Sometimes when we publish details and writeups about vulnerabilities we are so focused on the actual bug, that we don’t notice others, which might be still hidden inside the details. The same can happen when we read these issues, but if we keep our eyes open we might find hidden gems.
In this talk I will cover three macOS vulnerabilities that I found while reading the writeup of other vulnerabilities, where some of them were public for over four years. I also only spotted them after multiple reads, and once found I realized that it was right there in front of us every single time.
In the 2017 pwn2own macOS exploit chain the authors found a privilege escalation vulnerability is the disk arbitration service. What I found that the same logic flaw was present in another part of he code segment (literally right next to the original), which allowed an attacker to perform a full sandbox escape.
In the pwn2own 2020 macOS exploit chain there was a vulnerability concerning the preferences daemon. The patch was presented later by the authors and after reading through the patch for the ~20st time, I spotted a new privilege escalation possibility.
In 2021, the macOS XCSSET malware used a TCC 0day bypass, which was later patched. Mickey Jin found a bypass for the patch and presented a new TCC bypass. While reading through his analysis for the n-th time, it hit me, that not only possible to bypass the new patch but there is an underlying fundamental issue with the TCC framework, which allowed us to generically bypass TCC.
20+ ways to bypass your mac os privacy mechanismsCsaba Fitzl
"TotallyNotAVirus.app" would like to access the camera and spy on you. To protect your privacy, Apple introduced Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) framework that restricts access to sensitive personal resources: documents, camera, microphone, emails, and more. Granting such access requires authorization, and the mechanism's main design concern was clear user consent.
In this talk, we will share multiple techniques that allowed us to bypass this prompt, and as a malicious application, get access to protected resources without any additional privileges or user's consent. Together, we submitted over 40 vulnerabilities just to Apple through the past year, which allowed us to bypass some parts or the entire TCC. We also found numerous vulnerabilities in third-party apps (including Firefox, Signal, and others), which allowed us to avoid the OS restrictions by leveraging the targeted apps' privileges.
In the first part of the talk, we will give you an overview of the TCC framework, its building blocks, and how it limits application access to private data. We will explore the various databases it uses and discuss the difference between user consent and user intent.
Next, we will go through various techniques and specific vulnerabilities that we used to bypass TCC. We will cover how we can use techniques like process injection, mounting, application behavior, or simple file searches to find vulnerabilities and gain access to the protected resources.
The audience will leave with a solid understanding of the macOS privacy restrictions framework (TCC) and its weaknesses. We believe there is a need to raise awareness on why OS protections are not 100% effective, and in the end, users have to be careful with installing software on their machines. Moreover - as we're going to publish several exploits - red teams will also benefit from the talk.
Mitigating Exploits Using Apple's Endpoint SecurityCsaba Fitzl
I have spent the last two years finding logic vulnerabilities both in Apple's macOS operating system and in third-party apps running on macOS. One of the common ways to gain more privileges is by injecting code into a process that possesses various entitlements, which grants various rights to the process. Although Apple's own processes are well protected, the same is not the case for third-party apps. This has opened up the possibilities for plenty of privacy (TCC) related bypasses and privilege escalation to root through XPC services. Another common pattern is to attack the system and applications through symbolic links.
When Apple introduced the Endpoint Security framework, I decided to write an application to protect against such attacks, and to learn the framework myself. This application is free and open source.
In this talk I will introduce the basic concepts behind some of the logic attacks. I will talk about how they work, and what they make possible. Then we will discuss Apple's Endpoint Security framework, how it works, and how someone can use it.
Next I will talk about the development of the application, how the mitigations are implemented, and how it works in the background. I will go through several demonstrations showing its effectiveness against exploitation. I will also go through my experiences getting the Endpoint Security entitlement from Apple.
Abusing Microsoft Kerberos - Sorry you guys don't get itBenjamin Delpy
Talk of Skip Duckwall and I at BlackHat 2014 USA / Defcon Wall of Sheep.
Kerberos, and new pass-the-* feature, like overpass-the-hash and the Golden Ticket
Here Be Dragons: The Unexplored Land of Active Directory ACLsAndy Robbins
Presented by Andy Robbins, Rohan Vazarkar, and Will Schroeder at DerbyCon 7.0: Legacy, in Louisville, Kentucky, 2017.
See the video recording of the presentation here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mfaFuXEiLF4
20+ ways to bypass your mac os privacy mechanismsCsaba Fitzl
"TotallyNotAVirus.app" would like to access the camera and spy on you. To protect your privacy, Apple introduced Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) framework that restricts access to sensitive personal resources: documents, camera, microphone, emails, and more. Granting such access requires authorization, and the mechanism's main design concern was clear user consent.
In this talk, we will share multiple techniques that allowed us to bypass this prompt, and as a malicious application, get access to protected resources without any additional privileges or user's consent. Together, we submitted over 40 vulnerabilities just to Apple through the past year, which allowed us to bypass some parts or the entire TCC. We also found numerous vulnerabilities in third-party apps (including Firefox, Signal, and others), which allowed us to avoid the OS restrictions by leveraging the targeted apps' privileges.
In the first part of the talk, we will give you an overview of the TCC framework, its building blocks, and how it limits application access to private data. We will explore the various databases it uses and discuss the difference between user consent and user intent.
Next, we will go through various techniques and specific vulnerabilities that we used to bypass TCC. We will cover how we can use techniques like process injection, mounting, application behavior, or simple file searches to find vulnerabilities and gain access to the protected resources.
