The document outlines key concepts in international relations and foreign policy, including deterrence, security dilemmas, and decision-making processes in government agencies. It discusses the implications of military dynamics, such as the strategic defense initiative and the role of various actors like interest groups and public opinion in shaping foreign policy. Additionally, it highlights the importance of psychological factors in decision-making and the complexities of crisis management within the realms of modern warfare.

1. Dr. Tabakian’s Political Science 7
Modern World Governments – Spring 2013
Supplemental Power Point Material #8

2. LECTURE HIGHLIGHTS (1)
• Deterrence
• Obsolescence Of War
• Security Dilemma
• Counterbalancing
• Strategic Defense Initiative
• Missile Defense Agency
• Making Foreign Policy
• Models Of Decision Making
• Decision Making As Steering
• Individual Decision Makers
• Group Psychology

3. LECTURE HIGHLIGHTS (2)
• Crisis Management
• Domestic Politics
• Bureaucracies
• Interest Groups
• Military Industrial Complex
• Public Opinion
• Legislatures

4. DETERRENCE
Deterrence has worked because neither side
really knew what the other side was thinking. A
problem with deterrence is that the more times
bluffs are made it may lead to a time when
someone is going to make the call. At this point
there are only three alternatives:
1. Resort to nuclear war
2. Retreat
3. Resort to conventional war

5. OBSOLESCENCE OF WAR
Realists argue that the struggle for power remains
constant in the international system. The only variable is
the makeup of the balance of power. This may be bipolar,
or multipolar, which in turn determines whether war or
peace. When one state assumes unilateral control over
its neighbors, war will most likely erupt. A multipolar
balance of power leads to a constant struggle for power
among those states that continuing “tit for tat”
advantages. Bipolar distributions of power have shown to
be the best method for maintaining peace. Deterrence
theory argues that war will become obsolete and that it
will become transfixed in the moral arena.

6. SECURITY DILEMMA
Nation-states pursue their individual national-interests on
a never-ending basis, which in turn leads to a stable
international system. Defenders of a competitive security
system suggest that states are forever striving to increase
their security in relation to that of other states. This would
entail ego’s gain as alter’s loss and as a result is prone to
security dilemmas. In a cooperative security system,
states equate the security of each as a contribution to the
collective good. National interests are seen to bolster
international interests.

7. COUNTERBALANCING (1)
One can argue that the People’s Republic Of China (PRC)
will continue to seek a counterbalancing force to prevent
the US from extending its realm of influence in Asia. The
defensive posture of the US along with its cooperation
with Japan in building nationally based and theatre wide
anti-missile defense systems is plainly seen as a threat to
the PRC as it can also have offensive capabilities.
Realists affirm that power can serve to deter threats, but
too much power can force other actors to respond harshly,
sparking a “security dilemma”, which is a situation when
actors begin pursuing more power, resulting in an
environment that is less safe.

8. COUNTERBALANCING (2)
The PRC has nothing to worry about as anti-missile
defenses are not even worth considering if they are not
close to 100% effective. Once a state is in possession of
a delivery system that is able to withstand a first-strike
and deliver warheads to all targets, then it has achieved
the rational limits of nuclear armament. The rules of
World War II do not apply in the nuclear age with respect
to arms races

9. MAKING FOREIGN POLICY (1)
• Foreign policies are the strategies
governments use to guide their actions in
the international arena.
– Spell out the objectives state leaders
have decided to pursue in a given
relationship or situation.
– Foreign policy process: How policies
are arrived at and implemented.

10. MAKING FOREIGN POLICY (2)
• Comparative foreign policy.
– Study of foreign policy in various states
in order to discover whether similar
types of societies or governments
consistently have similar types of foreign
policies.
• Foreign policy outcomes result from
multiple forces at various levels of
analysis.

11. MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (1)
• Rational model:
– Decision makers set goals, evaluate
their relative importance, calculate the
costs and benefits of each possible
course of action, and then choose the
one with the highest benefits and lowest
costs.
– Role of uncertainty.
– Accepting of risk versus averse to risk.

12. MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (2)
• Organizational process model:
– Foreign policy makers generally skip the labor-
intensive process of identifying goals and alternative
actions, relying instead for most decisions on
standardized responses or standard operating
procedures (sop).
• Government bargaining (bureaucratic) model:
– Foreign policy decisions result from the bargaining
process among various government agencies with
somewhat divergent interests in the outcome.

13. DECISION MAKING AS STEERING

14. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (1)
• Study of individual decision making revolves
around the question of rationality.
– To what extent are national leaders (or citizens)
able to make rational decisions in the national
interest and thus conform to the realist view of
IR?
• Difficulties of oversimplification
– Individual decision makers have differing values
and beliefs and have unique personalities.
– Idiosyncrasies.

15. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (2)
• Beyond individual idiosyncrasies, individual
decision making diverges from the rational model
in at least three systematic ways:
• Decision makers suffer from misperceptions
and selective perceptions when they compile
information on the likely consequences of their
choices.
• The rationality of individual cost-benefit
calculations is undermined by emotions that
decision makers feel while thinking about the
consequences of their actions (affective bias).

16. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (3)
• Cognitive biases are systematic distortions of
rational calculations based not on emotional
feelings but simply on the limitations of the
human brain in making choices.
• Cognitive dissonance
• Justification of effort
• Wishful thinking
• Mirror image
• Projection
• Historical analogies

17. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (4)
• Two specific modifications of the rational model of
decision making have been proposed to accommodate
psychological realities.
– Bounded rationality:
• Takes into account the costs of seeking and
processing information.
– Optimizing.
– Satisfying.
– Prospect theory:
• Decision makes go through two phases: editing
phase and the evaluation phase.
• Holds that evaluations take place by comparison
with a reference point, which is often the status
quo but might be some past or expected situation.

