SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 25
A Military Perspective of the Daesh
By Norvell DeAtkine at tex.deatkine@gmail.com
 “…… Islamist militants focus obsessively on the methodology of such
battles as Yarmuk River in the Levant and Al-Qadisiyah in modern day
Iraq, drawing inspiration from the tactics that can be reintroduced and
expressed with 21st century technology. For these reasons we cannot
afford Not to teach early Islamic history and obscure battles of
the late antiquity……”.Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein (US Navy)
 So why don’t we? Even the more celebrated books on the ISIS such as
Mc Cants’s ISIS Apocalypse have no reference to the military strategy of
the ISIS.
 To some extent it is also the problem of walking through the minefield
of talking or writing about religion in which chances are you will
offend some or everyone.
 Arabs in Conventional War
 “Why Arabs Lose Wars,’”. Armed
Forces in the Middle East, ed. Barry
Rubin
 Lack of officer-EM cohesion
 Lack of professional NCO corps
 Lack of initiative at all levels
 Inability to perform combined arms
operations
 Security paranoia
 Structured disunity…creating a coup-
proof military
 Lack of maintenance and logistics systems
 Western Training of Arab Militaries
 http://www.rubincenter.org/2013/03/western-influence-
on-arab-militaries-pounding-square-pegs-into-round-
holes/
 Example of Winston Churchill’s optimism on creating the ‘ new
Egyptian army in the i880’s
 French in Syria
 British in Iraq and Jordan
 US in Saudi Arabia and lately Iraq
The difference between training soldiers to operate weapons and
building a cohesive professional ethos. We are counter-culture.
It has never been a matter of intelligence or courage but
CULTURE.
Culture is the primary determinant on how people fight.
 Arabs in Unconventional War
“The Arab as Insurgent and
Counterinsurgent,”In Conflict and
Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East,
ed. Barry Rubin;
 Light weapons hence very little
maintenance and logistics
 Blood and religious ties
 Leadership by performance rather than
appointment
 Consonance with Qur’anic Concept of war
 Allows greater individualism and self
promotion
 Ghazzia: the raid for plunder or
slaves
 deception and secrecy
 no shame in hasty flight
 Intimidation
 Lots of noise little blood
 Tribal wars; Relief from
boredom…prove manhood
 The concept of a unifying religious factor (later evolving into Jihad).
 Total war. Basically turned Bedouin warfare from a sport into a war of
total commitment.
 “Jihad is a continuous and never-ending struggle waged on all fronts
including political, economic, social, psychological, domestic, moral,
and spiritual to obtain the objective of policy.” ( Qu’ranic Concept of
War) by S.K Malik
 Despite the earlier Bedouin rules of war non- combatants were no
longer exempt from the effects of war. Resistance was dealt with
harshly.
 Total victory was the objective. Truces were only temporary.
 Plunder and slaves were the by- product of the total war concept.
 War was not the absence of peace but rather the perpetuation of the
quest for the conquest of the non- Islamic world.
 Seizure of land and its occupation was the new objective.
 “Once war was harnessed to strategic objectives, it became
possible to introduce tactical dimensions that were
completely new to traditional Arab warfare. Muhammad
used his armies in completely new ways.
 He attacked tribes, towns, and garrisons before they could
form hostile conditions: he isolated his enemy by severing
their economic lifelines and disrupting the lines of
communication
 Muhammad also introduced the new dimension of
psychological warfare, employing terror and even
massacres as a means to weaken the will of his enemies.”
Richard Gabriel. Muhammad: Islam’s First Great General
 The brutality of this way of war was practiced by all the
world empires, the Byzantines, the Persians.
 Jesus said. “Think not that I am come to send peace on
earth. I came not to send peace , but a sword.” Matthew
10:43
 The story of Saul and and the Amalekites in which
God was displeased with Saul because he disobeyed
God’s command to kill them all. Samuel 1:15
 Muhammad and his generals were normally generous
in terms if the enemy capitulated early in the conflict.
 The charisma and leadership of the Prophet
 The religious zealotry imputed by Islam,
demanding total personal commitment.
 The magnificent sources of plunder and slaves.
-An idea of the number of slaves flooding the Islamic Empire as a
result of the conquest may be gained from such exaggerated figures of the
following. Musa Ibn Nusayr took 300,000 captives from Ifriqiyah, one fifth
of whom he forwarded to al Walid, and from the Gothic nobility in Spain
he captured 30,000 virgins.
Philip Hitti, History of the Arabs
 Encompasses courage, esprit de corps, the individual fighting spirit and
cohesiveness of the fighting unit. Not to be confused with morality
• The empowering appeal and sweep of the Islamist story of the world, and
presenting an opportunity for an individual to be part of the grand design. As
was written of the early Islamic warriors They “delight in battle and
slaughter,” and the glory among their peers and those who follow. Blood
exhilarates not repels.
 The Importance of the mythological Islamic world and the heroic deeds of the
individuals,. Similar to the motivation of the Leftist terrorists of the seventies
 Read Eric Hoffer The True Believer. As Hoffer wrote;
 Dying and killing seem easy when they are part of a ritual, ceremonial,
dramatic performance or game, and becomes a theatrical gesture.
 Identification with a collective whole. The psychology of mass movements.
 Deprecation of the present and glorification of the past.
 Creation of a fact screen imposed between reality and the faithful.
 A culture of romance
 Promises adventure
 Harkens back to medieval
heroism
 Reinvent their identity
 This identity is not new but very
old.
Creswell and Haykel,”Why Jihadis Write Poetry”. New
Yorker Magazine
 “Victories Without Battles” TE Lawrence
 “Victory in war is the result of imaginary psychological factors. Numbers,
weapons and proper tactics may guarantee victories but they are less
effective that the factors of spreading dissension, disunity, and a feeling of
hopelessness among the enemy. “ Trickery is one of the most useful things
employed in warfare. It is the thing most likely to bring victory.” Ibn
Khaldun, The Muqaddimah
 In his use of propaganda, the Prophet used ridicule, the threat of total war
and a dramatic use of the carrot and stick policy toward his enemies. Russ
Rodgers, The Generals of Muhammad
 “The Arabs are also shown adept at spying, sneaking into their opponents
camp, cutting tent ropes and stealing their mounts to spread alarm
among the enemy.” Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests
 More than any other factor it was the psychology of fear that created to
collapse of the Iraqi army in Mosul.
Total war requires total commitment
 “The Quranic view on war is, however altogether different. According
to the Book, the very initiation of war is for the Cause of God. It is
therefore controlled and conditioned by the word of God from its
conception till culmination.” S. K Malik, The Quranic Concept of War
 In the traditional view, the world is divided into two parts, the House of
Islam ( Dar al Islam) where the Muslims rule and Muslim law is
