The Geological Survey of NSW collects and manages geological, geophysical, geochemical and geospatial data to inform the government, resource industry and the community about the state's geology, and mineral, coal, petroleum and renewable energy resources to facilitate the safe and sustainable development of NSW mineral and energy resources for the benefit of all NSW citizens.
The Geological Survey of NSW collects and manages geological, geophysical, geochemical and geospatial data to inform the government, resource industry and the community about the state's geology, and mineral, coal, petroleum and renewable energy resources to facilitate the safe and sustainable development of NSW mineral and energy resources for the benefit of all NSW citizens.
Global Maritime Issues Monitor 2018 1Global Maritime .docxshericehewat
Global Maritime Issues Monitor 2018 1
Global
Maritime
Issues Monitor
2018
Global Maritime Issues Monitor
2018
Table of contents
4
20
23
6
20
12
16
Foreword
Global maritime issues
Deep dive on digitalization
Deep dive on decarbonization
Methodology
Who participated in the survey
Glossary and bibliography
Global Maritime Issues Monitor 2018 4
Peter Stokes Marcus Baker Richard Turner
Chairman Chairman & Managing Director President
Global Maritime Forum Global Marine Practice, Marsh IUMI
Foreword
The Global Maritime Issues Monitor 2018 takes a global look at some of the major issues that are likely to impact
the global maritime industry. The report is based on the insight of senior maritime stakeholders from more than
50 countries, and their perceptions on the impact, likelihood, and preparedness on a number of issues potentially
affecting the global maritime industry. The report also undertakes deep dives into the emerging trends in digitalization
and decarbonization, which have forced the industry to re-examine some of the basic assumptions that have driven
traditional risk conventions.
As a result, companies in this sector now need to look afresh at the issues facing the maritime industry. The articles
contained in this publication examine some of these crucial issues and aim to provide critical insight into the challenges
and opportunities facing maritime companies as they navigate through the profound transformation that is under way.
With the future of the maritime industry uncertain, maritime leaders may have the opportunity to, at least partially,
shape it for themselves. Due to the systemic nature of changes the industry is or will likely be subject to, the case
could be made for pre-emptive action and wider collaboration, through which a critical mass of industry actors can
come together to sway the outcome in the industry’s favour. The Global Maritime Issues Monitor can in this perspective
be seen as a modest contribution to this goal as it gives a partial account of what should be at the basis of any such
attempt: a thorough understanding of the current state of affairs.
The Global Maritime Forum, Marsh and IUMI would like to thank those who participated in our survey. We dedicate our
special thanks also to the various individuals who have kindly provided their perspective on our findings and whose
comments complement our analysis of the results in all three sections of this report.
Global Maritime Issues Monitor 2018 5
Peter Stokes Marcus Baker Richard Turner
Chairman Chairman & Managing Director President
Global Maritime Forum Global Marine Practice, Marsh IUMI
Foreword
The Global Maritime Issues Monitor 2018 takes a global look at some of the major issues that are likely to impact
the global maritime industry. The report is based on the insight of senior maritime stakeholders from more than
50 countries, and their perceptions on the impact, likelih ...
global disaster trends- emerging risks of disaster- climate changeNitin Vadhel
Disaster risk trends are a measure of the sustainability of development.
Trend analysis helps us to understand patterns of disaster risk and, consequently, whether disaster risk reduction is being effective.
Using disaster trends to inform policy and practice requires a good understanding of the limits of these trends.
The pattern the trend displays (rising, falling or fluctuating) is only as real as the amount, quality and reliability of the data used. For instance, patterns of disaster losses may actually reflect a number of factors unrelated to disaster risk, including the time period over which they are measured and improvements in disaster risk reporting.
In order to account for these problems, analysts determine the statistical significance of the trend.
The NSW Resources Regulator is committed to supporting the health and safety of those working in the mining industry through the development and distribution of relevant and flexible learning and development programs.
As part of our commitment, we have collaborated to develop three flexible learning programs that specifically incorporate the findings from investigations and independent reviews of mining incidents that have involved multiple fatalities or where the circumstances that occurred presented a significant risk of death to workers or the wider community.
The case studies selected have been deliberately designed to represent all mining contexts. This is to reinforce to the industry that the risk of fatalities occurs in all parts of the mining industry, which requires everyone to remain vigilant and proactive. For this reason, learning from disasters has been directly integrated into the requirements to maintain competence, where relevant, as part of the maintenance of competence scheme for practising certificates.
