2. 2
Colonel Michael Vassalotti
Student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Michael.vassalotti@ndu.edu
Professional Biography:
- Military assistant to the NATO Senior Civilian Representative to
Afghanistan, the NATO Secretary General's personal, ambassadorial level
emissary to Afghanistan. 2009-2010
-Turkey Country Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington,
DC. Responsible for monitoring and managing all aspects of the U.S. – Turkish
defense relationship on a daily basis. 2007-2009
- Liaison to the French Joint Staff, US Defense Attaché Office, US Embassy
Paris. Worked daily inside the French Joint Staff National Military Command
Center as the sole full time U.S. representative reporting to the U.S. government
and French Ministry of Defense. 2004-2007
- Military Assistant to Commander, Kosovo Force, Pristina, Kosovo, 2003
- Staff of Defense Language Institute and Executive Officer, 229th Military
Intelligence Battalion, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center,
Monterey, CA. 2001-2004
- Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Managed the complex defense cooperation relationship with the entity
governments of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 2000-2001
- Company grade assignments included command of Headquarters Troop First
Squadron Second Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk Louisiana and Squadron
Operations Staff assignment, and combat service as a scout and support platoon
leader with Fourth Squadron Seventh Cavalry, Third Armored Division, during
Desert Storm and in Germany. 1989-1999
Academic Credentials: BS French, USMA 1989; MA Naval Post Graduate
School 1998, National Security Affairs.
3. 3
Abstract
Why would Russia open itself to cooperation in Ballistic Missile Defense?
Russia’s strategic culture, nuclear policy, and military investment, geo-politics,
including challenges, shared interests, benefits for Russia, and Russian caveats are
key variables in preparing the Russian side.
Russia’s main concern is a territorial missile defense system that would
defend the entire U.S. and Europe. There are least four specific benefits of BMD
cooperation for Russia: succeeding in its foreign policy, protecting its European
energy market by supporting stability, modernizing its economy, and hedging
against threats form the east and south.
Whether Russia’s leaders choose to capitalize on the opportunity for BMD
cooperation remains to be seen. Trust remains low, Russia’s conventional
military, including its defense industrial sector, remains weak, and Russia remains
reliant on its nuclear deterrent for security.
The U.S. and Russia have an historically invaluable opportunity to cement
U.S. – Russia – Europe relations in a mutually beneficial fashion through ballistic
missile defense cooperation. U.S. empathy and diplomacy are the best tools to
make this happen. All parties must recognize and exploit this opportunity to
realize a practical confidence building measure.
4. 4
This paper reviews the Russian side of the ballistic missile defense issue
using the technique of net assessment. It provides a framework for those who
pose the question, “Why would Russia, which has resisted U.S. and Western
attempts at creating ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in the past, reverse
its view and open itself to cooperation in such an endeavor?” It is essential that
the U.S. side examine in detail Russia’s views of the BMD issue in order to most
effectively prosecute the countries’ efforts to achieve a common understanding of
the risks and opportunities inherent in this issue. Strategic culture, Russian
nuclear policy, military investment, and geo-politics, including challenges, shared
interests, benefits for Russia, and Russian caveats are key variables in preparing
the Russian side.
Despite the last twenty-five years of U.S. and NATO menace, real,
imagined, or portrayedi
, Russia and the U.S., are positioned to cooperate on
nuclear and BMD issues under the security dilemma.ii
NATO’s security,
largely European, is intertwined with Russia’s.iii
Theater and territorial BMD can
be part and parcel of this intertwined security, as illustrated at the November 2010
Lisbon Summit. Therefore, the U.S. and Russia have an historically invaluable
opportunity to cement U.S. – Russia – Europe relations in a mutually beneficial
fashion through ballistic missile defense cooperation. All parties must recognize
and exploit this opportunity to realize a practical confidence building measure.
Russian Strategic Culture: Historical and Geographical Context
Russia’s strategic culture is a function of the experience of the Russian
state, beginning with the inception of the Russian nation. Reaching back to
5. 5
Kievan Rus illustrates the Russian connection to the Slavic lands of the Asian
steppe where there are no natural borders. It also evokes the rivalry of Kiev and
Muscovy and Muscovy’s drive for dominance of the territory surrounding the
former principality, now the heart of the current Russian state. Tatarstan, a
province of modern day Russia serves as a reminder of Muscovy’s and Russia’s
subjection to invasion, and domination, from the east. Conversely, the Russian
imperial expansion of the 17th
and 18th
centuries created a sprawling geographical
Russian entity. Such a massive entity, later state, could notionally be guarded and
secured in a time when the Treaty of Westphalia had only begun solidify the
rights and responsibilities of nation-states. Today, legal boundaries codify
centuries old conquests. But imperial aspirations and irredentism persist below
the veneer of international law. Russians know that they, like other great powers
of today, could be subject to historical boundary corrections or revisions backed
by threat, coercion, or hostility.
Deprived of the huge standing Soviet Army and of control of its Near
Abroad, Russians feel even more vulnerable today than historically. A certain
paranoia springs from this enduring national sense of vulnerability, a paranoia
leading logically to a desire to recapture control of the surrounding states – that is,
most of the former Soviet Republics and Warsaw Pact members. To defend
Russia and dominate the neighbors, Russia was said to have had only two friends:
its army and its navy. These two institutions held places of pride and influence
within the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Strategic thinking was highly
valued in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. The tools and concepts changed,
6. 6
but the high level of thought was maintained across generations. These in turn
created the operational and economic demand for materiel that depended,
especially during Soviet times, upon a strong industrial base.
