza Zamiri
 
Virtual Machines Security Internals: Detection and Exploitation
 Virtual Machines Security Internals: Detection and Exploitation Virtual Machines Security Internals: Detection and Exploitation
Virtual Machines Security Internals: Detection and Exploitation
Mattia Salvi
 
Breach and attack simulation tools
Breach and attack simulation toolsBreach and attack simulation tools
Breach and attack simulation tools
Bangladesh Network Operators Group
 
Countering Innovative Sandbox Evasion Techniques Used by Malware
Countering Innovative Sandbox Evasion Techniques Used by MalwareCountering Innovative Sandbox Evasion Techniques Used by Malware
Countering Innovative Sandbox Evasion Techniques Used by Malware
Tyler Borosavage
 
PANDEMONIUM: Automated Identification of Cryptographic Algorithms using Dynam...
PANDEMONIUM: Automated Identification of Cryptographic Algorithms using Dynam...PANDEMONIUM: Automated Identification of Cryptographic Algorithms using Dynam...
PANDEMONIUM: Automated Identification of Cryptographic Algorithms using Dynam...
CODE BLUE
 
Creating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & Visualization
Creating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & VisualizationCreating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & Visualization
Creating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & Visualization
Raffael Marty
 
Security for automation in Internet of Things by using one time password
Security for automation in Internet of Things by using one time passwordSecurity for automation in Internet of Things by using one time password
Security for automation in Internet of Things by using one time password
SHASHANK WANKHADE
 
Laporan Praktikum Keamanan Siber - Tugas 4 -Kelas C - Kelompok 3.pdf
Laporan Praktikum Keamanan Siber - Tugas 4 -Kelas C - Kelompok 3.pdfLaporan Praktikum Keamanan Siber - Tugas 4 -Kelas C - Kelompok 3.pdf
Laporan Praktikum Keamanan Siber - Tugas 4 -Kelas C - Kelompok 3.pdf
IGedeArieYogantaraSu
 
Blackhat USA 2016 - What's the DFIRence for ICS?
Blackhat USA 2016 - What's the DFIRence for ICS?Blackhat USA 2016 - What's the DFIRence for ICS?
Blackhat USA 2016 - What's the DFIRence for ICS?
Chris Sistrunk
 
BLOCKHUNTER.pptx
BLOCKHUNTER.pptxBLOCKHUNTER.pptx
BLOCKHUNTER.pptx
BhanuCharan9
 
BlueHat v18 || Record now, decrypt later - future quantum computers are a pre...
BlueHat v18 || Record now, decrypt later - future quantum computers are a pre...BlueHat v18 || Record now, decrypt later - future quantum computers are a pre...
BlueHat v18 || Record now, decrypt later - future quantum computers are a pre...
BlueHat Security Conference
 
Defcon through the_eyes_of_the_attacker_2018_slides
Defcon through the_eyes_of_the_attacker_2018_slidesDefcon through the_eyes_of_the_attacker_2018_slides
Defcon through the_eyes_of_the_attacker_2018_slides
Marina Krotofil
 
Micro-Architectural Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems
Micro-Architectural Attacks on Cyber-Physical SystemsMicro-Architectural Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems
Micro-Architectural Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems
Heechul Yun
 
Test Execution Infrastructure for IoT Quality analysis
Test Execution Infrastructure for IoT Quality analysisTest Execution Infrastructure for IoT Quality analysis
Test Execution Infrastructure for IoT Quality analysis
Axel Rennoch
 
InfiltrateCon 2016 - Why Nation-State Hack Telco Networks
InfiltrateCon 2016 - Why Nation-State Hack Telco NetworksInfiltrateCon 2016 - Why Nation-State Hack Telco Networks
InfiltrateCon 2016 - Why Nation-State Hack Telco Networks
Omer Coskun
 
Tsinghua University: Two Exemplary Applications in China
Tsinghua University: Two Exemplary Applications in ChinaTsinghua University: Two Exemplary Applications in China
Tsinghua University: Two Exemplary Applications in China
DataStax Academy
 