enforced , and the House of War ( Dar al Harb), the rest of the world
where infidels still rule.
 According to traditional teaching, the obligation of Jihad will continue
until all the world either adopts Islam or submits to Islamic rule.
Bernard Lewis. Islam; The Religion and the People
According to Egyptian Brotherhood leader Dr. Ateya
Adlan;
The Quran teaches the Muslims to “strike fear into the
hearts of the infidels, so strike them on their necks, and
chop off all their fingers, which they use to wield a sword.
In other words ,the Quran teaches Muslims how to fight.
When the Quran discusses the duty of Jihad for the sake
of Allah, it goes into the most minute detail.”
 The tactic of the German army in WWII. No passive defense.
Immediately counterattack. In early Islamic history every defeat or
indecisive battle was followed up quickly with an attack. Often the
Byzantines and Persians, after a successful campaign, retired to
their sanctuaries and cities.
 The early Islamic warriors simply regrouped and at earliest
opportunity renewed the offensive. Driven by religious duty and
the sense of martyrdom.
 The Qur'an directs the constant adherence to having the initiative.
“The Holy Prophet never let the initiative pass on to his
adversaries.” (Malik; Qu’ranic Concept of War).
 Michael Knights calls the ISIS conduct of war a “cult of the
offensive” driven by individual zeal for Jihad and glory.
 The Early Islamic conquerors used a variety of battle
strategies, indicating their versatility and
resourcefulness.
 Quickly adapted useful tactics and weapons of war
from their enemies.
 Adapting tactics, weapons, and strategy to hit enemy
vulnerabilities.
 The ISIS absorbing these lessons, has used
conventional warfare, maneuver warfare, Guerilla
warfare, and terrorism
 As a long time observer of the Arab scene has written, the Arabs
have a way of rising from the ashes.
 Many times in early Islamic history the Arab invaders were
soundly defeated ( example; Battle of the Bridges) but quickly
returned to continue the war to a successful conclusion. Their
patience and determination undermined the confidence of the
enemy.
 Western or Russian trained Arab armies have not shown this
resilience.
 The ISIS has evidenced the early Islamic resilience. Time and
time again they lose territory in one sector and immediately
attack in a different sector.
 In the early Islamic conquests, the death of leaders seem to
have had little consequence. So it appears with the ISIS.
 Specifically:
 Transformed Arab tribes into instruments of large scale of war
 Transformed social composition from tribes to a “national” army, just as ISIS
melds together many different ethnic groups
 Established a unity of command
 Transformed Arab style of combat from individual to collective unit.
 Created the concept of strategic war. The total war concept.
 Created a professional officer corps by the school of hard knocks.
 Introduced training and discipline.
 The use of spies to understand the enemy weaknesses, structure, strengths,
weaknesses, and their the leadership.
 The ancient Islamic ways of war have been modernized by the ISIS.
 The use of different types of formation, weaponry to confront different enemies.
 Encouraged the decentralization of command and individual initiative but insisted
on unity at the top.
 As seen today in ISIS tactics. Small unit initiative, and decentralized decision –
making.
 A one early Islamic tactician put it. “The first part of
the fighting is the shooting of arrows, then the
pointing of spears, then the trusting of them right to
left, and then the drawing of swords. “The Armies of the
Caliphs,” Hugh Kennedy
 Compare this to the so called swarm tactics of the
ISIS.
“Maintain an extended line abreast, keep your
neighbors just in sight, but no closer, move to the sound
of the guns, dismount when you see the enemy, when
you come under fire, stop and fire back.
Dennis Lowe, Small Wars Journal
 Individualism is a Bedouin attribute but has been
smothered in modern conventional Arab armies. It was
venerated in the early Islamic conquests. As Ibn Khaldun
wrote, every Bedouin wants to be the leader.
 Smallest formation was a squad size katai’ib which had
considerable latitude in their tactics.
 The Prophet was not primarily a military man. He relied
upon his commanders, but always questioned them closely
on tactics and strategy.
 Their leaders were shrewd and cunning, and generally
allowed to manage their campaigns without
micromanaging from Mecca. This decentralization of
authority was present at every level. This has been an
anathema to conventional Arab military.
 Water. They made sure they had ample supplies of water and access to water,
and use their mobility to get between their enemies and the water supplies.
Today water has become a very potent ISIS weapon.
 Night fighting. Rarely in conventional Arab armies but often in the early Arab
wars. ISIS made a river crossing at night to surprise a Kurdish village.
 Dust storms. Used very often to cover movements and attacks by the early
Islamic warriors. Used to cover the attack on Ramadi by ISIS.
 Sun Get the sun in the eyes of your opponents.
 Open terrain. Early Arab warriors avoided it “do not fight them ( your enemy)
firing arrows at them in an open space for they outnumber you and can
surround you.”
 Defiles and passes; Favorite place for Arab warriors to attack, especially for
ambushes.
 Cover your tracks; back track. Send small parties in several directions to
confuse the enemy of the main objective. Today the ISIS attacks simultaneously
in several places
 “Trickery is one of the most useful things in warfare. It is the thing
most likely to bring victory.” Ibn Khaldun,The Muqaddimah
 Accounts are replete of the Prophet and early Islamic commanders
rigorously maintaining security, secrecy, and using secret police, spies,
assassinations, and strategic and tactical duplicity throughout the era
of early Islamic conquests. Example: using soldiers disguised as
pilgrims to assist in conquering Mecca.
 The early Islamic warriors always used reconnaissance in force to
probe their enemies, infiltrated in agents to create unrest, and moved
boldly, but only after careful assessments of enemy strengths.
 Surprise, ambushes, and fake retreats, were essential features Islamic
warfare. Along with their mastery of archery their ambushes were
particularly effective. Arabs have always avoided close in combat
whenever possible, not because of a lack of courage but because they
were costly in casualties.
 As has the ISIS, the early Islamic armies fairly quickly
incorporated numbers of non- Arabs to fight their
wars. In fact the elite troops were often drawn from
Persians or central Asians, such as the Shakira who
were the praetorian guards of the ruling elite.
 However the seeds of eventual destruction of the
Islamic expansion was the Arab feeling of superiority
over the not only the non Muslims but also the
Mulawi, the non-Arab Muslims,
 “The Zealot is the man who takes refuge from the
unknown in the familiar; and when he joins battle
with a stranger who practices superior tactics and
employs formidable newfangled weapons of war
and finds himself getting the worst of the
encounter, he responds by practicing his own
traditional art of war with abnormally scrupulous
exactitude. “Zealotism,” in fact may be described
as archaism evoked by foreign pressure….”
 Arnold Toynbee Civilization on Trial