The audience will leave with a solid understanding of the macOS privacy restrictions framework (TCC) and its weaknesses. We believe there is a need to raise awareness on why OS protections are not 100% effective, and in the end, users have to be careful with installing software on their machines. Moreover - as we're going to publish several exploits - red teams will also benefit from the talk.
Mitigating Exploits Using Apple's Endpoint SecurityCsaba Fitzl
I have spent the last two years finding logic vulnerabilities both in Apple's macOS operating system and in third-party apps running on macOS. One of the common ways to gain more privileges is by injecting code into a process that possesses various entitlements, which grants various rights to the process. Although Apple's own processes are well protected, the same is not the case for third-party apps. This has opened up the possibilities for plenty of privacy (TCC) related bypasses and privilege escalation to root through XPC services. Another common pattern is to attack the system and applications through symbolic links.
When Apple introduced the Endpoint Security framework, I decided to write an application to protect against such attacks, and to learn the framework myself. This application is free and open source.
In this talk I will introduce the basic concepts behind some of the logic attacks. I will talk about how they work, and what they make possible. Then we will discuss Apple's Endpoint Security framework, how it works, and how someone can use it.
Next I will talk about the development of the application, how the mitigations are implemented, and how it works in the background. I will go through several demonstrations showing its effectiveness against exploitation. I will also go through my experiences getting the Endpoint Security entitlement from Apple.
Abusing Microsoft Kerberos - Sorry you guys don't get itBenjamin Delpy
Talk of Skip Duckwall and I at BlackHat 2014 USA / Defcon Wall of Sheep.
Kerberos, and new pass-the-* feature, like overpass-the-hash and the Golden Ticket
Here Be Dragons: The Unexplored Land of Active Directory ACLsAndy Robbins
Presented by Andy Robbins, Rohan Vazarkar, and Will Schroeder at DerbyCon 7.0: Legacy, in Louisville, Kentucky, 2017.
See the video recording of the presentation here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mfaFuXEiLF4
In this talk we will publish our research we conducted on 28 different AntiVirus products on macOS through 2020. Our focus was to assess the XPC services these products expose and if they presented any security vulnerabilities. We will talk about the typical issues, and demonstrate plenty of vulnerabilities, which typically led to full control of the given product or local privilege escalation on the system. At the end we will give advice to developers how to write secure XPC services.
DerbyCon 2016
Nick Landers @monoxgas
External mail via Exchange is one of the most common services offered by organizations today. The Microsoft Office suite is even more prevalent making Outlook the most common mail client around. This talk focuses on the abuse of these two products for the purpose of gaining code execution inside remote networks. Subjects include E-Mail and password scraping, OWA/EWS brute forcing techniques, and new research into abusing Outlook mail rules for remote code execution. Learn about the capabilities of client side rules, the underlying Windows APIs, and how to modify these rule objects to make phishing attacks obsolete. Security Consultant at Silent Break Security. Professional Hacker for 2 years. Current work involves writing custom malware and researching unique attack vectors that abuse functionality in windows environments.
Identifying privilege escalation paths within an Active Directory environment is crucial for a successful red team. Over the last few years, BloodHound has made it easier for red teamers to perform reconnaissance activities and identify these attacks paths. When evaluating BloodHound data, it is common to find ourselves having sufficient rights to modify a Group Policy Object (GPO). This level of access allows us to perform a number of attacks, targeting any computer or user object controlled by the vulnerable GPO.
In this talk we will present previous research related to GPO abuses and share a number of misconfigurations we have found in the wild. We will also present a tool that allows red teamers to target users and computers controlled by a vulnerable GPO in order to escalate privileges and move laterally within the environment.
A story of the passive aggressive sysadmin of AEMFrans Rosén
# By Frans Rosén
Adobe Experience Manager is an enterprise CMS with a troubled history. It was created with the angle of high customization factor, enabling consulting firms to deploy it all over the world for huge customers.
Then came security.
Frans will go through some terrible default configuration mistakes, Adobe’s love for bad Flash and how a sysadmin accidentialy exposed an international multi billion dollar company using only sad thoughts.
# About speaker
Frans Rosén is a tech entrepreneur, bug bounty hunter and a Security Advisor at Detectify, a security service for developers. He’s a frequent blogger at Detectify Labs and a top ranked participant of bug bounty programs, receiving some of the highest bounty payouts ever on HackerOne.
Frans was recently featured as #2 on Hackread’s list of 10 Famous Bug Bounty Hunters of All Time and the results of his security research has been covered in numerous international publications such as Observer, BBC, Ars Technica, Wired and Mashable.
Getting Started in Pentesting the Cloud: AzureBeau Bullock
Webcast Recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCbVMWvncuw
Increasingly, more organizations are migrating resources to being hosted in the cloud. With this comes a greater potential for misconfiguration if there isn’t a solid understanding of the attack surface. While there are many similarities between traditional on-premises pentesting and cloud-based pentesting, the latter is an animal of its own. This webcast will attempt to clear up some of the fogginess around cloud-based pentesting, specific to Microsoft Azure environments, including Microsoft 365.
In order to adequately determine the attack surface, the appropriate coverage areas will be highlighted. Differences between Azure resources and Microsoft 365 can oftentimes be confusing but knowing these differences is key to helping you pivot and escalate privileges. Conditional access policies are great for defining different scenarios for how users can authenticate securely but can also be misconfigured. There are security protections for stopping certain password attacks but some of these can be bypassed. Ultimately, a methodology for testing Azure environments along with tools and techniques will be presented in this talk.