ACSAC2020 "Return-Oriented IoT" by Kuniyasu Suzaki
ACSAC2020 "Return-Oriented IoT" by Kuniyasu SuzakiACSAC2020 "Return-Oriented IoT" by Kuniyasu Suzaki
ACSAC2020 "Return-Oriented IoT" by Kuniyasu Suzaki
Kuniyasu Suzaki
 
TiReX: Tiled Regular eXpression matching architecture
TiReX: Tiled Regular eXpression matching architectureTiReX: Tiled Regular eXpression matching architecture
TiReX: Tiled Regular eXpression matching architecture
NECST Lab @ Politecnico di Milano
 
Mixed Scanning and DFT Techniques for Arithmetic Core
Mixed Scanning and DFT Techniques for Arithmetic CoreMixed Scanning and DFT Techniques for Arithmetic Core
Mixed Scanning and DFT Techniques for Arithmetic Core
IJERA Editor
 

Similar to SecureCore RTAS2013 (20)

Python on Rails - Victory Levy
Python on Rails - Victory LevyPython on Rails - Victory Levy
Python on Rails - Victory Levy
 
a framework for fingerprinting ICS honeypots
a framework for fingerprinting ICS honeypotsa framework for fingerprinting ICS honeypots
a framework for fingerprinting ICS honeypots
 
Virtual Machines Security Internals: Detection and Exploitation
 Virtual Machines Security Internals: Detection and Exploitation Virtual Machines Security Internals: Detection and Exploitation
Virtual Machines Security Internals: Detection and Exploitation
 
Breach and attack simulation tools
Breach and attack simulation toolsBreach and attack simulation tools
Breach and attack simulation tools
 
Countering Innovative Sandbox Evasion Techniques Used by Malware
Countering Innovative Sandbox Evasion Techniques Used by MalwareCountering Innovative Sandbox Evasion Techniques Used by Malware
Countering Innovative Sandbox Evasion Techniques Used by Malware
 
PANDEMONIUM: Automated Identification of Cryptographic Algorithms using Dynam...
PANDEMONIUM: Automated Identification of Cryptographic Algorithms using Dynam...PANDEMONIUM: Automated Identification of Cryptographic Algorithms using Dynam...
PANDEMONIUM: Automated Identification of Cryptographic Algorithms using Dynam...
 
Creating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & Visualization
Creating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & VisualizationCreating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & Visualization
Creating Your Own Threat Intel Through Hunting & Visualization
 
Security for automation in Internet of Things by using one time password
Security for automation in Internet of Things by using one time passwordSecurity for automation in Internet of Things by using one time password
Security for automation in Internet of Things by using one time password
 
Laporan Praktikum Keamanan Siber - Tugas 4 -Kelas C - Kelompok 3.pdf
Laporan Praktikum Keamanan Siber - Tugas 4 -Kelas C - Kelompok 3.pdfLaporan Praktikum Keamanan Siber - Tugas 4 -Kelas C - Kelompok 3.pdf
Laporan Praktikum Keamanan Siber - Tugas 4 -Kelas C - Kelompok 3.pdf
 
Blackhat USA 2016 - What's the DFIRence for ICS?
Blackhat USA 2016 - What's the DFIRence for ICS?Blackhat USA 2016 - What's the DFIRence for ICS?
Blackhat USA 2016 - What's the DFIRence for ICS?
 
BLOCKHUNTER.pptx
BLOCKHUNTER.pptxBLOCKHUNTER.pptx
BLOCKHUNTER.pptx
 
BlueHat v18 || Record now, decrypt later - future quantum computers are a pre...
BlueHat v18 || Record now, decrypt later - future quantum computers are a pre...BlueHat v18 || Record now, decrypt later - future quantum computers are a pre...
BlueHat v18 || Record now, decrypt later - future quantum computers are a pre...
 
