ICAS Public Lecture (4.18.2014) Handout #3 Narushige Michishita: Myths and Realities of Japanese Security Policy

Challenges for the U.S.-Japan Alliance and U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa
57
Changing Military Strategies and the
Future of the U.S. Marine Presence
in Asia
Narushige Michishita
Associate Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy
Studies
This report is intended to provide a reference for considering future
security in Asia and Okinawa base issues by examining changes in military
strategy in Asia, scenarios and countermeasures for major
disputes/conflicts, and the U.S. Marine Corps’ role during the Cold War
and in the future.
1. Changing Military Strategy in Asia – Comparing the
Cold War with the Present
The strategic environment surrounding Japan has changed significantly
with the end of the Cold War, and in response, military strategy in Asia has
also changed significantly. The strategic environment during the Cold War
was characterized by (a) a clear threat in the Soviet Union, (b) the
assumption of a global war scenario, and (c) deterrence as the key to
security. After the Cold War, the characteristics became (a) unclear,
diverse threats, (b) the assumption of regional dispute scenarios, and (c) a
shift of focus from deterrence to defense. Accordingly, both Japan and the
United States changed their military strategy in response to the end of the
Cold War.
1) Military Strategy During the Cold War
The Cold War in East Asia was characterized by the following. First, in
East Asia, Japan was positioned in the center of the theater of
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the 1970s,
when the Soviets deployed nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
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(SSBNs) equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in
the Sea of Okhotsk, the strategic importance of the Soviet Far Eastern
theater increased dramatically. The Soviet Union also deployed different
bombers and combat aircraft including the Tu-22M backfire bomber, Kiev-
class aircraft carriers, Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with anti-ship
missiles, and SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. As a result, the
Pacific Fleet became the largest of the Soviet Union’s four fleets and one
fourth to one third of Soviet military forces were deployed to the Far East.
In response to the Soviet strategy that turned the Sea of Okhotsk into a
sanctuary for its SSBNs, the United States adopted an offensive strategy
called the “Maritime Strategy.” The U.S. planned to send offensive forces
to the Sea of Okhotsk in wartime to attempt to destroy the war potential of
SSBNs.48
Specifically, in the initial stage, the United States would attack
the Soviet base with cruise missiles and aircraft carriers. In the next stage,
it would destroy the Soviet’s SSBNs with nuclear-powered attack
submarines (SSNs) and shift the strategic nuclear balance between the
United States and Soviet Union to its advantage.
48
John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977-
1986, Naval War College Newport Papers 19 (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War
College, 2004); and Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and
Nuclear Risks (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (Cornell University Press, 1992),
pp. 129-158.
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Figure 1. Soviet Operations in the Sea of Okhotsk/ Northwest Pacific
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change
(1989) [Reproduced for this publication by Okinawa Prefectural Government]
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Figure 2. Soviet Perspective of Northwest Pacific and
Deployment Routes
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change
(1989) [Reproduced for this publication by Okinawa Prefectural Government]
Against this geopolitical background, Japan decided to contribute to the
Western Bloc’s Soviet containment policy by strengthening its own defense
capabilities. Its core duties were the three-strait blockade and sea-lane
defense. The goal of the three-strait blockade was to block the Soviets from
advancing into the Pacific and to make it possible for Japanese and U.S.
naval vessels to enter Soviet waters. The goal of the sea-lane defense was
to support U.S. offensive operations by guarding the U.S. Navy (in
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particular, U.S. aircraft carrier task forces) from Soviet attacks. Therefore,
the Maritime Self-Defense Force notably improved its anti-submarine
capabilities, the Air Self-Defense Force added equipment to fight Soviet
bombers and combat aircraft, and the Ground Self-Defense Force adopted a
strategy to resist enemy landing operations. P-3C, F-15, and E-2C early
warning aircraft and surface-to-ship missiles (SSM) became effective anti-
Soviet measures.
2) Post-Cold War Military Strategy
The end of the Cold War dramatically changed the strategic environment
of Northeast Asia. In the post-Cold War world, threats became unclear,
diverse, and geographically widespread. The possibility of full-scale war
between the superpowers diminished, and many of the new threats were
low intensity or indirect. Instead, there was an increased possibility that
low-intensity threats would become realities. In this way, Post-Cold War
Japan was confronted with numerous new threats. In 1994, there was a
mounting crisis with North Korea developing nuclear weapons in the
Korean peninsula, and Japan seriously considered imposing economic
sanctions on North Korea. In 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin
gas in the Tokyo subway system, leaving 11 dead and many wounded. In
1998, a Taepo Dong missile launched by North Korea flew over Japan and
landed in the Pacific. In 1999, two North Korean spy ships were discovered
in Japanese waters. And in 2001, the 9/11 terrorist attacks occurred,
symbolizing a new era. In December of the same year, a North Korean spy
ship believed to be involved in drug smuggling was discovered in the
southwest waters of Kyushu. In 2002, North Korea admitted to abducting
Japanese citizens. And in 2006 and 2009, North Korea conducted nuclear
tests.