This presentation done at DeepSec 2014 focuses on using PowerShell for Client Side attacks. New scripts which are part of the open-source toolkit Nishang were also released. NIshang is toolkit in PowerShell for Penetration Testing
This presentation was given at BSides Austin '15, and is an expanded version of the "I hunt sys admins" Shmoocon firetalk. It covers various ways to hunt for users in Windows domains, including using PowerView.
With the big delays in the time it takes until an iOS jailbreak is public and stable, it is often not possible to test mobile apps in the latest iOS version. Occasionally customers might also provide builds that only work in iOS versions for which no jailbreak is available. On Android the situation is better, but there can also be problems to root certain phone models. These trends make security testing of mobile apps difficult. This talk will cover approaches to defeat common security mechanisms that must be bypassed in the absence of root/jailbreak.
WAF Bypass Techniques - Using HTTP Standard and Web Servers’ BehaviourSoroush Dalili
Although web application firewall (WAF) solutions are very useful to prevent common or automated attacks, most of them are based on blacklist approaches and are still far from perfect. This talk illustrates a number of creative techniques to smuggle and reshape HTTP requests using the strange behaviour of web servers and features such as request encoding or HTTP pipelining. These methods can come in handy when testing a website behind a WAF and can help penetration testers and bug bounty hunters to avoid drama and pain! Knowing these techniques is also beneficial for the defence team in order to design appropriate mitigation techniques. Additionally, it shows why developers should not solely rely on WAFs as the defence mechanism.
Finally, an open source Burp Suite extension will be introduced that can be used to assess or bypass a WAF solution using some of the techniques discussed in this talk. The plan is to keep improving this extension with the help of the http.ninja project.
This presentation was given at PSConfEU and covers common privilege escalation vectors for Windows systems, as well as how to enumerate these issues with PowerUp.
[errata] For more information on DCSync and associated permissions, as well as AdminSDHolder and associated permissions, see Sean Metcalf's respective posts at https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729 and https://adsecurity.org/?p=1906 .
"An ACE Up the Sleeve: Designing Active Directory DACL Backdoors" was presented at BlackHat and DEF CON 2017.
In this talk we will publish our research we conducted on 28 different AntiVirus products on macOS through 2020. Our focus was to assess the XPC services these products expose and if they presented any security vulnerabilities. We will talk about the typical issues, and demonstrate plenty of vulnerabilities, which typically led to full control of the given product or local privilege escalation on the system. At the end we will give advice to developers how to write secure XPC services.
DerbyCon 2016
Nick Landers @monoxgas
External mail via Exchange is one of the most common services offered by organizations today. The Microsoft Office suite is even more prevalent making Outlook the most common mail client around. This talk focuses on the abuse of these two products for the purpose of gaining code execution inside remote networks. Subjects include E-Mail and password scraping, OWA/EWS brute forcing techniques, and new research into abusing Outlook mail rules for remote code execution. Learn about the capabilities of client side rules, the underlying Windows APIs, and how to modify these rule objects to make phishing attacks obsolete. Security Consultant at Silent Break Security. Professional Hacker for 2 years. Current work involves writing custom malware and researching unique attack vectors that abuse functionality in windows environments.
Identifying privilege escalation paths within an Active Directory environment is crucial for a successful red team. Over the last few years, BloodHound has made it easier for red teamers to perform reconnaissance activities and identify these attacks paths. When evaluating BloodHound data, it is common to find ourselves having sufficient rights to modify a Group Policy Object (GPO). This level of access allows us to perform a number of attacks, targeting any computer or user object controlled by the vulnerable GPO.
In this talk we will present previous research related to GPO abuses and share a number of misconfigurations we have found in the wild. We will also present a tool that allows red teamers to target users and computers controlled by a vulnerable GPO in order to escalate privileges and move laterally within the environment.
A story of the passive aggressive sysadmin of AEMFrans Rosén
# By Frans Rosén
Adobe Experience Manager is an enterprise CMS with a troubled history. It was created with the angle of high customization factor, enabling consulting firms to deploy it all over the world for huge customers.
Then came security.
Frans will go through some terrible default configuration mistakes, Adobe’s love for bad Flash and how a sysadmin accidentialy exposed an international multi billion dollar company using only sad thoughts.
# About speaker
Frans Rosén is a tech entrepreneur, bug bounty hunter and a Security Advisor at Detectify, a security service for developers. He’s a frequent blogger at Detectify Labs and a top ranked participant of bug bounty programs, receiving some of the highest bounty payouts ever on HackerOne.
Frans was recently featured as #2 on Hackread’s list of 10 Famous Bug Bounty Hunters of All Time and the results of his security research has been covered in numerous international publications such as Observer, BBC, Ars Technica, Wired and Mashable.
Getting Started in Pentesting the Cloud: AzureBeau Bullock
Webcast Recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCbVMWvncuw
Increasingly, more organizations are migrating resources to being hosted in the cloud. With this comes a greater potential for misconfiguration if there isn’t a solid understanding of the attack surface. While there are many similarities between traditional on-premises pentesting and cloud-based pentesting, the latter is an animal of its own. This webcast will attempt to clear up some of the fogginess around cloud-based pentesting, specific to Microsoft Azure environments, including Microsoft 365.
In order to adequately determine the attack surface, the appropriate coverage areas will be highlighted. Differences between Azure resources and Microsoft 365 can oftentimes be confusing but knowing these differences is key to helping you pivot and escalate privileges. Conditional access policies are great for defining different scenarios for how users can authenticate securely but can also be misconfigured. There are security protections for stopping certain password attacks but some of these can be bypassed. Ultimately, a methodology for testing Azure environments along with tools and techniques will be presented in this talk.
