SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Protection Coordination
Serge Beauzile
Chair IEEE FWCS
Ch i P & E S i t
Chair Power & Energy Society
serge.beauzile@ieee.org
June 10 2014
June, 10, 2014
8:30 -12:30
Florida Electric Cooperatives Association
Florida Electric Cooperatives Association
Clearwater, Florida
Seminar Objective
• Distribution Circuit Protection
– Fuse to Fuse Coordination
– Recloser to Fuse Coordination
– Breaker to Recloser Coordination
• Transmission Line Protection
Distance Protection
– Distance Protection
– Pilot Protection Schemes
– Current Differential Protection
Current Differential Protection
2
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Art & Science of System Protection
• Not an exact science, coordination
schemes will vary based on:
schemes will vary based on:
– Company Philosophy
Company Philosophy
– Protection engineer preference
– System requirements
3
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
C di ti D i
Coordinating Devices
Basic concept: All protective devices are able to
Basic concept: All protective devices are able to
detect a fault do so at the same instant.
If h d i th t d f lt t d
If each device that sensed a fault operated
simultaneously, large portions of the system
would be de-energized every time a fault needed
g y
to be cleared. This is unacceptable.
A properly designed scheme will incorporate time
A properly designed scheme will incorporate time
delays into the protection system, allowing
certain devices to operate before others.
4
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
C di ti D i
Coordinating Devices
Timing of device operation is verified using time
Timing of device operation is verified using time-
current characteristics or TCCs – device
response curves plotted on log-log graph paper.
Devices have inverse TCCs. They operate quickly for
large magnitude overcurrents, and more slowly
g g , y
for lower-magnitude overcurrents.
Operating time is plotted on the vertical axis and
Operating time is plotted on the vertical axis, and
current magnitude is plotted on the horizontal
scale.
5
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
C di ti D i
Coordinating Devices
100
Four different TCCs
h th
10
are shown on the
left. Device “D” is
the fastest to
1
Time
in
Seconds
operate, and device
“A” is the slowest.
25
0.1
A
B
C
D
For a given current
value, the operating
ti b f d
.25 sec 10,000
1000
10
100
0.01
100,000
D
time can be found.
3 kA
Current in Amperes
6
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Coordinating Devices
g
In this example,
A l l
100
Device A is clearly
faster than Device B
for low (400-700 A)
10
Uncertain
Coordination
( )
fault currents.
Device B is clearly
Time
in
Seconds
1
Device B is clearly
faster for high
(>1000 A) fault
t b t i th
0.1
A
currents, but in the
700-1000 A region,
timing is uncertain.
100
10
0.01
100,000
10,000
1000
B
g
1
Current in Amperes
7
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Coordinating Devices
Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse
Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse
100
Minimum Melt
10
Average Melt + tolerance
1
Time
in
Seconds
Total Clear
0.1
Average Melt + tolerance
+ arcing time
Curves are developed at 25ºC
100
10
1000
00,000
0,000
0.01
Curves are developed at 25ºC
With no preloading
10
1
Current in Amperes
8
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Coordinating Devices
Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse
Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse
100
In this example, the red
10
TCCs represent the
downstream (protecting)
fuse, and the blue TCCs
1
Time
in
Seconds
represent the upstream
(protected) fuse.
0.1
The protected fuse
should not be damaged
by a fault in the
100
10
1000
,000
,000
0.01
y
