This document discusses payments for environmental services (PES) schemes in Cambodia. It finds that while the concept of PES has broadly diffused in Cambodia, actual implementation of PES projects has been limited in scale and scope. Existing PES schemes vary significantly in their design and focus on small threats to protected areas. The performance of PES schemes is difficult to assess due to a lack of rigorous evaluations, but some evidence suggests they can positively impact the environment and rural livelihoods depending on scheme design. PES schemes emerge through political negotiations between stakeholders like the government and NGOs, rather than based purely on economic principles, and require significant resources to establish.

1. A review of payments for environmental
services (PES) experiences in Cambodia
Sarah Milne, Colas Chervier
Colas Chervier
PhD student
CIRAD
colas.chervier@gmail.com

2. Content: 4 topics
1. Role and extent of diffusion of PES concept
2. Definition of PES in the Cambodian context
3. Performance of Cambodian PES
4. Emergence and design of PES

3. ON THE ROLE AND THE EXTENT OF
DIFFUSION OF PES CONCEPT IN
CAMBODIA

4. « Soft » diffusion of the PES concept
• In official documents
– LIMITED to some government-endorsed strategies as
“innovative financing mechanisms” or as
“redistribution mechanisms” for REDD+ money
– NO specific legal framework for PES, but some
attempts to develop one (watershed PES)
• As ideas and discourses
– BROAD diffusion: from the international sphere
(INGO) and through key officials and up to very high
ranking government sphere (PM)
– CONTRASTING opinions and views (opposed,
skeptical, promoters)

5. « Hard » diffusion (1/2): small-scale pilot projects
3 types of PES schemes with:
• different overall characteristics (ES, buyer)
• different levels of implementation: some
processes are frozenES type Project Implementer Payee Payer
Biodiversity PES Community-based
Ecotourism
WCS Village fund Tourists
Agri-environment Payments WCS Individual farmers
Urban consumers, hotels
and restaurants
Direct payments schemes for
bird nest protection,
WCS, WWF, Birdlife Individual villagers NGO
Direct Contracts for Turtle
Nest Protection
CI Individual villagers NGO
Conservation incentive
agreements
CI, Poh Kao
Commune fund and
individual villagers
NGO
Watershed PES
NB. not yet operational
Payments for fresh water
provision
Wildlife Alliance / MoE Not determined Not determined
Watershed protection for
hydro-power in Cardamom
Mountains
FFI / MoE & FA Not determined Not determined
REDD pilots
NB. not yet operational
Oddar Meanchey Community
Forestry REDD+ Project
PACT / FA Stopped
Voluntary Carbon market
(certified)
Seima Protection Forest
REDD+ Pilot
WCS / FA CF and the RGC
Voluntary Carbon market
(certified)

6. Biodiversity PES
Watershed PES
REDD+ demonstration activities
Village
within 5Km
buffer
PES area (5
Km buffer)
PA
boundaries
PA 5km
buffer
« Hard » diffusion (2/2): low significance
 Located around some PAs
 Low diffusion as compared to CF and PAs
 Target small-scale threats associated with family agriculture
Inland core
Cardamom landscape CCPF
Area inside protected area (Ha) 1193088 401313
Area under PES contract (Ha) 35500 35500
% area 3,0 8,8
Population within a 5km buffer (#
households 2011) 36182 2132
Population receiving PES (# households
2011) 1119 1119
% population 3,1 52,5

7. ON THE DEFINITION OF PES IN THE
CAMBODIAN CONTEXT

8. In discourses: no common understanding
• No common understanding of the concept of PES
– BROAD: any scheme that entailed a monetary transfer
for the purposes of conservation from an ‘innovative’
or non-public source of financing
– NARROW: PES to exist only in the context of
watershed management schemes (user-pay)
• Limited links with any “written” references
– NO legal framework
– LIMITED knowledge of the scientific literature on PES

9. In practice: a broad “church”
Scheme Directness of transfer Level of commodification
Importance of the economic
incentive vs. other interventions
Conservation
agreements
(2006 - )
+
CI
 Commune & CBOs
 individual farmers
(Non-voluntary)
+
Compliance with land-use, non-
logging & non-hunting rules
(livelihood, law)
 Level of payment do not
depend on level of ES / effort
+
Mix of communal in-kind and
individual in-cash payments
Community-based institutions
Strong law enforcement
Turtle nest direct
payments
(2008- )
+++
CI
 individual farmers
(voluntary)
++
Stop harvest eggs & protection of
nests (tradition)
 # hatchlings
+++
Monetary and individual
payment
• Diversity of ES and institutional arrangements (see the 3 types of PES)
• 2 main and quite different approaches amongst existing schemes (see below)
• One common point: they do not correspond to the Coasean bargaining
mechanism although they involve some levels of conditionality and the
transfer of incentives