18. GROUP PSYCHOLOGY
• Group dynamics can be a promoter of state interests but
they can also introduce new sources of irrationality into
the decision-making process.
• Groupthink
– Refers to the tendency for groups to reach decisions
without accurately assessing their consequences,
because individual members tend to go along with
ideas they think the others support
– Groups tend to be overly optimistic about the chances
of success and are thus more willing to take risks.
• Iran-Contra scandal

19. CRISIS MANAGEMENT
• Crises are foreign policy situations in
which outcomes are very important
and time frames are compressed.
–Time constraints
–Groupthink
–Psychological stress

20. DOMESTIC POLITICS
• Foreign policy is shaped not only by the
internal dynamics of individual and group
decision making but also by the states
and societies within which decision
makers operate.

21. BUREAUCRACIES
• Diplomats:
– Virtually all states maintain a diplomatic corps, or
foreign service, of diplomats in embassies in foreign
capitals.
– Political appointees.
– Career diplomats.
– Tension common between state leaders and foreign
policy bureaucrats.
• Interagency tensions:
– Bureaucratic rivalry as an influence on foreign policy
challenges the notion of states as unitary actors in the
international system.

22. INTEREST GROUPS
• Coalitions of people who share a common interest in the
outcome of some political issue and who organize
themselves to try to influence the outcome.
• Lobbying:
– The process of talking with legislators or officials to
influence their decisions on some set of issues.
– Three important elements:
• Ability to gain a hearing with busy officials.
• Ability to present cogent arguments for one’s case.
• Ability to trade favors in return for positive action
on an issue.

23. MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1)
• Huge interlocking network of governmental agencies,
industrial corporations, and research institutes, working
together to supply a nation’s military forces.
• Response to the growing importance of technology
• Encompasses a variety of constituencies, each of which has
an interest in military spending.
– Corporations, military officers, universities, and scientific
institutes that receive military research contracts.
– Revolving door.
– PACS from the military industry.

24. MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2)
The phrase, “Military Industrial Complex” was
first used by President Dwight D. Eisenhower
during his farewell address to the nation on
January 17, 1961. He warns against the
increasing influence of corporate influence in
all areas of government. More significant is
the fact that before the presidency, Dwight
Eisenhower’s was a five-star general in the
United States Army. During the Second World
War, he served as Supreme Commander of
the Allied forces in Europe, with responsibility
for planning and supervising the successful
invasion of France and Germany in 1944–45.
In 1951, he became the first supreme
commander of NATO.

25. PUBLIC OPINION (1)
• Range of views on foreign policy issues
held by the citizens of a state.
• Has a greater influence on foreign policy in
democracies than in authoritarian
governments.
– Legitimacy
– Propaganda
– Journalists as gatekeepers

26. PUBLIC OPINION (2)
• In democracies, public opinion generally
has less effect on foreign policy than on
domestic policy.
– Attentive public
– Foreign policy elite
– Rally ’round the flag syndrome
– Diversionary foreign policy

27. LEGISLATURES (1)
• Conduit through which interest groups and public opinion
can wield influence.
– Presidential systems; separate elections.
• Legislatures play a direct role in making foreign
policy.
• Different rules apply, however, to the use of military
force.
– Rally ’round the flag.
– May challenge the president if they have power
of the “purse”.

28. LEGISLATURES (2)
– Parliamentary systems; political parties are
dominant
• Often parliamentary executives do not need
to submit treaties or policies for formal
approval by the legislature.
• Call elections; new executive
• Legislatures play a key role in designing
and implementing foreign policy.

29. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (1)
AIRBORNE LASER LABORATORY
The Airborne Laser Lab was a gas-dynamic
laser mounted in a modified version of a KC-
135 used for flight testing. Similar to the
commercial Boeing 707, the slightly smaller
KC-135 was designed to military specifications
and operated at hight gross weights. The
NKC-135A (S/N 55-3123) is one of 14 KC-
135As permanently converted for special
testing. It was extensively modified by the Air
Force weapons Labratory at Kirtland AFB,
New Mexico, and used in an 11-year
experiment to prove a high-energy laser could
be operated in an aircraft and employed
against airborne targets. During the
experiment, the Airborne Laser Lab destroyed
five AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and a
Navy BQM-34A target drone.

30. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (2)

31. MDA’s mision is to develop and field an
integrated, layered, ballistic missile defense
system to defend the United States, its
deployed forces, allies, and friends against all
ranges of enemy ballistic missiles in all phases
of flight. The fundamental objective of the
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program is to
develop the capability to defend forces and
territories of the United States, its allies and
friends against all classes and ranges of
ballistic missile threats.

32. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has developed a
research, development and test program focusing on missile
defense as a single layered defense system. The structure
involves three basic phases of ballistic missile trajectories:
boost, midcourse and terminal. Boost phase is the portion of
flight immediately after launch, when the missile is to gain
acceleration under power to lift its payload into the air
(airspace). This lasts 3-5 minutes.

33. Midcourse phase is the longest part of
the missile flight. It is where the missile
payload has separated from the
booster rocket and is coasting
unpowered toward a target. This phase
can be as long as 20 minutes. The final
phase is called terminal. This is when
the missile's warhead re-enters the
earth's atmosphere and falls towards
its target, propelled only by its
momentum and the force of gravity.
However, its speed can be thousands
of miles per hour. This phase lasts
approximately 30 seconds.

35. BOOST PHASE DEFENSE
The boost phase is the part of a missile flight path from
launch until it stops accelerating under its own power.
Typically the boost phase ends at altitudes of 300 miles or
less, and within the first 3 to 5 minutes of flight. During this
phase, the rocket is climbing against the Earth's gravity.
Intercepting a missile in its boost phase is the ideal solution.
We can defend a large area of the globe and prevent
midcourse decoys from being deployed by destroying the
missile early in its flight. Of the boost phase defenses, the
Airborne Laser (ABL) is the most mature.