While different from western thought, Imperial Russian and Soviet
thought were no less deserving of consideration and respect, at home and abroad.
This thinking is best compared to a chess masters’ thought processes. Russians
value long-term strategic thinking. They venerate those who can think moves
ahead of an opponent, confronting them with a fait accompli that ends in
checkmate. Simultaneously Russians value evolutionary, subtle change. Their
tendency is to subtly change activities or conditions without announcement, only
very much later acknowledging their actions and their demands.
The tension of superiority and inferiority complexes in the Russian psyche
plays a part in this deliberate, cautious method.iv
Russian leaders have
historically condescended to smaller, weaker nations. Simultaneously they have
been plagued by doubts over Russia’s or Soviet status and place in the world.
Personal Russian relations play out in extremes of stoic patience and spirituality
contrasted with violent outbursts to settle scores. The strategic end of this mental
effort is survival – of the individual and of the nation.
The ways and means of Russian and Russian-dominated Soviet strategy
differed greatly from western ways and means but deserve consideration because
they persist today. Russian and Soviet military thinking were and are based upon
defense of Russia’s enormous geography by an enormous army composed of a
massive active component supported in time of war by a general levée of an even
7. 7
larger proportion of the populace. Simple, rugged weaponry was to be furnished
for its use. The navy likewise would sail in and control the maritime portion of
the near abroad, the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, and Arctic. With the creation of the
Soviet Union more people and resources were available to support the massive
Soviet forces and operations farther abroad, yet always animated by the paranoid
dedication to defense of Russia. Russian security officials may evince concern
with geo-political or technological shifts that seem divorced from Russia’s
interests. However, the logic always returns to the central question of how any
technology might eventually be employed against Russia itself, BMD included.
Evolution of Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine
While Russia has lost influence over its former Warsaw Pact allies while
NATO, including U.S. forces, has moved closer to its borders. Its own territorial
integrity has been challenged from within. It has reeled through economic crises,
including a default in 1998, that undermined its security and world standing and
robbed its military of funding. Russia’s nuclear doctrine is of particular
importance to the issue of BMD because of concerns, voiced by President
Medvedev at the New START treaty signing, that BMD could threaten Russia’s
offensive nuclear weapons, its ultimate defense.v
Russian perceptions of the U.S.
threat, based upon memory of the past 25 years are not positive. The U.S. must
be cognizant of this recent history and situate this in the Russian historical
context. The U.S. and Russia appear to perceive that they are in acceptably
balanced positions judging from the U.S. Reset Initiative, the outcomes of the
recent NATO Lisbon Summit, and the finalization of the New START Treaty.
8. 8
The interaction between the U.S. and Russia weighs particularly on Russia’s
contemporary nuclear policy.
From 1987 to 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev made a series of agreements with
the U.S. and with NATO and Western nations, under the guise of New Thinkingvi
,
that reduced Soviet military leverage in Europe and, combined with Soviet
economic collapse, brought the Soviet Union and Russia as a successor state to a
point of ignoble weakness in comparison to other world powers. The 1987 INF
Treaty was the end of a successful confrontation for the U.S., that ended Soviet
missile deployments in Europe. The 1990 CFE Treaty limited Soviet ability to
deploy forces within Europe. And 1991 START limited Soviet and U.S. strategic
missiles to 1600 long range ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. Gorbachev
announced and conducted the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from European Warsaw
Pact countries, Afghanistan and other Third World countries. Russia, after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, was forced to begin anew from a low
point of diplomatic, political, military, and economic retrenchment.
Russia retained the Soviet nuclear weapons which were and remain
symbols of status and Russia’s ultimate security guarantee.vii
Russian strategic
culture embraces mass in all facets of military operations. The Soviet Union
overtook the U.S. in sheer volume of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles in the
eighties. But then Gorbachev cut numbers. This may have in fact helped
alleviate the economic burden of maintaining such a large arsenal.viii
Such cuts
are outright offensive to the Russian strategic culture in two ways. First, the
Soviet and Russian concepts of defense are based upon the concept of massive
9. 9
forces and firepower concentrated to repel and punish an invader by destroying
his forces and overrunning his land. Second, the chess player mentality, planning
many moves into the future in order to confront an opponent with a checkmate
was turned completely on its head as the Soviet economy, the underpinning of the
Soviet Union’s military might, disintegrated without military strategists having
taken this eventuality into account. Russian planners were left with the remnants
of Soviet greatness in terms of materiel, force structure, manpower, infrastructure
and doctrine.
The legacy Soviet ‘no first use policy’ governed employment of Russia’s
nuclear weapons until 1993 when Russia’s first military doctrine was published.
It implicitly allowed for first use of nuclear weapons by authorizing them for use
against a conventional attack, however, the role was not clearly defined.ix
Momentum for NATO expansion east was building. Abject economic and
military weakness pervaded Russia.x
Russia, which perceived a threat that was
incomprehensible to Western leaders, was impotent to counter these NATO and
U.S. moves. In quantifiable terms Russia lost none of its historic homeland. But
it lost international standing as a derzhava [holder of international balance] and
Russians felt the full force of Western leaders’ deception real and perceived.xi
The Soviet Union fell prey to American deception under its Strategic Defense
Initiative, wherein interceptors’ effectiveness was enhanced at optimal times to
produce false successful result during missile intercept tests. The credulous
Soviets subsequently overspent in an effort to maintain parity or offset this
perceived U.S. advantage in strategic capabilities. After the collapse of the Soviet
10. 10
Union, Russia was penetrated by armies of International Monetary Fund and
World Bank consultants who prescribed painful economic austerity measures on
pain of denial of further economic support but whose prescriptions did not live up
to Russian expectations of economic rescue.