More Related Content

Similar to muhammad taught us to fightppt.pptx

Lecture 6 international terrorism
Lecture 6  international terrorismLecture 6  international terrorism
Lecture 6 international terrorismJames Feldkamp
 
Lecture 6 international terrorism
Lecture 6  international terrorismLecture 6  international terrorism
Lecture 6 international terrorismJames Feldkamp
 
Was islam spread by the sword ?
Was islam spread by the sword ?Was islam spread by the sword ?
Was islam spread by the sword ?Hlcyn
 
Internship Essays
Internship EssaysInternship Essays
Internship EssaysCody Benke
 
Islamic Principles of War for the Twenty-first Century, by Professor Joel Hay...
Islamic Principles of War for the Twenty-first Century, by Professor Joel Hay...Islamic Principles of War for the Twenty-first Century, by Professor Joel Hay...
Islamic Principles of War for the Twenty-first Century, by Professor Joel Hay...Professor Joel Hayward
 
Through The Lens Of Cultural Awareness
Through The Lens Of Cultural AwarenessThrough The Lens Of Cultural Awareness
Through The Lens Of Cultural Awarenesswdwunderle
 
Revisiting the Past: The Value of Teaching Islamic Military History, by Pr...
Revisiting the  Past: The Value of  Teaching Islamic  Military History, by Pr...Revisiting the  Past: The Value of  Teaching Islamic  Military History, by Pr...
Revisiting the Past: The Value of Teaching Islamic Military History, by Pr...Professor Joel Hayward
 
War and peace in islam, the uses and abuses of jihad edited by hrh prince gha...
War and peace in islam, the uses and abuses of jihad edited by hrh prince gha...War and peace in islam, the uses and abuses of jihad edited by hrh prince gha...
War and peace in islam, the uses and abuses of jihad edited by hrh prince gha...topbottom1
 
Civilian Immunity in Foundational Islamic Strategic Thought, by Professor Joe...
Civilian Immunity in Foundational Islamic Strategic Thought, by Professor Joe...Civilian Immunity in Foundational Islamic Strategic Thought, by Professor Joe...
Civilian Immunity in Foundational Islamic Strategic Thought, by Professor Joe...Professor Joel Hayward
 

Similar to muhammad taught us to fightppt.pptx (15)

Lecture 6 international terrorism
Lecture 6  international terrorismLecture 6  international terrorism
Lecture 6 international terrorism
 
Lecture 6 international terrorism
Lecture 6  international terrorismLecture 6  international terrorism
Lecture 6 international terrorism
 
Was islam spread by the sword ?
Was islam spread by the sword ?Was islam spread by the sword ?
Was islam spread by the sword ?
 