36. The two types of boost defense elements are:
1. Directed energy systems using high power lasers such
as the Airborne Laser
2. Kinetic energy interceptors
Boost phase elements will be integrated into an overall
Ballistic Missile Defense operational concept. Sensors
developed in this segment will have multi-mission
capabilities intended to provide critical tracking data for
threat ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.

37. AIRBORNE LASER
1. Designed to detect, track, target, and kill
threatening missiles, no matter if they are
short, medium, or long-range
2. Uses an amalgamation of technologies
including a Boeing 747-400 freighter and
Chemical, Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL)
3. Laser destroys the missile by heating its
metal skin until it cracks
4. Infrared sensors were first tested on the F-
14 "Tomcat" fighter aircraft shortly before
the first Gulf War

38. Overview
The Airborne Laser program brings together a combination
of technologies: a 747 aircraft, an advanced detection and
tracking system, adaptive optics, and a revolutionary high-
energy laser, all of which are being integrated into a single
weapon system for the first time

39. AIRBORNE LASER PROGRAM

40. Operational Sequence
1. The Airborne Laser uses six strategically placed infrared sensors
to detect the exhaust plume of a boosting missile
2. Once a target is detected, a kilowatt-class laser, the Track
Illuminator, tracks the missile and determines a precise aim point
3. The Beacon Illuminator, a second kilowatt-class laser, then
measures disturbances in the atmosphere, which are corrected
by the adaptive optics system to accurately point and focus the
high energy laser
4. Using a very large telescope located in the nose turret, the beam
control/fire control system focuses the megawatt class laser
beam onto a pressurized area of the boosting missile

41. Development
1. Testing was completed on the High Energy Chemical Oxygen Iodine
Laser on December 6, 2005. The laser was fired continuously for
more than 10 seconds at a power level sufficient to destroy a hostile
ballistic missile.
2. The Low Power System Integration-active flight test series was
successfully completed on Aug. 23, 2007 at Edwards Air Force Base,
Calif. During the test, ABL used all three of the aircraft's laser
systems to detect, track, and then engaged a target mounted on a
test aircraft with a low-power laser that is serving as a surrogate for
the high-power laser.
3. ABL has begun integration of the High Energy Laser system on the
aircraft. Upon completion, the aircraft will undergo additional ground
and flight tests prior to the lethal demonstration against a boosting
missile in 2009.

42. KINETIC ENERGY WEAPONS
1. The program's primary objective over the next few
years is developing an interceptor capable of
destroying incoming missiles
2. The longer-term objective is to develop an
interceptor that can kill ballistic missiles in the
midcourse phase of flight
3. The first generation of these interceptors, called the
Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) element
4. System was tested fully in 2011

43. Kinetic Energy Interceptors
The Kinetic Energy Interceptors program’s mission is to provide
the Ballistic Missile Defense System a strategically deployable,
tactically mobile land and sea-based capability to defeat medium
to long-range ballistic missiles during the boost, ascent, and
midcourse phases of flight. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors
weapon system has the potential capacity to be deployed as an
element of the Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System in
three configurations: land-mobile, sea-mobile, and land-fixed.
These multiple deployment configurations increase engagement
opportunities, enhance the Ballistic Missile Defense System’s
layered defensive capability, and decrease life-cycle operation
costs by leveraging common sub-components across the three
deployed configurations.

44. Overview
The Kinetic Energy Interceptors weapon
system is comprised of three major
components: a missile launcher; a fire
control and communications unit; and a
high acceleration interceptor that delivers
payloads capable of destroying adversary
ballistic missiles and their lethal payloads
using kinetic energy.

45. Details
1. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors destroy ballistic missiles in
the boost, ascent, or midcourse phases of flight
2. During boost or ascent phase intercepts, the interceptor’s
payload acquires, homes, and kinetically destroys a hot
burning threat ballistic missile prior to deployment of its
lethal payload, decoys, and countermeasures
3. For midcourse phase intercepts, the interceptor’s payload
acquires, discriminates the missile’s deployed lethal
payload from accompanying decoys, countermeasures
and exhausted boost motors, and then destroys the lethal
payload

46. 4. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors weapon system’s
mobility enables rapid deployment near an adversary’s
launch sites and subsequent early battle-space
engagements of the adversary’s ballistic missile in the
boost, ascent, and early midcourse phases of flight.
5. Mobility provides the operational flexibility to respond to
changing adversary conditions (countries,
countermeasures, and tactics) and mitigates an
adversary’s capability to exploit our fixed-site ballistic
missile defense weapon systems.
6. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors fire control component
interfaces with the Ballistic Missile Defense System
command and control element, Ballistic Missile Defense
System sensors and other overhead sensors to obtain
threat tracking data.

47. MIDCOURSE PHASE DEFENSE
The midcourse phase of a ballistic missile trajectory allows the
longest window of opportunity to intercept an incoming missile up
to 20 minutes. This is the point where the missile has stopped
thrusting so it follows a more predictable glide path. The
midcourse interceptor and a variety of radars and other sensors
have a longer time to track and engage the target compared to
boost and terminal interceptors. Also, more than one interceptor
could be launched to ensure a successful hit. A downside to the
longer intercept window is the attacker has an opportunity to
deploy countermeasures against a defensive system.