On the heels of these Western ruses and intrusions, a period of NATO
expansion and use of force ensued, against which Russia could only protest. The
West could claim not to have threatened Russia’s security, even as it absorbed
former Soviet Republics into NATO and the EU. Expansion offered U.S. forces
the ability to maneuver or reside in those countries. Gorbachev had argued that
the west was self containingxii
, that it would limit expansion of its influence. By
1999, Russians had ample evidence that the U.S. might not be a self-containing
power. This exacerbated Russians’ fears and forced them to confront their
relative weakness.
Claiming to fear for its own territorial integrity in the aftermath of
NATO’s Kosovo operation in 1999, Russia published a new more comprehensive
military doctrine in 2000. This document organized war into 4 categories, in 2 of
which Russia could employ nuclear weapons: a regional war (attack by a state or
coalition in pursuit of significant political goals), or global war (attack by a
coalition of states or survival and sovereignty of Russia are at stake). The
concern of this document was deterring a Kosovo like operation against a Russian
region, such as Chechnya, by employing a limited nuclear strike to de-escalate the
conflict by deterring any further action by the attacker.xiii
It is also important to
11. 11
note that this concept envisions reliance upon nuclear weapons as a temporary
remedy for the country’s conventional weakness.xiv
The 2010 Russian Military Doctrine has seen a further modification to
Russia’s nuclear policy with a further restriction on the use of nuclear weapons.
The 2000 document foresaw the use of nuclear weapons in situations “critical” to
national security. The 2010 document restricts their use to situations where
Russia’s existence is threatened. However, it retains the option for first use and
retains the concept of inflicting a specific amount of damage to an opponent, not
unlimited damage, which is meant to end a conflict without further escalation. xv
Russian Defense Investment
Russia arrived at and pursues this strategy because it has traversed twenty
five years of deficient defense spending on modernization and investment. It
remains in a state of conventional military weakness. Defense investment, as an
indicator of Russian ability to act in any future environment has only recently
been revived as a consequence of its energy revenues. Statements from the
Russian Government underline a determination to build Russian capabilities at a
deliberate pace. However, the Russian defense sector’s capacity to design and
provide the materiel that the military needs is questionable.
In October 2010, State Duma Defense Committee head Viktor Zavarzin
announced that Russia’s defense spending, including research and development
(R&D) would rise from $16.3B in 2010, to $19.2B in 2011, $24.3B in 2012, and
amount to $38.8B in 2013. R&D will decline from 22 percent in 2010 to 16
percent in 2013. However, modernization spending will amount to 13% in 2010,
12. 12
15% in 2011-2012, and 14% in 2013.xvi
In February 2011, Russian Finance
Minister, Alexei Kudrin, announced that Russian defense spending would rise
from .5% of GDP to the level of 1.5% of GDP from 2012. In addition in February
2011, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that it would spend $650B
through 2020 to acquire 600 new warplanes, 100 ships, and 1000 helicopters.xvii
The promised increase in spending points toward moderate and likely
sustainable defense spending that could lead to increased defense capability and
diminished national vulnerability. Russia could reduce its reliance on its nuclear
forces in favor of conventional forces. Over the long term then, reduced Russian
reliance on its nuclear arsenal could decrease Russian resistance to territorial
BMD. A revived Russian defense sector could contribute materially to BMD
cooperation. Ironically, a conventionally stronger Russia, could buttress U.S.
efforts to pursue its phased adaptive approach to territorial missile defense.
The big ticket items Russia is purchasing could provide a welcome
stimulus to the Russian defense industry, which has weakened significantly since
the demise of the Soviet Union. An enormous challenge for Russia, and a change
from Soviet days, is the inability of the Russian defense industry to reliably
provide the modern equipment that the Russian military needs. While spending
was low, the industry stagnated.
Today, the industry is unable to reliably deliver the right equipment on
time at a profitable price. There is finger pointing between government ministers
and industry officials. For calendar year 2010, the industry failed to deliver one
ship, three submarines, 3 of 9 Yak trainer airplanes, and 73 of 151 BMP3 armored
13. 13
fighting vehicles. Industry officials claim that the Russian government is limiting
industry profits by limiting growth in materials costs and failing to pay
outstanding bills. Russian analyst Vladimir Dvorkin claims that 1/3 of defense
firms are bankrupt, productivity is 5 to 10 times lower than in advanced countries
and more than 70% of technologies that support production are worn out or
obsolete.xviii
Spending remains subject to the vagaries of the energy markets.
While recent spikes in energy prices have benefited Russia’s revenues they have
removed the impetus to reform economically.
Ironic Challenges: Relations with Iran and U.S. Technology Transfer Regime
Because Russia has chosen a geo-political path independent of Europe,
NATO, and the U.S., its interests in and relations with Iran differ greatly, due to
historical, economic, and unavoidable geographical conditions. Historically
Russians have contended with the Muslim, Persian, Caucasian, and Turkic
peoples to the south and east. The Persian Empire was a great rival to the Russian
Empire. Nationalist feelings in both sides simmer below the surface. Claims and
counter-claims on territories wrested even centuries ago are not forgotten and can
be reprised. Iranian irredentist sentiment toward former ‘northern territories’ in
the Caucasus offers but one possible example. Absent, irredentist sentiment, Iran
could cause difficulties for Russia by stirring up dissent against Moscow among
Russia’s Muslim, ethnic minorities there. xix
Iran’s possession of a nuclear
weapon on Russia’s southern doorstep would increase the threat from the south.
