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Arms Control AND Disarmament


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Arms Control AND Disarmament

  1. 1. Arms control and Disarmament
  2. 2. Definitional Issues• What is arms control?• How is this different from Disarmament?• Does one lead to another?• Normative versus practical dimensions.• What causes arms control?• Is disarmament feasible?
  3. 3. Defining Arms Control• Any agreement among states to regulate some aspects of their military capability or potential. The agreement may apply to the location, amount, readiness, and types of military forces, weapons and facilities• Arms control is an alternative approach to achieving international security through military strategies or ‘peace through manipulation of force’
  4. 4. Definition…• Participants jointly regulate their abilities to threaten each other and to drive a bargaining advantage in their context. So, an arms control agreement allows states to retain their relative ability to bargain, but at the same time, reducing the cost of sustaining these abilities
  5. 5. Arms Control Defined• Jaffrey Larsen: “AC can be defined as any agreement among states to regulate some aspect of their military capability or potential. The agreement may apply to the location, amount, readiness, and types of military forces, weapons and facilities…all AC presuppose some form of cooperation or joint action among the participants regarding their military programs.”
  6. 6. Further Defining Arms Control • 1961 - Thomas Schelling & Morton Halprin: “Adjustments in military postures and doctrines that induce reciprocal adjustments by a potential opponent can be of mutual benefit if they reduce the danger of a war that neither side wants, or contains its violence, or otherwise serve the security of the nation.
  7. 7. Arms ControlIn its general conception, arms control is any type ofrestraint on the use of arms, any form of militarycooperation between adversaries. Arms control can beimplicit or explicit, formal or informal, and unilateral,bilateral, or multilateral. It is a process of jointlymanaging the weapons-acquisition processes of theparticipant states in the hope of reducing the risk of war…Arms control [refers] to formal agreements imposingsignificant restrictions or limitations on the weapons or securitypolicies of the signatories. 7
  8. 8. DisarmamentDisarmament rests on a fundamentally differentphilosophical premise than arms control. It envisions thedrastic reduction or elimination of all weapons, lookingtoward the eradication of war itself. Disarmament is basedon the notion that if there were no more weapons therewould be no more war. This is a compelling proposition,with enough truth to give it a very long life in the historyto popular impression, it is not necessarily abut reducingarms levels. 8
  9. 9. Arms control and disarmamentArms control attempts to stabilize the status quo andto manage conflict, to force. Although many visceralopponents would be shocked at the thought, armscontrol is fundamentally a conservative enterprise.Disarmament, by contrast, is a radical one.Disarmament seeks to overturn the status quo; armscontrol works to perpetuate it. 9
  10. 10. Major Arms Control AgreementAgreement Signed by Provision YearGeneva Protocol 100+ Bans use of chemical weapons 1925Antarctic Treaty Partial 12 Prohibits all military activity in Antarctic area 1959 NuclearTest Ban Treaty 131 Prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere In 1963 outer space, and under waterOuter Space Treaty 127 Prohibits all military activity in outer space, 1967 Including on the moon and other celestial BodiesTreaty of Tlatelolco 35 Prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America 1967Nuclear Nonproliferation 191 Prohibits acquisition of nuclear weapons by Non- 1968 Treaty nuclear nationsSeabed Arms Control 92 Bans placing nuclear weapons in o under the 1971 seabedBiological Weapons 80+ Ban the possession and use of biological 1972 Convention weapons 10
  11. 11. Agreement Signed by Provision YearStrategic Arms Limitation 2 Provides for freeze on aggregate number of 1972 Treat (SALT 1) fixed, Land-based ICBMs and SLBMsABM Treaty 2 Limits deployment of antiballistic missile systems 1972 Two sites in each country. Reduced to one site by 1974 agreementThreshold Test Ban 2 Limits U.S. and USSR underground tests to 150 1974 ktSALT II 2 Limited the number and types of USSR and 1979 USA. Strategic weaponsSouth Pacific Nuclear Free- 13 Prohibits the manufacture or acquisition of 1985 Zone nuclear Weapons in the regionIntermediate Range Nuclear 2 Eliminates all U.S. and Soviet missiles with 1987 Forces (INF) ranges Between 500 km and 5500 kmMissile Technology Regime 25 Limits transfer of missiles or missile technology 1987Conventional Armed Forces 30 Sets limits on NATO and WARSAW Pact tanks, 1990 in Europe Other armored vehicles, artillery, combat, helicopters And air craft 11
  12. 12. Major Arms Control AgreementsAgreement Signatories Provisions YearCTBT Over 180 Bans nuclear Tests, 1996 Allows sub-critical tests