Responding to these new developments and changes to strategic
environment, Japan and the United States revised the Guidelines for U.S.-
Japan Defense Cooperation, and in 1999, Japan enacted the Law
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Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in
Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ Law). This law allows Japan
to support the activities of U.S. forces away from the Japanese territories if
the situation is perceived to have “an important influence on Japan’s peace
and security.” 49
The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, passed in
response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was created based on the SIASJ Law.
Furthermore, after the 1998 Taepo Dong missile launch, the Japanese
government decided to conduct joint technological research with the
United States on a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system.
In the meantime, Japan also proceeded with operational countermeasures.
The Ground Self-Defense Force strengthened its counter-guerilla and
counter-special forces training and exercises. Japan and the United States
conducted cooperative training exercises co-training for urban combat
against guerillas and commando forces. The Maritime Self-Defense Force
strengthened its coordination with the Japan Coast Guard while adding
high-speed missile craft, aligning its Special Boarding Unit to disarm and
neutralize suspicious vessels, and equipping destroyers and patrol
helicopters with machine guns.
3) China’s Rise and the U.S. Response
In recent years, China has increased and modernized its military
capabilities, mainly its navy and air force. Based on this, China began
strengthening its influence in the region, resulting in new military-strategic
developments in Asia. The Chinese military build-up drawing the most
attention is China’s development of its so-called anti-access/area denial
(A2/AD) capabilities. The goal of A2/AD capabilities is to eliminate the
influence of other countries, particularly the United States, from as near as
the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea to as far as the
49
U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Completion of the Review of the
Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation”, September 23, 1997.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/defense.html
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Western Pacific Ocean and to form a regional order that will serve its own
interests. As a means of doing this, China has established two lines of
defense called the “First Island Chain” and the “Second Island Chain”
around its periphery. It is reinforcing or developing different types of ships,
submarines, fighters, bombers, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and anti-
ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) to protect these lines. Of these,
intermediate-range ballistic missiles and long-range cruise missiles can
pose a threat to forward-deployed U.S. troops and U.S. bases in Japan.
Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with multiple anti-ship missiles and
silent Kilo-class submarines are capable of obstructing mobile strike forces,
including U.S. aircraft carriers, from taking action in the waters
surrounding China and the Western Pacific. On the other hand, ASBMs are
technically difficult to bring to maturity and should not pose a realistic
threat to the U.S. Navy. However, even if they would not actually make
direct hits, if ASBMs were deployed, the U.S. military would be compelled
to take expensive countermeasures and U.S. policymakers would have to
think twice about deploying aircraft carriers to China’s surrounding seas.
Even without ASBMs, the J-20 stealth fighter could be used to deny access.
China seems to be strengthening A2/AD capabilities with the short-term
goal of blocking U.S. intervention in Taiwan and the mid- to long-term
goal of preventing the United States, Japan, and other countries in the
region from interfering with China’s attempt to create a new regional order.
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Figure 3. First and Second Island Chains
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China (2011)
In response, the United States is in the process of developing a new
concept called “Air-Sea Battle,” and the Pentagon established an Air-Sea
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Battle Office in November 2011 for this purpose. In January 2012, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff announced the “Joint Operational Access Concept
(JOAC)” to counteract A2/AD. Additionally, in March, the Army and
Marine Corps announced “Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-
Marine Corps Concept,” a document that explains Army and Marine Corps
roles in JOAC. JOAC is a concept to resist A2/AD. Air-Sea Battle, Army
and Marine Corps concepts, and operations such as entry operation and
littoral operation are positioned beneath JOAC.