On the other hand, Russia has benefited from its contact with Iran in terms
of weapons sales, though Iran is about 10% of Russia’s annual sales, and leverage
14. 14
against the west. Russian participation in the Bushehr nuclear power plant
construction project provides a lever over both the West and the Iranians. Russia
can influence the rate of the project’s advance and can serve a mediating role for
the rest of the international community because of this unique placement.
Maintaining cordial relations with Iran, in consideration of the possibility that Iran
could obtain a nuclear weapon, is a useful activity from Moscow’s perspective.
In contrast to Russia’s interest in dealing with Iran lies its need to import
foreign technology and to cooperatively develop technology with Western
partners like the U.S. The global trend in technology development is toward
collaborative technology development between and among universities and
scientists. Russia is already opening to technology co-development between
universities in an attempt to contribute to Russian economic development.xx
Specifically in the BMD realm, the U.S. is the acknowledged leader in the
field. President Ronald Reagan famously offered to share U.S. Strategic Defense
Initiative technology with the Soviet Union. Presidential Decision Directive 17 of
1993 is an excellent start point for determining what cooperative development and
sharing the U.S. can carry out with Russia. Certain portions also should be
revisited, specifically the limit on transfer of certain technologies already
developed. xxi
At a minimum, in the realms of sensing and C2 many changes
would be necessary to facilitate inter-operability among all concerned parties and
to create the absolute reliability of the sensing data gathered and support data
exchange between Russia, NATO, and the U.S. Today NATO has accepted the
necessity to cooperate with Russia in BMD, although for now geographic defense
15. 15
responsibilities remain divided between NATO’s responsibility for allies’ security
and Russia’s structure for Russian territory.xxii
That preserving national security secrets and technological supremacy in
some sectors remains crucial to U.S. security is undeniable. In this realm of
inter-theater ballistic missile systems modified to carry weapons of mass
destruction where geography and allies contribute invaluable expertise and geo-
political advantages, the U.S. cannot afford not to fail to partner fully with Russia
and vice versa. Recycling the Cold War mentality of blocs in opposition on
principle, is simply counter-productive for the U.S. and for Russia.
Shared Interests
Russia’s historical experience, cultural framework, and Communist
ideology ill-prepared it for the changes of the eighties and nineties and in many
ways it has not yet completed its transition from the paradigms of those Soviet
and immediate post-Soviet days. But it has established its own new political
reality based upon a thorough application of its historical lessonsxxiii
and a
pragmatic assessment of its interests. These are listed in the 12 July 2008 Foreign
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Among them are Russian national
security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; modernization (mainly economic);
and influencing global processes in favor of international law.xxiv
It is at this point, respecting Russian interests and developing common
interests that the U.S. must meet Russia. Both have an abiding interest in
maintaining international institutions like the UN and OSCE which are based
upon mutual agreement of consenting states. Prospective future partners should
16. 16
expect that cooperation with a confident economically healthy Russia would be
more productive than cooperation with a weak, fearful, defensive Russia.
Russia’s main, lingering concern is the possible evolution of NATO’s
Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) system into a
territorial missile defense system that would defend Europe in accord with the
U.S. Phased Adaptive Approach that would fully create a strategic missile defense
over the entire U.S. and Europe. The Soviets believed the U.S. was capable of
creating such a system as early as the 1990s. Still in a weakened conventional
state, relying mainly on nuclear weapons for deterrence, Russia fears it would
diminish or invalidate its nuclear arsenal. This view is a legacy of the Soviet Cold
War approach to strategic arms control as exercised since the end of World War II
but it can be overcome. Russia has hinted at real and conceptual acceptance of
theater ballistic missile defense through its grudging acceptance of the NATO
ALTBMD and ratification of New START. Cooperating on ALTBMD with
NATO and with the U.S. directly may be only “a shift from resistance to
adaptation.”xxv
Russia likely has identified real interests and real benefits to be
gained from ALTBMD and territorial BMD cooperation.
Over the history of BMD efforts, there has not yet been an instance where
defensive weapons seriously threatened the effectiveness of multiple offensive
weapons.xxvi
This time may come and it is crucial that the U.S. use diplomacy
and empathy to convince Russia that the countries can arrive there as partners
with full transparency. The U.S. and its NATO partners can take many paths
toward realizing their ALTBMD project over the next ten years. Principles for
17. 17
just such an endeavor have already been proposed by collectively by Madeleine
Albright, Strobe Talbott, Igor Ivanov and Alexander Dynkin.xxvii
How the
countries go about this is as important as getting to the end state of the project and
could have the added benefit of confirming Russia’s identity as European state.
Such a recognition and principled actions that allow Russia to realize benefits can
provide a practical augmentation to Western theater and territorial BMD, and in a
larger sense, contribute to building the confidence necessary to relieve legacy
Cold War tensions in western Eurasia and reduce the security burden on the U.S.
Rather than leaving Russia to stand alone against threats it perceives from south
and east, they could anchor Russia in Europe where it has historically been a
major actor.
There are least four specific benefits of BMD cooperation for Russia.