  13. 13. Arms control treaties Washington Naval Treaty, 1922 (as part of the naval conferences) Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological weapons, 1925 and its two augmentations:  Biological Weapons Convention, 1972  Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993 Outer Space Treaty, 1967 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1972
  14. 14. Arms control treaties Environmental Modification Convention, 1976 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR ), 1987 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1992 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I ), 1994 Wassenaar Arrangement, 1996
  15. 15. Arms control treaties Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 1996 Open Skies Treaty, 2002• Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty ( SORT), 2003• START Three (2010)
  16. 16. Arms Control – The Cold War Days• Theory developed as an adjunct to national security from 1958 – 62• Instead of disarmament it emphasized enhancement of cooperative security arrangements• Numerous institutional mechanisms• Problems of trust• Problems of verification
  17. 17. Cold War Days…• The driver of arms control agreements was the shared perception regarding the fear of a nuclear war between the two powers.• Arms control seen as a prime means of restraining strategic arms race, especially restraining the use of certain types of technologies that exacerbated the threat of war• The objective was also to reduce the cost of war,• And reduce the damage of a war did occur
  18. 18. Arms Control Explained• According to Thomas Schelling and Morton Halprin: “We believe that arms control is a promising, but still only dimly perceived, enlargement of the scope of our military strategy. It rests essentially on the recognition that our military relations with potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs.”
  19. 19. It achieves…• Reduces possibility of war• Reduces political and economic costs• Minimizes the scope and violence of war• So it primarily depends on cooperation of some level between adversaries
  20. 20. The Purpose of Arms Control • It is a means to an end which is enhancing security, especially security against nuclear weapons • The three underlying principles of arms control are: – It is a means to an end – national security – States have a common interest in avoiding nuclear war – Arms control and military strategy should work together to promote national security (deployment of weapons or an adverse tactical maneuver)
  21. 21. Objectives of Arms Control • Should be in broad harmony with national security strategy • Arms control theory was developed during the Cold War to deal with the questions of: – What deters? – How much is enough? – What if deterrence fails?
  22. 22. Methodology• Institutional mechanisms involving a certain understanding regarding force buildup, strategic deployment, etc• Improve strategic signaling• Build channels of communication• Increase exchange of information
  23. 23. Institutions• Alliance or agreements - INCSEA, SALT or Indus Water Treaty• Potential tools but remain on the sidelines of statecraft (Track-II, III…)• Change preference over outcomes Institutions are important because they have the potential of generating powerful impact on the policymaking process e.g. Anglo-French Entente 1904 Institutional mechanisms create enduring patterns of shared expectation of behavior that gradually receive some degree of formal assent – INCSEA or Indus Water Treaty
  24. 24. Institutional Mechanisms – Another View • Institutions will not have any substantial impact because, as Charles Glaser Points out: “Institutions are the product of the same factors – states interests and the constraints imposed by the system that influence whether should cooperate”
  25. 25. Issues with Arms Control• Additional information cannot change the strategic choices• There is also the issue of trust• The concept will not work because relations between states are driven by their interest in enhancing their power• Prisoner’s dilemma
  26. 26. Prisoner’s Dilemma• Choices made by two players between two possible outcomes• Hedley Bull’s perspective - players do not act in total ignorance of each other’s choices and no one can count on having the last word. Hence, a pessimistic outcome could be avoided and a condition of conditional cooperation can be maintained which is termed as an equilibrium outcome
  27. 27. Arms Control in South Asia • There is a need for institutionalizing arms control arrangement because: – Nuclear weapons – Conventional buildup – Existing disputes – Endemic mistrust – a generational change that would undermine peace – Countries pursing independent trajectories of socio- political and military development
  28. 28. Present Situation• Technological expansion• Asymmetrical balance• No arms control arrangement• CBMS only
  29. 29. Existing CBMsCommunication Measures• Hotline between DGMOs since Dec 1971.• After Brasstacks IV tensions and 1990 US alarm, DGMO hotline activated weekly.• Telephone links between sector commanders on LoC
  30. 30. Communication Measures • Hotlines between PMs: • Installed in 1989 by Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi. • In November 1990, re-established by Chandra Shekhar and Nawaz Sharif to facilitate direct communication. • In May 1997, I. K. Gujral and Sharif pledged to reinstate the hotline.
