The Mumbai High North oil platform fire was caused when a support vessel collided with the platform during a medical evacuation, severing a gas riser and causing an explosion and fire. 22 people died and the platform was destroyed. Key issues identified were deficiencies in risk assessment processes, poor safety culture, vulnerabilities of the risers and vessel, and inadequate rescue efforts. The incident highlighted the need for thorough risk assessment and management of riser damage risks as well as adoption of good collision avoidance practices.

1. CASE TITLE The Devastating Fire That Engulfed The ONGC Mumbai High North Platform Presentation to Dr. Mandira Aggarwal, Faculty HSE Muzahid Khan Integrated BBA + MBA (Oil & Gas Management), 2007-11 muzahidkhan123@gmail.com

2. HSE Foretalk (w.r.t the Case) OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LIMITED @

4. Effective and vibrant management system.

5. Top management is committed for maintaining highest HSE standards

6. HSE Committee Board comprises of members of Board from ONGC including representative from Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas.

7. A dedicated HSE website has been developed for creating awareness among company employees

9. We shall comply with all applicable codes and requirements to promote occupational health, safety and environment protection.

10. We shall be always alert, equipped and ready to respond to emergencies.

11. We shall take all actions necessary to protect the integrity of the system in order to avoid accidental release of hazardous substances.

15. Introduction The complex imported fluids from 11 other satellite wellhead platforms and exported oil to shore via undersea pipelines, as well as processing gas for gas lift operations. The seven-storey high Mumbai High North (MHN) platform had five gas export risers and ten fluid import risers situated outside the platform jacket. In July 2005, a multi-purpose support vessel (MSV) collided with the MHN platform, severing at least one gas riser and causing a massive fire which destroyed the MHN platform within two hours. Weather=Monsoon

17. Mumbai High North Platform Fire, India Overview

18. The Accident The fire occurred on 27 July 2005 - a multi- purpose support vessel (MSV), Samundra Suraksha,100m long, hit one of the MHN platform risers. Vessel owned by ONGC but operated and maintained by another nationalised company, the Shipping Company of India (SCI). Vessel working elsewhere in the field, supporting saturation diving operations. Cook cut off the tips of two fingers, and transfer sought to MHN complex for medical treatment. Monsoon meant that no helicopters were available, so the vessel came alongside MHN to affect a man-riding basket transfer. MSV: SamundraSuraksha

19. The Accident Leeward crane on MHN was not working, so vessel came onto the windward side (wind 35 knots, swell 5 metres, sea current 3 knots). Problems with azimuth thrusters – came alongside under manual (joy stick) control in emergency mode, stern first. The casualty was transferred off the deck by crane The vessel experienced a strong heave, and the helideck struck the risers (export gas lift). The resulting leak ignited very quickly afterwards. The resulting fire engulfed virtually all of MHN and MHF, with NA and the Noble rig severely affected by heat radiation.

20. Rescue Operations 22 people died. 362 were rescued over next fifteen hours. The fire significantly affected rescue, with only two out of the eight complex lifeboats able to be launched, and only one out of ten life rafts. Similarly, only half of the NCY’s rescue craft could be launched. Rescue exacerbated by the monsoon conditions. Mumbai, so no helicopters could take off from land. Six divers in saturation chamber on vessel rescued 36 hours later. SamudraSuraksha sunk four days afterwards.

21. Aftermath Key safety management issues: Robustness of risk assessment process Poor Safety Culture Riser Issues Vessel Issues

22. Poor Safety Culture Serious doubts have been raised on the safety certification of MHN Intervention of the higher management seems to be just ad hoc Seaworthiness of the MSV has been questioned as during the rescue mission it was found that the vessel was working on emergency thrusters as the manual thrusters were not working Rescue efforts have also been questioned Standard operating practices were not followed There was enough warning from external agencies but the management appeared remise without enquiring further into the risk of riser ruptures.

23. Riser Issues The positioning of risers in relation to the platform structure and loading zones The vulnerability to damage (even risers inside the jacket structure may be at risk) The appropriateness of fendering/riser guards in relation to the design of attending vessels The inventory which is likely to be discharged if the riser fails below its ESDV Risk management process

24. Vessel Issues Role of Safety Zone and vessels approaching the installation Collision Risk Management Principles Installation vulnerability Vessel suitability Crew competence Marine knowledge of Installation Communication Installation data cards, pre-entry checks, UKOOA “Guidelines for Ship/Installation Collision Avoidance”. Quality of discussions, radios etc

25. Conclusion Incident reinforces the need for Thorough risk assessment of the potential causes and consequences of riser damage Development, implementation and maintenance of associated risk management measures Adoption of collision avoidance and protection measures which at least meet current good practice as described in UKOOA Management arrangements to ensure that the risk management measures are effective and observed in practise.