First, Russia calls itself the “biggest European State…ready to play a constructive
role in ensuring a civilizational compatibility of Europe”xxviii
and has proposed a
European Security Treaty to members of the OSCE and the CIS, to “create
regional collective security and cooperation…from Vancouver to Vladivostok”.
Such a project, whether this specific one or anotherxxix
, would further the web of
agreements among Euro-Atlantic states, particularly the still weak links between
Russia and European states as a bloc.xxx
Such a convergence would be in both
Europe’s and Russia’s interest. Asian social and political decline during the 18th
through 20th
centuries elevated Europe, including Russia, to abnormal historical
status. In the aftermath of World War II, and later strong growth in Europe,
demographics have changed to produce aging welfare societies. In Russia, birth
18. 18
rates have gyrated with political, social, and economic changes that have been
more drastic than in Europe, especially in the last twenty five years. It appears
that Europe and Russia are receding in global significance as compared to China
and India, as well as the still relevant U.S. The historical affinities of these
peoples appear to lead logically to a convergence of economic and security
interests that would benefit greatly from cooperation rather than independence.
Second, Europe is currently Russia’s main energy market, where Russia
seeks to demonstrate it is a “responsible partner”xxxi
even to the point of
restructuring payments of its long term energy contracts with European
buyers.xxxii
While Europeans can find other supplies of natural gas and oil on the
world market, Russian investment in pipelines running directly to Europe and
long term take or pay contracts give it an enormous interest in protecting the
market from destabilizing effects, such as threats of, or actual missile launches
from, countries like Iran. In addition to protecting its European market, Russia’s
interest in taking steps to prevent or, in the very unlikely case of a launch, helping
to prevent a missile strike on Israel has not been addressed as yet in open source
literature.
In both the cases above, threat or launch, one could argue that Russia
benefits from, and even has an interest in, any instability that Iran introduces into
the energy market because prices rise and revenue flows to Russia. While it is no
doubt true that Russia benefits from unstable energy markets, as it has during the
2011 Arab political unrest, Russia would benefit more from maintaining the
primacy of the UN Security Council and its security prescriptions. Russia’s status
19. 19
as a great power is tightly connected to its permanent seat on the UN Security
Council so it should brook little dissent from other powers of lesser stature. In
2008 the Russian foreign minister voiced Russian disapproval of Iran’s
simultaneous development of its missile sector and uranium enrichment. Russia
denied export of S300 missiles to Iran that deprived Iran of an integrated air
defense system and nudged Iran toward making a settlement with the P5+1. xxxiii
Russia has a deeper interest in maintaining stability by preventing such a
catastrophic attack or coercion, as a responsible great power, than its short term
economic gain realized through unstable energy markets.
Third, Russia has announced its desire to modernize its economy and its
economy and military. The potential economic benefit of technology transfer
from and co-development with the U.S. and Europe through a BMD initiative are
not to be ignored. Russia is in need of both human and financial capital
development. Experimentation at universities is ongoing and holds potential
primarily for technology development, but secondarily for helping to expand and
realize Russia’s defense technology sector’s conversion to market driven
operation. Dual use technologies have been a prime driver in Western markets
since the end of World War II. The Russian economy, especially the defense
sector, hampered by the Soviet command economy, only began its conversion,
with U.S. assistance in 1994.xxxiv
The mentality of the free market has yet to fully
take root in Russia and some would argue that it will not completely do so, in
ways that a European or especially an American would understand, in a pure
liberal economic sense. But the opening is adequate for business to carry on.
20. 20
This allows the benefit of increased foreign direct investmentxxxv
to grow and
build the Russian economy, in sectors beyond the raw materials and energy export
sectors, a key long term goal of the Medvedev administration.
Fourth, ballistic missile defense or at least the acquisition of the
technology through partnership with the West could serve as a hedging strategy
against threats from the south and east. Russians rarely speak openly of the
strategic balance with China but it definitely tilts in favor of China.
Demographically, Siberian Russia is becoming sparsely populated and is subject
to illegal migration from neighboring states. Though the outright threat of
invasion is certainly low, future competition for resources could spur competition
or conflict. While BMD does not serve to protect against tactical nuclear devices
or large scale strategic attack, it could provide protection against countries that
have large armies and few strategic delivery vehicles.
Concluding Thoughts
Whether Russia’s leaders will, or can, choose to capitalize on the
opportunity for BMD cooperation remains to be seen. Further analysis is required
to factor in U.S., Iranian, European, and Chinese perceptions. The weight of the
variables depends on ever-evolving political, economic, and technological
situations.
The views from Russians are not promising. There is little if any trust in
American offers of transparency or protests of the country’s non-threatening
posture toward Russia. The idea that the U.S. is a dangerous power, while
attenuated since the 2009 Reset, persists. One might argue that there is little
21. 21
empathy on the Russian side for the U.S. embrace of preemptive war in the
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Though that may not be correct, the
Russian counter-argument would find that U.S. actions since 2003 have had little
to do with the actual attacks and created only instability. Russia’s defense
establishment disagrees with the New START Treaty and is inclined to build
additional nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles as a deterrent to U.S.
encroachment on Russian territory. Skepticism over U.S. protests that a U.S.
territorial missile shield will not degrade Russia’s second strike capability in the
future is pervasive. Russians believe that while the New START Treaty contains
a supposedly firm finding that missile defense does not jeopardize either side’s
nuclear deterrent, the U.S. could withdraw from this treaty as it did from the
ABM treaty in 2002.xxxvi
The military is particularly concerned about the threat of the U.S.