Defcon through the_eyes_of_the_attacker_2018_slides
Defcon through the_eyes_of_the_attacker_2018_slidesDefcon through the_eyes_of_the_attacker_2018_slides
Defcon through the_eyes_of_the_attacker_2018_slides
 
Micro-Architectural Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems
Micro-Architectural Attacks on Cyber-Physical SystemsMicro-Architectural Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems
Micro-Architectural Attacks on Cyber-Physical Systems
 
Test Execution Infrastructure for IoT Quality analysis
Test Execution Infrastructure for IoT Quality analysisTest Execution Infrastructure for IoT Quality analysis
Test Execution Infrastructure for IoT Quality analysis
 
InfiltrateCon 2016 - Why Nation-State Hack Telco Networks
InfiltrateCon 2016 - Why Nation-State Hack Telco NetworksInfiltrateCon 2016 - Why Nation-State Hack Telco Networks
InfiltrateCon 2016 - Why Nation-State Hack Telco Networks
 
Tsinghua University: Two Exemplary Applications in China
Tsinghua University: Two Exemplary Applications in ChinaTsinghua University: Two Exemplary Applications in China
Tsinghua University: Two Exemplary Applications in China
 
ACSAC2020 "Return-Oriented IoT" by Kuniyasu Suzaki
ACSAC2020 "Return-Oriented IoT" by Kuniyasu SuzakiACSAC2020 "Return-Oriented IoT" by Kuniyasu Suzaki
ACSAC2020 "Return-Oriented IoT" by Kuniyasu Suzaki
 
TiReX: Tiled Regular eXpression matching architecture
TiReX: Tiled Regular eXpression matching architectureTiReX: Tiled Regular eXpression matching architecture
TiReX: Tiled Regular eXpression matching architecture
 
Mixed Scanning and DFT Techniques for Arithmetic Core
Mixed Scanning and DFT Techniques for Arithmetic CoreMixed Scanning and DFT Techniques for Arithmetic Core
Mixed Scanning and DFT Techniques for Arithmetic Core
 

Recently uploaded

Driving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success Story
Driving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success StoryDriving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success Story
Driving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success Story
Safe Software
 
Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdf
Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdfMonitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdf
Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdf
Tosin Akinosho
 
Trusted Execution Environment for Decentralized Process Mining
Trusted Execution Environment for Decentralized Process MiningTrusted Execution Environment for Decentralized Process Mining
Trusted Execution Environment for Decentralized Process Mining
LucaBarbaro3
 
Generating privacy-protected synthetic data using Secludy and Milvus
Generating privacy-protected synthetic data using Secludy and MilvusGenerating privacy-protected synthetic data using Secludy and Milvus
Generating privacy-protected synthetic data using Secludy and Milvus
Zilliz
 
Deep Dive: Getting Funded with Jason Jason Lemkin Founder & CEO @ SaaStr
Deep Dive: Getting Funded with Jason Jason Lemkin Founder & CEO @ SaaStrDeep Dive: Getting Funded with Jason Jason Lemkin Founder & CEO @ SaaStr
Deep Dive: Getting Funded with Jason Jason Lemkin Founder & CEO @ SaaStr
saastr
 
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup Slides
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup SlidesProgramming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup Slides
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup Slides
Zilliz
 
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides
DanBrown980551
 
Finale of the Year: Apply for Next One!
Finale of the Year: Apply for Next One!Finale of the Year: Apply for Next One!
Finale of the Year: Apply for Next One!
GDSC PJATK
 
GraphRAG for Life Science to increase LLM accuracy
GraphRAG for Life Science to increase LLM accuracyGraphRAG for Life Science to increase LLM accuracy
GraphRAG for Life Science to increase LLM accuracy
Tomaz Bratanic
 
Building Production Ready Search Pipelines with Spark and Milvus
Building Production Ready Search Pipelines with Spark and MilvusBuilding Production Ready Search Pipelines with Spark and Milvus
Building Production Ready Search Pipelines with Spark and Milvus
Zilliz
 
Recommendation System using RAG Architecture
Recommendation System using RAG ArchitectureRecommendation System using RAG Architecture
Recommendation System using RAG Architecture
fredae14
 
dbms calicut university B. sc Cs 4th sem.pdf
dbms  calicut university B. sc Cs 4th sem.pdfdbms  calicut university B. sc Cs 4th sem.pdf
dbms calicut university B. sc Cs 4th sem.pdf
Shinana2
 
Deep Dive: AI-Powered Marketing to Get More Leads and Customers with HyperGro...
Deep Dive: AI-Powered Marketing to Get More Leads and Customers with HyperGro...Deep Dive: AI-Powered Marketing to Get More Leads and Customers with HyperGro...
Deep Dive: AI-Powered Marketing to Get More Leads and Customers with HyperGro...
saastr
 