protecting fuse’s zone of
protection.
1
100,
10,
Current in Amperes
9
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Coordinating Devices
Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse
Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse
100
Four factors need to be
10
considered:
1. Tolerances.
1
Time
in
Seconds
2. Ambient
temperature.
0.1
p
3. Preloading effects.
100
10
1000
0,000
0,000
0.01
4. Predamage effects.
1
100
10
Current in Amperes
10
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Coordinating Devices
Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse
Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse
100
Consideration of these
10
four factors can be
quite involved.
1
Time
in
Seconds
Practically, the “75%
Method” can be used:
the maximum clearing
0.1
g
time of the protecting
link shall be no more
than 75% of the
100
10
1000
,000
,000
0.01
minimum melting time
of the protected link.
1
100
10
Current in Amperes
11
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Coordinating Devices
Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse
Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse
100
Minimum melting time of
10
protected link at 5 kA is
0.3 seconds.
1
Time
in
Seconds
Total clearing time of the
protecting link at 5 kA is
0.22 seconds.
0.1
0.22 < 0.3 × 75% = 0.225,
so coordination is
100
10
1000
0,000
0,000
0.01
assured for current
magnitudes ≤ 5 kA.
100
10
Current in Amperes
12
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Utility Distribution Feeders
y
Multiple Feeder Segments
Segments are defined as sectionalizable pieces of a
feeder that can be automatically or manually
separated from the rest of the feeder
separated from the rest of the feeder.
Segments are delineated by reclosers, fuses,
sectionalizers or switches
sectionalizers or switches.
Two primary concerns: number of customers per
d l
segment and time to isolate segment.
13
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Utility Distribution Feeders
y
Number of Customers per Segment
The number of customers per segment has a major
impact on reliability indices.
As the number of segments per feeder increases,
reliability can also be adversely impacted, and
y y p
construction cost will increase.
A ti i t t b ht t d t i th
An optimum point must be sought to determine the
best segment size.
14
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Utility Distribution Feeders
Utility Distribution Feeders
Present and Future Load Requirements
Even the best load forecasts are full of errors.
You must continuously monitor your fuse
coordination due changes in the load.
coordination due changes in the load.
It is impossible to predict everything, so versatility is
the key.
15
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Coordination Goal
1. Maximum Sensitivity.
2. Maximum Speed.
3. Maximum Security.
4. Maximum Selectivity.
16
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Basic Coordination Strategy
gy
1. Establish a coordination
pairs.
2. Determine maximum load
of each segment and the
pickup of all delayed
overcurrent devices.
3. Determine the pickup
current of all instantaneous
current of all instantaneous
overcurrent devices, based
on short-circuit studies.
4 D t i i i
4. Determine remaining
overcurrent device
characteristics starting
from the load and moving to
g
the source.
17
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
18
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
19
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
20
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
21
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
22
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Fuse Peak Load Capability
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile 23
24
