A comparison of the tactics and strategy used in the early Islamic expansion and the present day strategy and tactics of the Daesh Erhab ( terrorists)

1. A Military Perspective of the Daesh
By Norvell DeAtkine at tex.deatkine@gmail.com

2.  “…… Islamist militants focus obsessively on the methodology of such
battles as Yarmuk River in the Levant and Al-Qadisiyah in modern day
Iraq, drawing inspiration from the tactics that can be reintroduced and
expressed with 21st century technology. For these reasons we cannot
afford Not to teach early Islamic history and obscure battles of
the late antiquity……”.Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein (US Navy)
 So why don’t we? Even the more celebrated books on the ISIS such as
Mc Cants’s ISIS Apocalypse have no reference to the military strategy of
the ISIS.
 To some extent it is also the problem of walking through the minefield
of talking or writing about religion in which chances are you will
offend some or everyone.

3.  Arabs in Conventional War
 “Why Arabs Lose Wars,’”. Armed
Forces in the Middle East, ed. Barry
Rubin
 Lack of officer-EM cohesion
 Lack of professional NCO corps
 Lack of initiative at all levels
 Inability to perform combined arms
operations
 Security paranoia
 Structured disunity…creating a coup-
proof military
 Lack of maintenance and logistics systems

4.  Western Training of Arab Militaries
 http://www.rubincenter.org/2013/03/western-influence-
on-arab-militaries-pounding-square-pegs-into-round-
holes/
 Example of Winston Churchill’s optimism on creating the ‘ new
Egyptian army in the i880’s
 French in Syria
 British in Iraq and Jordan
 US in Saudi Arabia and lately Iraq
The difference between training soldiers to operate weapons and
building a cohesive professional ethos. We are counter-culture.
It has never been a matter of intelligence or courage but
CULTURE.
Culture is the primary determinant on how people fight.

5.  Arabs in Unconventional War
“The Arab as Insurgent and
Counterinsurgent,”In Conflict and
Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East,
ed. Barry Rubin;
 Light weapons hence very little
maintenance and logistics
 Blood and religious ties
 Leadership by performance rather than
appointment
 Consonance with Qur’anic Concept of war
 Allows greater individualism and self
promotion

6.  Ghazzia: the raid for plunder or
slaves
 deception and secrecy
 no shame in hasty flight
 Intimidation
 Lots of noise little blood
 Tribal wars; Relief from
boredom…prove manhood

7.  The concept of a unifying religious factor (later evolving into Jihad).
 Total war. Basically turned Bedouin warfare from a sport into a war of
total commitment.
 “Jihad is a continuous and never-ending struggle waged on all fronts
including political, economic, social, psychological, domestic, moral,
and spiritual to obtain the objective of policy.” ( Qu’ranic Concept of
War) by S.K Malik
 Despite the earlier Bedouin rules of war non- combatants were no
longer exempt from the effects of war. Resistance was dealt with
harshly.
 Total victory was the objective. Truces were only temporary.
 Plunder and slaves were the by- product of the total war concept.
 War was not the absence of peace but rather the perpetuation of the
quest for the conquest of the non- Islamic world.
 Seizure of land and its occupation was the new objective.

8.  “Once war was harnessed to strategic objectives, it became
possible to introduce tactical dimensions that were
completely new to traditional Arab warfare. Muhammad
used his armies in completely new ways.
 He attacked tribes, towns, and garrisons before they could
form hostile conditions: he isolated his enemy by severing
their economic lifelines and disrupting the lines of
communication
 Muhammad also introduced the new dimension of
psychological warfare, employing terror and even
massacres as a means to weaken the will of his enemies.”
Richard Gabriel. Muhammad: Islam’s First Great General

9.  The brutality of this way of war was practiced by all the
world empires, the Byzantines, the Persians.
 Jesus said. “Think not that I am come to send peace on
earth. I came not to send peace , but a sword.” Matthew
10:43
 The story of Saul and and the Amalekites in which
God was displeased with Saul because he disobeyed
God’s command to kill them all. Samuel 1:15
 Muhammad and his generals were normally generous
in terms if the enemy capitulated early in the conflict.