Presentation of the OECD Artificial Intelligence Review of Germany
Presentation of the OECD Artificial Intelligence Review of GermanyPresentation of the OECD Artificial Intelligence Review of Germany
Presentation of the OECD Artificial Intelligence Review of Germany
innovationoecd
 
AWS Cloud Cost Optimization Presentation.pptx
AWS Cloud Cost Optimization Presentation.pptxAWS Cloud Cost Optimization Presentation.pptx
AWS Cloud Cost Optimization Presentation.pptx
HarisZaheer8
 
UI5 Controls simplified - UI5con2024 presentation
UI5 Controls simplified - UI5con2024 presentationUI5 Controls simplified - UI5con2024 presentation
UI5 Controls simplified - UI5con2024 presentation
Wouter Lemaire
 
Columbus Data & Analytics Wednesdays - June 2024
Columbus Data & Analytics Wednesdays - June 2024Columbus Data & Analytics Wednesdays - June 2024
Columbus Data & Analytics Wednesdays - June 2024
Jason Packer
 
Overcoming the PLG Trap: Lessons from Canva's Head of Sales & Head of EMEA Da...
Overcoming the PLG Trap: Lessons from Canva's Head of Sales & Head of EMEA Da...Overcoming the PLG Trap: Lessons from Canva's Head of Sales & Head of EMEA Da...
Overcoming the PLG Trap: Lessons from Canva's Head of Sales & Head of EMEA Da...
saastr
 
How to Interpret Trends in the Kalyan Rajdhani Mix Chart.pdf
How to Interpret Trends in the Kalyan Rajdhani Mix Chart.pdfHow to Interpret Trends in the Kalyan Rajdhani Mix Chart.pdf
How to Interpret Trends in the Kalyan Rajdhani Mix Chart.pdf
Chart Kalyan
 
Best 20 SEO Techniques To Improve Website Visibility In SERP
Best 20 SEO Techniques To Improve Website Visibility In SERPBest 20 SEO Techniques To Improve Website Visibility In SERP
Best 20 SEO Techniques To Improve Website Visibility In SERP
Pixlogix Infotech
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Driving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success Story
Driving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success StoryDriving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success Story
Driving Business Innovation: Latest Generative AI Advancements & Success Story
 
Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdf
Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdfMonitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdf
Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdf
 
Trusted Execution Environment for Decentralized Process Mining
Trusted Execution Environment for Decentralized Process MiningTrusted Execution Environment for Decentralized Process Mining
Trusted Execution Environment for Decentralized Process Mining
 
Generating privacy-protected synthetic data using Secludy and Milvus
Generating privacy-protected synthetic data using Secludy and MilvusGenerating privacy-protected synthetic data using Secludy and Milvus
Generating privacy-protected synthetic data using Secludy and Milvus
 
Deep Dive: Getting Funded with Jason Jason Lemkin Founder & CEO @ SaaStr
Deep Dive: Getting Funded with Jason Jason Lemkin Founder & CEO @ SaaStrDeep Dive: Getting Funded with Jason Jason Lemkin Founder & CEO @ SaaStr
Deep Dive: Getting Funded with Jason Jason Lemkin Founder & CEO @ SaaStr
 
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup Slides
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup SlidesProgramming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup Slides
Programming Foundation Models with DSPy - Meetup Slides
 
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up Slides
 
Finale of the Year: Apply for Next One!
Finale of the Year: Apply for Next One!Finale of the Year: Apply for Next One!
Finale of the Year: Apply for Next One!
 
GraphRAG for Life Science to increase LLM accuracy
GraphRAG for Life Science to increase LLM accuracyGraphRAG for Life Science to increase LLM accuracy
GraphRAG for Life Science to increase LLM accuracy
 
Building Production Ready Search Pipelines with Spark and Milvus
Building Production Ready Search Pipelines with Spark and MilvusBuilding Production Ready Search Pipelines with Spark and Milvus
Building Production Ready Search Pipelines with Spark and Milvus
 
Recommendation System using RAG Architecture
Recommendation System using RAG ArchitectureRecommendation System using RAG Architecture
Recommendation System using RAG Architecture
 
dbms calicut university B. sc Cs 4th sem.pdf
dbms  calicut university B. sc Cs 4th sem.pdfdbms  calicut university B. sc Cs 4th sem.pdf
dbms calicut university B. sc Cs 4th sem.pdf
 
Deep Dive: AI-Powered Marketing to Get More Leads and Customers with HyperGro...
Deep Dive: AI-Powered Marketing to Get More Leads and Customers with HyperGro...Deep Dive: AI-Powered Marketing to Get More Leads and Customers with HyperGro...
Deep Dive: AI-Powered Marketing to Get More Leads and Customers with HyperGro...
 