territorial BMD system to the Russian nuclear deterrent. According to one retired
military expert, Russia does not need massive numbers of warheads and delivery
vehicles. Under the terms of the New START Treaty, Russia has an adequate
arsenal to deter the U.S., provided that the U.S. BMD system does not build up
qualitatively or quantitatively. A Russian withdraw from the treaty is an option
should such a threat to the Russian arsenal become a reality.xxxvii
Russia’s security concerns deserve respectful consideration in light of
recent history and its current, still precarious, military posture. Russia and the
U.S., as world powers with interests in preserving the current international order,
are positioned to cooperate on nuclear and BMD. The benefits, according to a
22. 22
rational analysis from the Russian perspective, would appear to support a cautious
advance toward cooperative territorial BMD with the U.S. and Europe as partners.
Therefore, the U.S. and Russia have an historically invaluable opportunity to
cement U.S. – Russia – Europe relations in a mutually beneficial fashion, with
ballistic missile defense as the start point.
23. 23
Bibliography
Madeleine Albright, Strobe Talbott, Igor Ivanov and Alexander Dynkin, “Next
Steps on U.S-Russian Nuclear Negotiations and Non-Proliferation,”
Brookings/IMEMO paper,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/10_nonproliferation_albr
ight_talbott/10_nonproliferation_albright_talbott.pdf> accessed 2 March 2011.
Belton, Catherine and Crooks, Ed, Gazprom in contract shake-up
February 25 2010 23:06 , http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/53068c2c-2254-11df-9a72-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1FU7WijGK, accessed 2 March 2001.
Benson, Sumner, The Impact of Technology Transfer on the Military Balance, Air
University Review, November December 1984,
http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/nov-dec/benson.html,
accessed 11 April 2011.
Blumenstyk, Goldie, In New Project, Russian Universities Tap American
Expertise in Tech Transfer, http://chronicle.com/article/In-New-Project-
Russian/124657, accessed 11 April 2011.
Brezhnev, L.I., Nixon R.M., Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/abm/abm2.html,
accessed 27 Feb 2011.Bruno, Greg, Missile Defense Technology,
http://www.cfr.org/defense-technology/missile-defense-technology/p18812 ,
updated September 17, 2009, accessed 22 February 2011.
Bruno, Greg, National Missile Defense: A Status Report
http://www.cfr.org/defense-strategy/national-missile-defense-status-report/p18792
, updated September 17, 2009, accessed 21 February 2011.
Carnegie Endowment, The New Start-A View from Moscow, Alexei Arbatov
Q&A, 6 April 2010,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publlications/index.cfm?fa=view&id40506,
accessed 30 March 2011.
Charnysh, Volha, Benefits of US Russian Missile Defense Cooperation,
http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2010/6/29/132429/429, accessed 21
February 2011.
Clinton, William J. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 17,
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-17.pdf, accessed 16 April 2011.
24. 24
Ermarth, Fritz W., Russia’s Strategic Culture: Past, Present, and…In
Transition?, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/russia.pdf, accessed 22 Feb
2011.
Fisher-Thompson, Jim, Helsinki Treaty Spurred Fall of Berlin Wall, End of
Communism, http://www.america.gov/st/democracyhr-
english/2009/November/200911060930531ejrehsiF0.1870996.html, 6 November
2009, accessed 27 Feb 2011.
Department of State, Missile Defense Cooperation with the Russian Federation,
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/152164.htm
Druzhinin, Alexei, Russia Reveals Detailed Data on Defense Spending until 2013,
RIA Novosti, http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20101012/160919044.html, accessed
30 March 2011.
Esin Victor, A Russian View of START, posted to EatWest Institute on 7 June
2010, http://www.ewi.info/russian-view-start, accessed, 30 March 2011.
Fletcher Michael A. and Pan, Philip P, U.S. and Russia to Reduce Arsenals,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/06/AR2009070600784.html, 7 July 2009, accessed 21
Feb 2011.
Gates, Robert M. Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, February 2010.
http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_f
or%20web.pdf
Giberson, Michael, Gazprom, Europe and Long-term take-or-pay Contracts,
http://theenergycollective.com/index.php?q=michaelgiberson/29342/gazprom-
europe-and-long-term-take-or-pay-contracts, accessed 2 March 2011.
Gutterman, Steve, Russia’s Medvedev Warns of New Arms Race,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/30/us-russia-medvedev-
idUSWLA950420101130, accessed 2 March 2011.
Hildreth, Steven and Ek Carl, Missile Defense and NATO’s Lisbon Summit,
Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R41549, www.crs.gov,
http://www.tmd.nato.int/what_we_do.html
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-5CAEDD6A-
377E7AB3/natolive/topics_49635.htm
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm
25. 25
Jervis, Robert, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, first published in World
Politics, Vol 30, No 2, January 1978, Johns Hopkins University Press, cited from
Classical Readings of International Relations, Wililams, Goldstein, Shfritz,
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh,
Harcourt Brace College Publishers, San Diego Ca, 1994
Kimball Daryl G and Pomper Miles A. , A Fresh Start? An Interview With
Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak , Arms Control Today. Washington:Dec
2008. Vol. 38, Iss. 10, p. 6-12 (7 pp.)
Kuzmin, Vladimir , Russian draft proposals for a new European Security Treaty
are first steps to overhaul, Rossiyskaya Gazeta,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/politics/6772198/Russian-draft-
proposals-for-a-new-European-Security-Treaty-are-first-steps-to-overhaul.html,
accessed 21 Feb 2011.
