Public Lecture Slides (7.9.2018) Sino-Japanese Power Politics
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Sino-Japanese Power Politics: Might, Money and Minds Speaker: Dr. Giulio Pugliese, Lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London ICAS public lecture videos on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAA67B040B82B8AEF
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Public Lecture Slides (7.9.2018) Sino-Japanese Power Politics
- 1. Japan-China Power Politics: Might, Money and Minds The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan July 9, 2018 Giulio Pugliese – giulio.pugliese@kcl.ac.uk Twitter handle: @PugliesAsia
- 2. Outline of Today’s Presentation • Might: Importance of Balancing • Money: Economic Statecraft and Geo-Economic Competition • Minds: Sino-Japanese Propaganda Race
- 3. The International Structure • Structural Realism: states cooperate, balance or compete along the incentives posed by a particular distribution of power in the international (or regional) system. • Defensive Realism variant: “Balance-of-threat” theory, states balance against perceived threats rather than against power or capabilities per se.
- 5. Neo-Classical Realism and Sino-Japanese Relations • An increasingly unbalanced multipolar system • States balance against perceived threats. • Intentions and perception of state leaders • Xi and Abe as “paramount” leaders • China fills a vacuum, Japan balances China • Both states promote adversarial narratives Structure of International System as Independent Variable Intra-state mechanisms as Intervening Variable Foreign Policy Behavior as dependent variable
- 6. MIGHT: INSTITUTIONAL BUILD-UP CHINA JAPAN • 12/2013: Establishment of the National Security Council • 12/2013: Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy -> whole of-gov’t-approach • 2013-2016: New security legislation (State Secrecy Law, Nat. Security Laws, Anti- Conspiracy Law) • Abe’s mandate until 2021? • 11/2013: Establishment of opaque CCP’s National Security Commission. • Active use of small leading groups. • Emphasis on national/domestic security • Xi as “core leader”: more than two mandates.
- 7. MIGHT CHINA JAPAN EXTERNAL BALANCING • 2006-2007: The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity + Quad. • 2012~: Asian Democratic Security Diamond. • 2015 US-Japan Security Guidelines • 2017~ : Free and Open Indo-Pacific + Quad? INTERNAL BALANCING • 2013: Reorganization of Coast Guard under SOA. • 2013-ongoing: militarization of the Coast Guard • 11/2013: Establishment of East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.
- 8. MONEY Geo-economics and Economic Statecraft • Geo-economics: Japan’s Indo-Pacific initiatives – China’s Belt & Road Initiative • Geo-economics II: Japan’s new Oda Charter and capacity building
- 10. MINDS Strategic Narratives CHINA 1. Peaceful “Self” vs. aggressive “Other” 2. Status quo “Self” vs. revisionist “Other” 3. Benevolent China versus unrepentant Japan > History used as a tool for domestic and international gains. JAPAN 1. Peaceful “Self” vs. aggressive “Other” 2. Status quo “Self” vs. revisionist “Other” 3. Democratic and lawful Japan versus autocratic, unlawful China >Simplification of the message, also for political gains
- 11. International Propaganda Forays CHINA • Chinese state-owned media in English • SOA publishing house • Mobilization of Chinese overseas communities • Cultural Diplomacy JAPAN • Generous PR budgets: for consumption by Prime Ministerial Executive • MOFA’s Strategic Information Dissemination: 50 billion yen (+300% in 2015), toeing Prime Minister’s line. • New institutions: Japan Houses (5 billion yen)
- 12. Conclusion: Détente, at last?
- 13. Further References: • 2017 “Japan’s Kissinger? Yachi Shōtarō: the State Behind the Curtain”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 90, No.2 • 2017 “Kantei Diplomacy? Japan's Hybrid Leadership in Foreign and Security Policy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 30, No.2 • 2017 “No Conflict by Invitation: Japan’s China Balancing amidst US Relative Decline”, in James Parisot and Santino Regilme (eds.), Global Cooperation or Conflict? The Rise of Emerging Powers and the Post-American World Order, London and New York: Routledge. • 2018 “Post-Cold War Sino-Japanese Relations and Japan’s China Policy: The Rise of Strategic Realism,” in James D. Brown and Jeff Kingston (eds)., Routledge Handbook of Japan’s International Relations in Asia.
Editor's Notes
- Distinctively Realist understanding of Japan-China relations in full display following Senkaku/Diaoyu standoff that coincided with rise of Abe and Xi: two governments engaged in zero-sum power games in a three dimensional chessboard: traditional military security also through coast guard ships & para-military tools (China); economic initiatives for political if not geo-political gains; information efforts. In itself empirically new initiatives: embedded in the broader argument is evidence of Japan socialized to Chinese practice, playing a Chinese game while Japan presents itself as defender of liberal order, it has played increasingly by the power politics book, as it would normally happen. So-called international liberal order has rested on Pax Americana and favourable balance granted by relatively benign US hegemony, granting security to Japan. Now under serious question: not just Trump, but a process that has started with 2nd Bush Administration and became evident under Obama.