This presentation done at DeepSec 2014 focuses on using PowerShell for Client Side attacks. New scripts which are part of the open-source toolkit Nishang were also released. NIshang is toolkit in PowerShell for Penetration Testing
This presentation was given at BSides Austin '15, and is an expanded version of the "I hunt sys admins" Shmoocon firetalk. It covers various ways to hunt for users in Windows domains, including using PowerView.
With the big delays in the time it takes until an iOS jailbreak is public and stable, it is often not possible to test mobile apps in the latest iOS version. Occasionally customers might also provide builds that only work in iOS versions for which no jailbreak is available. On Android the situation is better, but there can also be problems to root certain phone models. These trends make security testing of mobile apps difficult. This talk will cover approaches to defeat common security mechanisms that must be bypassed in the absence of root/jailbreak.
WAF Bypass Techniques - Using HTTP Standard and Web Servers’ BehaviourSoroush Dalili
Although web application firewall (WAF) solutions are very useful to prevent common or automated attacks, most of them are based on blacklist approaches and are still far from perfect. This talk illustrates a number of creative techniques to smuggle and reshape HTTP requests using the strange behaviour of web servers and features such as request encoding or HTTP pipelining. These methods can come in handy when testing a website behind a WAF and can help penetration testers and bug bounty hunters to avoid drama and pain! Knowing these techniques is also beneficial for the defence team in order to design appropriate mitigation techniques. Additionally, it shows why developers should not solely rely on WAFs as the defence mechanism.
Finally, an open source Burp Suite extension will be introduced that can be used to assess or bypass a WAF solution using some of the techniques discussed in this talk. The plan is to keep improving this extension with the help of the http.ninja project.
This presentation was given at PSConfEU and covers common privilege escalation vectors for Windows systems, as well as how to enumerate these issues with PowerUp.
[errata] For more information on DCSync and associated permissions, as well as AdminSDHolder and associated permissions, see Sean Metcalf's respective posts at https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729 and https://adsecurity.org/?p=1906 .
"An ACE Up the Sleeve: Designing Active Directory DACL Backdoors" was presented at BlackHat and DEF CON 2017.
20+ Ways to Bypass Your macOS Privacy MechanismsSecuRing
"TotallyNotAVirus.app" would like to access the camera and spy on you. To protect your privacy, Apple introduced Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) framework that restricts access to sensitive personal resources: documents, camera, microphone, emails, and more. Granting such access requires authorization, and the mechanism's main design concern was clear user consent.
In this talk, we will share multiple techniques that allowed us to bypass this prompt, and as a malicious application, get access to protected resources without any additional privileges or user's consent. Together, we submitted over 40 vulnerabilities just to Apple through the past year, which allowed us to bypass some parts or the entire TCC. We also found numerous vulnerabilities in third-party apps (including Firefox, Signal, and others), which allowed us to avoid the OS restrictions by leveraging the targeted apps' privileges.
In the first part of the talk, we will give you an overview of the TCC framework, its building blocks, and how it limits application access to private data. We will explore the various databases it uses and discuss the difference between user consent and user intent.
Next, we will go through various techniques and specific vulnerabilities that we used to bypass TCC. We will cover how we can use techniques like process injection, mounting, application behavior, or simple file searches to find vulnerabilities and gain access to the protected resources.
The audience will leave with a solid understanding of the macOS privacy restrictions framework (TCC) and its weaknesses. We believe there is a need to raise awareness on why OS protections are not 100% effective, and in the end, users have to be careful with installing software on their machines. Moreover - as we're going to publish several exploits - red teams will also benefit from the talk.
Owning computers without shell access 2Royce Davis
These are the slides from my talk at BSides Puerto Rico 2013. I will post a link to the slides later.
Abstract:
For many years Penetration Testers have relied on gaining shell access to remote systems in order to take ownership of network resources and enterprise owned assets. AntiVirus (AV) companies are becoming increasingly more aware of shell signatures and are therefore making it more and more difficult to compromise remote hosts. The current industry mentality seams to believe the answer is stealthier payloads and super complex obfuscation techniques. I believe a more effective answer might lie in alternative attack methodologies involving authenticated execution of native Windows commands to accomplish the majority of shell reliant tasks common to most network level penetration tests. The techniques I will be discussing were developed precisely with this style of attack in mind. Using these new tools, I will demonstrate how to accomplish the same degree of network level compromise that has been enjoyed in the past with shell-based attack vectors, while avoiding detection from AV solut
The slides of my ObjectiveByTheSea v4 conference talk.
Abstract
---------
In this talk we will dive into mount operation internals on macOS and discuss several vulnerabilities impacted the system.
In the first half we will introduce how mounting is happening, how the sandbox is tied to the mount operation. We will also discuss the diskarbitration service, which is also responsible some of the mounting which can be done by the user.
Next we will detail different bugs impacted macOS in the past, where mounting had a key role. These range from privilege escalation to complete privacy (TCC) bypasses.
Lastly we will review how we can use the mount command for our own advantage when exploiting third party applications.
Security research over Windows #defcon chinaPeter Hlavaty
Past several years Microsoft Windows undergo lot of fundamental security changes. Where one can argue still imperfect and bound to tons of legacy issues, on the other hand those changes made important shifts in attacker perspective. From tightened sandboxing, restricting attack surface, introducing mitigations, applying virtualization up to stronger focus even on win32k. In our talk we will go trough those changes, how it affects us and how we tackle them from choosing targets, finding bugs up to exploitation primitives we are using. While also empathize that windows research is not only about sandbox, and there are many more interesting target to look for.