To oppose A2/AD and secure access to the combat theater, JOAC
indicates that it is crucial to (a) maintain forward-deployed bases, (b) gain
foreign partners willing to provide military and political support, and (c)
maintain routes from the continental United States to the theaters. JOAC
also lists the following general principles for military operations: “create
pockets or corridors of local domain superiority to penetrate the enemy’s
defenses and maintain them as required to accomplish the mission,”
“maneuver directly against key operational objectives from strategic
distance,” and “attack enemy anti-access/area-denial defenses in depth
rather than rolling back those defenses from the perimeter.”50
4) Comparing Military Strategies During the Cold War and at the
Present
What is demonstrated by a comparison between U.S. and Soviet military
strategies during the Cold War and U.S. and Chinese military strategies at
the present time? Here, I will consider the similarities and differences
between the two and point out facets of the current strategic environment
that are more favorable than during the Cold War and the reverse, facets of
the current situation that are riskier than during the Cold War.
50
U.S. Department of Defense. “Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC).”
January 17, 2012. p. iii.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf.
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First, looking at similarities between military strategy during the Cold
War and the present, China is currently trying to define the South China
Sea as an area of its “core interest” and turn it into a sanctuary in the same
way that the Soviet Union tried to turn the Sea of Okhotsk into a sanctuary.
In the Sea of Okhotsk, the Soviet Union deployed SSBNs, which had the
ability to attack the United States, and China is now building an SSBN
base in Hainan Island in the South China Sea. Also, in the same way that
the Soviet Union tried to deny access to the Sea of Okhotsk by establishing
two defensive lines called “sea control” and “sea denial,” China is
currently trying to create two defensive lines called the “First Island Chain”
and the “Second Island Chain” to deny access to the South China Sea.
There are also many commonalities in the types of equipment used to deny
access. The Soviet Union deployed multiple submarines, fleets, and
bombers to protect its two defensive lines. China is rapidly increasing its
equipment in the same way including the addition of Sovremenny-class
destroyers, which the Soviet Union used during the Cold War. The aircraft
carrier which China recently started operating is a Soviet-era carrier
purchased from Ukraine. It was previously called “Varyag,” and has been
renamed the “Liaoning.” Since China is utilizing a military strategy similar
to that of the Soviets during the Cold War, it is no coincidence that China
has introduced many types of equipment that the Soviets developed and
produced during the Cold War.
However, China’s attempt to develop ASBMs differentiates it from the
former Soviet Union. Of course, whether ASBMs will actually have the
capability to make direct hits on U.S. aircraft carriers is questionable, but
actual targeting accuracy of ASBMs aside, the existence of such equipment
would place a big psychological burden on the United States. Also, the J-
20 stealth bomber that China is currently developing can be seen as a
backup in case ASBM development ends in failure. Drawing a comparison
with the Soviet Union, the J-20 is expected to play a similar role as the Tu-
22M “Backfire” bomber.
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The second similarity between the Cold War and the present is the U.S.
military strategy. During the Cold War, the United States adopted the
offensively oriented Maritime Strategy in response to the Soviet Union’s
use of the Sea of Okhotsk as a strategic sanctuary. Since the details of
JOAC and Air-Sea Battle concepts have not been defined yet, their degree
of similarity with the Maritime Strategy is currently unclear. However, the
general principles to “create pockets or corridors of local domain
superiority to penetrate the enemy’s defenses and maintain them as
required to accomplish the mission” and “attack enemy anti-access/area-
denial defenses in depth rather than rolling back those defenses from the
perimeter” have much in common with the Maritime Strategy. 51
In
particular, the “create pockets or corridors of local domain superiority”
section corresponds to the Sea-lane Defense that Japan was responsible for
within the “roles and duties” shared between Japan and the United States
during the Cold War.52
The “attack enemy anti-access/area-denial defenses
in depth” section evokes cruise missile attacks against Vladivostok and
Khabarovsk.53
These aspects will be worth noting as JOAC and Air-Sea
Battle concepts are developed.
Next, I will discuss the differences between the Cold War period and the
present by dividing them into differences that are favorable for Japan and
differences that are unfavorable. The first difference that is favorable to
Japan is geographic in nature. During the Cold War, the Kuril Islands,
which played the role of a strategic barrier separating the Western Pacific
from the Sea of Okhotsk, were controlled by the Soviet Union. However,
Japan controls the Ryukyu Islands, which currently plays the same role.
For this reason, Japan and the United States can simultaneously use the
Ryukyu Islands as a defense line and base for attacks. The second
51
U.S. Department of Defense. “Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC).”
January 17, 2012. p. iii.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf.
52
Ibid., p.iii.
53
Ibid., p.iii.