48. Primary Elements Of Midcourse Defense Segment
1. Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
2. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD)
Ground Based Midcourse (GMD)
1. Defends against long-range ballistic missile attacks
2. During a GMD intercept, a booster missile flies toward a
target's predicted location and releases a "kill vehicle" on a
path with the incoming target.
3. The kill vehicle uses data from ground-based radars and its
own on-board sensors to collide with the target, thus
destroying both the target and the kill vehicle using only the
force of the impact

49. Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
The mission of the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense element of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System is to defend the nation, our deployed
personnel, and our friends and allies against a
limited long-range ballistic missile attack.
Overview
1. Uses an array of sensors, radars, and ground-based
interceptors that are capable of shooting down long-range
ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase
2. Directly hits the incoming missile by ramming the warhead with
a closing speed of approximately 15,000 miles per hour to
destroy it. This is called “hit-to-kill” technology and has been
proven to work

50. Details
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense is
composed of three main components:
sensors, ground-based interceptors, and fire
control and communications
1. Sensors: Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense uses a variety of sensors and
radars to obtain information on missile
launches and to track, discriminate, and
target an incoming warhead. This
information is provided to the Ground-
Based Interceptor before launch and
during flight to help it find the incoming
ballistic missile and close with it.

51. 2. Ground-Based Interceptor: A Ground-Based Interceptor is
made up of a three-stage, solid fuel booster and an
exoatmospheric kill vehicle. When launched, the booster
missile carries the kill vehicle toward the target’s predicted
location in space. Once released from the booster, the 152
pound kill vehicle uses data received in-flight from ground-
based radars and its own on-board sensors to close with and
destroy the target using only the force of the impact.
3. Fire Control and Communications: This is the central
nervous system of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
element. It connects all of the hardware, software and
communications systems necessary for planning, tasking and
controlling Ground-Based Midcourse Defense.

52. Development
1. Interceptor missiles are emplaced at Fort Greely, Alaska and
Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. More are planned to be
emplaced in 2006
2. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense fire control centers are in
Colorado and Alaska
3. Several existing early warning radars located around the
world, including one on Shemya Island in the Alaskan
Aleutian chain, have been upgraded to support flight tests
and to provide tracking information in the event of a hostile
missile attack
4. Nearing completion is a powerful, mobile Sea-based X-Band
radar that is scheduled to be fully integrated into the Ballistic
Missile Defense System in 2006

53. AEGIS
The sea-based system is intended to
intercept short to medium range hostile
missiles in the ascent and descent phase of
midcourse flight. Engaging missiles in the
ascent phase reduces the overall BMD
System's susceptibility to countermeasures.
Builds upon technologies in the existing
Aegis Weapons System now aboard U.S.
Navy ships and uses the Standard Missile 3.

54. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is the sea-based
element of the Missile Defense Agency’s Ballistic
Missile Defense System that has been tactically
certified, deployed and contributes to the ongoing
BMD System under development. Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense leverages and builds upon
capabilities inherent in the Aegis Weapon System,
Standard Missile, and Navy Ballistic Missile
Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
and Intelligence systems. Aegis is at sea, on patrol,
certified, and on alert, performing a strategic role in
Homeland Defense.

55. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Long Range Surveillance and
Track:
1. Aegis Destroyers, on Ballistic Missile Defense patrol, detect and
track Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and report track data to the
missile defense system. This capability shares tracking data to cue
other missile defense sensors and provides fire control data to
Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors located at Fort
Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. To date,
sixteen Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers have been upgraded with
the Long Range Surveillance and Track capability.
2. At-sea tracking events and flight tests have verified the capability to
track Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and demonstrated the
connectivity and reliability of long-haul transmission of track data
across nine time zones.

56. Engagement Capability
1. Aegis Cruisers and Long Range Surveillance and Track
Destroyers are equipped with the capability to intercept short
and medium range, unitary and separating ballistic missile
threats with the Standard Missile 3.
2. Flight tests are conducted using operational warships, operated
by fleet Sailors and Officers. Each test progressively increases
the operational realism and complexity of targets and scenarios.
To date, there have been nine successful intercepts out of
eleven attempts. The next flight mission is scheduled for
summer, 2008.
3. The engagement capability will be resident in three Aegis
Cruisers and 15 Destroyers by 2009. Additionally, the capability
is present on several Japanese ships and other nations are
interested.

57. Testing
To date, including a dual engagement in November, 2007 and the
first test by an allied Navy in December, 2007, the Aegis BMD
has had 12 intercepts in 14 attempts, including two intercepts by
two interceptors during one test. Multiple tests are planned for
each year.
Future Capabilities
1. Increased precision track data via radar signal processing
upgrades, improving both Long Range Surveillance and
Track and engagement capabilities
2. Defense against intermediate and intercontinental ballistic
missiles
3. Increased international participation in sea-based ballistic
missile defense capabilities

58. TERMINAL PHASE DEFENSE
A missile enters the terminal phase when the warhead falls
back into the atmosphere. This phase generally lasts from 30
seconds to one minute. The primary elements in the Terminal
Defense Segment are:
1. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
2. PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
3. Arrow, a joint effort between the U.S. and Israel
4. Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), a co-
developmental program with Germany and Italy

59. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD)
1. THAAD will destroy a ballistic missile as it transitions
from the midcourse to terminal phase of its trajectory
2. A land-based element that has the capability to shoot
down a short or medium range ballistic missile in its
final stages of flight
3. Consists of four principal components: truck-mounted
launchers; interceptors; radars; and command,
control and battle management (C2BM)
4. All system components fit inside a C-130 aircraft for
transport around the world

60. Arrow
1. Developed jointly by the U.S. and Israel.
Provides capability to defend against short and
medium-range ballistic missiles
2. Became operational in October 2000
3. Arrow Deployability Program (ADP) supports
Israel's acquisition of a third Arrow battery and
Arrows' interoperability with U.S. systems
4. Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP)
includes both technical cooperation to improve
the performance of the AWS and a cooperative
test and evaluation program to validate the
improved performance

61. PATRIOT PAC-3 Program
1. The most mature elements of the BMDS
2. Transferred to the U. S. Army in 2003.
3. MDA still responsible for PAC-3's integration
into BMDS
4. Builds on the previous PATRIOT air and
missile defense infrastructure
5. PAC-3 missiles were deployed to Southwest
Asia as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom in
2003