Project: Malware Analysis
CS 6262 Project 3
Agenda
• Part 1: Analyzing Windows Malware
• Part 2: Analyzing Android Malware
Scenario
• Analyzing Windows Malware
• You got a malware sample from the wild. Your task is to discover what
malware does by analyzing it
• How do you discover the malware’s behaviors?
• Static Analysis
• Manual Reverse Engineering
• Programming binary analysis
• Dynamic Analysis
• Network behavioral tracing
• Run-time system behavioral tracing(File/Process/Thread/Registry)
• Symbolic Execution
• Fuzzing
Scenario
• In our scenario, you are going to analyze the given malware with tools
that we provide.
• The tools help you to analyze the malware with static and dynamic
analysis.
• Objective
1. Find which server controls the malware (the command and control (C2)
server)
2. Discover how the malware communicates with the command and control
(C2) server
• URL and Payload
3. Discover what activities are done by the malware payload
• Attack Activities
Scenario
• Requirement
• Make sure that no malware traffic goes out from the virtual machine
• But, updating of malware (stage 2), and downloading payload (stage 3) are required to
be allowed (set as default option)
• The command and control server is dead. You need to reconstruct it
• Use tools to reconstruct the server, then reveal hidden behaviors of the malware
• Analyze network traffic on the host, and figure out the list of available
commands for the malware
• Analyze network traffic trace of the host, and figure out what malware does
• Write down your answer into assignment-questionnaire.txt
Project Structure
• A Virtual Machine for Malware analysis
• Please download and install the latest version or update your virtual box.
• https://www.virtualbox.org/wiki/Downloads
• Download the VM
• Download links
• http://ironhide.gtisc.gatech.edu/vm_2018.7z
• http://bombshell.gtisc.gatech.edu/vm_2018.7z
• Verify the md5 hash of the 7z file: 537e70c4cb4662d3e3b46af5d8223fd
• Please install 7zip or p7zip
• Windows, Linux and MacOs: http://www.7-zip.org/download.html
• Unarchive the 7z file
• Password: GTVM!
https://www.virtualbox.org/wiki/Downloads
http://ironhide.gtisc.gatech.edu/vm_2018.7z
http://bombshell.gtisc.gatech.edu/vm_2018.7z
http://www.7-zip.org/download.html
Project Structure
• Open VirtualBox
• Go to File->Import Appliance.
• Select the ova file and import it.
• For detailed information on how to import the VM, see:
• https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E26217_01/E26796/html/qs-import-vm.html
• VM user credentials
• Username: analysis
• Password: analysis
https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E26217_01/E26796/html/qs-import-vm.html
Project Structure
• In the Virtual Machine (VM)
• Files
• init.py
• This initializes the project environment
• Type your Georgia Tech username (same login name as Canvas) after running this
• update.sh
• This script updates the VM if any further update has been made by TA
• DO NOT execute the scri.
SpringOne Platform 2016
Speakers: Tom Collings; Senior Enterprise Architect, ECS Team. Dustin Ruehle; Director Integration, ECS Team.
Cloud Foundry is a highly-available Platform-as-a-Service that provides organizations a stable environment to host their applications. Pivotal Cloud Foundry also includes the concept of tiles, which provide functionality for other services. When installed, tiles gain the benefits of being managed by the PaaS such as reliability and high availability. Examples of these tiles include MySQL, RabbitMQ, and Spring Cloud Services. Administrators can generate brokered instances of these services which are then available to any application running in the PaaS.
Organizations often find themselves in the position of owning custom functionality (e.g. a payment processing service) that would best be implemented as a tile in the PCF installation. Pivotal has recently introduced a new tile generation utility, which makes the generation of custom tiles a practical endeavor. In this session, attendees will learn: the benefits of generating a tile, some of the criteria used to decide whether a tile or some other mechanism is best for your organization, a short demonstration of a tile generation utility provided by Pivotal, and how to operationalize the maintenance of a tile.
DevOoops (Increase awareness around DevOps infra security)
DevOps is increasingly blending the work of both application and network security professionals. In a quest to move faster, organisations can end up creating security vulnerabilities using the tools and products meant to protect them. What happens when these tools are used insecurely or - even worse - they are just insecure? Technologies discussed will encompass AWS, Puppet, Hudson/Jenkins, Vagrant, Docker and much, much more. Everything from common misconfigurations to remote code execution.
Cloud Foundry is a highly-available Platform-as-a-Service that provides organizations a stable environment to host their applications. Pivotal Cloud Foundry also includes the concept of tiles, which provide functionality for other services. When installed, tiles gain the benefits of being managed by the PaaS such as reliability and high availability. Examples of these tiles include MySQL, RabbitMQ, and Spring Cloud Services. Administrators can generate brokered instances of these services which are then available to any application running in the PaaS.
Organizations often find themselves in the position of owning custom functionality (e.g. a payment processing service) that would best be implemented as a tile in the PCF installation. Pivotal has recently introduced a new tile generation utility, which makes the generation of custom tiles a practical endeavor. In this session, attendees will learn: the benefits of generating a tile, some of the criteria used to decide whether a tile or some other mechanism is best for your organization, a short demonstration of a tile generation utility provided by Pivotal, and how to operationalize the maintenance of a tile.