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difference is that the Soviet Union during the Cold War was a sophisticated
military superpower, which retained the ability to wage global nuclear war
in addition to the ability to wage a full-scale war in Europe. However,
China is currently inferior to the United States and Japan in terms of
conventional capabilities and does not have strategic nuclear capability
comparable to the Soviet Union’s. Third, the United States and Soviet
Union during the Cold War had a completely adversarial relationship in all
aspects: military, politics, economy, and ideology. While there is constant
competition and conflict between the United States and China, the
relationship is nowhere near as antagonistic as a cold war. Lastly, related
to the previous point, the Soviet Union’s national goal was victory in its
competition with the United States, and in military terms, this meant
victory in a global war. However, China has several goals including (a)
obstructing Taiwan’s independence, (b) securing/acquiring resources, and
(c) strengthening influence in the region. Therefore, China is unlikely to
get into a situation where it provokes escalation of conflict by focusing all
of its interests and resources on competing with the United States.
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Figure 4. Chinese Activities in the Vicinity of Japan
Source: Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012 (2012)
On the other hand, when comparing the Cold War and the present, we
can also find differences that are not favorable for Japan. First, the only
exits Soviet fleets had for advancing to the Western Pacific were the three
straits of Soya (La Perouse), Tsugaru, and Tsushima, but China’s fleets
have at least nine to eleven locations that could be used as exits to advance
to the Western Pacific. In other words, Japan and the United States have an
advantage in their control of the Ryukyu Islands, but the environment is
advantageous for China because there are many exits to the Western
Pacific. Second, compared to the Cold War era, the current theater for
military competition has expanded from the three dimensions of “land, sea,
and air” to the five dimensions of “land, sea, and air plus outer space plus
cyberspace.” Of course, it is unclear who will gain a greater advantage
from this, but at the very least, the competitive landscape has become more
complex and opaque. Third, the European and Far Eastern theaters, which
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were coupled during the Cold War, have become decoupled in the current
strategic environment. The Soviet Union was a global threat, but China is
nothing more than a regional threat. Because of this, some European
countries are willing to export weapons to China. Fourth, although there
were bitter conflicts between the United States and Soviet Union, they did
not engage in direct critical conflict in Asia because they established game
rules between themselves in the late 1970s when the Soviet Union started
military expansion in the Far East. Both the United States and Soviet Union
learned the lessons of the Berlin and Cuban crises that occurred in the
1950s and 1960s. On the other hand, present day China is trying to play the
world power game for the first time with aspirations of becoming a
superpower equivalent to the United States. In other words, China is
currently in the same position as the Soviet Union was in the 1950s and
1960s without clearly set game rules between itself and the United States.
The occurrence of a crisis under this environment can be considered
unavoidable, and we have already glimpsed the seeds of a crisis during the
2001 EP-3 incident. Lastly, without a doubt, China’s economic
performance is superior to the Soviet’s. The Soviet economy collapsed as a
result of the arms race that it locked itself into with the United States.
However, if the United States and China lock themselves into an arms race
in the future, it is not clear who will collapse first. China’s military
spending increased 170% in the last 10 years, but Japan’s military spending
decreased 2.5%. In the same period, U.S. military spending increased 59%,
but it is believed that the United States will maintain the status quo in the
future or decrease its spending.
2. Contingency Scenarios and U.S. Military Role in Asia
There are three major contingency scenarios that pose security concerns
in Asia. Specifically, these are (a) a full-scale conflict on the Korean
Peninsula, (b) collapse of North Korea, and (c) Chinese regional hegemony.
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In this section, I will discuss what kind of roles the U.S. military would
play in each scenario.
1) Full-Scale Conflict on the Korean Peninsula
In the event that a full-scale conflict erupts on the Korean Peninsula,
both the United States and South Korea are supposed to respond with
“OPLAN 5027.” If North Korea started to invade South Korea, U.S. and
South Korean forces would first respond with air strikes. After adequately
diminishing North Korean military forces, U.S. and South Korean ground
forces would move north into North Korean territory. Furthermore, if the
opportunity arose in the third stage, Marines from both countries would
make an amphibious landing on the coast of the Korean Peninsula and
make a pincer assault on North Korean forces by cooperating with ground
forces moving from south to north.
North Korea has not necessarily forward deployed all of its troops, and
mechanized corps are positioned in the rear area along the coast of the
Korean Peninsula. One reason is that these divisions can be used as follow-
up power if North Korea succeeds in invading South Korea from the north.
The second reason is to prevent U.S. and South Korean Marines from
landing in the rear area. In other words, North Korea is deploying its forces
based not only on attack but also taking defense into consideration.