62. Medium Extended Air Defense System
1. A cooperative effort between the United States,
Germany, and Italy to develop an air and missile
defense system that is mobile and transportable
2. Capable of countering ballistic missiles and air-
breathing threats such as aircraft, unmanned
aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles, utilizing a
radar with a 360 degree capability
3. Uses the combat-proven Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 (PAC-3) as a platform

63. 4. MEADS' role in ballistic missile defense is to
bridge the gap between man-portable systems
like the Stinger missile and the higher levels of
the (BMDS), such as the Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) system
5. Offers the opportunity for U. S. forces to work in
conjunction with our allies and contributes to the
interoperability of U. S. and allied forces ballistic
missile defense systems
6. Future development will be an Army-led effort
because of its close association with PAC-3

64. Sensors
An effective layered defense incorporates a wide-range
of sensors to detect and track threat missiles through all
phases of their trajectory. Satellites and a family of land-
and sea-based radars provide worldwide sensor
coverage.
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)
The restructured Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS) will be a constellation of interoperable
Research and Development (R&D) satellites and
supporting ground infrastructure for the detection,
tracking and discrimination of ballistic missiles. Data
from STSS will be used to allow BMDS interceptors to
engage incoming missiles earlier in flight. Plans are for
STSS to be incorporated into the missile defense Test
Bed beginning in 2006-2007.

65. Defense Support Program (DSP) Satellites
Existing Defense Support Program (DSP)
satellites, now orbiting the earth in a
geosynchronous orbit, provide global coverage
for early warning, tracking and identification.
Besides warning of a ballistic missile launch,
satellite sensors can develop an early estimate of
where the hostile missile is headed. Integration
of DSP into the initial missile defense capability
provides first, accurate warning and early
tracking of a ballistic missile launch.

66. Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
constellation will provide early warning of ballistic
missile attacks and accurate state vector
information to effectively cue other Ballistic Missile
Defense System elements to support, intercept
and negate the threat. Currently under
development by the U.S. Air Force, SBIRS will
provide early warning messages, accurate launch
point estimates to support theater attack
operations, radar cue for enhanced active defense
for both theater operations and Ground Missile
Defense operations.

67. Early Warning Radars (EWR)
MDA is upgrading the hardware and
software of existing ground-based radars
located in California, Alaska and
overseas for incorporation into initial
defense capabilities. These upgrades
will allow the radar to more accurately
determine where an incoming ballistic
missile is headed.

68. THAAD Radar
The TPS-X radar produced for the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) missile system will be
upgraded to be used in the Test Bed
to validate algorithms and support
forward based capability for near
and long-term missile defense
capabilities.

69. Forward Deployable Radars (FDR)
Forward Deployable Radars would provide
additional layers of sensor capability and more
effective tracking of hostile missiles. Forward
basing of ground based radars places the
radar where it can obtain data from early parts
of an ICBM’s trajectory and provides for early
and accurate target-tracing and signature
data, permitting earlier launch of defense
interceptors and a greater battle space within
which they can operate. Derived from the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
X-band radar, it is air-transportable, adding
the ability to quickly move the radar to where it
is most needed.

70. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (1)
AIRBORNE LASER LABORATORY
The Airborne Laser Lab was a gas-dynamic
laser mounted in a modified version of a KC-
135 used for flight testing. Similar to the
commercial Boeing 707, the slightly smaller
KC-135 was designed to military specifications
and operated at hight gross weights. The
NKC-135A (S/N 55-3123) is one of 14 KC-
135As permanently converted for special
testing. It was extensively modified by the Air
Force weapons Labratory at Kirtland AFB,
New Mexico, and used in an 11-year
experiment to prove a high-energy laser could
be operated in an aircraft and employed
against airborne targets. During the
experiment, the Airborne Laser Lab destroyed
five AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and a
Navy BQM-34A target drone.

71. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (2)

72. MDA’s mision is to develop and field an
integrated, layered, ballistic missile defense
system to defend the United States, its
deployed forces, allies, and friends against all
ranges of enemy ballistic missiles in all phases
of flight. The fundamental objective of the
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program is to
develop the capability to defend forces and
territories of the United States, its allies and
friends against all classes and ranges of
ballistic missile threats. On December 17, 2002,
President George W. Bush directed the
Department of Defense to begin fielding in 2004
a capability to protect our homeland, deployed
forces, and our friends and allies from ballistic
missile attack.

73. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has developed a
research, development and test program focusing on missile
defense as a single layered defense system. The structure
involves three basic phases of ballistic missile trajectories:
boost, midcourse and terminal. Boost phase is the portion of
flight immediately after launch, when the missile is to gain
acceleration under power to lift its payload into the air
(airspace). This lasts 3-5 minutes.

74. Midcourse phase is the longest part of
the missile flight. It is where the missile
payload has separated from the
booster rocket and is coasting
unpowered toward a target. This phase
can be as long as 20 minutes. The final
phase is called terminal. This is when
the missile's warhead re-enters the
earth's atmosphere and falls towards
its target, propelled only by its
momentum and the force of gravity.
However, its speed can be thousands
of miles per hour. This phase lasts
approximately 30 seconds.

75. MDA'S GOALS
1. Retain, recruit, and develop a high-performing and accountable
workforce.
2. Deliver near-term additional defensive capability in a structured Block
approach to close gaps and improve the BMDS.
3. Establish partnerships with the Services to enable their operations and
support of the BMDS components for the Combatant Commanders.
4. Substantially improve and demonstrate the military utility of the BMDS
through increased system integration and testing.
5. Execute a robust BMDS technology and development program to
address the challenges of the evolving threat through the use of key
knowledge points.
6. Expand international cooperation through a comprehensive strategy to
support our mutual security interests in missile defense.
7. Maximize mission assurance and cost effectiveness of MDA's
management and operations through continuous process improvement.