Presentation of the OECD Artificial Intelligence Review of Germany
Presentation of the OECD Artificial Intelligence Review of GermanyPresentation of the OECD Artificial Intelligence Review of Germany
Presentation of the OECD Artificial Intelligence Review of Germany
 
AWS Cloud Cost Optimization Presentation.pptx
AWS Cloud Cost Optimization Presentation.pptxAWS Cloud Cost Optimization Presentation.pptx
AWS Cloud Cost Optimization Presentation.pptx
 
UI5 Controls simplified - UI5con2024 presentation
UI5 Controls simplified - UI5con2024 presentationUI5 Controls simplified - UI5con2024 presentation
UI5 Controls simplified - UI5con2024 presentation
 
Columbus Data & Analytics Wednesdays - June 2024
Columbus Data & Analytics Wednesdays - June 2024Columbus Data & Analytics Wednesdays - June 2024
Columbus Data & Analytics Wednesdays - June 2024
 
Overcoming the PLG Trap: Lessons from Canva's Head of Sales & Head of EMEA Da...
Overcoming the PLG Trap: Lessons from Canva's Head of Sales & Head of EMEA Da...Overcoming the PLG Trap: Lessons from Canva's Head of Sales & Head of EMEA Da...
Overcoming the PLG Trap: Lessons from Canva's Head of Sales & Head of EMEA Da...
 
How to Interpret Trends in the Kalyan Rajdhani Mix Chart.pdf
How to Interpret Trends in the Kalyan Rajdhani Mix Chart.pdfHow to Interpret Trends in the Kalyan Rajdhani Mix Chart.pdf
How to Interpret Trends in the Kalyan Rajdhani Mix Chart.pdf
 
Best 20 SEO Techniques To Improve Website Visibility In SERP
Best 20 SEO Techniques To Improve Website Visibility In SERPBest 20 SEO Techniques To Improve Website Visibility In SERP
Best 20 SEO Techniques To Improve Website Visibility In SERP
 