Conversely, it is unlikely that Marines would land in enemy territory in the
early stages of a war because the risk is too high. Marines would land when
the war was fairly advanced. More specifically, they would land either
after North Korean mechanized corps placed in the coastal area of the rear
had moved to other areas or when these corps lost significant fighting
capability.
The U.S. would end up adding reinforcements to U.S. troops in South
Korea and Japan, and it would carry out its duty of defending South Korea
from bases in South Korea and Japan. In the early stages of the war, U.S.
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air bases in Japan would be actively used for air strikes on North Korea or
to deploy troops to South Korea. U.S. naval bases in Japan would be used
in parallel for aircraft carrier task forces, and later, marine bases in
Okinawa would be used for amphibious landings.
If conflict breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, Japan would invoke the
SIASJ Law and provide rear-area support to U.S. operations in defense of
South Korea.
2) Collapse of North Korea
If North Korea became destabilized or collapsed, South Korea would
respond in accordance with a contingency plan called “Buheung,” or
Reconstruction, and both the U.S. and South Korean military would
respond in accordance with CONPLAN 5029.54
This plan is based on six
scenarios: (a) the sudden death of Kim Jong-il (author’s note – content
from when the plan was developed), (b) North Korean civil war due to
coup d’état or civil unrest, (c) North Korean government losing control of a
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon or a weapon of mass destruction
like a missile, (d) exodus of North Korean citizens, (e) taking of Korean
citizens in North Korea as hostages for political reasons, and (e) flooding
or earthquake. Planned countermeasures for these situations are said to
include (a) procedures for providing shelter, food, and vaccinations against
contagious diseases in the event that there is a tide of refugees, (b)
countermeasures in the event that Koreans involved with the Kaesong
Industrial Region in North Korea become unable to return home, and (c)
establishment of a North Korea Liberalization Administration Headquarters
(tentative name) as a governing authority of North Korean regions with a
Minister of Unification serving as the Chief of Headquarters. In response
54
An operation plan is mainly comprised of details on the timing, route, and
method for moving each of the troops. On the other hand, a concept plan does not
include detailed actions like an operation plan. There is a movement between the
U.S. and Korea to develop CONPLAN 5029 into an operation plan, but this has not
happened so far.
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to a fluid situation, the United States would end up deploying the Navy and
Marines to North Korea and its surrounding areas and preparing for
conflict resolution and peace building (maintaining order, assisting with
recovery).
However, there are differences between U.S. and South Korean
responses in the event of a North Korean collapse. South Korea takes the
approach that North Korea is part of its territory. On the other hand, while
the United States does not have diplomatic relations with North Korea,
North Korea is a member nation of the United Nations, and the United
States effectively recognizes it as an independent nation.
In a scenario that assumes the collapse of North Korea, Japan’s role is
not clear. If a war clearly erupted, Japan could invoke the SIASJ Law, but
if North Korea was merely getting destabilized, Japan could not invoke the
SIASJ Law. Also, even if Japan invoked the SIASJ Law and played a role,
it would probably be centered on humanitarian support because Japan
cannot take full-scale military action.
The usage of bases in Japan under this scenario would be very fluid.
Japan has a treaty with the UN forces that allows UN forces to use seven
bases in Japan. However, even in a situation where North Korea collapsed,
it is difficult to believe that the UN Security Council would be able to
adopt a resolution enabling an effective response that includes military
action because China would wield its veto power. It is highly likely that
China would move to secure its own country’s freedom of action while
making it difficult for the U.S. and South Korean military to take action. In
addition to being able to move into North Korea from its sovereign
territory with relative ease, China has signed an alliance pact with North
Korea, which China might use to justify its intervention.
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While it is unlikely that Marines would be deployed from the beginning
in a major war scenario, it is quite possible that Marines would be used
from the early stages in a situation where North Korea was getting
destabilized. If the V-22 Osprey becomes fully operational, it would be
possible to directly carry troops from Okinawa to South Korea or to North
Korea given the aircraft’s extended operational radius.
3) Chinese Regional Hegemony
Lastly, preparations to respond to a Chinese regional hegemony scenario
are currently underway. A detailed military plan has not yet emerged. As of
the present, the United States is in the process of developing a strategic
concept called “Air-Sea Battle,” and Japan is trying to respond to this with
“Dynamic Defense Force.” Since I have already written about the content
of Air-Sea Battle, I will only explain “dynamic defense capability” here.
The content of the “Dynamic Defense Force” is indicated in the basic
defense policy document National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG),
which was revised in 2010. The NDPG indicates that Japan will build up a
Dynamic Defense Force with the goal of responding flexibly and
seamlessly to different scenarios that occur during peacetime and wartime.