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
25
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
26
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
27
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
28
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Fuse Blow Vs. Fuse Save
Fuse Blow Vs. Fuse Save
• Fuse Blow
– Eliminates Instantaneous trip of the breaker or recloser
Eliminates Instantaneous trip of the breaker or recloser
(1st) by having the fuse blow for all permanent and
temporary faults.
– Minimizes momentary interruptions and increases SAIDI
Minimizes momentary interruptions and increases SAIDI.
Improves power quality but decreases reliability.
• Fuse Save
• Fuse Save
– Minimizes customer interruption time by attempting to
open the breaker or recloser faster than it takes to melt the
fuse
fuse.
– This saves the fuse and allows a simple momentary
interruption.
29
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Fuse Blow
FUSE is BLOWN
Lateral experiences
Lateral experiences
sustained interruption
30
Fuse Blow
Fuse Blow
– Used primarily to minimize momentary
interruptions (reduces MAIFI)
– Increases interruption duration (SAIDI)
– Very successful in high short circuit areas
– More suitable for industrial type
customers having very sensitive loads
31
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Fuse Save
Entire Feeder trips
Momentary occurs
FUSE is SAVED
FUSE is SAVED
32
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Fuse Save
Fuse Save
– Minimize customer interruption time
Reduce SAIDI
– Reduce SAIDI
– Increase MAIFI
– May not work in high short circuit areas
– May not work in high short circuit areas
– Work well in most areas
– Not suitable for certain industrial
Not suitable for certain industrial
customers that cannot tolerate immediate
reclosing
– Works best for residential and small
commercial customers
33
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Both (Fuse Save & Fuse Blow)
( )
• Many utilities use both schemes for a variety of
reasons
reasons
– Fuse Blow for high short circuit current areas
and Fuse Save where it will work.
– Fuse Save on overhead and Fuse Blow on
underground taps.
– Fuse Save on rural and Fuse Blow on urban
Fuse Save on rural and Fuse Blow on urban
– Fuse Save on stormy days and Fuse Blow on nice
days.
F S i it d F Bl
– Fuse Save on some circuits and Fuse Blow on
others depending on customer desires
34
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Fast Bus Trip
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile 35
SEL-351S
SEL 351S
Protection and Breaker Control
Relay
Relay
36
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Modern Microprocessor Relay
Protection and Breaker Control Relay
Extremely versatile, many applications
Most commonly used on distribution feeders
Communicates with EMS system (DNP 3.0 Protocol)
Key element of “Substation Integration”
Provides many “traditional” features
Provides new capabilities
37
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
SEL-351S
Protection and Breaker Control Relay
Protection Features:
P f t l t 18 diff t t ti f ti
Performs at least 18 different protection functions.
=
38
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
SEL-351S
Protection and Breaker Control Relay
Protection Features:
B U d lt (27)
Bus Undervoltage (27)
Phase Overvoltage (59P)
G d O lt (59G)
Ground Overvoltage (59G)
Sequence Overvoltage (59Q)
O f (81O)
Overfrequency (81O)
Underfrequency (81U)
39
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Modern Microprocessor Relay
Protection and Breaker Control Relay
Protection Features (continued):
Ph Di ti l O t (67P)
Phase Directional Overcurrent (67P)
Ground Directional Overcurrent (67G)
S Di ti l O t (67Q)
Sequence Directional Overcurrent (67Q)
Instantaneous Phase Overcurrent (50P)