Explaining israel by Shaikh Imran Hussain
Explaining israel by Shaikh Imran HussainExplaining israel by Shaikh Imran Hussain
Explaining israel by Shaikh Imran Hussain
 
Explaining israel
Explaining israelExplaining israel
Explaining israel
 
Presentation1
Presentation1Presentation1
Presentation1
 
Internship Essays
Internship EssaysInternship Essays
Internship Essays
 
Clash of civ
Clash of civClash of civ
Clash of civ
 
Islamic Principles of War for the Twenty-first Century, by Professor Joel Hay...
Islamic Principles of War for the Twenty-first Century, by Professor Joel Hay...Islamic Principles of War for the Twenty-first Century, by Professor Joel Hay...
Islamic Principles of War for the Twenty-first Century, by Professor Joel Hay...
 
Through The Lens Of Cultural Awareness
Through The Lens Of Cultural AwarenessThrough The Lens Of Cultural Awareness
Through The Lens Of Cultural Awareness
 
Warfare in the Qur’an
Warfare in the Qur’anWarfare in the Qur’an
Warfare in the Qur’an
 
Myths about jihad
Myths about jihadMyths about jihad
Myths about jihad
 
Revisiting the Past: The Value of Teaching Islamic Military History, by Pr...
Revisiting the  Past: The Value of  Teaching Islamic  Military History, by Pr...Revisiting the  Past: The Value of  Teaching Islamic  Military History, by Pr...
Revisiting the Past: The Value of Teaching Islamic Military History, by Pr...
 
War and peace in islam, the uses and abuses of jihad edited by hrh prince gha...
War and peace in islam, the uses and abuses of jihad edited by hrh prince gha...War and peace in islam, the uses and abuses of jihad edited by hrh prince gha...
War and peace in islam, the uses and abuses of jihad edited by hrh prince gha...
 
Civilian Immunity in Foundational Islamic Strategic Thought, by Professor Joe...
Civilian Immunity in Foundational Islamic Strategic Thought, by Professor Joe...Civilian Immunity in Foundational Islamic Strategic Thought, by Professor Joe...
Civilian Immunity in Foundational Islamic Strategic Thought, by Professor Joe...
 

More from Norvell (Tex) DeAtkine (16)

ME_URBAN_WAR.ppt
ME_URBAN_WAR.pptME_URBAN_WAR.ppt
ME_URBAN_WAR.ppt
 
Obstacles to Arab progress.pptx
Obstacles to Arab progress.pptxObstacles to Arab progress.pptx
Obstacles to Arab progress.pptx
 
Islamist brief.pptx
Islamist brief.pptxIslamist brief.pptx
Islamist brief.pptx
 
Psychology of terrorism[1]
Psychology of terrorism[1]Psychology of terrorism[1]
Psychology of terrorism[1]
 
De Atkine2016
 De Atkine2016 De Atkine2016
De Atkine2016
 
Middle East law
Middle East lawMiddle East law
Middle East law
 
Leb ppt
Leb pptLeb ppt
Leb ppt
 
Islamist brief
Islamist briefIslamist brief
Islamist brief
 
Islamist brief
Islamist briefIslamist brief
Islamist brief
 
Middle East Cultural historical comp[onents
 Middle East Cultural historical comp[onents Middle East Cultural historical comp[onents
Middle East Cultural historical comp[onents
 
Crosscltr
CrosscltrCrosscltr
Crosscltr
 
Asmea Presentation ppt 2017Iran-Iraq war
Asmea  Presentation ppt 2017Iran-Iraq warAsmea  Presentation ppt 2017Iran-Iraq war
Asmea Presentation ppt 2017Iran-Iraq war
 
Arab way of war 09
Arab way of war 09Arab way of war 09
Arab way of war 09
 
Muhammad taught us to fight
Muhammad taught us to fightMuhammad taught us to fight
Muhammad taught us to fight
 
Obstacles to arab progress
Obstacles to arab progressObstacles to arab progress
Obstacles to arab progress
 
Meurbanwar
MeurbanwarMeurbanwar
Meurbanwar
 

Recently uploaded

Alper Gobel In Media Res Media Component
Alper Gobel In Media Res Media ComponentAlper Gobel In Media Res Media Component
Alper Gobel In Media Res Media ComponentInMediaRes1
 
POINT- BIOCHEMISTRY SEM 2 ENZYMES UNIT 5.pptx
POINT- BIOCHEMISTRY SEM 2 ENZYMES UNIT 5.pptxPOINT- BIOCHEMISTRY SEM 2 ENZYMES UNIT 5.pptx
POINT- BIOCHEMISTRY SEM 2 ENZYMES UNIT 5.pptxSayali Powar
 