SecureCore RTAS2013

  • 1. SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems Man-Ki Yoon, Sibin Mohan, Jaesik Choi, Jung-Eun Kim, Lui Sha Dept. of Computer Science, UIUC Information Trust Institute, UIUC Lawrence Berkeley National Lab Apr 9th, 2013
  • 2. Rethinking Real-Time Embedded System Security SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 2 Increased Capability More Networked Open, Standard Platform More Vulnerable to Security Attacks
  • 3. SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 3 SecureCore Architecture Intrusion Detection, not prevention •Most critical component: control application •System recovery upon detection Behavior monitoring •Predictable timing behaviors of real-time apps •Profile using statistical learning Multicore-based core-to-core monitoring •On-chip HW for processor state inspection •Hypervisor-based protection/isolation
  • 4. Rest of the Talk • System and Application Model • Timing-based Intrusion Detection (Overview) • SecureCore – Architecture Design – Timing-based Intrusion Detection (Detail) • Implementation and Evaluation • Limitations and Future Work SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 4
  • 5. • Multicore-based Real-Time Control System System and Application Model SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 5 Physical plant Time Controller Sensor data Sensor data Actuation cmd Actuation cmd SecureCore MonitoredCore SecureCore Architecture
  • 6. • Multicore-based Real-Time Control System System and Application Model SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 6 Physical plant Time Controller Sensor data Sensor data Actuation cmd Actuation cmd Threat Model: Malicious code execution • Embedded in the control code • Activated after system initialization • Irrelevant how it gained entry SecureCore MonitoredCore SecureCore Architecture
  • 7. Timing-Based Intrusion Detection • Idea: Deterministic timing of real-time applications – Any malicious activity consumes finite time to execute – Deviation from expected timing → Suspicious! SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 7 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 𝒆 𝟏 𝒆 𝟐 𝒆 𝟑 𝒆 𝟒 𝒆 𝟓 𝒆 𝟔 Malicious Code 𝑒3 ∗ ≠ 𝑒3 Observed Legitimate
  • 8. Timing-Based Intrusion Detection • Idea: Deterministic timing of real-time applications – Any malicious activity consumes finite time to execute – Deviation from expected timing → Suspicious! SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 8 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ1 = 3𝑚𝑠 𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2 = 7𝑚𝑠 𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ3 = 5𝑚𝑠 𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑋 = 7 𝑚𝑠 𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑌 = 9 𝑚𝑠 𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑋 =? 𝑚𝑠 Execution time variations Control flow path Input values System effects (e.g., shared resource) 𝒆 𝟏 𝒆 𝟐 𝒆 𝟑 𝒆 𝟒 𝒆 𝟓 𝒆 𝟔
  • 9. Timing-Based Intrusion Detection • Idea: Deterministic timing of real-time applications – Any malicious activity consumes finite time to execute – Deviation from expected timing → Suspicious! SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 9 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 𝑒1 𝑒2 𝑒3 𝑒4 𝑒5 𝑒6 𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ1 = 3𝑚𝑠 𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2 = 7𝑚𝑠 𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ3 = 5𝑚𝑠 𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑋 = 3 𝑚𝑠 𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑌 = 2 𝑚𝑠 𝑒6|𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ2, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑋 =? 𝑚𝑠 Execution time variations Control flow path Input values System effects (e.g., shared resource) • Profile probabilistic execution time model • Estimate Prob(e*) • Capture even legitimate variations Statistical learning-based profiling/detection 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008 0.0010 0.0012 0.0014 0.0016 0.0018 0.0020 272000 274000 276000 278000 280000 282000 Prob.Density Execution Time
  • 10. Outline • System and Application Models • Timing-based Intrusion Detection (Overview) • SecureCore – Architecture Design – Timing-based Intrusion Detection (Detail) • Implementation and Evaluation • Limitations and Future Work SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 10
  • 11. SecureCore Architecture SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 11 Plant Complex Controller Safety Ctrl. Decision Module Sensor Data Actuation Command Monitored Core Secure Core OS OS Hypervisor I/O Proxy Inter-Core Communication Timing Trace Module Scratch Pad Memory Secure Monitor