[HES2013] Virtually secure, analysis to remote root 0day on an industry leadi...Hackito Ergo Sum
Today most networks present one “gateway” to the whole network – The SSL-VPN. A vector that is often overlooked and considered “secure”, we decided to take apart an industry leading SSL-VPN appliance and analyze it to bits to thoroughly understand how secure it really is. During this talk we will examine the internals of the F5 FirePass SSL-VPN Appliance. We discover that even though many security protections are in-place, the internals of the appliance hides interesting vulnerabilities we can exploit. Through processes ranging from reverse engineering to binary planting, we decrypt the file-system and begin examining the environment. As we go down the rabbit hole, our misconceptions about “security appliances” are revealed.
Using a combination of web vulnerabilities, format string vulnerabilities and a bunch of frustration, we manage to overcome the multiple limitations and protections presented by the appliance to gain a remote unauthenticated root shell. Due to the magnitude of this vulnerability and the potential for impact against dozens of fortune 500 companies, we contacted F5 and received one of the best vendor responses we’ve experienced – EVER!
https://www.hackitoergosum.org
Today’s cutting edge companies have software release cycles measured in days instead of months. This agility is enabled by the DevOps practice of continuous delivery, which automates building, testing, and deploying all code changes. This automation helps you catch bugs sooner and accelerates developer productivity. In this session, we’ll share best practices (including ones followed internally at Amazon) and how you can bring them to your company by using open source and AWS services.
Speaker: Raghuraman Balachandran, Solutions Architect, Amazon India
Gianluca Varisco - DevOoops (Increase awareness around DevOps infra security)Codemotion
DevOps is increasingly blending the work of both application and network security professionals. In a quest to move faster, organisations can end up creating security vulnerabilities using the tools and products meant to protect them. What happens when these tools are used insecurely or - even worse - they are just insecure? Technologies discussed will encompass AWS, Puppet, Hudson/Jenkins, Vagrant, Docker and much, much more. Everything from common misconfigurations to remote code execution.
Similar to macOS Vulnerabilities Hiding in Plain Sight (20)
Launch and Environment Constraints OverviewCsaba Fitzl
In this talk I will talk about two mitigations which Apple introduced in order to protect against many types of logic vulnerabilities. Launch Constraints was introduced in macOS Ventura, and they can control who can launch a built-in system application and how. Environment Constraints were introduced in Sonoma, and it's basically the extension of Launch Constraints for third party apps. These two features are probably the most impactful when it comes to exploitation. I will review them in detail, how they are set up, what they do exactly, and what kind of vulnerability classes they mitigate. I will also go through a couple of past vulnerabilities, which could not have been exploited with these constraints present. Finally I will walk through how various third party apps should be set up in order to be secure.
Exploiting Directory Permissions on macOSCsaba Fitzl
This talk covers how we can exploit applications on macOS (including macOS itself), where some of the directory / file permissions are incorrectly set. The incorrectness of these settings is not trivial at first sight because understanding these permissions are not intuitive. We will see bugs from simple arbitrary overwrites, to file disclosures and privilege escalation. The concepts applicable to *nix based system as well, however this talk focuses on macOS bugs only. We will also cover different techniques about how to control contents of files, to what we don’t have direct write access.
We will do a deep dive overview of the various r / w / x permissions, what do they mean in case of files, and more importantly in case of directories. We will also take a look at the additional settings, like ownership and the ‘lock’ flag and how do they affect the previous permissions. As part of this we will see how to find such bugs.
We will see a file information disclosure bug affecting macOS Mojave, where we can get read access to files which would normally be accessible only for root users. We will also cover 4 vulnerabilities that are caused due to our ability to control the location of certain files. As we have direct control over only the file location, but not the contents, we will explore tricky techniques how we can influence the contents of some of these files to our benefit.
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 previewPrayukth K V
The IoT and OT threat landscape report has been prepared by the Threat Research Team at Sectrio using data from Sectrio, cyber threat intelligence farming facilities spread across over 85 cities around the world. In addition, Sectrio also runs AI-based advanced threat and payload engagement facilities that serve as sinks to attract and engage sophisticated threat actors, and newer malware including new variants and latent threats that are at an earlier stage of development.
The latest edition of the OT/ICS and IoT security Threat Landscape Report 2024 also covers:
State of global ICS asset and network exposure
Sectoral targets and attacks as well as the cost of ransom
Global APT activity, AI usage, actor and tactic profiles, and implications
Rise in volumes of AI-powered cyberattacks
Major cyber events in 2024
Malware and malicious payload trends
Cyberattack types and targets
Vulnerability exploit attempts on CVEs
Attacks on counties – USA
Expansion of bot farms – how, where, and why
In-depth analysis of the cyber threat landscape across North America, South America, Europe, APAC, and the Middle East
Why are attacks on smart factories rising?
Cyber risk predictions
Axis of attacks – Europe
Systemic attacks in the Middle East
Download the full report from here:
https://sectrio.com/resources/ot-threat-landscape-reports/sectrio-releases-ot-ics-and-iot-security-threat-landscape-report-2024/
Builder.ai Founder Sachin Dev Duggal's Strategic Approach to Create an Innova...Ramesh Iyer
In today's fast-changing business world, Companies that adapt and embrace new ideas often need help to keep up with the competition. However, fostering a culture of innovation takes much work. It takes vision, leadership and willingness to take risks in the right proportion. Sachin Dev Duggal, co-founder of Builder.ai, has perfected the art of this balance, creating a company culture where creativity and growth are nurtured at each stage.