- Strong personalities; hands-on approach to policy-making centralized & top-down also through politicized bureaucracy (Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs). Remarkable consistency. Written extensively on Abe’s leadership style and decision-making; especially on his bond with National Security Advisor Yachi.
- MILITARIZATION= PLAN transfers of units and substantal increase in tonnage + weapons instead of water cannons; 2017: People’s Armed Police now controls Coast Guard (under CMC); Japan and US successfully convinced China od acting with restraint and quieting activities, but only at tactical level ECS connected with SCS. Indo-Pacific & Quad: much hyped and going flat as the first did. Trump commited to bilateral relations; China going on a charm offensive: India committed to non-alignment.
- Japan passed domestic legislation for TPP-11; Mexico as well; Australia and Canada soon; others to follow? Change in development practice: JICA also focused on Free & Open Indo-Pacific Strategy
- Systemic form of purposeful persuasion intended to influence emotions, attitudes and actions through messages/signalling that may or may not be factual. 1622 Bernini building;
- China’s overtures to South Korea are exemplary (Memorial honouring Korean freedom fighter in Harbin); message tailored for UK, Australia, local communities; Japan -> lamenting Chinese resource extractive activities in ECS, in its own part of the Japan-claimed median line, is fully lawful, interestingly enough James Manicom cites private conversations with Japanese officials that acknowledge it; China also very clever in not going against international law here, especially if we consider the fact that a dispute exists. Realpolitik gains: cement resolve on islands, sell publicity to public opinion. Democracy and rule of law also a simplification of Japanese behaviour -> cozying up to Duterte, and Russia. Protracted War – Mao reference / influential article reprinted on website of Qiúshì , bi-monthly journal 实事求是 (shí shì qiú shì) circulated amongst high-level Communist Party officials author: China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations Logic of gaining leverage is evident. NSS outlines the blueprint of Japan’s communication strategy. New Protracted War: Use all Resources to Fight and Curb Right-Leaning Japan” (全力打好遏制日本右傾化的“新持久戰”) JAPAN NSS: “At a time when the global security environment is becoming more complex and diverse, it becomes increasingly likely for countries to have conflicting interests [emphasis added]” “in order to promote its security policy it is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate its policy to the world and its people.”
- Publicity on the Senkaku/Diaoyu: Advisory Panel on Communications Concerning Territorial Integrity; New educational guidelines; Japanese research on disputed islands; museum opened in 2017 on the subject. Propaganda in narrow sense: covert funding of think tank in London to pen commentary in prestigious newspapers, signed by authoritative proxies. Speaking of which, strategic investment in fostering Japan/East Asia political experts: initially I was affected growing interest on Japan-China relations meant it turned into a meta-project; almost philosophical: who am I? What am I doing? – Considerable liberty. JBIC pooling resources through help of 3 megabanks + 2 to allow Nikkei Shinbun to acquire Financial Times ($1.3 billion deal)
- NDA President Kokubun: Xi Jinping now more comfortable, got rid of rival factions and anti-Japan discourses: Former Amb. Miyamoto Yuji: China’s self-examination of policy failures, especially as growing consensus mounts in the US and, to a lesser extent, Europe about Chinese intentions and growing capabilities. There’s truth to that: early interviews confirm that China wanted badly to restart Economic Dialogue with Japan in April, and insisted in early JPN-CHN-ROK trilateral in May against Moon remonstrations to celebrate his one year inauguration back home; leverage versus Trump (also as Japan will continue bilateral econ. dialogue under tenser atmo); US-China trade wars also negative to Japan given regional production networks. & Tactical détente; tenuous; Dialogues restarted; Maritime-aerial communication mechanism, but doesn’t cover Coast Guard. Basic Plan Ocean Policy emphasizes security; History issue is sidelined, but new institutions have been initiated NanMassMemorialDay –Xi participated -- Comfort Women offensive, spillover effects among Chinese comm in Canada. Abe now praised for “overtures” to China, but suspicions remain on Abe’s “militarist dream” Senkaku/Diaoyu islands also toned down, but China claims victory with pro forma patrols. Signalling continues also with new crescendo: Submarine in January in Cont.Zone; sometimes four ships. Back to square one: it’s the US-China structure that has moved China towards “charm offensive”, but China reasons that time is on its side and will work on that assumption.