76. THE THREAT
While the end of the Cold War signaled a reduction in the likelihood of global
nuclear conflict, the threat from ballistic missiles has grown steadily as
sophisticated missile technology becomes available on a wider scale to
countries hostile to the U.S. and its allies.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic and cruise
missiles that could deliver them pose a direct and immediate threat to the
security of the United States and its deployed military forces, allies and
friends.
We have already witnessed the willingness of countries to use theater-class
ballistic missiles for military purposes. Since 1980, ballistic missiles have
been used in six regional conflicts. Ballistic missiles, including
intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and
SLBMs) exist in abundance around the world today.

79. BOOST PHASE DEFENSE
The boost phase is the part of a missile flight path from
launch until it stops accelerating under its own power.
Typically the boost phase ends at altitudes of 300 miles or
less, and within the first 3 to 5 minutes of flight. During this
phase, the rocket is climbing against the Earth's gravity.
Intercepting a missile in its boost phase is the ideal solution.
We can defend a large area of the globe and prevent
midcourse decoys from being deployed by destroying the
missile early in its flight. Of the boost phase defenses, the
Airborne Laser (ABL) is the most mature.

80. The two types of boost defense elements are:
1. Directed energy systems using high power lasers such
as the Airborne Laser.
2. Kinetic energy interceptors.
Boost phase elements will be integrated into an overall
Ballistic Missile Defense operational concept. Sensors
developed in this segment will have multi-mission
capabilities intended to provide critical tracking data for
threat ballistic missiles in all phases of flight.

81. AIRBORNE LASER
1. Designed to detect, track, target, and kill
threatening missiles, no matter if they are
short, medium, or long-range.
2. Uses an amalgamation of technologies
including a Boeing 747-400 freighter and
Chemical, Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL).
3. Laser destroys the missile by heating its
metal skin until it cracks, which causes the
boosting missile to fail.
4. Infrared sensors were first tested on the F-
14 "Tomcat" fighter aircraft shortly before
the first Gulf War.

82. Overview
The Airborne Laser program brings together a combination
of technologies: a 747 aircraft, an advanced detection and
tracking system, adaptive optics, and a revolutionary high-
energy laser, all of which are being integrated into a single
weapon system for the first time.

83. Operational Sequence
1. The Airborne Laser uses six strategically placed infrared sensors
to detect the exhaust plume of a boosting missile.
2. Once a target is detected, a kilowatt-class laser, the Track
Illuminator, tracks the missile and determines a precise aim
point.
3. The Beacon Illuminator, a second kilowatt-class laser, then
measures disturbances in the atmosphere, which are corrected
by the adaptive optics system to accurately point and focus the
high energy laser at its intended target.
4. Using a very large telescope located in the nose turret, the beam
control/fire control system focuses the megawattclass laser
beam onto a pressurized area of the boosting missile, holding it
there until the concentrated energy causes the missile to break
apart.

84. Development
1. Testing was completed on the High Energy Chemical Oxygen Iodine
Laser on December 6, 2005. The laser was fired continuously for
more than 10 seconds at a power level sufficient to destroy a hostile
ballistic missile at operational ranges.
2. The Low Power System Integration-active flight test series was
successfully completed on Aug. 23, 2007 at Edwards Air Force Base,
Calif. During the test, ABL used all three of the aircraft's laser
systems to detect, track, and then engaged a target mounted on a
test aircraft with a low-power laser that is serving as a surrogate for
the high-power laser, and therefore demonstrating all steps required
to support a ballistic missile intercept.
3. ABL has begun integration of the High Energy Laser system on the
aircraft. Upon completion, the aircraft will undergo additional ground
and flight tests prior to the lethal demonstration against a boosting
missile in 2009.

85. KINETIC ENERGY WEAPONS
1. The program's primary objective over the next few
years is developing an interceptor capable of
destroying incoming missiles while their booster
rockets are still burning.
2. The longer-term objective is to develop an
interceptor that can kill ballistic missiles in the
midcourse phase of flight.
3. The first generation of these interceptors, called the
Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) element, will be built
and launched from mobile launchers.
4. System will be tested fully between 2010 and 2011.
MDA plans to integrate the missile into a sea-based
capability, giving the system worldwide availability.

86. Kinetic Energy Interceptors
The Kinetic Energy Interceptors program’s mission is to provide
the Ballistic Missile Defense System a strategically deployable,
tactically mobile land and sea-based capability to defeat medium
to long-range ballistic missiles during the boost, ascent, and
midcourse phases of flight. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors
weapon system has the potential capacity to be deployed as an
element of the Integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System in
three configurations: land-mobile, sea-mobile, and land-fixed.
These multiple deployment configurations increase engagement
opportunities, enhance the Ballistic Missile Defense System’s
layered defensive capability, and decrease life-cycle operation
costs by leveraging common sub-components across the three
deployed configurations.

87. Overview
The Kinetic Energy Interceptors weapon
system is comprised of three major
components: a missile launcher; a fire
control and communications unit; and a
high acceleration interceptor that delivers
payloads capable of destroying adversary
ballistic missiles and their lethal payloads
using kinetic energy.

88. Details
1. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors destroy ballistic missiles in
the boost, ascent, or midcourse phases of flight.
2. During boost or ascent phase intercepts, the interceptor’s
payload acquires, homes, and kinetically destroys a
hotburning threat ballistic missile prior to deployment of its
lethal payload, decoys, and countermeasures.
3. For midcourse phase intercepts, the interceptor’s payload
acquires, discriminates the missile’s deployed lethal
payload from accompanying decoys, countermeasures
and exhausted boost motors, and then autonomously
homes in, and kinetically destroys the lethal payload.