  31. 31. Existing CBMsNotification Measures• Agreement on Prior Notification of Military Exercises, 1991: – 10,000 or more troops. – No manoeuvres towards IB. – Exercises at Corps-level minimum 45 km and Division-level minimum 25 km from IB. No Division exercise near LoC. – No military activity within five km of IB.
  32. 32. Existing CBMsBorder Security Measures• Karachi Agreement, 1949: no deployment less than 500 yards from CFL (now LoC). (Observed more in breach!)• Indo-Pakistani Agreement on Border Disputes in the West, 1960.• Rann of Kutch Tribunal Award after 1965 War. (Left out Sir Creek dispute.)
  33. 33. Existing CBMsBorder Security Measures• Agreement on Prevention of Violation of Airspace, August 1992: – Armed fixed-wing aircraft not to fly within 10 nautical miles of IB. – Armed helicopters not permitted within one NM. – No aircraft within 1,000 metres.• Often breached: Atlantique incident; RPVs; helicopters shot down at Siachen.
  34. 34. Existing CBMsTransparency Measures• MAs/DAs being invited as observers for major exercises: – Zarb-e-Momin in 1989. – Several Indian exercises.• DGMO clarifications – Brasstacks, 1990, Kargil 1999, ongoing.
  35. 35. Existing CBMsDeclarations• Joint Declaration on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.Track II Measures• Neemrana initiative.• Admiral Ramdas’ forum.
  36. 36. Breakdown Since 1989 -90
  37. 37. Breakdown of CBMs• Flag meetings on LoC stopped. Fraternisation has fizzled out.• Tele links between sector commanders non-existent.• Deployment on/across LoC, particularly since Kargil conflict.• Frequent RPV flights and air space violations.• Reduced humanitarian cooperation.
  38. 38. Breakdown of CBMs• Flag meetings on LoC stopped. Fraternisation has fizzled out.• Tele links between sector commanders non-existent.• Deployment on/across LoC, particularly since Kargil conflict.• Frequent RPV flights and air space violations.• Reduced humanitarian cooperation.
  39. 39. Potential CBMs• Demilitarisation of Siachen (?): – Permanent Ceasefire. – Demarcation of AGPL on ground and map. – Joint verification agreement. – Redeployment to mutually agreed positions. – Agreement to resolve dispute.
  40. 40. Potential CBMs• Verification: Joint patrolling of LoC to counter infiltration (?).• Reduction in Indian troops deployed in Kashmir (?)
  41. 41. Potential CBMs• Ferry service between Mumbai and Karachi• Security of Oil and Gas pipelines• Maritime disaster management• Joint search and rescue at sea• Protection of fishermen
  42. 42. Arms Control in South Asia • Cycle of conventional and non-conventional technology proliferation • Various CBMs that have the potential of gradually moving towards an arms control agreement • Prisoner’s dilemma in the region • Increasing the cost of the adversary is part of the calculus • Varied threat perceptions • Varied political cultures
  43. 43. Potential Arms Control Measures• Mutual troop reduction/disarmament (?)• Notification of mobilisation (?)• Exchange of data (Detailing existing military holdings, planned purchases, military personnel and budgets can clarify a state’s current and projected military capabilities and provide advance notice of destabilising arms build-up. Data exchanges can take place bilaterally or multilaterally)• Ground-based electronic sensor systems (Manned or unmanned, these can verify compliance to agreed restrictions on equipment deployment or troop movements)• Incidents at Sea Agreement (first proposed at Lahore, 1999)
  44. 44. Some Questions• Is it possible to build institutional mechanisms for arms control in the region?• What will deter either sides from a surprise attack or destabilizing the military-strategic balance?• What will be the institutional guarantees to ensure that the parties will not shirk from honoring their commitment?• What kind of asymmetrical military balance will ensure deterrence in the region?