10.  The charisma and leadership of the Prophet
 The religious zealotry imputed by Islam,
demanding total personal commitment.
 The magnificent sources of plunder and slaves.
-An idea of the number of slaves flooding the Islamic Empire as a
result of the conquest may be gained from such exaggerated figures of the
following. Musa Ibn Nusayr took 300,000 captives from Ifriqiyah, one fifth
of whom he forwarded to al Walid, and from the Gothic nobility in Spain
he captured 30,000 virgins.
Philip Hitti, History of the Arabs

11.  Encompasses courage, esprit de corps, the individual fighting spirit and
cohesiveness of the fighting unit. Not to be confused with morality
• The empowering appeal and sweep of the Islamist story of the world, and
presenting an opportunity for an individual to be part of the grand design. As
was written of the early Islamic warriors They “delight in battle and
slaughter,” and the glory among their peers and those who follow. Blood
exhilarates not repels.
 The Importance of the mythological Islamic world and the heroic deeds of the
individuals,. Similar to the motivation of the Leftist terrorists of the seventies
 Read Eric Hoffer The True Believer. As Hoffer wrote;
 Dying and killing seem easy when they are part of a ritual, ceremonial,
dramatic performance or game, and becomes a theatrical gesture.
 Identification with a collective whole. The psychology of mass movements.
 Deprecation of the present and glorification of the past.
 Creation of a fact screen imposed between reality and the faithful.

12.  A culture of romance
 Promises adventure
 Harkens back to medieval
heroism
 Reinvent their identity
 This identity is not new but very
old.
Creswell and Haykel,”Why Jihadis Write Poetry”. New
Yorker Magazine

13.  “Victories Without Battles” TE Lawrence
 “Victory in war is the result of imaginary psychological factors. Numbers,
weapons and proper tactics may guarantee victories but they are less
effective that the factors of spreading dissension, disunity, and a feeling of
hopelessness among the enemy. “ Trickery is one of the most useful things
employed in warfare. It is the thing most likely to bring victory.” Ibn
Khaldun, The Muqaddimah
 In his use of propaganda, the Prophet used ridicule, the threat of total war
and a dramatic use of the carrot and stick policy toward his enemies. Russ
Rodgers, The Generals of Muhammad
 “The Arabs are also shown adept at spying, sneaking into their opponents
camp, cutting tent ropes and stealing their mounts to spread alarm
among the enemy.” Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests
 More than any other factor it was the psychology of fear that created to
collapse of the Iraqi army in Mosul.

14. Total war requires total commitment
 “The Quranic view on war is, however altogether different. According
to the Book, the very initiation of war is for the Cause of God. It is
therefore controlled and conditioned by the word of God from its
conception till culmination.” S. K Malik, The Quranic Concept of War
 In the traditional view, the world is divided into two parts, the House of
Islam ( Dar al Islam) where the Muslims rule and Muslim law is
enforced , and the House of War ( Dar al Harb), the rest of the world
where infidels still rule.
 According to traditional teaching, the obligation of Jihad will continue
until all the world either adopts Islam or submits to Islamic rule.
Bernard Lewis. Islam; The Religion and the People

15. According to Egyptian Brotherhood leader Dr. Ateya
Adlan;
The Quran teaches the Muslims to “strike fear into the
hearts of the infidels, so strike them on their necks, and
chop off all their fingers, which they use to wield a sword.
In other words ,the Quran teaches Muslims how to fight.
When the Quran discusses the duty of Jihad for the sake
of Allah, it goes into the most minute detail.”

16.  The tactic of the German army in WWII. No passive defense.
Immediately counterattack. In early Islamic history every defeat or
indecisive battle was followed up quickly with an attack. Often the
Byzantines and Persians, after a successful campaign, retired to
their sanctuaries and cities.
 The early Islamic warriors simply regrouped and at earliest
opportunity renewed the offensive. Driven by religious duty and
the sense of martyrdom.
 The Qur'an directs the constant adherence to having the initiative.
“The Holy Prophet never let the initiative pass on to his
adversaries.” (Malik; Qu’ranic Concept of War).
 Michael Knights calls the ISIS conduct of war a “cult of the
offensive” driven by individual zeal for Jihad and glory.

17.  The Early Islamic conquerors used a variety of battle
strategies, indicating their versatility and
resourcefulness.
 Quickly adapted useful tactics and weapons of war
from their enemies.
 Adapting tactics, weapons, and strategy to hit enemy
vulnerabilities.
 The ISIS absorbing these lessons, has used
conventional warfare, maneuver warfare, Guerilla
warfare, and terrorism

18.  As a long time observer of the Arab scene has written, the Arabs
have a way of rising from the ashes.
 Many times in early Islamic history the Arab invaders were
soundly defeated ( example; Battle of the Bridges) but quickly
returned to continue the war to a successful conclusion. Their
patience and determination undermined the confidence of the
enemy.
 Western or Russian trained Arab armies have not shown this
resilience.
 The ISIS has evidenced the early Islamic resilience. Time and
time again they lose territory in one sector and immediately
attack in a different sector.
 In the early Islamic conquests, the death of leaders seem to
have had little consequence. So it appears with the ISIS.