I t t G d O t (50G)
Instantaneous Ground Overcurrent (50G)
Instantaneous Sequence Overcurrent
(50Q)
(50Q)
40
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
SEL-351S
Protection and Breaker Control Relay
Protection Features (continued):
Ti Ph O t (51P)
Time Phase Overcurrent (51P)
Time Ground Overcurrent (51G)
Ti S O t (51Q)
Time Sequence Overcurrent (51Q)
Directional Neutral Overcurrent (67N)
I t t N t l O t (50N)
Instantaneous Neutral Overcurrent (50N)
Time Neutral Overcurrent (51N)
41
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
SEL-351S
Protection and Breaker Control Relay
Breaker Control Features:
S h i Ch k (25)
Synchronism Check (25)
Automatic Circuit Reclosing (79)
TRIP/CLOSE Pushbuttons
Enable/Disable Reclosing
Enable/Disable Reclosing
Enable/Disable Supervisory Control
42
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
SEL-351S
Protection and Breaker Control Relay
Other Features:
E t R ti d R di
Event Reporting and Recording
Breaker Wear Monitor
St ti B tt M it
Station Battery Monitor
High-Accuracy Metering
F lt L t
Fault Locator
43
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
SEL-351S
Protection and Breaker Control Relay
44
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
• Advantages of microprocessor relays
• Advantages of microprocessor relays
ƒ Extremely flexible
ƒ Have many different elements (UF, UV, Directionality, etc…)
ƒ One relay can protect on zone of protection
One relay can protect on zone of protection
ƒ Inexpensive and require much less maintenance
ƒ Alarm if they fails and don’t need calibration
ƒ Provide fault information
ƒ Provide oscillography and SER data
ƒ Can provide analog data to SCADA
• Disadvantages of microprocessor relays
ƒ Can be very complex to program due to given flexibility
R i t i i t R l T h i i
ƒ Require more training to Relay Technicians
ƒ Require more training to Relay Engineers
45
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Relays
Relays
• Basic relay settings:
ƒ Phase overcurrent elements must be set above maximum
ƒ Phase overcurrent elements must be set above maximum
possible loads
ƒ Ground overcurrent elements must be set above maximum
anticipated unbalanced loads
p
ƒ Must be coordinated with downstream protective devices
ƒ Under Frequency elements must be set according to the
predetermined set point
• TAGGING
ƒ NORMAL mode – 2 reclosing attempts
g p
ƒ WORK mode – HOT LINE TAG
ƒ COLD mode
46
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Relay Curves
Relay Curves
100
10
1
S
e
c
o
n
d
Moderately Inverse
Inverse
Very Inverse
0.1
d
s
Very Inverse
Extremely Inverse
0.01
0.1 1 10 100
Multiple of Pick Up
Multiple of Pick Up
47
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Very Inverse Curve Time Dial
Very Inverse Curve Time Dial
100
0.29s
In this example
10
p
Multiple of Pickup = 3.
TD = 0 5 Time = 0 3s
1
SECONDS
TD=0.5
TD=2
TD=6
TD = 0.5 Time = 0.3s
TD = 2 Time = 1.1s
TD = 6 Time = 3.4s
TD = 15 Time = 7.0s
0.1
TD 6
TD=15
0.01
0.1 1 10 100
Multiples Of Pick Up
Multiples Of Pick Up
48
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Very Inverse Curve Time Dial
Very Inverse Curve Time Dial
100
0.29s In this example,
Pi k 600 A
10
Pickup = 600 A.
Fault Current = 1800 A.
TD = 0.5 Time = 0.29s
1
SECONDS
TD=0.5
TD=2
TD=6
T 0.5 Time 0. 9s
TD = 2 Time = 1.16s
TD = 6 Time = 3.48s
TD = 15 Time = 8.72s
0.1
TD 6
TD=15
Pickup = 900 A.
Fault Current = 1800 A.
0.01
0.1 1 10 100
Multiples Of Pick Up
TD = 0.5 Time = 0.69s
TD = 2 Time = 2.78s
TD = 6 Time = 8.33s
TD = 15 Time = 20 8s
Multiples Of Pick Up TD = 15 Time = 20.8s
49
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Pickup Current of Delayed Ground OC Devices
p y
Source Side Load Side
Single Phase to Ground Fault
Primary
Backup
IMU<IPU<I MIN Fault
g
IMU = Maximum Unbalance
50