Dynamic Defense Force increases intelligence gathering capability and
regional presence during peacetime by strengthening patrol and
surveillance activities. It also improves presence and full readiness for
crises and conflicts by strengthening exercises and training. This is based
on the awareness that the central issue in future relations with China will
be about competition during peacetime with repeated military-diplomatic
skirmishes, instead of full-scale military conflict. In 2012, in the wake of
the Japanese government’s purchase of three of the Senkaku islands,
Chinese ships and aircraft started frequently entering Japanese waters and
contiguous waters near the Senkaku Islands. These types of demonstrative
use of force are typical of the situations that will arise in the future
between Japan and China. If China continues to take similar actions, the
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occurrence of more serious crises would come as no surprise. Also, as
demonstrated by the Chinese fishing boat collision that occurred near the
Senkaku Islands in 2010, civilian activities that cannot always be
controlled by the governments of either country could cause a crisis.
4) Future Prospects
Of these scenarios, the likelihood of “a full-scale Korean Peninsula
conflict” becoming a reality is still considered to remain low even though
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and missiles is a concern.
On the other hand, the probability of a “ North Korean destabilization
scenario” is expected to increase. A year has passed since the young,
inexperienced leader Kim Jong-un officially raised to power, and so far
there seem to be no particular problems with the situation. However, when
his father Kim Jong-il came into power, his opponents intensified activities
within the ruling circle two years later. The same can happen to his son.
Lastly, we cannot deny that the “Chinese regional hegemony scenario” is
gradually becoming a reality. A relationship with China that has some level
of competition and conflict is becoming unavoidable for Japan and the
United States. Going forward, concerns will probably focus on which area
of gradation from peacetime to wartime will become central in the military
relationship between U.S.-Japan and China. If U.S.-Japan and China’s
military relationship remains at a relatively low level of conflict, and the
strong overtones become “long-term competition in peacetime,” then
Dynamic Defense Force will probably become more important than Air-Sea
Battle. In this case, military-diplomatic mind games will play an important
role against a backdrop of military power because the critical issue will be
how to effectively handle China’s “maritime guerilla operations.” The
occurrence of full-scale conflict is a low possibility. However, power
struggles during peacetime will continue to occur, like the situation in the
Senkaku islands where Chinese boats are repeatedly violating Japanese
territorial waters and gradually trying to create a fait accompli.
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In the event that U.S.-Japan and Chinese relations deteriorated and a
full-scale military conflict became more likely, the development of China’s
nuclear strategy, including the build-up of SSBN forces, and progress with
A2/AD capability would become a critical concern. In this situation,
maintaining a warfighting strategy with a long-distance strike capability,
and more robust deterrence capability would become critical. In such a
scenario, some Japanese and U.S. forces, including the U.S. Marines, might
be redeployed to rear areas in order to maintain strategic depth. Because
Marines positioned in Okinawa are highly vulnerable, they could be
redeployed to Australia, Guam, or other locations in Asia. Tohoku or
Hokkaido could also become candidates. The fact that the Marines were
prepositioned in Okinawa during the Cold War with the goal of landing in
the South Kuril Islands and/or Sakhalin Island could serve as a reference.
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Figure 5. Geopolitical Position of Okinawa and the U.S. Marine Corps
Presence
Source: Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2012 (2012)
Conversely, in the event that China’s “maritime guerilla strategy”
becomes a central concern, we would need to maintain our forces in the
vicinity of the potential flashpoints, and this is precisely the essence of
Dynamic Defense Force. In this scenario, U.S. forces in Japan, including
the Marines, would remain forward deployed, and the maintenance of rapid
response capability for diverse situations would be emphasized. The V-22
Osprey, which has a combat radius of 600 km, would play a major role.
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The Self-Defense Force would also further forward deploy their forces to
focus on patrol, surveillance, early warning, and presence.
In any event, when formulating strategy against China, we need to bear
in mind that China’s strategy will continue to change because China itself
does not have a clear and complete strategy. We cannot forget that China’s
future is also uncertain for China’s leaders. If we look back on the Cold
War, the Soviet’s naval strategy in the 1970s, which focused on disrupting
the western side’s sea lines of communication (SLOC), was completely
different from its naval strategy in the 1980s, which focused primarily on
using strategic nuclear capability. When considering our strategy against
China, we must take into account changes in Chinese military and
diplomatic strategy and the interaction between our strategy and China’s
strategy.