89. 4. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors weapon system’s mobility
enables rapid deployment near an adversary’s launch sites and
subsequent early battle-space engagements of the adversary’s
ballistic missile in the boost, ascent, and early midcourse phases
of flight.
5. Mobility provides the operational flexibility to respond to
changing adversary conditions (countries, countermeasures,
and tactics) and mitigates an adversary’s capability to exploit our
fixed-site ballistic missile defense weapon systems.
6. The Kinetic Energy Interceptors fire control component
interfaces with the Ballistic Missile Defense System command
and control element, Ballistic Missile Defense System sensors
and other overhead sensors to obtain threat tracking data.

90. MIDCOURSE PHASE DEFENSE
The midcourse phase of a ballistic missile trajectory allows the
longest window of opportunity to intercept an incoming missile up
to 20 minutes. This is the point where the missile has stopped
thrusting so it follows a more predictable glide path. The
midcourse interceptor and a variety of radars and other sensors
have a longer time to track and engage the target compared to
boost and terminal interceptors. Also, more than one interceptor
could be launched to ensure a successful hit. A downside to the
longer intercept window is the attacker has an opportunity to
deploy countermeasures against a defensive system. However,
the interceptor and other sensors have more time to observe and
discriminate countermeasures from the warhead. The Midcourse
Defense Segment has ground-and sea-based elements.

91. The primary elements of the Midcourse Defense Segment
are:
1. Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
2. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD)
Ground Based Midcourse (GMD)
1. Defends against long-range ballistic missile attacks.
2. During a GMD intercept, a booster missile flies toward a
target's predicted location and releases a "kill vehicle" on a
path with the incoming target.
3. The kill vehicle uses data from ground-based radars and its
own on-board sensors to collide with the target, thus
destroying both the target and the kill vehicle using only the
force of the impact.

92. Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
The mission of the Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense element of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System is to defend the nation, our deployed
personnel, and our friends and allies against a
limited long-range ballistic missile attack.
Overview
1. Uses an array of sensors, radars, and ground-based
interceptors that are capable of shooting down long-range
ballistic missiles during the midcourse phase of flight.
2. Directly hits the incoming missile by ramming the warhead with
a closing speed of approximately 15,000 miles per hour to
destroy it. This is called “hit-to-kill” technology and has been
proven to work in a number of flight tests.

93. Details
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense is
composed of three main components:
sensors, ground-based interceptors, and fire
control and communications.
1. Sensors: Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense uses a variety of sensors and
radars to obtain information on missile
launches and to track, discriminate, and
target an incoming warhead. This
information is provided to the Ground-
Based Interceptor before launch and
during flight to help it find the incoming
ballistic missile and close with it.

94. 2. Ground-Based Interceptor: A Ground-Based Interceptor is
made up of a three-stage, solid fuel booster and an
exoatmospheric kill vehicle. When launched, the booster
missile carries the kill vehicle toward the target’s predicted
location in space. Once released from the booster, the 152
pound kill vehicle uses data received in-flight from ground-
based radars and its own on-board sensors to close with and
destroy the target using only the force of the impact.
3. Fire Control and Communications: This is the central
nervous system of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
element. It connects all of the hardware, software and
communications systems necessary for planning, tasking and
controlling Ground-Based Midcourse Defense.

95. Development
1. Interceptor missiles are emplaced at Fort Greely, Alaska and
Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. More are planned to be
emplaced in 2006.
2. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense fire control centers have
been established in Colorado and Alaska.
3. Several existing early warning radars located around the
world, including one on Shemya Island in the Alaskan
Aleutian chain, have been upgraded to support flight tests
and to provide tracking information in the event of a hostile
missile attack.
4. Also nearing completion is a powerful, mobile Sea-based X-
Band radar that is scheduled to be fully integrated into the
Ballistic Missile Defense System in 2006.

96. AEGIS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
The sea-based system is intended to
intercept short to medium range hostile
missiles in the ascent and descent phase of
midcourse flight. Engaging missiles in the
ascent phase reduces the overall BMD
System's susceptibility to countermeasures.
Builds upon technologies in the existing
Aegis Weapons System now aboard U.S.
Navy ships and uses the Standard Missile 3.

97. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense is the sea-based
element of the Missile Defense Agency’s Ballistic
Missile Defense System that has been tactically
certified, deployed and contributes to the ongoing
BMD System under development. Aegis Ballistic
Missile Defense leverages and builds upon
capabilities inherent in the Aegis Weapon System,
Standard Missile, and Navy Ballistic Missile
Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
and Intelligence systems. Aegis is at sea, on patrol,
certified, and on alert, performing a strategic role in
Homeland Defense. It is a core mission of the U.S.
Navy, and a keystone in its “Cooperative Strategy for
21st Century Seapower.”

98. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Long Range Surveillance and
Track:
1. Aegis Destroyers, on Ballistic Missile Defense patrol, detect and
track Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and report track data to the
missile defense system. This capability shares tracking data to cue
other missile defense sensors and provides fire control data to
Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptors located at Fort
Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. To date,
sixteen Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers have been upgraded with
the Long Range Surveillance and Track capability.
2. At-sea tracking events and flight tests have verified the capability to
track Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and demonstrated the
connectivity and reliability of long-haul transmission of track data
(across nine time zones) necessary to support missile defense
situational awareness, target cueing, and engagements.

99. Engagement Capability
1. Aegis Cruisers and Long Range Surveillance and Track
Destroyers are being equipped with the capability to intercept
short and medium range, unitary and separating ballistic missile
threats with the Standard Missile 3.
2. Flight tests are conducted using operational warships, operated
by fleet Sailors and Officers. Each test progressively increases
the operational realism and complexity of targets and scenarios.
To date, there have been nine successful intercepts out of
eleven attempts. The next flight mission is scheduled for
summer, 2008.
3. The engagement capability will be resident in three Aegis
Cruisers and 15 Destroyers by 2009. Additionally, the capability
is present on several Japanese ships and other nations are
interested.