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Pickup Current of Delayed Phase OC Devices
p y
Source Side Load Side
IML<IPU<Imin Ø‐Ø Fault Phase to Phase Fault
IML = Maximum Load
51
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Typical Pickup Setting
TB > TR + CTI CTI = Coordination Time Interval (Typically 0.2-0.5sec)
Recloser Ct ratio 600:1 Breaker Ct ratio 240:1
IPU = 1 A IPU = 3.75 A
IPU Primary= 600 A IPU Primary= 900 A
52
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
53
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Trip Logic
TR OC + PB9 + 51P1T + 51G1T * (LT6 + LT7) + (50P3 + 50G3) * LT7 + (50P2 + 50G2) * SH1
TR = OC + PB9 + 51P1T + 51G1T * (LT6 + LT7) + (50P3 + 50G3) * LT7 + (50P2 + 50G2) * SH1
OC: OPEN COMMAND (SCADA TRIP)
PB9: FRONT PUSH BUTTON
51P1T: PHASE TIME OC ELEMENT
51G1T: GROUND TIME OC ELEMENT
LT6: TAGGING IS IN NORMAL MODE
LT7: TAGGING IS IN WORK MODE
50P2/50P3: PHASE INSTANTANEOUS OC ELEMENT
50G2/50G3: GROUND INSTANTANEOUS OC ELEMENT
SH1: RECLOSING SHOT #1 (FIRST RECLOSE ATTEMPT)
CTR = 600.0
INSTANTANEOUS ENABLED ONLY AFTER FIRST RECLOSE ATTEMPT
50P2P = 2.5 (1500 AMPS PRIMARY)
50G2P = 1 6 (960 AMPS PRIMARY)
50G2P 1.6 (960 AMPS PRIMARY)
INSTANTANEOUS ENABLED ONLY DURING WORK/HOT LINE TAG
50P3P = 1.35 (810 AMPS PRIMARY)
50G3P = 0 50 (300 AMPS PRIMARY) NORMAL UNBALANCE GROUND CURRENT ~20 TO 30 AMPS
50G3P = 0.50 (300 AMPS PRIMARY) – NORMAL UNBALANCE GROUND CURRENT ~20 TO 30 AMPS
54
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
55
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
56
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
57
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
SEL-351S
History Summary (HIS Command)
Sample output:
58
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
SEL-351S
Sequence of Events Recording (SER)
Sequence of Events Recording (SER)
59
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
SEL-351S
Metering Data (MET Command)
Sample output - Metering Data (MET):
60
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
SEL-351S
Metering Data (MET Command)
Sample output - Metering Demand (MET D):
61
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
SEL-351S
Metering Data (MET Command)
Sample output - Metering Energy (MET E):
62
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
SEL-351S
Metering Data (MET Command)
Sample output - Metering Max/Min (MET M):
63
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Differential Relays
Protection of a Delta‐Wye Transformer
I
I I
I I
A
B
a
b
Ia
52
52
Ib
Ia‐Ib Ia
Ia
Ia‐Ib
Ib‐Ic
Ia‐Ib
Ib‐Ic
Ia
B
C
b
c
52
52
Ic
Ib‐Ic
Ic‐Ia
Ib
Ic
Ib
Ic
Ic‐Ia
Ic‐Ia
Ib
Ic
Ia‐Ib
Ia‐Ib
R R
OP
OP
Ia‐Ib
I I
Ic‐Ia
Ib‐Ic
R
R
R
R
OP
OP Ic‐Ia
Ib‐Ic
Ib‐Ic
Ic‐Ia
Power System Protection -64- Ralph Fehr, Ph.D., P.E. – October 28, 2013
R R
Distance Relays
y
Protection Features
– Four zones of distance protection
– Pilot schemes
– Phase/Neutral/Ground TOCs
Phase/Neutral/Ground IOCs
Power System Protection -65- Ralph Fehr, Ph.D., P.E. – October 28, 2013
– Phase/Neutral/Ground IOCs
Distance Relays
y
Protection Features ‐ continued
– Negative sequence TOC
– Negative sequence IOC
– Phase directional OCs
– Neutral directional OC
– Negative sequence directional OC
– Phase under‐ and overvoltage
– Power swing blocking
– Out of step tripping
Power System Protection -66- Ralph Fehr, Ph.D., P.E. – October 28, 2013
Distance Relays
Control Features
Control Features
B k F il ( h / t l )
– Breaker Failure (phase/neutral amps)
– Synchrocheck
– Autoreclosing
Power System Protection -67- Ralph Fehr, Ph.D., P.E. – October 28, 2013
Distance Relays
Metering Features
Metering Features
F lt L t
− Fault Locator
− Oscillography
− Event Recorder
− Data Logger
− Phasors / true RMS / active, reactive
and apparent power, power factor
and apparent power, power factor