19.  Specifically:
 Transformed Arab tribes into instruments of large scale of war
 Transformed social composition from tribes to a “national” army, just as ISIS
melds together many different ethnic groups
 Established a unity of command
 Transformed Arab style of combat from individual to collective unit.
 Created the concept of strategic war. The total war concept.
 Created a professional officer corps by the school of hard knocks.
 Introduced training and discipline.
 The use of spies to understand the enemy weaknesses, structure, strengths,
weaknesses, and their the leadership.
 The ancient Islamic ways of war have been modernized by the ISIS.
 The use of different types of formation, weaponry to confront different enemies.
 Encouraged the decentralization of command and individual initiative but insisted
on unity at the top.
 As seen today in ISIS tactics. Small unit initiative, and decentralized decision –
making.

20.  A one early Islamic tactician put it. “The first part of
the fighting is the shooting of arrows, then the
pointing of spears, then the trusting of them right to
left, and then the drawing of swords. “The Armies of the
Caliphs,” Hugh Kennedy
 Compare this to the so called swarm tactics of the
ISIS.
“Maintain an extended line abreast, keep your
neighbors just in sight, but no closer, move to the sound
of the guns, dismount when you see the enemy, when
you come under fire, stop and fire back.
Dennis Lowe, Small Wars Journal

21.  Individualism is a Bedouin attribute but has been
smothered in modern conventional Arab armies. It was
venerated in the early Islamic conquests. As Ibn Khaldun
wrote, every Bedouin wants to be the leader.
 Smallest formation was a squad size katai’ib which had
considerable latitude in their tactics.
 The Prophet was not primarily a military man. He relied
upon his commanders, but always questioned them closely
on tactics and strategy.
 Their leaders were shrewd and cunning, and generally
allowed to manage their campaigns without
micromanaging from Mecca. This decentralization of
authority was present at every level. This has been an
anathema to conventional Arab military.

22.  Water. They made sure they had ample supplies of water and access to water,
and use their mobility to get between their enemies and the water supplies.
Today water has become a very potent ISIS weapon.
 Night fighting. Rarely in conventional Arab armies but often in the early Arab
wars. ISIS made a river crossing at night to surprise a Kurdish village.
 Dust storms. Used very often to cover movements and attacks by the early
Islamic warriors. Used to cover the attack on Ramadi by ISIS.
 Sun Get the sun in the eyes of your opponents.
 Open terrain. Early Arab warriors avoided it “do not fight them ( your enemy)
firing arrows at them in an open space for they outnumber you and can
surround you.”
 Defiles and passes; Favorite place for Arab warriors to attack, especially for
ambushes.
 Cover your tracks; back track. Send small parties in several directions to
confuse the enemy of the main objective. Today the ISIS attacks simultaneously
in several places

23.  “Trickery is one of the most useful things in warfare. It is the thing
most likely to bring victory.” Ibn Khaldun,The Muqaddimah
 Accounts are replete of the Prophet and early Islamic commanders
rigorously maintaining security, secrecy, and using secret police, spies,
assassinations, and strategic and tactical duplicity throughout the era
of early Islamic conquests. Example: using soldiers disguised as
pilgrims to assist in conquering Mecca.
 The early Islamic warriors always used reconnaissance in force to
probe their enemies, infiltrated in agents to create unrest, and moved
boldly, but only after careful assessments of enemy strengths.
 Surprise, ambushes, and fake retreats, were essential features Islamic
warfare. Along with their mastery of archery their ambushes were
particularly effective. Arabs have always avoided close in combat
whenever possible, not because of a lack of courage but because they
were costly in casualties.

24.  As has the ISIS, the early Islamic armies fairly quickly
incorporated numbers of non- Arabs to fight their
wars. In fact the elite troops were often drawn from
Persians or central Asians, such as the Shakira who
were the praetorian guards of the ruling elite.
 However the seeds of eventual destruction of the
Islamic expansion was the Arab feeling of superiority
over the not only the non Muslims but also the
Mulawi, the non-Arab Muslims,

25.  “The Zealot is the man who takes refuge from the
unknown in the familiar; and when he joins battle
with a stranger who practices superior tactics and
employs formidable newfangled weapons of war
and finds himself getting the worst of the
encounter, he responds by practicing his own
traditional art of war with abnormally scrupulous
exactitude. “Zealotism,” in fact may be described
as archaism evoked by foreign pressure….”
 Arnold Toynbee Civilization on Trial