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 The independent protec on layers IPLs are vital to keep plant operate smoothly and safely, and in case
of any fire case will take appropriate mi ga on controls to protect plant from catastrophic
consequences such as explosions and fire.
 There are three IPLs that depends on cyber assets (DCS, ESD and F&G systems) which emphasis
importance of such assets to protect plant so it is important to maintain availability and integrity for
theses cyber assets and from this point OT cybersecurity became important.
Any control loop in the plant contains:
 Sensors to sense process parameters such as pressure, flow, level and temperature .
 Controllers such as PLC , DCS controllers , SCADA RTU , VFD ,etc. to control process parameters at required setpoints and to take
ac ons according to implemented logic and control algorithms .
 Final control elements such as ON/Off valve, control valve, pump, motor, etc.
It is worthy men oned that PLC and worksta on are similar in components (Input , output and processor)
 Input for worksta on is keyboard, output is screen and processor.
 Input to PLC is sensors, Out puts are finial control elements and processor.
The Industrial control system ICS infrastructures is like IT network structure contains same ethernet switches which used
in IT networks which makes it vulnerable to the same cyber threats which threaten IT environment.
Isola on of OT and make it isolated island becomes impossible Due to rapid and spread digi za on through transferring
all process data for enterprise network which used in data analysis to help top management in decisions and enhance
produc on op miza on.
The History of cyber incident affected cri cal infrastructure all a lot such as:
 Stuxnet : is a malicious computer worm first uncovered in 2010 and is believed to be responsible for causing substantial damage to
the nuclear program of Iran
 Black Energy: hackers using the Black Energy 3 malware remotely compromised information systems of three energy distribution
companies in Ukraine and temporarily disrupted the electricity supply to consumers.
 Triton Targeted Attack: In August of 2017, TRITON malware was used to target and disrupt Safety Instrumented System (SIS)
controllers within a Saudi petrochemical refinery.
 The anti-surge controller is one of the most critical control loops in a turbine or compressor. It is
responsible for preventing the compressor from entering in surge, which can cause damage to the
equipment.
 If a cyber attacker is able to successfully attack the anti-surge controller, they could change the
parameters of the controller in a way that could lead compressor to surge.
 This could have catastrophic consequences, such as loss of production, damage to equipment, or even
injury or death.
 Most of OT asset owners have concept that we are safe and away from cyber-a ack but this not correct as, the industrial control
system could be affected by infected USB s ck, infected engineering laptop, infected remote connec on and misconfigured firewall
between OT and IT.
 OT cybersecurity concerned about maintaining availability and integrity of OT assets from human error of opera on and
maintenance teams not only cybercriminal.
 Cyber incident targeted OT environment in different sectors increasing rapidly and for example cyber incident affected energy
sector in las year was 190 in compared to 2016 was 59 cyber incidents.
 So Asset owners of cri cal infrastructure to take OT cybersecurity as priority to keep plants run smoothly and safely without
produc on loss or incidents.
 The difference between OT and IT in priori es makes special Requirements to deal with OT cybersecurity to maintain its availability
and integrity as OT deals with physical process.
 For example, in IT patch management is straigh orward process, may be every month do it but in OT it required special precau ons
and permits to perform patch management for any controllers.
 Another example is in IT realm it is easy to restart worksta on but in OT is not permi ed.
 Due to high risk which could results from high consequences in case of lost availability or integrity of industrial
control system, So It is very important to protect industrial control system by applying multiple layers of defense.
 This is called a defense-in-depth (D-ID) strategy. It means that if one layer of security is breached, the subsequent layers
will still be able to prevent the attack.
 The selection of these layers should be the result of an effective cyber risk assessment. This assessment should identify
the specific threats and vulnerabilities to industrial control system and then select the most appropriate cybersecurity
countermeasures to mitigate those cyber risks.
 ISA/IEC 62443 standards are the most popular in OT cybersecurity contains 14 publications.
 It divides the cybersecurity topics by stakeholder category / roles including:
 the operator,
 the service providers (service providers for integration and for maintenance)
 the component/system manufacturers.
 The different roles each follow a risk-based approach to prevent and manage security risks in their activities.
 ISA/IEC 62443-2-1 “Security program requirements for IACS asset owners” is directed to asset owner to help in
issue cyber security management system.