Connector Corner: Automate dynamic content and events by pushing a buttonDianaGray10
Here is something new! In our next Connector Corner webinar, we will demonstrate how you can use a single workflow to:
Create a campaign using Mailchimp with merge tags/fields
Send an interactive Slack channel message (using buttons)
Have the message received by managers and peers along with a test email for review
But there’s more:
In a second workflow supporting the same use case, you’ll see:
Your campaign sent to target colleagues for approval
If the “Approve” button is clicked, a Jira/Zendesk ticket is created for the marketing design team
But—if the “Reject” button is pushed, colleagues will be alerted via Slack message
Join us to learn more about this new, human-in-the-loop capability, brought to you by Integration Service connectors.
And...
Speakers:
Akshay Agnihotri, Product Manager
Charlie Greenberg, Host
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4DianaGray10
Welcome to UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series part 4. In this session, we will cover Test Manager overview along with SAP heatmap.
The UiPath Test Manager overview with SAP heatmap webinar offers a concise yet comprehensive exploration of the role of a Test Manager within SAP environments, coupled with the utilization of heatmaps for effective testing strategies.
Participants will gain insights into the responsibilities, challenges, and best practices associated with test management in SAP projects. Additionally, the webinar delves into the significance of heatmaps as a visual aid for identifying testing priorities, areas of risk, and resource allocation within SAP landscapes. Through this session, attendees can expect to enhance their understanding of test management principles while learning practical approaches to optimize testing processes in SAP environments using heatmap visualization techniques
What will you get from this session?
1. Insights into SAP testing best practices
2. Heatmap utilization for testing
3. Optimization of testing processes
4. Demo
Topics covered:
Execution from the test manager
Orchestrator execution result
Defect reporting
SAP heatmap example with demo
Speaker:
Deepak Rai, Automation Practice Lead, Boundaryless Group and UiPath MVP
"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor TurskyiFwdays
I have heard many times that architecture is not important for the front-end. Also, many times I have seen how developers implement features on the front-end just following the standard rules for a framework and think that this is enough to successfully launch the project, and then the project fails. How to prevent this and what approach to choose? I have launched dozens of complex projects and during the talk we will analyze which approaches have worked for me and which have not.
Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey 2024 by 91mobiles.pdf91mobiles
91mobiles recently conducted a Smart TV Buyer Insights Survey in which we asked over 3,000 respondents about the TV they own, aspects they look at on a new TV, and their TV buying preferences.
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...James Anderson
Effective Application Security in Software Delivery lifecycle using Deployment Firewall and DBOM
The modern software delivery process (or the CI/CD process) includes many tools, distributed teams, open-source code, and cloud platforms. Constant focus on speed to release software to market, along with the traditional slow and manual security checks has caused gaps in continuous security as an important piece in the software supply chain. Today organizations feel more susceptible to external and internal cyber threats due to the vast attack surface in their applications supply chain and the lack of end-to-end governance and risk management.
The software team must secure its software delivery process to avoid vulnerability and security breaches. This needs to be achieved with existing tool chains and without extensive rework of the delivery processes. This talk will present strategies and techniques for providing visibility into the true risk of the existing vulnerabilities, preventing the introduction of security issues in the software, resolving vulnerabilities in production environments quickly, and capturing the deployment bill of materials (DBOM).
Speakers:
Bob Boule
Robert Boule is a technology enthusiast with PASSION for technology and making things work along with a knack for helping others understand how things work. He comes with around 20 years of solution engineering experience in application security, software continuous delivery, and SaaS platforms. He is known for his dynamic presentations in CI/CD and application security integrated in software delivery lifecycle.
Gopinath Rebala
Gopinath Rebala is the CTO of OpsMx, where he has overall responsibility for the machine learning and data processing architectures for Secure Software Delivery. Gopi also has a strong connection with our customers, leading design and architecture for strategic implementations. Gopi is a frequent speaker and well-known leader in continuous delivery and integrating security into software delivery.
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge GraphGuy Korland
Guy Korland, CEO and Co-founder of FalkorDB, will review two articles on the integration of language models with knowledge graphs.
1. Unifying Large Language Models and Knowledge Graphs: A Roadmap.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.08302
2. Microsoft Research's GraphRAG paper and a review paper on various uses of knowledge graphs:
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/blog/graphrag-unlocking-llm-discovery-on-narrative-private-data/
Let's dive deeper into the world of ODC! Ricardo Alves (OutSystems) will join us to tell all about the new Data Fabric. After that, Sezen de Bruijn (OutSystems) will get into the details on how to best design a sturdy architecture within ODC.
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*Frank van Harmelen
Neuro-symbolic (NeSy) AI is on the rise. However, simply machine learning on just any symbolic structure is not sufficient to really harvest the gains of NeSy. These will only be gained when the symbolic structures have an actual semantics. I give an operational definition of semantics as “predictable inference”.
All of this illustrated with link prediction over knowledge graphs, but the argument is general.