100. Testing
• To date, including a dual engagement in November, 2007 and
the first test by an allied Navy in December, 2007, the Aegis
BMD has had 12 intercepts in 14 attempts, including two
intercepts by two interceptors during one test. Multiple tests
are planned for each year.
Future Capabilities
1. Increased precision track data via radar signal processing
upgrades, improving both Long Range Surveillance and
Track and engagement capabilities.
2. Defense against intermediate and intercontinental ballistic
missiles.
3. Increased international participation in sea-based ballistic
missile defense capabilities.

101. TERMINAL PHASE DEFENSE
A missile enters the terminal phase when the warhead falls
back into the atmosphere. This phase generally lasts from 30
seconds to one minute. The primary elements in the Terminal
Defense Segment are:
1. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
2. PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
3. Arrow, a joint effort between the U.S. and Israel
4. Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), a co-
developmental program with Germany and Italy.

102. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD)
1. THAAD will destroy a ballistic missile as it transitions
from the midcourse to terminal phase of its trajectory.
2. A land-based element that has the capability to shoot
down a short or medium range ballistic missile in its
final stages of flight, both inside and just outside of
the atmosphere.
3. Consists of four principal components: truck-mounted
launchers; interceptors; radars; and command,
control and battle management (C2BM). System has
rapid mobility so that it can be air-lifted to almost
anywhere in the world within hours.
4. All system components fit inside a C-130 aircraft for
transport around the world.

103. Arrow
1. Developed jointly by the U.S. and Israel.
Provides Israel with a capability to defend its
borders and U.S. troops deployed in the region
against short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles.
2. System became operational in October 2000.
3. Arrow Deployability Program (ADP) supports
Israel's acquisition of a third Arrow battery and
Arrows' interoperability with U.S. systems.
4. Arrow System Improvement Program (ASIP)
includes both technical cooperation to improve
the performance of the AWS and a cooperative
test and evaluation program to validate the
improved performance.

104. PATRIOT PAC-3 Program
1. The most mature elements of the BMDS.
2. Transferred to the U. S. Army in 2003.
3. MDA still responsible for PAC-3's integration
into BMDS.
4. Builds on the previous PATRIOT air and
missile defense infrastructure.
5. PAC-3 missiles were deployed to Southwest
Asia as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom in
2003.

105. Medium Extended Air Defense System
1. A cooperative effort between the United States,
Germany, and Italy to develop an air and missile
defense system that is mobile and transportable.
2. Capable of countering ballistic missiles and air-
breathing threats such as aircraft, unmanned
aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles, utilizing a
radar with a 360 degree capability.
3. Uses the combat-proven Patriot Advanced
Capability-3 (PAC-3) as a platform.

106. 4. MEADS' role in ballistic missile defense is to
bridge the gap between man-portable systems
like the Stinger missile and the higher levels of
the (BMDS), such as the Terminal High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD) system.
5. Offers the opportunity for U. S. forces to work in
conjunction with our allies and contributes to the
interoperability of U. S. and allied forces ballistic
missile defense systems.
6. Future development will be an Army-led effort
because of its close association with PAC-3.

107. Sensors
An effective layered defense incorporates a wide-range
of sensors to detect and track threat missiles through all
phases of their trajectory. Satellites and a family of land-
and sea-based radars provide worldwide sensor
coverage.
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)
The restructured Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS) will be a constellation of interoperable
Research and Development (R&D) satellites and
supporting ground infrastructure for the detection,
tracking and discrimination of ballistic missiles. Data
from STSS will be used to allow BMDS interceptors to
engage incoming missiles earlier in flight. Plans are for
STSS to be incorporated into the missile defense Test
Bed beginning in 2006-2007.

108. Defense Support Program (DSP) Satellites
Existing Defense Support Program (DSP)
satellites, now orbiting the earth in a
geosynchronous orbit, provide global coverage
for early warning, tracking and identification.
Besides warning of a ballistic missile launch,
satellite sensors can develop an early estimate of
where the hostile missile is headed. Integration
of DSP into the initial missile defense capability
provides first, accurate warning and early
tracking of a ballistic missile launch.

109. Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
constellation will provide early warning of ballistic
missile attacks and accurate state vector
information to effectively cue other Ballistic Missile
Defense System elements to support, intercept
and negate the threat. Currently under
development by the U.S. Air Force, SBIRS will
provide early warning messages, accurate launch
point estimates to support theater attack
operations, radar cue for enhanced active defense
for both theater operations and Ground Missile
Defense operations, and impact area predictions.

110. Early Warning Radars (EWR)
MDA is upgrading the hardware and
software of existing ground-based radars
located in California, Alaska and
overseas for incorporation into initial
defense capabilities. These upgrades
will allow the radar to more accurately
determine where an incoming ballistic
missile is headed.

111. THAAD Radar
The TPS-X radar produced for the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) missile system will be
upgraded to be used in the Test Bed
to validate algorithms and support
forward based capability for near
and long-term missile defense
capabilities.

112. Forward Deployable Radars (FDR)
Forward Deployable Radars would provide
additional layers of sensor capability and more
effective tracking of hostile missiles. Forward
basing of ground based radars places the
radar where it can obtain data from early parts
of an ICBM’s trajectory and provides for early
and accurate target-tracing and signature
data, permitting earlier launch of defense
interceptors and a greater battle space within
which they can operate. Derived from the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
X-band radar, it is air-transportable, adding
the ability to quickly move the radar to where it
is most needed.

113. This is a film produced by the Missile Defense
Agency. It is titled “BMDS Overview: A Day in the
Life of Global Ballistic Missile Defense”