Crayon Activity Handout For the Crayon A
Crayon Activity Handout For the Crayon ACrayon Activity Handout For the Crayon A
Crayon Activity Handout For the Crayon AUnboundStockton
 
Presiding Officer Training module 2024 lok sabha elections
Presiding Officer Training module 2024 lok sabha electionsPresiding Officer Training module 2024 lok sabha elections
Presiding Officer Training module 2024 lok sabha electionsanshu789521
 
CARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptx
CARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptxCARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptx
CARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptxGaneshChakor2
 
Solving Puzzles Benefits Everyone (English).pptx
Solving Puzzles Benefits Everyone (English).pptxSolving Puzzles Benefits Everyone (English).pptx
Solving Puzzles Benefits Everyone (English).pptxOH TEIK BIN
 
Sanyam Choudhary Chemistry practical.pdf
Sanyam Choudhary Chemistry practical.pdfSanyam Choudhary Chemistry practical.pdf
Sanyam Choudhary Chemistry practical.pdfsanyamsingh5019
 
Mastering the Unannounced Regulatory Inspection
Mastering the Unannounced Regulatory InspectionMastering the Unannounced Regulatory Inspection
Mastering the Unannounced Regulatory InspectionSafetyChain Software
 
Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)
Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)
Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)eniolaolutunde
 
Hybridoma Technology ( Production , Purification , and Application )
Hybridoma Technology  ( Production , Purification , and Application  ) Hybridoma Technology  ( Production , Purification , and Application  )
Hybridoma Technology ( Production , Purification , and Application ) Sakshi Ghasle
 
Final demo Grade 9 for demo Plan dessert.pptx
Final demo Grade 9 for demo Plan dessert.pptxFinal demo Grade 9 for demo Plan dessert.pptx
Final demo Grade 9 for demo Plan dessert.pptxAvyJaneVismanos
 
18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf
18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf
18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdfssuser54595a
 
How to Configure Email Server in Odoo 17
How to Configure Email Server in Odoo 17How to Configure Email Server in Odoo 17
How to Configure Email Server in Odoo 17Celine George
 
Biting mechanism of poisonous snakes.pdf
Biting mechanism of poisonous snakes.pdfBiting mechanism of poisonous snakes.pdf
Biting mechanism of poisonous snakes.pdfadityarao40181
 
The Most Excellent Way | 1 Corinthians 13
The Most Excellent Way | 1 Corinthians 13The Most Excellent Way | 1 Corinthians 13
The Most Excellent Way | 1 Corinthians 13Steve Thomason
 
Science 7 - LAND and SEA BREEZE and its Characteristics
Science 7 - LAND and SEA BREEZE and its CharacteristicsScience 7 - LAND and SEA BREEZE and its Characteristics
Science 7 - LAND and SEA BREEZE and its CharacteristicsKarinaGenton
 
A Critique of the Proposed National Education Policy Reform
A Critique of the Proposed National Education Policy ReformA Critique of the Proposed National Education Policy Reform
A Critique of the Proposed National Education Policy ReformChameera Dedduwage
 
BASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdf
BASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK  LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdfBASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK  LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdf
BASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdfSoniaTolstoy
 

Recently uploaded (20)

TataKelola dan KamSiber Kecerdasan Buatan v022.pdf
TataKelola dan KamSiber Kecerdasan Buatan v022.pdfTataKelola dan KamSiber Kecerdasan Buatan v022.pdf
TataKelola dan KamSiber Kecerdasan Buatan v022.pdf
 
Alper Gobel In Media Res Media Component
Alper Gobel In Media Res Media ComponentAlper Gobel In Media Res Media Component
Alper Gobel In Media Res Media Component
 
POINT- BIOCHEMISTRY SEM 2 ENZYMES UNIT 5.pptx
POINT- BIOCHEMISTRY SEM 2 ENZYMES UNIT 5.pptxPOINT- BIOCHEMISTRY SEM 2 ENZYMES UNIT 5.pptx
POINT- BIOCHEMISTRY SEM 2 ENZYMES UNIT 5.pptx
 
Crayon Activity Handout For the Crayon A
Crayon Activity Handout For the Crayon ACrayon Activity Handout For the Crayon A
Crayon Activity Handout For the Crayon A
 
Presiding Officer Training module 2024 lok sabha elections
Presiding Officer Training module 2024 lok sabha electionsPresiding Officer Training module 2024 lok sabha elections
Presiding Officer Training module 2024 lok sabha elections
 
CARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptx
CARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptxCARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptx
CARE OF CHILD IN INCUBATOR..........pptx
 
Solving Puzzles Benefits Everyone (English).pptx
Solving Puzzles Benefits Everyone (English).pptxSolving Puzzles Benefits Everyone (English).pptx
Solving Puzzles Benefits Everyone (English).pptx
 
Sanyam Choudhary Chemistry practical.pdf
Sanyam Choudhary Chemistry practical.pdfSanyam Choudhary Chemistry practical.pdf
Sanyam Choudhary Chemistry practical.pdf
 