2. whoami
• lead content developer of "macOS Control Bypasses" @
Offensive Security
• macOS bug hunter
• ex red/blue teamer
• husband, father
• hiking, trail running 🥾 🏔 🏃
3. Agenda
• Intro
• CVE-2021-1815 - macOS local privilege escalation via Preferences
• CVE-2021-30972 - TCC bypass
• CVE-2022-32780 - Sandbox escape via disk arbitration
• for each CVE:
• technical background
• original vulnerability and exploit
• new vulnerability and exploit
4. INTRO
• "can't see the forest for the trees"
• we are so focused on something, that we can easily miss some details
• rush in reading stuff online
5. INTRO
• I tend to read the same articles again and again
• I found three vulnerabilities in published writeups
• not for the
fi
rst read, but probably 10th, 20th or even 30th
7. cfprefsd
• core foundation preferences daemon
• sets/stores and retrieves preferences for apps
• 2 instances: user, system
• interact: Preferences API or direct XPC ()
8. original vulnerability
• pwn2own 2020 - 6 step exploit chain to
pwn macOS (Yonghwi Jin, Jungwon Lim,
Insu Yun, and Taesoo Kim)
• LPE via cfprefsd
• allowed change ownership of arbitrary
folder
9. original exploit
• race with symlink
• change ownership of /etc/pam.d
• update sudo pam con
fi
g
• get root without password
11. the issue
• although the symlink issue is solved
• a directory is still created
• and ownership set
• ==> we can create a directory
anywhere and set the user as the
owner
12. exploit method #1
• periodic scripts: executed daily/weekly/
monthly
• con
fi
g: /etc/defaults/periodic.conf
• the "local" directory is empty by default
• won't work beyond 11.5 (see: https://
theevilbit.github.io/beyond/
beyond_0019/)
• slow :( getting root can take up to a day
15. exploit method #2
• sysdiagnose runs as root
• it executes binaries from /usr/local/bin
(doesn't exists by default)
• some of these have been remediated
because of homebrew
• not perfect - depends on user trigger:
• Feedback Assistant
• manually invoke
• keyboard shortcut: Command + Option
+ Shift+ Control + Period (.)
17. TCC
• security feature to control access to
privacy related resources
• sqlite3 database (except: private
entitlements, macl extended
attribute) - (~)/Library/Application
Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db
• for more: talk (20+ Ways to Bypass
Your macOS Privacy Mechanisms),
posts by Wojciech Regula and myself
18. CVE-2021-30713 - TCC bypass by XCSSET
Source: JAMF
• XCSSET malware TCC bypass 0day
• discovered by JAMF
• malicious app is hosted inside a
bundle, which has TCC
permissions
• macOS wrongly identi
fi
es the
bundle (hint!!!)
19. CVE-2021-30798 - TCC Bypass Again, Inspired By
XCSSET
• found by Mickey Jin
• TCC db contains only bundle
ID
• simply fake the bundle ID in
the app
• system performs code sign
check on the real bundle
(hint!!!)
20. problem?
• the TCC.db does store the csreq info
• none of the fake processes had proper code signature
• the bypass in both cases was possible because: binaries on disk were veri
fi
ed
• WUT????
• on macOS: you can modify app binaries on disk even when they run (unlike
in Windows)
21. elsewhere?
• in every other case*, code signature is veri
fi
ed in memory
• *except GateKeeper/am
fi
d when the app is launched, because there is no
process yet
• XPC / Mach connections
• should use audit token
• even PID is insecure
• on-disk? not even an option 🤣
• in-memory integrity check by AMFI
22. CVE-2021-30972 - TCC bypass again
1. Make a fake app with the same bundle ID
and name as the one we want to
impersonate, and place it in an arbitrary
location
2. Start the app
3. Copy the original app over the fake app
4. Initiate an action which requires privacy
permissions
5. TCC is bypassed, with inheriting the original
app's rights
23. CVE-2021-30972 - Wojciech's version
1. Make a fake app, and embed in a "donor" app (use the same team ID)
2. Start the app
3. Copy the donor app over the embedded app
4. Initiate an action which requires privacy permissions
5. TCC is bypassed, with inheriting the donor's rights
28. diskarbitration - the basics
• system wide service, de
fi
ned in:
• /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.diskarbitrationd.plist
• XPC: com.apple.DiskArbitration.diskarbitrationd
• manage disk mounting, unmounting
• calls mount/unmount system calls under the hood
29. diskarbitration - why we like it?
• runs as root
• unsandboxed
• XPC service accessible from
application sandbox
• opensource
30. CVE-2017-2533 - LPE via diskarbitrationd
• used by phoenhex team in pwn2own 2017
• DA:
• resolves path -> checks if the user has rights to
mount over directory
• no more checks later
• resolves path -> mounting
• TOCTOU bug, race condition
• exploit: mount the EFI (admin writeable) partition
over crontabs
31. CVE-2022-32780
• not exactly hidden
• Apple moved the check into
DAServer.c -
"_DAServerSessionQueueRequest"
• extra check for the sandbox
35. CVE-2022-32780 - exploitation
• what to mount?
• EFI won't work (can't mount + not
reachable from sandbox)
• custom dmg!
• how? DA works on /dev,
diskmanagementd (can map dmg into /
dev/) is not reachable from sandbox
• 💡use "open"
• we can unmount, /dev/ remains
36. CVE-2022-32780 - exploitation
• where to mount?
• Terminal Preferences
• ~/Library/Preferences/
com.apple.Terminal.plist
• "CommandString" executed upon
launch
37. CVE-2022-32780 - full exploit
1. Drops a `dmg`
fi
le
2. It will call `open` to open a `dmg`
fi
le
3. Then it will use the diskarbitration service to unmount it --> at this point we have a custom disk device we
can mount somewhere
4. It will start a thread to alternate the symlink and the directory
5. Then it will start a loop to call the mount operation of the DA service - due to the racer it will eventually
succeed
• we also always unmount the local directory, as we don't need that
6. It will check if we mounted over `Preferences`, and if yes stop
7. Open Terminal