  • 12. Timing-Based Intrusion Detection • Block-level monitoring – Narrowing estimation domain • Less variation, better accuracy – Block boundary: check point • Detect unexpected flow deviations SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 12 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6
  • 13. How to Get Timing Profiles SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 13 Raw Traces Trace Tree Profiles Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 Block 6 Block 6 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 Block 6 Block 6 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 272000 274000 276000 278000 280000 282000 Statistical Learning
  • 14. Timing Trace Module SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 14 rlwimi 0,0,0,0,1 rlwimi 0,0,0,0,2 rlwimi 0,0,0,0,3 rlwimi 0,0,0,0,4 INST_REG_PID INST_ENABLE_TRACE INST_DISABLE_TRACE INST_TRACE foo() { INST_TRACE; Do_something(); INST_TRACE; Do_something(); INST_TRACE; } main() { INST_REG_PID; … INST_ENABLE_TRACE; … foo(); ... INST_DISABLE_TRACE; } Trace Instructions Timestamp i+2 PID BA AddrHead Timestamp i Addr i Timestamp i+1 Addr i+1 Addr i+2 ... ... AddrTail 0x000 Timestamp j Addr j Timestamp j+1 Addr j+10x010 0xFF0 4 Bytes 0x8a0 0x8b0 0x8c0 SPM Layout - PID registration for preventing traces from being forged - BA: Base Address ( = PC of INST_REG_PID)
  • 15. Timing Trace Module SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 15 rlwimi 0,0,0,0,1 rlwimi 0,0,0,0,2 rlwimi 0,0,0,0,3 rlwimi 0,0,0,0,4 INST_REG_PID INST_ENABLE_TRACE INST_DISABLE_TRACE INST_TRACE foo() { INST_TRACE; Do_something(); INST_TRACE; Do_something(); INST_TRACE; } main() { INST_REG_PID; … INST_ENABLE_TRACE; … foo(); ... INST_DISABLE_TRACE; } Trace Instructions Timestamp i+2 PID BA AddrHead Timestamp i Addr i Timestamp i+1 Addr i+1 Addr i+2 ... ... AddrTail 0x000 Timestamp j Addr j Timestamp j+1 Addr j+10x010 0xFF0 4 Bytes 0x8a0 0x8b0 0x8c0 SPM Layout - Read Timestamp and Program Counter from the processor registers - Addri = BA – PCi (i.e., relative address from BA)
  • 16. Raw Traces SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 16 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 INST_TRACE INST_TRACE INST_TRACE INST_TRACE INST_TRACE INST_TRACE INST_TRACE Addr1 Addr2 Addr3 Addr4 Addr6 Addr5 Addr7 (Addr1, t5) (Addr2, t6) (Addr4, t7) (Addr6, t8) (Addr7, t9) (Addr1, t10) (Addr2, t11) (Addr4, t12) (Addr5, t13) (Addr7, t14) … (Addr1, t1) (Addr3, t3) (Addr7, t4) (Addr2, t2)
  • 17. Trace Tree SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 17 (Addr1, t5) (Addr2, t6) (Addr4, t7) (Addr6, t8) (Addr7, t9) (Addr1, t10) (Addr2, t11) (Addr4, t12) (Addr5, t13) (Addr7, t14) … (Addr1, t1) (Addr3, t3) (Addr7, t4) (Addr2, t2) Addr1 Addr3 Addr2 Addr7 Block1 Block2Block6 Addr4 Addr5 Addr7 Block6Block4 Addr2 Addr6 Addr7 Addr4 Block6 Block3 Block5 t2-t1 t3- t2 t4- t3 t6-t5 t11-t10 t7-t6 t12-t11 t13-t12 t9-t8 t8-t7 t14-t13 …… … … … ……
  • 18. Trace Tree SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 18 (Addr1, t5) (Addr2, t6) (Addr4, t7) (Addr6, t8) (Addr7, t9) (Addr1, t10) (Addr2, t11) (Addr4, t12) (Addr5, t13) (Addr7, t14) … (Addr1, t1) (Addr3, t3) (Addr7, t4) (Addr2, t2) Addr1 Addr3 Addr2 Addr7 Block1 Block2Block6 Addr4 Addr5 Addr7 Block6Block4 Addr2 Addr6 Addr7 Addr4 Block6 Block3 Block5 t2-t1 t3- t2 t4- t3 t6-t5 t11-t10 t7-t6 t12-t11 t13-t12 t9-t8 t8-t7 t14-t13 …… … … … …… Same execution block, but on different paths. Each has its own timing profile From a trace tree, we can get • Execution time samples (each node) • Legitimate execution flows
  • 19. Timing Profile • What is a good estimation of execution times? – Min & max, mean, … • Not representative • Cannot capture variations well – Probabilistic timing model • Estimate the likelihoods of execution times! – Probability distribution • Parametric vs. Non-parametric distribution – Unknown shape SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 19
  • 20. (FigureisfromCSCE666PatternAnalysisbyRicardoGutierrez-OsunaatTAMU) Example Execution Time Profile Using Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) • Non-parametric Probability Density Function Estimation SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 20 1 2 3 1. Given samples of execution times 2. Draw scaled distribution at each sample point 3. Sum them up - Kernel & bandwidth affect shape and smoothness - Gaussian kernel Estimated pdf Kernel function Bandwidth (Smoothing constant)