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introduction to #OT cybersecurity for O&M teams.pdf

  • 1.
  • 2.  The independent protec on layers IPLs are vital to keep plant operate smoothly and safely, and in case of any fire case will take appropriate mi ga on controls to protect plant from catastrophic consequences such as explosions and fire.  There are three IPLs that depends on cyber assets (DCS, ESD and F&G systems) which emphasis importance of such assets to protect plant so it is important to maintain availability and integrity for theses cyber assets and from this point OT cybersecurity became important.
  • 3. Any control loop in the plant contains:  Sensors to sense process parameters such as pressure, flow, level and temperature .  Controllers such as PLC , DCS controllers , SCADA RTU , VFD ,etc. to control process parameters at required setpoints and to take ac ons according to implemented logic and control algorithms .  Final control elements such as ON/Off valve, control valve, pump, motor, etc. It is worthy men oned that PLC and worksta on are similar in components (Input , output and processor)  Input for worksta on is keyboard, output is screen and processor.  Input to PLC is sensors, Out puts are finial control elements and processor.
  • 4. The Industrial control system ICS infrastructures is like IT network structure contains same ethernet switches which used in IT networks which makes it vulnerable to the same cyber threats which threaten IT environment. Isola on of OT and make it isolated island becomes impossible Due to rapid and spread digi za on through transferring all process data for enterprise network which used in data analysis to help top management in decisions and enhance produc on op miza on.
  • 5. The History of cyber incident affected cri cal infrastructure all a lot such as:  Stuxnet : is a malicious computer worm first uncovered in 2010 and is believed to be responsible for causing substantial damage to the nuclear program of Iran  Black Energy: hackers using the Black Energy 3 malware remotely compromised information systems of three energy distribution companies in Ukraine and temporarily disrupted the electricity supply to consumers.  Triton Targeted Attack: In August of 2017, TRITON malware was used to target and disrupt Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers within a Saudi petrochemical refinery.
  • 6.  The anti-surge controller is one of the most critical control loops in a turbine or compressor. It is responsible for preventing the compressor from entering in surge, which can cause damage to the equipment.  If a cyber attacker is able to successfully attack the anti-surge controller, they could change the parameters of the controller in a way that could lead compressor to surge.  This could have catastrophic consequences, such as loss of production, damage to equipment, or even injury or death.
  • 7.
  • 8.  Most of OT asset owners have concept that we are safe and away from cyber-a ack but this not correct as, the industrial control system could be affected by infected USB s ck, infected engineering laptop, infected remote connec on and misconfigured firewall between OT and IT.  OT cybersecurity concerned about maintaining availability and integrity of OT assets from human error of opera on and maintenance teams not only cybercriminal.
  • 9.  Cyber incident targeted OT environment in different sectors increasing rapidly and for example cyber incident affected energy sector in las year was 190 in compared to 2016 was 59 cyber incidents.  So Asset owners of cri cal infrastructure to take OT cybersecurity as priority to keep plants run smoothly and safely without produc on loss or incidents.
  • 10.
  • 11.  The difference between OT and IT in priori es makes special Requirements to deal with OT cybersecurity to maintain its availability and integrity as OT deals with physical process.  For example, in IT patch management is straigh orward process, may be every month do it but in OT it required special precau ons and permits to perform patch management for any controllers.  Another example is in IT realm it is easy to restart worksta on but in OT is not permi ed.
  • 12.  Due to high risk which could results from high consequences in case of lost availability or integrity of industrial control system, So It is very important to protect industrial control system by applying multiple layers of defense.  This is called a defense-in-depth (D-ID) strategy. It means that if one layer of security is breached, the subsequent layers will still be able to prevent the attack.  The selection of these layers should be the result of an effective cyber risk assessment. This assessment should identify the specific threats and vulnerabilities to industrial control system and then select the most appropriate cybersecurity countermeasures to mitigate those cyber risks.
  • 13.  ISA/IEC 62443 standards are the most popular in OT cybersecurity contains 14 publications.  It divides the cybersecurity topics by stakeholder category / roles including:  the operator,  the service providers (service providers for integration and for maintenance)  the component/system manufacturers.  The different roles each follow a risk-based approach to prevent and manage security risks in their activities.  ISA/IEC 62443-2-1 “Security program requirements for IACS asset owners” is directed to asset owner to help in issue cyber security management system.