Learning from experience, preventing devastating reoccurrences and improving the health and safety of all working in this industry is a profound way of acknowledging and recognising all those who have been affected by mining safety incidents throughout history.
The death of a truck operator in the USA in 2018 at a Peabody mine as a result of a fire highlights the importance of installing fire suppression systems. Firestorm has been involved in the world's largest retrofit of fire supression systems on buses. While buses may be considered simple for fire protection versus a mining machine, buses can carry up to 100 passengers and typically there is a lack of mechanical protection with the majority of the body made of fibreglass, wood and plastics that burn very quickly and are highly toxic. The risk for multiple deaths is therefore a much higher factor compared with a mining machine with one operator. The risk assessment required in AS5062-2016 needs to consider the egress paths available for an operator/passenger to safely evacuate the machine and consideration for actuators and fire extinguishers along this path.
Changes to laws in 2016 required the removal of PFAS and PFOS in both Queensland and South Australia with penalties noe effective for non-compliance. Several NSW mines have been put on notice by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to prevent further contamination of waterways. Firestorm is now moving away from exposing our own people to PFAS/PFOS systems to ensure we are providing best practice even though laws are not yet in place for NSW. This presentation looks at what it means if you choose to move away from PFAS/PFOS systems.
Presentation by Jared Jageler, David Adler, Noelia Duchovny, and Evan Herrnstadt, analysts in CBO’s Microeconomic Studies and Health Analysis Divisions, at the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Conference.
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Monitoring Health for the SDGs - Global Health Statistics 2024 - WHOChristina Parmionova
The 2024 World Health Statistics edition reviews more than 50 health-related indicators from the Sustainable Development Goals and WHO’s Thirteenth General Programme of Work. It also highlights the findings from the Global health estimates 2021, notably the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on life expectancy and healthy life expectancy.
Donate to charity during this holiday seasonSERUDS INDIA
For people who have money and are philanthropic, there are infinite opportunities to gift a needy person or child a Merry Christmas. Even if you are living on a shoestring budget, you will be surprised at how much you can do.
Donate Us
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ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdfSaeed Al Dhaheri
This keynote was presented during the the 7th edition of the UAE Hackathon 2024. It highlights the role of AI and Generative AI in addressing government transformation to achieve zero government bureaucracy
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Michael Quinlan: Learning from Failure: Pattern Causes of Fatal Incidents in Mines
1. Learning from Failure:
Pattern Causes of Fatal
Incidents in Mines
Mechanical Engineering Safety Seminar
3 August 2016
Michael Quinlan
School of Management, UNSW and Business School
Middlesex University London
2. The presentation content is as follows
Background and methods
Ten pattern causes in mining
Queensland ISHR/SSHR study
Observations and some conclusions
3. Presentation draws on review of official investigations into 24 fatal
incidents and disasters in mine in 5 countries (Australia, New
Zealand, USA, UK and Canada) 1990 and 2011. Are the repeat or
pattern causes underpinning these events?
Five countries with similar regulatory regimes and governance
facilitate generalisation as did the number of incidents examined.
15 involved 3 or more deaths while 9 single fatalities (includes 4
fatal mine incidents in Tasmania). Do the causes vary between
multiple and single fatality incidents?
Most multiple fatality incidents occurred in coal mines (86%) and
each incident also killed more on average (11 per incident
compared to 6 in metalliferous mines)
Also examined multiple fatality incidents in other high hazard work
places (shipping, aviation, oil rigs, chemical factories etc) globally
to see if same pattern causes found outside mining.