3. The Role of the Marines – Cold War Retrospective and
Future Outlook
1) The Role of the U.S. Marines During the Cold War – Marines Within
Maritime Strategy
The U.S. Marines were put into operation in Cold War Asia with the goal
of contributing to the execution of the Maritime Strategy, and the
Amphibious Warfare Strategy was formulated in 1985 for this purpose.55
During the Cold War, the role and actions of the U.S. Marines in global
warfare were assumed to be the following. First, it was highly likely that
the Marines would not participate in direct combat in the first phase. Their
focus would be to maintain rapid response capability and move rapidly to
55
“The Amphibious Warfare Strategy, 1985,” in John B. Hattendorf and Peter M.
Swartz, eds., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, Naval War
College Newport Papers 33 (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2008), pp.
105-136.
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79
the locations to prepare for activities in the next phase. Specifically, this
could be to air transport two Marine Amphibious Brigades (MAB) and to
prepare for future missions along with Maritime Prepositioning Ship
squadrons (MPS squadrons). The I and III Marine Amphibious Forces (I
and III MAF) would move the maximum possible number of personnel to
necessary locations with landing crafts. They would also move commercial
and military boats to necessary locations for assault follow-on echelons
(AFOE). Integrating these would make it possible to organize Composite
MAFs Forward. The II MAF might be dispatched to the Pacific, but
conversely, it was also possible to move I MAF and III MAF to the Indian
Ocean or the Atlantic Front. Forward-deployed troops would converge with
troops coming from the U.S. mainland or take actions to avoid escalation.
Next, in the second phase, possible strategies ranged from limited
amphibious landing by the Marines to MAF scale amphibious landing. This
would facilitate support from other military branches and allies. For
example, an amphibious landing on the South Kuril Islands would become
an option.
Lastly, in the third and final phase in a war, the Marines would end up
executing duties such as (a) recapturing territory, (b) maintaining critical
SLOCs, and (c) occupying Soviet territory to end the war under
advantageous conditions. The value of the Marines as strategic reserves
would become highest at this point. Their activity at the Pacific Front
would not directly impact the course of the war on the European Front, but
they could possibly increase uncertainty by taking actions such as agilely
pinpointing weak spots on the Soviet side. In the final phase of war, it
would be possible for MAF to make an amphibious landing on Sakhalin
Island. This was expected to contribute to the achievement of war goals in
the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan.
79

80
As stated above, the Marines’ main targets on the Pacific Front during
the Cold War were the South Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island. In
particular, partly because the United States thought that Japan would try to
recapture the South Kuril Islands during wartime, the United States
envisaged a strategy that would make attacking the Soviet submarine force
in the fortified Sea of Okhotsk easier by mounting a preemptive strike on
the Soviet forces, which might be used to attack Hokkaido, and occupying
the South Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Islands.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union deployed substantial ground forces
equipped with tanks and artillery to these areas during the Cold War. Along
with deploying army forces to Kamchatka, the Soviets also deployed new
radars and attack helicopters to the Sakhalin Islands. And starting in 1978,
they redeployed ground troops to the Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan
Islands. The assumption that these areas would be subject to Japanese and
U.S. military attacks during war was behind these actions.
2) Future Role of U.S. Marines – Position of Marines Under JOAC
What are the roles of Marines as defined in JOAC, which is currently
formulated as the strategic concept toward China? Here, I will clarify the
Marines’ position within JOAC based on “Gaining and Maintaining
Access: An Army-Marine Corps Concept,” the report which I already
mentioned. The report’s general theory is that the Army and Marines “will
contribute to the joint effort to gain and maintain operational access by
entering hostile territory.”56
The report points out that “through entrance
into an adversary’s territory or providing the credible threat of doing so,
56
U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. “Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army-
Marine corps Concept.” March 2012. p. 17.
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/Army%20Marine%20Corp
%20Gaining%20and%20Maintaining%20Access.pdf.
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81
U.S. Army and Marine Corps contribute to overall campaign success.”57
The report then lists specific goals such as the following.58
・ Neutralizing landward threats to [U.S. force] access, including those
intentionally imbedded in heavily populated urban areas to negate U.S.
sensors and weapons.
・ Making persistent the otherwise temporary effects of [U.S.] remote fires.
・ Providing strategic staying power - the capability for sustained, high-
tempo, combat operations, or a rapid crisis response such as a raid into a
sovereign territory.
・ Seizing, occupying and/or controlling terrain, particularly in maritime
chokepoints essential to protecting naval maneuver, naval movement,
and/or maritime commerce.