  45. 45. VERIFICATION MEASURES• Designed to collect data or provide first hand access in order to confirm or verify a states compliance with a particular treaty or agreement.• Aerial inspections Monitor compliance with force deployment limitations in restricted zones, confirm data exchanges on the disposition of military forces, provide early warning of potentially destabilising activities.• Ground-based electronic sensor systems (Manned or unmanned) Verify states compliance to agreed restrictions on equipment deployment or troop movements.• On-site inspections Challenge and routine; help verify that states are complying with agreements. Inspections may be carried out by third parties, opposing parties, or jointly.
  46. 46. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treatyat a GlanceMay 2003 46
  47. 47. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) whichentered into force in March 1970, seeks to inhibit thespread of nuclear weapons. Its 188 states-parties areclassified in two categories: nuclear-weapon states(NWS)—consisting of the United States, Russia, China,France, and the United Kingdom—and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Under the treaty, the five NWScommit to pursue general and complete disarmament,while the NNWS agree to forgo developing or acquiringnuclear weapons. 47
  48. 48. Select Treaty ArticlesUnder Articles I and II of the treaty, the NWS agree not to help NNWSdevelop or acquire nuclear weapons, and the NNWS permanentlyforswear the pursuit of such weapons. To verify these commitmentsand ensure that nuclear materials are not being diverted for weaponspurposes, Article III tasks the International Atomic Energy Agency withthe inspection of the non-nuclear-weapon states nuclear facilities. Inaddition, Article III establishes safeguards for the transfer of fissionablematerials between NWS and NNWS. 48
  49. 49. Article IV acknowledges the "inalienable right" of NNWS to research,develops, and uses nuclear energy for non-weapons purposes. It also supportsthe "fullest possible exchange" of such nuclear-related information andtechnology between NWS and NNWS. Article V, now effectively obsolete,permits NNWS access to NWS research and development on the benefits ofnuclear explosions conducted for peaceful purposes. As the perceived utilityof peaceful nuclear explosions has diminished over time, the relevance of thisclause has lost much of its practical value. It is now moot due to therestriction on all nuclear explosions mandated by the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty—to which all five NWS are signatories.
  50. 50. Article VI commits the NWS to "pursue negotiations in good faith oneffective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at anearly date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on generaland complete disarmament under strict and effective internationalcontrol." Acknowledging the necessity of intermediate steps in theprocess of nuclear disarmament, Article VII allows for theestablishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones. 50
  51. 51. Article VIII requires a complex and lengthy process to amendthe treaty, effectively blocking any changes absent clearconsensus. Article X establishes the terms by which a state maywithdraw from the treaty, requiring three months advancenotice should "extraordinary events" jeopardize its supremenational interests.The remainder of the treaty deals with its administration,providing for a review conference every five years and adecision after 25 years on whether the treaty should beextended. The 1995 review conference extended the treatyindefinitely and enhanced the review process by mandatingthat the five-year review conferences review pastimplementation and address ways to strengthen the treaty. 51
  52. 52. With its near-universal membership, the NPT has the widestadherence of any arms control agreement, with only India, Israel, andPakistan remaining outside the treaty. In order to accede to the treaty,these states must do so as NNWS, since the treaty restricts NWSstatus to nations that "manufactured and exploded a nuclear weaponor other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.“ For India, Israel, and Pakistan, all known to possess or suspected ofhaving nuclear weapons, joining the treaty as NNWS would requirethat they dismantle their nuclear weapons and place their nuclearmaterials under international safeguards. South Africa followed thispath to accession in 1991. 52
  53. 53. Thirteen Practical Steps to Implement Article VIObligations of the Non-Proliferation TreatyThe following are the thirteen practical steps to implementArticle VI obligations. The program of action was adopted bythe State parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference.The Conference agrees on the following practical steps forthe systematic and progressive efforts to implement articleVI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weaponsand paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation andDisarmament": 53
  54. 54. 1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty. 54
  55. 55. 3.The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non- discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. 55
  56. 56. 4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. 56
  57. 57. 6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions. 57
  58. 58. 8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all: Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally; Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament; 58
  59. 59.  The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process; Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. 59
  60. 60. 10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. 60
  61. 61. 12. Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non- Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world. 61
  62. 62. START I at a Glance January 2002START I was signed July 31, 1991, by the United States and the Soviet Union. Five monthslater, the Soviet Union dissolved, leaving four independent states in possession ofstrategic nuclear weapons: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. On May 23, 1992,the United States and the four nuclear-capable successor states to the Soviet Unionsigned the "Lisbon Protocol," which makes all five nations party to the START Iagreement. START I entered into force December 5, 1994, when the five treaty partiesexchanged instruments of ratification in Budapest. All treaty parties met the agreementsDecember 5, 2001 implementation deadline.