Mastering the Unannounced Regulatory Inspection
Mastering the Unannounced Regulatory InspectionMastering the Unannounced Regulatory Inspection
Mastering the Unannounced Regulatory Inspection
 
Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)
Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)
Software Engineering Methodologies (overview)
 
Hybridoma Technology ( Production , Purification , and Application )
Hybridoma Technology  ( Production , Purification , and Application  ) Hybridoma Technology  ( Production , Purification , and Application  )
Hybridoma Technology ( Production , Purification , and Application )
 
Final demo Grade 9 for demo Plan dessert.pptx
Final demo Grade 9 for demo Plan dessert.pptxFinal demo Grade 9 for demo Plan dessert.pptx
Final demo Grade 9 for demo Plan dessert.pptx
 
Model Call Girl in Tilak Nagar Delhi reach out to us at 🔝9953056974🔝
Model Call Girl in Tilak Nagar Delhi reach out to us at 🔝9953056974🔝Model Call Girl in Tilak Nagar Delhi reach out to us at 🔝9953056974🔝
Model Call Girl in Tilak Nagar Delhi reach out to us at 🔝9953056974🔝
 
18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf
18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf
18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf
 
How to Configure Email Server in Odoo 17
How to Configure Email Server in Odoo 17How to Configure Email Server in Odoo 17
How to Configure Email Server in Odoo 17
 
Biting mechanism of poisonous snakes.pdf
Biting mechanism of poisonous snakes.pdfBiting mechanism of poisonous snakes.pdf
Biting mechanism of poisonous snakes.pdf
 
The Most Excellent Way | 1 Corinthians 13
The Most Excellent Way | 1 Corinthians 13The Most Excellent Way | 1 Corinthians 13
The Most Excellent Way | 1 Corinthians 13
 
Science 7 - LAND and SEA BREEZE and its Characteristics
Science 7 - LAND and SEA BREEZE and its CharacteristicsScience 7 - LAND and SEA BREEZE and its Characteristics
Science 7 - LAND and SEA BREEZE and its Characteristics
 
A Critique of the Proposed National Education Policy Reform
A Critique of the Proposed National Education Policy ReformA Critique of the Proposed National Education Policy Reform
A Critique of the Proposed National Education Policy Reform
 
BASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdf
BASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK  LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdfBASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK  LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdf
BASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdf
 