10. ON WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE
PERFORMANCE OF CAMBODIAN PES

11. Quantitative impact assessments
• Several attempts to implement rigorous methods,
only one succeeded:
– Rigorous = counterfactual methods such as matching
– Reason = lack of appropriate data, evaluation design is
not built in (project-based approach and financing),
costly
• Results of Clements et al.
– Positive environmental outcomes which depend on
whether the “outcome that is rewarded actually
reflects conservation needs”
– Neutral or positive social impacts, depending on the
scheme and the level of individual payment

12. Governance and institutional evaluation
• Transaction costs:
– Different levels according to the type of scheme (individual vs.
collective) and the stage of implementation
– Investment in setting up local institutions may have longer term
effects
• Property rights:
– Not a prerequisite but necessary on the longer run
• Impact on local governance:
– Strengthening collective action vs. strengthening preexisting
power asymmetries
• Distributive fairness:
– Generally not equal even for collective schemes which are
supposed to reach more people
– Lower access to the poorest
– This is a problem because it is linked to environmental outcomes.

13. Sustainability: an emerging field
• Overlooked issues although it makes sense as
the funding sources for these types of
schemes are not ensured
• Emerging evidences (now these schemes are
older):
– Long term impact evaluation and impact
heterogeneity over time (e.g. interactions with the
last land titling program)
– Impact on motivations and crowding out

14. ON THE EMERGENCE AND DESIGN

15. Re-conceptualizing PES design (1/2)
• Design framed by a donor-funded project designed and
coordinated by an international conservation NGO
– SPES project / FFI / EU
– Cardamoms conservation / CI/ AFD
• PES project as a way to engage other stakeholders in
conservation
• Works as a negotiation arena aime at dealing with a
number of controversial questions:
– The “distribution of economic burdens and benefits” from the
use and conservation of NR (e.g. who pays in watershed PES)
– Rarely about the choice of PES vs. another instrument or about
the social optimum (see how CBAs are designed)

16. Re-conceptualizing PES design (2/2)
• Different positions / interests of « negotiators »
– Not based on a simple maximization of personal benefits or the
benefits for the society
– Rather influenced by:
• Many ideas and discourses (e.g. different views about the conservation-
development nexus)
• The institution’s mission and strategy (e.g the NSDP of the RGC)
• Several hierarchical and financing « patrons » interests (e.g. voters, donors)
• Importance of power relations in influencing the compromise:
– The Prime Minister’s public speech  hierarchy linked to position and
legal framework
– NGO power to maintain PES in the negotiations  financial and
network resources

17. Different types of decision situation
• Level of “politics”:
– number and nature of government agencies involved
• Level of legalization: crafting PES in preexisting
legal framework
– Beyond links with land policies
• Level of Transaction costs: influenced by the type
of scheme and influence the pace of
negotiations, justify the project-based approach.
– Production of data (ES, CBA); gathering people
– Setting up local institutions
 Probably explain the “duration of negotiations”

18. CONCLUSION

19. Gap between theory and practice:
• PES do not naturally come into being, driven by supply and demand
• but rather require considerable political and discursive work, institution-building
and donor funding to become established
• PES originates from reaching a compromise out of contrasting interests
Implications & risks associated with the nature of the emergence processes
• Process can be slow and inefficient (cost a lot of money for nothing), particularly
when many parties and interests are involved.
• The environmental effectiveness and efficiency promises of PES may not be met
(not ideal targeting and arrangement)
• On the other hand, decisions may benefit a few, reinforce wealth inequalities.
Different requirements in terms of political and financial inputs
• depend on the type of scheme negotiated:
• how the distribution of costs and benefits from the use and the conservation of NR
is envisioned
• how large these changes are.
Possible levers are:
• Filling gap of knowledge regarding the effect of PES (upstream and downstream)
and clarifying its definition
• Focusing on diffusing supporting ideas and discourses (“lobby”)