  63. 63. Basic Terms:1,600 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launchedballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers for each side.6,000 "accountable" warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, of whichno more than 4,900 may be on ICBMs and SLBMs, 1,540 on heavy missiles (theSoviet SS-18), and 1,100 on mobile ICBMs.Ballistic missile throw-weight (lifting power) is limited to 3,600 metric tons oneach side.
  64. 64. Counting Rules:Heavy bombers equipped only with bombs or short-range attack missiles (SRAMs)are counted as carrying one warhead each.U.S. heavy bombers may carry no more than 20 long-range air-launched cruisemissiles (ALCMs) each. The first 150 of these bombers count as carrying only 10ALCMs each.Soviet heavy bombers may carry no more than 16 ALCMs each. The first 180 of thesebombers count as carrying only eight ALCMs each.No more than 1,250 warheads may be "downloaded" (removed from) and notcounted on existing multiple-warhead ballistic missiles.
  65. 65. Other Provisions:START I runs for 15 years with an option to extend for successive five-year periods.Based on commitments made at the March 1997 Helsinki Summit, the sides agreed inprinciple to negotiate an agreement making the START treaties unlimited in duration.Separate "politically binding" agreements limit sea-launched cruise missiles withranges above 600 kilometers to 880 for each side and the Soviet Backfire bomber to500.
  66. 66. START II and Its Extension Protocol at a Glance January 2003Russia announced on June 14, 2002, that it would no longer be bound by its START IIcommitments, ending almost a decade of U.S.-Russian efforts to bring the 1993 treatyinto force. Moscows statement came a day after the United States withdrew from theAnti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and a few weeks after the two countries concluded anew nuclear arms accord on May 24. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT),which requires the United States and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to1,700-2,200 warheads apiece by December 31, 2012, effectively superseded START IIsrequirement for each country to deploy no more than 3,000-3,500 warheads byDecember 2007. Yet other key START II provisions, such as the prohibition againstdeploying multiple independently target able reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on intercontinentalballistic missiles (ICBMs), were not addressed in the SORT agreement.
  67. 67. START IIs ratification process began after U.S. President George H. W. Bush andRussian President Boris Yeltsin signed the agreement on January 3, 1993. TheUnited States ratified the original START II agreement in January 1996, but neverratified a 1997 protocol extending the treatys implementation deadline or theconcurrently negotiated ABM Treaty succession, demarcation, and confidence-building agreements. On May 4, 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed theresolution of ratification for START II, its extension protocol, and the 1997 ABM-related agreements. Russias ratification legislation made exchange of START IIsinstruments of ratification (required to bring it into force) contingent on U.S.approval of the extension protocol and the ABM agreements; Congress never votedto ratify the entire package.
  68. 68. Basic Terms: Deployment of no more than 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads on ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers by December 31, 2007. "Deactivation" of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles slated for elimination under the treaty by removing their nuclear reentry vehicles (warheads), or taking other jointly-agreed steps, by December 31, 2003.
  69. 69. Additional Limits: No multiple warheads (MIRVs) on ICBMs. All SS-18 "heavy" Russian ICBMs must be destroyed. No more than 1,700 to 1,750 warheads may be deployed on SLBMs. Reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, as well as de-MIRVing ICBMs, may be achieved by "downloading" (removing) warheads from missiles. Once removed, warheads may not be restored to downloaded missiles.
  70. 70. The START III Framework at a GlanceJanuary 2003
  71. 71. With the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), it appearsunlikely that a START III agreement will be negotiated. President George W. Bushand Russian President Vladimir Putin signed SORT on May 24, 2002. The treatycalls for each country to deploy no more than 1,700-2,200 strategic warheads,effectively matching the limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads proposed for START III.SORT does not, however, address strategic nuclear warhead destruction ortactical nuclear weapons limits, both ground-breaking arms control measuresthat were suggested for inclusion in START III.