  • 21. Intrusion Detection Using Timing Profiles SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 21 0.0000 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008 0.0010 0.0012 0.0014 0.0016 0.0018 0.0020 272000 273000 274000 275000 276000 277000 278000 279000 280000 281000 282000 Prob.Density Execution Time PDF of the Execution Time of an example block Highly likely Multiple peaks: different inputs or system effects How much deviation should we consider malicious? Threshold test Prob(𝑒∗ ) < 𝜽 Prob(𝑒∗ ) ≥ 𝜽 Malicious Legitimate •E.g., 𝜃 = 0.01 or 0.05 •At least 𝜃 of measurements were close to 𝑒∗
  • 22. Summary of Timing-Based Intrusion Detection SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 22 Complex Controller Secure Monitor Monitored Core Secure Core Timing Trace Module Scratch Pad Memory Addr1 Addr3 Addr2 Addr7 Block1 Block2Block6 Addr4 Addr5 Addr7 Block6Block4 Addr2 Addr6 Addr7 Addr4 Block6 Block3 Block5 [Profile] Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Block 6 [Run-time Execution] (Addr1, ti) (Addr2, ti+1) (Addr4, ti+2) (Addr6, ti+3) (Addr7, ti+4) Trace Traverse and check
  • 23. Outline • System and Application Models • Timing-based Intrusion Detection (Overview) • SecureCore – Architecture Design – Timing-based Intrusion Detection (Detail) • Implementation and Evaluation • Limitations and Future Work SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 23
  • 24. Implementation SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 24 CC SC DM SM Monitored Core Secure Core IOP LWE Linux 2.6.34 TTM SPM Hypervisor Inverted Pendulum (IP) Dynamics Simics (P4080) Host PC Serial (tty) Pseudo Terminal (pts)Byte channel Freescale P4080 on Simics • Only two cores (Core 0 and 1) • Cache (L1 and L2) and bus models for system effects • ISA modification for trace instruction
  • 25. Implementation SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 25 CC SC DM SM Monitored Core Secure Core IOP LWE Linux 2.6.34 TTM SPM Hypervisor Inverted Pendulum (IP) Dynamics Simics (P4080) Host PC Serial (tty) Pseudo Terminal (pts)Byte channel Inverted Pendulum Control • Controller and dynamics (cart position, rod’s angle) • Generated from Simulink IP model
  • 26. Application Model • IP Control + FFT (EEMBC) SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 26 FFT Init FFT Phase #1 FFT Phase #2 FFT Phase #3 IP Control PathID = 1, 2 PathID = 0 1 run if PathID = 0, 1 2 runs if PathID = 2 0 + 1 meter Malicious code • Injected at the end of FFT Phase #3 • Simple loop (some array copy) • 440, 720, 1000 cycles for 1,3,5 loops • (FFT Phase#3: ~260,000 cycles) • Activated when the cart passes +0.7 m • Execute randomly thereafter • Loop execution • Sends old actuation cmd Timing Profile • ~10,000 runs (no malicious code activation) • ‘ksdensity’ (Matlab) for Gaussian KDE • Total exec time: 850,000 ~ 1,200,000 cycles (~1ms) • Control period: 10 ms
  • 27. Early Detection SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 27 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 Time (sec) Cartposition(meter) No attack 𝜽: 𝟎. 𝟎𝟏 (1%) Loop count: 3 ( ~ 720 cycles) 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 Time (sec) Cartposition(meter) No attack No protection Attack activated 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 Time (sec) Cartposition(meter) No attack No protection Simplex only Attack activated 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 Time (sec) Cartposition(meter) No attack No protection Simplex only Our methodAttack activated
  • 28. Intrusion Detection Accuracy SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 28 • Criteria: False prediction rates – False positive: predict “malicious” when not – False negative: fail to detect a real attack PredictedReal 1/1024 (0.10%) 7/1015 (0.69%) 1 loop 3 loops 5 loops 827/1022 (81%) 574/1046 (55%) 130/1098 (12%) 578/1050 (55%) 117/1011 (12%) 0/1024 (0%) False positive rates False negative rates Trade off: Low 𝜽? High 𝜽? Detect well More false alarms Miss often Fewer false alarms 272000 274000 276000 278000 280000 282000 Probability Execution Time Low 𝜽 High 𝜽
  • 29. Limitations and Future Work • Limitations – Low detection accuracy for short malicious code → More deterministic execution – Still high false positive → Long-term monitoring • Other future work – Monitoring multiple applications on multiple cores – Monitoring of other behavioral aspects (e.g., Memory, I/O) – Multi-dimensional monitoring SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 29
  • 30. Thank you SecureCore: A Multicore-based Intrusion Detection Architecture for Real-Time Embedded Systems 30