4. Failure can be as instructive as success
examining series of incidents identifies recurring
causes, why systems fail & how to remedy
Strategic decision making needs to draw on past
while recognising risk of misinterpretation & change
Focus on mining but same approach could be used
regarding other industries and types of incidents
Identified 10 causal pathways to fatal incidents (at
least 3 present in virtually all while majority had 5 or
more – some had all 10)
More thorough the investigation the more pattern
causes identified
5. DATE LOCATION INCIDENT
TYPE
FATALITIES
20 SEPTEMBER
1975
KIANGA MINE,
QLD
EXPLOSION 13
16 JULY 1986 MOURA NO.4,
QLD
EXPLOSION 12
8 JULY 1994 MOURA NO.2,
QLD
EXPLOSION 11
14 NOVEMBER
1996
GRETLEY
COL.,NSW
INRUSH 4
30 OCTOBER
2000
CORNWALL
COL.TAS
ROCKFALL 1
6 JUNE 2001 RENISON
MINE, TAS
ROCKFALL 2
6. DATE LOCATION INCIDENT
TYPE
FATALITIES
5 MAY 2003 RENISON MINE,
TAS
ROCKFALL 1
19 MAY 2004 BHP NEWMAN
WA
HIT BY
MACHINERY
1
25 APRIL 2006 BEACONSFIELD,
TAS
ROCK FALL 1 (2 TRAPPED)
19 MAY 1992 WESTRAY,
CANADA
EXPLOSION 26
19 NOVEMBER
2010
PIKE RIVER, NZ EXPLOSION 27
25 SEPTEMBER
2011
GLEISION COL,
UK
INRUSH 4
7. DATE LOCATION INCIDENT
TYPE
FATALITIES
7 DECEMBER 1992 NO.3 MINE,VI
USA
EXPLOSION 8
23 SEPTEMBER
2001
NO.5 JWR AL
USA
EXPLOSION 13
2 JANUARY 2006 SAGO MINE WV
USA
EXPLOSION 12
20 MAY 2006 DARBY NO.5 KY
USA
EXPLOSION 5
6 AUGUST 2007 CRANDALL
UTAH US
FALL OF
RIB/FACE
6
5 APRIL 2010 UBB MINE WV
USA
EXPLOSION 29
8. How and some incidents where contributed
Failure to provide/maintain plant etc (eg
Westray-ventilation/monitoring/roof bolting)
Inadequately planned mining methods & failure
to revise (Westray, Crandall Canyon)
Flawed/misused maps of workings(Gretley)
Seal design/flaws (Sago & Moura No.2)
Hydro mining and main ventilator UG (Pike
River)
Note: these are only examples and not exhaustive
9. How and some incidents where contributed
Failure to respond to trends in atmospheric
pressure & methane levels (Westray, Pike River)
Failure to respond to or analyse rockfalls
(Cornwall, Renison & Beaconsfield)
Failure to respond to prior outbursts (Crandall
Canyon)
Failure to adequately respond to evidence of
heating (Moura No.2 -note too two prior
disasters)
Evidence of abnormal water prior to inrush
(Gretley)
10. How and some incidents where contributed
Failure to assess risk of inrush (Gretley)
Failure to properly assess risks prior to
authorising entry (Jim Walter Resources/JWR)
Failure to do risk assessment following coal
outbursts (Crandall Canyon)
Failure to undertake comprehensive risk
assessment after major rockfall (Beaconsfield/BG)
Failure to risk assess hydro mining or UG main
ventilator (Pike River)
11. How and some incidents where contributed
Poor system structures/communication & over-
focus on behaviour/minor safety issues (JWR, BG)
Inadequate training/procedures (Sago & Darby
No.1)
Failure to maintain safety critical systems –rock
dusting, ventilation, equipment – UBB & Pike R)
Poor management of contractors/work re-
organisation (Renison, BHPB)
Poor hazard/risk management systems & worker
feedback mechanisms(BHPB)
12. How and some incidents where contributed
Failure to audit critical safety processes (eg
Moura No.2 management of spontaneous
combustion)
Failure to adopt audit findings (BG)
No proper OHS audit (Pike River)
13. How and some incidents where contributed
Production pressure/cost cutting compromising
safe work practices (Westray, UBB, Pike River) or
use of consultants/in-house technical expertise
(Renison)
Poor financial state of mine putting miners
‘under the pump’ (Westray, Renison)
Incentive pay systems encouraging unsafe
practices (Westray & Pike River)
14. How and some incidents where contributed
Insufficient/inadequately trained or supervised
inspectors (3 Tas incidents, Sago, Pike River)
Poor inspection procedures (Crandall, Darby
No.1, JWR) including prior notice (UBB)
Inadequate/poorly targeted enforcement
(Westray, Gretley, Sago, UBB, Pike River)
Flaws in Legislation - standards, reporting
requirements, sanctions, worker rights (3 Tas,
Pike River, UBB & other US disasters)
15. How and some incidents where contributed
Evidence of significant level of serious concerns
(Cornwall, BG, UBB)
worker/supervisors raised concerns but were
ignored (Cornwall, BG)
Note: this matter seldom seems to be explored in
the course of most investigations (BG & UBB
exceptional in that interviewed large numbers of
miners and even family members)
16. How and some incidents where contributed
Prolonged/bitter struggle over unionisation
(Westray, BG) or non-union mine (UBB)
Inadequate input mechanisms (Ctees & HSRs) &
poor response to workers raising safety issues
(BG, BHPB)
Poor management communication processes