  72. 72. START IIIs Origins: During their March 1997 summit meeting in Helsinki, U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed on a framework for START III negotiations. At the Moscow Summit in September 1998, Clinton and Yeltsin reiterated their commitment to begin formal negotiations on START III as soon as Russia ratified START II.
  73. 73. Basic Elements: By December 31, 2007, coterminous with START II, the United States and Russia would each deploy no more than 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. Russian officials stated that they were willing to consider negotiated levels as low as 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads within the context of a START III agreement. The United States and Russia would negotiate measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads, as well as other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions. The United States and Russia would resolve issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.2
  74. 74. Resolution 1540
  75. 75. • Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,• 1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;
  76. 76. • Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non- State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;
  77. 77. • . Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:
  78. 78. • Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;
  79. 79. • Every day, millions of men, women and children are living in fear of armed violence. Every minute, one of them is killed. There are 640 million weapons in circulation globally and 8 million more are produced every year along with 16 billion bullets. Small arms are produced by 1,249 companies in
  80. 80. Ban Ki- Moon’s five point proposal• All states to negotiate an international nuclear weapons convention, backed by a strong system of verification;• The U.N. Security Council to discuss security assurances with non-nuclear states;• The international community to pursue institutionalization of nuclear treaties, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;• Nuclear states to be more transparent about the sizes of their arsenals, stocks of fissile material and specific disarmament achievements;• All states to pursue complementary materials, including the elimination of other types of WMD.
  81. 81. What did he say…• "The United States will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons,"• Committed himself to reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal.• Bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force.• And seeking tough penalties for countries that broke the rules on non-proliferation.
  82. 82. What did he say….• If the nuclear threat from Iran were eliminated, this would remove the driving force for building anti-missile defenses.• As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with the missile system," Obama said.• "If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile construction in Europe will be removed."
  83. 83. What is behind the Obama doctrine• More is worse not better: "Even with the Cold War now over, the spread of nuclear weapons or the theft of nuclear material could lead to the extermination of any city on the planet,“
  84. 84. Basic assumptions• Nuclear weapons have become more trouble thanthey are worth, an expensive luxury for superpowersand a threat for the rest of the world.• The size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals inspiresnuclear starter-states such as China to add to theirstockpiles and give non-nuclear states a reason to jointhe club.• Getting serious about eliminating nuclear weaponsmakes the United States more credible when it arguesthat states such as Iran should not be able to buildtheir own arsenals.
  85. 85. Why the initiative• Responding to call for a nuclear free world made by Former secretaries of state Kissinger and Schultz and two others, former Defense Secretary William Perry and former Sen. Sam Nunn in a joint newspaper article.• Ashton B Carter, Obama’s nominee as the Pentagons chief weapons acquisition official, has warned of dangers of “catastrophic terrorism” facing the United States.• Obama has hired a coterie of advisers and aides with extensive arms control and nonproliferation pedigrees.
  86. 86. Feasibility of the proposal• We have been there before – 1986 Reagan proposal for ground zero – for example.• Is the US willing to lead by example?• Can he get other’s – the remaining 4 P’s, India, Israel and Pakistan on board.• Will US be the last to eradicate nukes?• What will happen to the nuclear labs and the infrastructure?• What will happen to nuclear knowledge?• What about security guarantees?
  87. 87. Feasibility of the proposal• Is the world ready for a nuclear weapon free world?• How do we address the security concerns of weak states?• How do we reverse the proliferation dynamic?• Who will punish the violator of the global norm against having nuclear weapons?
  88. 88. WMD and Prospects for AC in Globalized World Nuclear Chemical Biological CyberspaceNumber of P5 plus 3--- 100s 100s 10,000 plusparticipantsR and D Limits ABM Treaty, CTBT No testing Testing limits NoneProduction/storage Declarations, Limits Ban Ban NoneDeployment Launcher Limits None None NoneTesting Warhead Limits Ban Ban NoneUse Legal 1993 ban 1972 ban Criminal lawBarriers to entry High Moderate Low Very lowOffense Dominant Limited Dominant DynamicDefense Very Difficult Dominant Difficult DynamicVerification Relatively easy Difficult More Difficult Very difficultDual Purpose Low High High Very lowRole of NSA Low Moderate High Very high
  89. 89. Connect With Us ULTRASPECTRA OPEN