Karaganov, Sergei et al, Towards an Alliance of Europe, Analytical Report by
the Russian Group of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Valdai Discussion
Club, RiaNovosti, 7 Sep 2010, Moscow.
Mahnken, Thomas G., Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945,
Columbia University Press, New York, 2008.
Medvedev, Dmitri et al, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,
July 12 2008, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml,
accessed 27 Feb 2011. also available at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-
issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policy/russian-nuclear-policy/fpc.htm.
Medvedev, Dmitri, NEW START signing remarks,
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2010/04/08/Obama-Medvedevs-
remarks-at-pact-signing/UPI-27651270750998
O’Reilly, Patrick J., Unclassified Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 16 June 2010, http://www.mda.mil/news/public_statements.html,
accessed 21 February 2010.
O’Reilly, Patrick J., Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Regarding the European Phased Adaptive
Approach (EPAA),
http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ps_oreilly_120110_HASC.pdf,
accessed 21 Feb 2011.
Nation, R. Craig, U.S. Interests in the New Eurasia,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub829.pdf, accessed 17
April 2011.
26. 26
Nazila, Fathi, ‘Wipe Israel Off the Map’ Iranian Says,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/africa/26iht-iran.html, published 27
October 2005, accessed 17 April 2011.
Nowak, David, Russian Military to Purchase 600 Planes, 100 Ships,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110224/ap_on_re_eu/eu_russia_military_expansion
, accessed 2 March 2011
O’Donnell, Clara Marina, Europe Frets Over Foreign Investments in defense
Industry, Yale Global Online Magazine,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/europe-frets-over-foreign-investments, accessed
30 March 2011.
Parker, John W. Persian Dreams, Moscow and Teheran Since the Fall of the
Shah, Potomac Books Inc., Washington D.C., 2009.
Pifer, Steven, The Next Round: The United States and Nuclear Arms Reductions
After New START Brookings Institution, Arms Control Series, Paper 4,
December 2010.
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2010/12_arms_control_pifer.aspx
Pitalyev, Ilya, Russia’s CFE Moratorium to Remain in Place – Defense Minister,
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100917/160620094.html, 17 September 2009, accessed
21 Feb 2011.
Podvig, Pavel, Offense and Defense After New START,
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/offense-and-defense-
after-new-start, accessed 13 Feb 2011.
Reuters, Israel Defense Chief: Iran is Not a Nuclear Threat,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/17/us-israel-iran-
idUSTRE58G0ZF20090917, accessed 17 April 2011.
RIAnovosti, OSCE ‘unfit’ to deal with Missile Defense – Medvedev,
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101203/161612154.html, accessed 21 Feb 2011.
Roberts, Cynthia A., Russia and the European Union: The Sources and Limits of
“Special Relationships,”Carlisle P: US rmy Wr College, Strategic Studies
Institute, Feb ruary 2007, P 49.
Rozoff, Rick, NATO surrenders Europe to U.S. Global Missile Shield Project,
http://world.mediamonitors.net/Headlines/NATO-surrenders-Europe-to-U.S.-
Global-Missile-Shield-Project, accessed 21 February 2011.
27. 27
Sello, Harry, Dual Use Technology: A Key to Defense Conversion, in The Anatomy of Russian Defense
Conversion, edited by Vlad E. Genin, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, Vega
Press, Stanford CA, 2001, pp 554-567.
Sokov, Nikolai N., The Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Security
Policy, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA, April
2009, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=98884, accessed 2 March 2011.
Sokov, Nikolia, The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle,
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100205_russian_nuclear_doctrine.htm, 5 Feb 2011,
accessed 2 March 2011.
Sokov, Nikolai, Evolution in Nuclear Strategy in US and Russia and its
Implications for Arms Control, IFRI, spring 2003, www.ifri.org, accessed 2
March 2011.
Townsend Anthony, in The Future Now Blog, http://www.iftf.org/node/2701,
accessed 16 April 2011.
Trenin, Dmitri, Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture,
se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/.../02_Russias_Threat_Perception.pdf, accessed
17 April 2011.
Tsygankov, Andrei P., Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in
National Identity, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Plymouth United
Kingdom, 2010.
Wagner , Daniel and Stellman, Diana, The Prospects for Missile Defense
Cooperation Between NATO and Russia,
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/02/10/the-prospects-for-missile-
defense-cooperation-between-nato-and-russia/, accessed 21 Feb 2011.
Wegren, Stephen and Herspring, Dale, ed. After Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect,
Future Uncertain,(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).
i
For a description of U.S. SDI deception operations see Mahnken, Thomas G., Technology and
the American Way of War Since 1945, Columbia University Press, New York, 2008, pp 151-152.
ii
Jervis, Robert, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, first published in World Politics, Vol
30, No 2, January 1978, Johns Hopkins University Press, cited from Classical Readings of
International Relations, Wililams, Goldstein, Shfritz, Graduate School of Public and International
Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, Harcourt Brace College Publishers, San Diego Ca, 1994, p 195.