muhammad taught us to fightppt.pptx

  • 1. A Military Perspective of the Daesh By Norvell DeAtkine at tex.deatkine@gmail.com
  • 2.  “…… Islamist militants focus obsessively on the methodology of such battles as Yarmuk River in the Levant and Al-Qadisiyah in modern day Iraq, drawing inspiration from the tactics that can be reintroduced and expressed with 21st century technology. For these reasons we cannot afford Not to teach early Islamic history and obscure battles of the late antiquity……”.Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein (US Navy)  So why don’t we? Even the more celebrated books on the ISIS such as Mc Cants’s ISIS Apocalypse have no reference to the military strategy of the ISIS.  To some extent it is also the problem of walking through the minefield of talking or writing about religion in which chances are you will offend some or everyone.
  • 3.  Arabs in Conventional War  “Why Arabs Lose Wars,’”. Armed Forces in the Middle East, ed. Barry Rubin  Lack of officer-EM cohesion  Lack of professional NCO corps  Lack of initiative at all levels  Inability to perform combined arms operations  Security paranoia  Structured disunity…creating a coup- proof military  Lack of maintenance and logistics systems
  • 4.  Western Training of Arab Militaries  http://www.rubincenter.org/2013/03/western-influence- on-arab-militaries-pounding-square-pegs-into-round- holes/  Example of Winston Churchill’s optimism on creating the ‘ new Egyptian army in the i880’s  French in Syria  British in Iraq and Jordan  US in Saudi Arabia and lately Iraq The difference between training soldiers to operate weapons and building a cohesive professional ethos. We are counter-culture. It has never been a matter of intelligence or courage but CULTURE. Culture is the primary determinant on how people fight.
  • 5.  Arabs in Unconventional War “The Arab as Insurgent and Counterinsurgent,”In Conflict and Insurgency in the Contemporary Middle East, ed. Barry Rubin;  Light weapons hence very little maintenance and logistics  Blood and religious ties  Leadership by performance rather than appointment  Consonance with Qur’anic Concept of war  Allows greater individualism and self promotion
  • 6.  Ghazzia: the raid for plunder or slaves  deception and secrecy  no shame in hasty flight  Intimidation  Lots of noise little blood  Tribal wars; Relief from boredom…prove manhood
  • 7.  The concept of a unifying religious factor (later evolving into Jihad).  Total war. Basically turned Bedouin warfare from a sport into a war of total commitment.  “Jihad is a continuous and never-ending struggle waged on all fronts including political, economic, social, psychological, domestic, moral, and spiritual to obtain the objective of policy.” ( Qu’ranic Concept of War) by S.K Malik  Despite the earlier Bedouin rules of war non- combatants were no longer exempt from the effects of war. Resistance was dealt with harshly.  Total victory was the objective. Truces were only temporary.  Plunder and slaves were the by- product of the total war concept.  War was not the absence of peace but rather the perpetuation of the quest for the conquest of the non- Islamic world.  Seizure of land and its occupation was the new objective.
  • 8.  “Once war was harnessed to strategic objectives, it became possible to introduce tactical dimensions that were completely new to traditional Arab warfare. Muhammad used his armies in completely new ways.  He attacked tribes, towns, and garrisons before they could form hostile conditions: he isolated his enemy by severing their economic lifelines and disrupting the lines of communication  Muhammad also introduced the new dimension of psychological warfare, employing terror and even massacres as a means to weaken the will of his enemies.” Richard Gabriel. Muhammad: Islam’s First Great General
  • 9.  The brutality of this way of war was practiced by all the world empires, the Byzantines, the Persians.  Jesus said. “Think not that I am come to send peace on earth. I came not to send peace , but a sword.” Matthew 10:43  The story of Saul and and the Amalekites in which God was displeased with Saul because he disobeyed God’s command to kill them all. Samuel 1:15  Muhammad and his generals were normally generous in terms if the enemy capitulated early in the conflict.
  • 10.  The charisma and leadership of the Prophet  The religious zealotry imputed by Islam, demanding total personal commitment.  The magnificent sources of plunder and slaves. -An idea of the number of slaves flooding the Islamic Empire as a result of the conquest may be gained from such exaggerated figures of the following. Musa Ibn Nusayr took 300,000 captives from Ifriqiyah, one fifth of whom he forwarded to al Walid, and from the Gothic nobility in Spain he captured 30,000 virgins. Philip Hitti, History of the Arabs
  • 11.  Encompasses courage, esprit de corps, the individual fighting spirit and cohesiveness of the fighting unit. Not to be confused with morality • The empowering appeal and sweep of the Islamist story of the world, and presenting an opportunity for an individual to be part of the grand design. As was written of the early Islamic warriors They “delight in battle and slaughter,” and the glory among their peers and those who follow. Blood exhilarates not repels.  The Importance of the mythological Islamic world and the heroic deeds of the individuals,. Similar to the motivation of the Leftist terrorists of the seventies  Read Eric Hoffer The True Believer. As Hoffer wrote;  Dying and killing seem easy when they are part of a ritual, ceremonial, dramatic performance or game, and becomes a theatrical gesture.  Identification with a collective whole. The psychology of mass movements.  Deprecation of the present and glorification of the past.  Creation of a fact screen imposed between reality and the faithful.
  • 12.  A culture of romance  Promises adventure  Harkens back to medieval heroism  Reinvent their identity  This identity is not new but very old. Creswell and Haykel,”Why Jihadis Write Poetry”. New Yorker Magazine
  • 13.  “Victories Without Battles” TE Lawrence  “Victory in war is the result of imaginary psychological factors. Numbers, weapons and proper tactics may guarantee victories but they are less effective that the factors of spreading dissension, disunity, and a feeling of hopelessness among the enemy. “ Trickery is one of the most useful things employed in warfare. It is the thing most likely to bring victory.” Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah  In his use of propaganda, the Prophet used ridicule, the threat of total war and a dramatic use of the carrot and stick policy toward his enemies. Russ Rodgers, The Generals of Muhammad  “The Arabs are also shown adept at spying, sneaking into their opponents camp, cutting tent ropes and stealing their mounts to spread alarm among the enemy.” Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests  More than any other factor it was the psychology of fear that created to collapse of the Iraqi army in Mosul.
  • 14. Total war requires total commitment  “The Quranic view on war is, however altogether different. According to the Book, the very initiation of war is for the Cause of God. It is therefore controlled and conditioned by the word of God from its conception till culmination.” S. K Malik, The Quranic Concept of War  In the traditional view, the world is divided into two parts, the House of Islam ( Dar al Islam) where the Muslims rule and Muslim law is enforced , and the House of War ( Dar al Harb), the rest of the world where infidels still rule.  According to traditional teaching, the obligation of Jihad will continue until all the world either adopts Islam or submits to Islamic rule. Bernard Lewis. Islam; The Religion and the People