・ Controlling or influencing populations.
・ Defeating enemy forces.
・ Depriving the enemy of sanctuary.
In order to achieve these goals, required Army and Marine capabilities
include:59
・ Conducting simultaneous force projection and sustainment of numerous
maneuver units via multiple, distributed, austere and unexpected
penetration points and landing zones in order to avoid established
defenses, natural obstacles, and the presentation of a concentrated,
lucrative target.
57
58
Ibid., p.17.
59
81

82
・ Countering the effects of adversary actions against the air, sea, space and
cyberspace domains by locating / seizing / neutralizing / destroying land-
based capabilities that threaten those domains, thus contributing to cross
domain synergy. These may include, but are not limited to, air and
missile defenses, anti-shipping capabilities, guided rockets, artillery,
mortars, and missiles (G-RAMM), and enemy maneuver units.
・ Seizing key terrain in order to deny it to the enemy or to facilitate the
introduction of follow-on forces.
・ Rapidly projecting follow-on forces that can be employed with minimal
need for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) or
dependence on local infrastructure.
The report also divides entry forces into two types: assault forces and
follow-on forces, and it specifies dispatch methods for the Army and
Marines for each type. Assault forces are comprised of (a) Marine air-
ground task forces operating from ships at sea, (b) Army airborne forces
delivered by inter-theater or intra-theater airlift, (c) Army air assault forces
operating from intermediate staging bases within the theater. After this,
heavily-armored follow-on forces would be deployed, and the report also
discusses follow-on forces that are deployed as a bridge before deployment
of heavily-armored follow-on forces, which require full-scale landing
infrastructure. The report gives the specific examples of (a) Army mounted
forces that are directly dispatched to the target site through mounted
vertical maneuvers and (b) Marine forces using maritime prepositioning
forces.
As stated above, the report “Gaining and Maintaining Access” presents a
broad range of Marine missions and operational concepts. How these
concepts will develop in the future is unknown, but I will point out the
commonalities and differences with Marines missions during the Cold War.
First, “neutralizing landward threats to access,” “seizing, occupying and/or
controlling terrain, particularly in maritime chokepoints essential to
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83
protecting naval maneuver, naval movement, and/or maritime commerce,”
and “depriving the enemy of sanctuary” can be considered commonalities
with the Cold War period. On the other hand, “making persistent the
otherwise temporary effects of remote fires,” “provide strategic
sustainment,” “controlling or influencing populations,” and “ defeating
enemy forces” were missions that weren’t very important in Cold War Asia.
Compared to the Cold War era, the Marines’ required capabilities are
small in scale, but they are expected to perform more amphibious landings.
This can be attributed to the fact that Marine amphibious landings during
the Cold War were expected to be implemented in the later half of a war,
while the new operational concept assumes that amphibious landings would
occur in parallel with operations conducted by other services. Another
characteristic difference from the Cold War is that more attention is being
paid to space and cyberspace in addition to sea and land.
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Marines have operated more like
the Army. As a result, the Marines are now referred to as the “second army.”
To wage a full-scale war during the Cold War, the Marines needed the
ability to flexibly execute amphibious landings depending on the situation
in the face of larger Soviet forces. But the Marines can now easily secure
points of access and openly unload their equipment because no one in the
world can match U.S. military might. However, amphibious landings are
becoming more important as China grows into an America’s peer
competitor comparable to the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Japan and the United States continue to face the difficult challenge of
finding a good balance between maintaining a credible deterrence and
defense posture, and minimizing the burden of military force presence on
local population. I sincerely hope that this article will serve as a reference
to assess and understand at least one end of this important political,
military, diplomatic, and socioeconomic equation.
83

知事公室地域安全政策課調査・研究班編
Executive Office of the Governor
Regional Security Policy Division Research Section

Copyright © 2013 by Research Section,
Regional Security Policy Division,
Executive Office of the Governor
of Okinawa Prefectural Government
All rights Reserved, including the right to reproduce this book
or portions thereof in any form.
March 2013
Published by Okinawa Prefectural Government
1-2-2 Izumizaki, Naha City, Okinawa, Japan 900-8570
(+81) 98-866-2565
Printed in Japan

ICAS Public Lecture (4.18.2014) Handout #3 Narushige Michishita: Myths and Realities of Japanese Security Policy

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ICAS Public Lecture (4.18.2014) Handout #3 Narushige Michishita: Myths and Realities of Japanese Security Policy