My discussion using this theory throughout the paper is dependent upon this source.
iii
Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept for the Defence and
Security of the Members of the North Atrlantic Treay Organisation,
28. 28
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm, accessed 2 March
2011.
iv
Ermarth, Fritz W., Russia’s Strategic Culture: Past, Present, and…In Transition?,
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/russia.pdf, accessed 22 Feb 2011, pp 6-7.
v
Medvedev NEW START signing remarks, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-
News/2010/04/08/Obama-Medvedevs-remarks-at-pact-signing/UPI-27651270750998
vi
Discussion of the Gorbachev era is based upon Tsygankov, Andrei P., Russian Foreign Policy,
Change and Continuity in National Identity, pp 31-53.
vi
Fedorov
vii
Sokov, Nikolai N., The Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Security Policy, James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA, April 2009,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-
2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=98884, accessed 2 March 2011, pp 73-74.
viii
Tsygankov, Andrei P., Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity,
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Plymouth United Kingdom, 2010 p 42.
ix
Ibid p 77.
x
Tsygankov, Andrei P., Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity,
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Plymouth United Kingdom, 2010 p 75.
xi
Ibid, p 103.
xii
Ibid, p 37.
xiii
Sokov, Nikolai, Evolution in Nuclear Strategy in US and Russia and its Implications for Arms
Control, IFRI, spring 2003, www.ifri.org, accessed 2 March 2011, pp 9-11.
xiv
Sokov, Nikolai N., The Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Security Policy, James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA, April 2009,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-
2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=98884, accessed 2 March 2011, p 83.
xv
Sokov, Nikolia, The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle,
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100205_russian_nuclear_doctrine.htm, 5 Feb 2011, accessed 2 March
2011
xvi
Druzhinin, Alexei, Russia Reveals Detailed Data on Defense Spending until 2013, RIA
Novosti, http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20101012/160919044.html, accessed 30 March 2011.
xvii
Nowak, David, Russian Military to Purchase 600 Planes, 100 Ships,
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110224/ap_on_re_eu/eu_russia_military_expansion, accessed 2 March 2011
xviii
Russian defense Policy
xix
Parker, John W. Persian Dreams, Moscow and Teheran Since the Fall of the Shah, Potomac
Books Inc., Washington D.C., 2009, p292.
xx
Blumenstyk, Goldie, In New Project, Russian Universities Tap American Expertise in Tech
Transfer, http://chronicle.com/article/In-New-Project-Russian/124657, accessed 11 April 2011.
xxi
Clinton, William J. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC 17,
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-17.pdf, accessed 16 April 2011.
xxiiRT.com, NATO rules out joint defense with Russia, http://rt.com/politics/appathurai-nato-missile-
afghanistan/, accessed 16 April 2011.
xxiii
See Tsygankov, Andrei P., Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National
Identity, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Plymouth United Kingdom, 2010, pp 98-99 for a
discussion of Russian Chancellor Gorchakov’s “Concentration” course after the Crimean War.
xxiv
Medvedev, Dmitri et al, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 12 2008,
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml, accessed 27 Feb 2011.
xxv
Tsygankov, Andrei P., Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity,
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., Plymouth United Kingdom, 2010 p 104
xxvi
Podvig, Pavel, Offense and Defense After New START, http://thebulletin.org/web-
edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/offense-and-defense-after-new-start, accessed 13 Feb 2011.
29. 29
xxvii
Madeleine Albright, Strobe Talbott, Igor Ivanov and Alexander Dynkin, “Next Steps on U.S-Russian
Nuclear Negotiations and Non-Proliferation,” Brookings/IMEMO paper,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/10_nonproliferation_albright_talbott/10_nonprolifer
ation_albright_talbott.pdf> accessed 2 March 2011.
xxviii
Medvedev, Dmitri et al, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 12 2008,
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml, accessed 27 Feb 2011. also
available at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policy/russian-
nuclear-policy/fpc.htm
xxix
See Karaganov, Sergei et al, Towards an Alliance of Europe, Analytical Report by the Russian
Group of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Valdai Discussion Club, RiaNovosti, 7 Sep
2010, Moscow, for additional detail on a proposed Treaty on an Alliance of Europe.
xxx
Ibid.
xxxi
Medvedev, Dmitri et al, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 12 2008,
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml, accessed 27 Feb 2011. also
available at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policy/russian-
nuclear-policy/fpc.htm
xxxii
Belton, Catherine and Crooks, Ed, Gazprom in contract shake-up
February 25 2010 23:06 , http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/53068c2c-2254-11df-9a72-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1FU7WijGK, accessed 2 March 2001.
xxxiii
Parker, John W. Persian Dreams, Moscow and Teheran Since the Fall of the Shah, Potomac
Books Inc., Washington D.C., 2009, p309.
xxxiv
Sello, Harry, Dual Use Technology: A Key to Defense Conversion, in The Anatomy of
Russian Defense Conversion, edited by Vlad E. Genin, Institute for International Studies, Stanford
University, Vega Press, Stanford CA, 2001, pp 554-567..
xxxv
Hildreth, Steven and Ek Carl, Missile Defense and NATO’s Lisbon Summit, Congressional
Research Service, 7-5700, R41549, www.crs.gov, p 7.
xxxvi
Carnegie Endowment, The New Start-A View from Moscow, Alexei Arbatov Q&A, 6 April
2010, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publlications/index.cfm?fa=view&id40506, accessed
30 March 2011.
xxxvii
Esin Victor, A Russian View of START, posted to EatWest Institute on 7 June 2010,
http://www.ewi.info/russian-view-start, accessed, 30 March 2011. Victor Esin is a retired Russian
Army Colonel General and former chief of staff ot the Russian Strategic Forces.