  • 15. According to Egyptian Brotherhood leader Dr. Ateya Adlan; The Quran teaches the Muslims to “strike fear into the hearts of the infidels, so strike them on their necks, and chop off all their fingers, which they use to wield a sword. In other words ,the Quran teaches Muslims how to fight. When the Quran discusses the duty of Jihad for the sake of Allah, it goes into the most minute detail.”
  • 16.  The tactic of the German army in WWII. No passive defense. Immediately counterattack. In early Islamic history every defeat or indecisive battle was followed up quickly with an attack. Often the Byzantines and Persians, after a successful campaign, retired to their sanctuaries and cities.  The early Islamic warriors simply regrouped and at earliest opportunity renewed the offensive. Driven by religious duty and the sense of martyrdom.  The Qur'an directs the constant adherence to having the initiative. “The Holy Prophet never let the initiative pass on to his adversaries.” (Malik; Qu’ranic Concept of War).  Michael Knights calls the ISIS conduct of war a “cult of the offensive” driven by individual zeal for Jihad and glory.
  • 17.  The Early Islamic conquerors used a variety of battle strategies, indicating their versatility and resourcefulness.  Quickly adapted useful tactics and weapons of war from their enemies.  Adapting tactics, weapons, and strategy to hit enemy vulnerabilities.  The ISIS absorbing these lessons, has used conventional warfare, maneuver warfare, Guerilla warfare, and terrorism
  • 18.  As a long time observer of the Arab scene has written, the Arabs have a way of rising from the ashes.  Many times in early Islamic history the Arab invaders were soundly defeated ( example; Battle of the Bridges) but quickly returned to continue the war to a successful conclusion. Their patience and determination undermined the confidence of the enemy.  Western or Russian trained Arab armies have not shown this resilience.  The ISIS has evidenced the early Islamic resilience. Time and time again they lose territory in one sector and immediately attack in a different sector.  In the early Islamic conquests, the death of leaders seem to have had little consequence. So it appears with the ISIS.
  • 19.  Specifically:  Transformed Arab tribes into instruments of large scale of war  Transformed social composition from tribes to a “national” army, just as ISIS melds together many different ethnic groups  Established a unity of command  Transformed Arab style of combat from individual to collective unit.  Created the concept of strategic war. The total war concept.  Created a professional officer corps by the school of hard knocks.  Introduced training and discipline.  The use of spies to understand the enemy weaknesses, structure, strengths, weaknesses, and their the leadership.  The ancient Islamic ways of war have been modernized by the ISIS.  The use of different types of formation, weaponry to confront different enemies.  Encouraged the decentralization of command and individual initiative but insisted on unity at the top.  As seen today in ISIS tactics. Small unit initiative, and decentralized decision – making.
  • 20.  A one early Islamic tactician put it. “The first part of the fighting is the shooting of arrows, then the pointing of spears, then the trusting of them right to left, and then the drawing of swords. “The Armies of the Caliphs,” Hugh Kennedy  Compare this to the so called swarm tactics of the ISIS. “Maintain an extended line abreast, keep your neighbors just in sight, but no closer, move to the sound of the guns, dismount when you see the enemy, when you come under fire, stop and fire back. Dennis Lowe, Small Wars Journal
  • 21.  Individualism is a Bedouin attribute but has been smothered in modern conventional Arab armies. It was venerated in the early Islamic conquests. As Ibn Khaldun wrote, every Bedouin wants to be the leader.  Smallest formation was a squad size katai’ib which had considerable latitude in their tactics.  The Prophet was not primarily a military man. He relied upon his commanders, but always questioned them closely on tactics and strategy.  Their leaders were shrewd and cunning, and generally allowed to manage their campaigns without micromanaging from Mecca. This decentralization of authority was present at every level. This has been an anathema to conventional Arab military.
  • 22.  Water. They made sure they had ample supplies of water and access to water, and use their mobility to get between their enemies and the water supplies. Today water has become a very potent ISIS weapon.  Night fighting. Rarely in conventional Arab armies but often in the early Arab wars. ISIS made a river crossing at night to surprise a Kurdish village.  Dust storms. Used very often to cover movements and attacks by the early Islamic warriors. Used to cover the attack on Ramadi by ISIS.  Sun Get the sun in the eyes of your opponents.  Open terrain. Early Arab warriors avoided it “do not fight them ( your enemy) firing arrows at them in an open space for they outnumber you and can surround you.”  Defiles and passes; Favorite place for Arab warriors to attack, especially for ambushes.  Cover your tracks; back track. Send small parties in several directions to confuse the enemy of the main objective. Today the ISIS attacks simultaneously in several places
  • 23.  “Trickery is one of the most useful things in warfare. It is the thing most likely to bring victory.” Ibn Khaldun,The Muqaddimah  Accounts are replete of the Prophet and early Islamic commanders rigorously maintaining security, secrecy, and using secret police, spies, assassinations, and strategic and tactical duplicity throughout the era of early Islamic conquests. Example: using soldiers disguised as pilgrims to assist in conquering Mecca.  The early Islamic warriors always used reconnaissance in force to probe their enemies, infiltrated in agents to create unrest, and moved boldly, but only after careful assessments of enemy strengths.  Surprise, ambushes, and fake retreats, were essential features Islamic warfare. Along with their mastery of archery their ambushes were particularly effective. Arabs have always avoided close in combat whenever possible, not because of a lack of courage but because they were costly in casualties.
  • 24.  As has the ISIS, the early Islamic armies fairly quickly incorporated numbers of non- Arabs to fight their wars. In fact the elite troops were often drawn from Persians or central Asians, such as the Shakira who were the praetorian guards of the ruling elite.  However the seeds of eventual destruction of the Islamic expansion was the Arab feeling of superiority over the not only the non Muslims but also the Mulawi, the non-Arab Muslims,
  • 25.  “The Zealot is the man who takes refuge from the unknown in the familiar; and when he joins battle with a stranger who practices superior tactics and employs formidable newfangled weapons of war and finds himself getting the worst of the encounter, he responds by practicing his own traditional art of war with abnormally scrupulous exactitude. “Zealotism,” in fact may be described as archaism evoked by foreign pressure….”  Arnold Toynbee Civilization on Trial