(Moura No.2)
Poor management response to worker,
supervisor and union concerns (Pike River)
17. How and some incidents where contributed
Flaws in emergency procedures, maps or training
(Darby No.1, Sago)
Poor safety management makes rescue more
dangerous (Crandall, BG)
Poor inspectorate/Mine Rescue Brigade rescue
procedures or resources (Moura No.2, Sago,
Crandall)
No second egress (Pike River)
18. Examined 1165 MI, ISHR & SSHR inspection reports for 19
mines (7 ug & 12 o/c) 1984-2013 (75% since 2000)
MI 605 (52%); ISHR 473 (41%); SSHR 50 (4%)
Electronic recording and exchange of all inspections,
reports etc by MI, SSHR, ISHR very important
Also interviewed ISHRs & SSHRs at 13 of mines, and
senior mines inspector
Both MI & ISHR/SSHR inspections focused on serious
hazards (ie fatality risks)
>90% of ISHR/SSHR reports dealt with at least one fatality
risk (many more than one)
Also strong emphasis on HPIs and incident investigation
20. No evidence ISHR/SSHR reports dealt with anything
but safety & sparing use of suspension powers (24
SSHR reports & 3 SSHR – all but 1 related to fatal
risks/exception was bullying case)
54% of ISHR reports examined documents as well as
physical (MI 50% and SSHR around 20%)
Evidence of system corrosion at some mines &
suspensions to prevent serious incidents – in some
cases management suspended operations, other
cases MI,ISHR,SSHR
Overall good relationship between MI & SSHR &
ISHR/strong complementary roles (little
disagreement re suspension)
Some issues re SSHR presence & management
turnover
21. Pattern flaws provide reference point for
◦ Assessing regulation/identifying gaps
◦ Informing inspection practices & incident investigation
(eg Pike River, Gleision colliery)
◦ Evaluating regulatory regimes
Guidance on & auditing of systems and risk assessment
Prescription re well known hazards (systems/risk
management & prescription balance)
Vigorous reporting of any safety critical deviations
Strengthening auditing requirements
Strengthening regulatory oversight
Providing/facilitating meaningful worker input
22. These pattern causes help to explain fatal incidents in high hazard
workplaces & focusing on them would minimise fatalities
Safety ‘culture’ was not a pattern cause rather symptom of failure in
OHS management regime and priorities
Systems as hierarchies of control that corrode over time & better
suited to routine risk?
Pattern causes apply to both single fatalities and multiple fatalities
(both low frequency/high impact events)
Changes to work organisation like subcontracting can weaken
Clear lessons in terms regulation but battle to implement these in
wealthy democratic countries & largely ignored in newly
industrialising countries
23. Mining has over 200 years experience to learn from and help other
high hazard industries.
Must ask why lessons from past failures lost/forgotten or not kept?
Qld and NSW learned important lessons from 1990s disasters & since
regulatory reforms no disasters notwithstanding industry expansion &
adjudged world’s best practice regulation by Pike River RC
Reforms recognised number of pattern causes including the need for
comprehensive and rigorously audited management of all major
hazards, clear requirements re known hazards/controls, well-
resourced proactive inspectorate, and strong worker input.
Important package as is mutually reinforcing with multiple feedback
loops (internal company, inspectors, safety reps/union) to identify
failures/ensure constructive dialogue (potential for different views is
critical
24. Need to remain vigilant about sustaining these key elements and the
ever-present risk of corrosion of even robust regimes
Actually entering dangerous period
◦ Downturn/job insecurity and industry/corporate restructuring
◦ Length of time since last disaster
◦ Complacency/over-confidence that paperwork systems reflect
actual practices
◦ Increased use of subcontractors requires ongoing oversight
◦ Must ensure key roles and ‘eyes’ get trained and encouraged to
speak out/identify problems
◦ Queensland study found disturbing incidents where down to very
last line of defence but for late intervention
Need reactivated attention from all or history will repeat – degree of
unease essential
25. M. Quinlan (2014), Ten Pathways to Death and Disaster:
Learning from fatal incidents in mines and other high
hazard workplaces, Federation Press, Sydney.
Hopkins, A. & Maslen, S. (2015) Risky rewards: how
company bonuses affect safety, Ashgate, Farnham, Surrey.
Walters, D. Wadsworth, E. Johnstone, R. & Quinlan, M.
(2014) A study of the role of workers’ representatives in
health and safety arrangements in coal mines in
Queensland, Report prepared with support of the CFMEU,