Power System Protection -68- Ralph Fehr, Ph.D., P.E. – October 28, 2013
Distance Relays
Zones of Protection Zone 2
X
Line Impedance (Line A)
Zone 1
Zone 2
1
2
3
Line Impedance (Line A)
Zone 2
Z 3
1
2
3
1
Line A
A1 A2
Zone 1
Zone 3 3
4
1
2
Bus 1 Bus 2
Normal Load
Distance Relay
at Bus 1
R
Zone 1 – fastest (80% of line)
2 Normal Load
to protect Line A
Zone 3
Zone 2 – slower (120% of line)
Zone 3 –(backwards Use in Pilot
Protection for current
4
Reversal logic)
Power System Protection -69- Ralph Fehr, Ph.D., P.E. – October 28, 2013
Zone 3
Zone 2 Zone 2
Zone of Protection
∆t
Zone 1 Zone 1
Zone 2
∆t
∆t
∆t
1 2 4
3
Zone 1
Zone 1 Zone 1
Zone 3
Zone 2
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 1: Under reaches the remote line end Typically 0.7 Z1L to 0.9 Z1L
With no intentional time delay.
Z 2 O h th t li d T i ll 1 2 Z
Zone 2: Over reaches the remote line end Typically 1.2 Z1L
with definite time delay.
Zone 3: Over reaches the longest adjacent line
i h d fi i i d l h Z 2
with definite time delay greater than Zone2.
70
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Unconventional Zone 2 & Zone 3 Settings
Zone 2
Zone 1
Zone 2
∆t
Long Line Short Line
Be Mindful when Applying General Rules
71
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Step Distance Relay Coordination Exercise
Setting the relay at breaker 3 protecting Circuit 2.
Set the Zones of Protection.
The maximum expected load is about 600A.
CTR = 1200:5 or 240:1 PTR = 600:1
CTR 1200:5 or 240:1 PTR 600:1
72
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Distance Relay Coordination Exercise
Circuit 2 & Circuit 5 Impedances Circuit 3 & Circuit 6 Impedances
Z1 = 35.11 83.97˚ Ω primary
Z0 = 111.58 81.46˚ Ω primary
Z1 = 17.56 83.72˚ Ω primary
Z0 = 53.89 81.56˚ Ω primary
Circuit 1& Circuit 4 Impedances
Z1 = 35.21 83.72˚ Ω primary
Z0 = 187.80 81.56˚ Ω primary
73
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Distance Relay Coordination Exercise
Zone 1 Reach = 0.8 * (35.11 83.97˚) Ω primary Zone 1 Reach = 28.09 83.97˚) Ω primary
Z 2 R h 1 2 * (35 11 83 97˚) Ω i Z 2 R h 42 13 83 97˚) Ω i
Zone 2 Reach = 1.2 * (35.11 83.97˚) Ω primary
Check Zone 2 reach does not overreach = Circuit 2 Impedance + (Zone 1 of Circuit 3) or (Zone 1of Circuit 6).
General rule = protected Circuit Impedance + Zone 1 of the Shortest Circuit past the protected circuit.
Zone 2 Reach = 42.13 83.97˚) Ω primary
p p p p
Check for Zone 2 Overreach = 35.11. + (0.8 * 17.56) = 49.16 Ω primary
Zone 2 Reach = 42.13 < 49.16 no overreach
Zone 4 Reach = 52.55 83.35˚) Ω primary
Zone 4 Reach = (35.11 83.97˚) + (17.56 83.72˚) ( Ω primary)
74
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Primary / Secondary Impedance
Relay Input
75
Relay Input
Zone 1 Reach = 28.09 Ω x 240 = 11.24 Ω secondary
600
Zone 2 Reach = 42.43 Ω x 240 = 16.97 Ω secondary
600
Zone 4 Reach = 28.09 Ω x 240 = 21.02 Ω secondary
600
76
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Overcurrent Supervision Setting Criteria
1) Find the lowest Ø – Ø fault seen by relay 3
for a remote end bus (4 10 5 11)
Set above (maximum load) and 60% of min fault.
Zone 1 Phase Fault detector:
for a remote end bus (4, 10, 5, 11).
Zone 2 Phase Fault detector:
Set above (maximum load) and 60% of min fault.
1) Find the lowest Ø – Ø fault seen by relay 3
for a remote end bus (6, 12).
( , )
Zone 4 Fault detector same as Zone 2
Repeat same process for Ground Fault detector.
77
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Current Infeed
IL =0.5 A
ZL =2 Ω
IR =1 A
ZR =1 Ω
IT =0.5 A
ZT =1 Ω
Actual Impedance from L to the Fault is 3Ω
Apparent Impedance = EL
I L
Apparent Impedance = ( IL x ZL) + (IR x ZR)
IL
Apparent Impedance = 4Ω
78
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
Thank You
Thank You
79
IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile

More Related Content

Similar to Line Protection.pdf

Brosur Fluke Insulation Resistance Testing. Hubungi PT. Siwali Swantika 021-4...
Brosur Fluke Insulation Resistance Testing. Hubungi PT. Siwali Swantika 021-4...Brosur Fluke Insulation Resistance Testing. Hubungi PT. Siwali Swantika 021-4...
Brosur Fluke Insulation Resistance Testing. Hubungi PT. Siwali Swantika 021-4...
PT. Siwali Swantika
 
Arc flash q
Arc flash qArc flash q
Arc flash q
guestf8e1f7
 
IRJET- Implementation and Automation of Air Blaster
IRJET- Implementation and Automation of Air BlasterIRJET- Implementation and Automation of Air Blaster
IRJET- Implementation and Automation of Air Blaster
IRJET Journal
 
POC To Product: 8 Key Processes in Design Path
POC To Product: 8 Key Processes in Design PathPOC To Product: 8 Key Processes in Design Path
POC To Product: 8 Key Processes in Design Path
futurewardcentral
 
Polyfuse.
Polyfuse.Polyfuse.
Polyfuse.
ansari masroof
 
RAMS Tech Paper
RAMS Tech PaperRAMS Tech Paper
RAMS Tech Paper
Alvin CJ Chin
 
Presentation department of space by jmv lps
Presentation department of space by jmv lpsPresentation department of space by jmv lps
Presentation department of space by jmv lps
Mahesh Chandra Manav
 
Presentation department of space by jmv lps
Presentation department of space by jmv lpsPresentation department of space by jmv lps
Presentation department of space by jmv lps
Mahesh Chandra Manav
 
Commscope-Andrew L44R
Commscope-Andrew L44RCommscope-Andrew L44R
Commscope-Andrew L44R
savomir
 
Asco Safety Systems Solenoid Valve Selection Guide
Asco Safety Systems Solenoid Valve Selection GuideAsco Safety Systems Solenoid Valve Selection Guide
Asco Safety Systems Solenoid Valve Selection Guide
Miller Energy, Inc.
 
FEEDER PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM EARTH FAULT, SHORT CIRCUIT AND OVERLOAD FAULTS
FEEDER PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM EARTH FAULT, SHORT CIRCUIT AND OVERLOAD FAULTSFEEDER PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM EARTH FAULT, SHORT CIRCUIT AND OVERLOAD FAULTS
FEEDER PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM EARTH FAULT, SHORT CIRCUIT AND OVERLOAD FAULTS
IRJET Journal
 
Eds coordination system protectives device ppt
Eds coordination system protectives device pptEds coordination system protectives device ppt
Eds coordination system protectives device ppt
Sudhakiran Sudha
 
Nfpa 70 E
Nfpa 70 ENfpa 70 E
Nfpa 70 E
jboullemet
 
Arc Flash Calculations What Does It All Mean
Arc Flash Calculations What Does It All MeanArc Flash Calculations What Does It All Mean
Arc Flash Calculations What Does It All Mean
B Bhargav Reddy
 
Unit 9 loto pwr_pt
Unit 9 loto pwr_ptUnit 9 loto pwr_pt
Unit 9 loto pwr_pt
Jon Hilden
 
Data and Power Isolation (Design Conference 2013)
Data and Power Isolation (Design Conference 2013)Data and Power Isolation (Design Conference 2013)
Data and Power Isolation (Design Conference 2013)
Analog Devices, Inc.
 
Webinar - Electrical Arc Flash Hazards - Is your company in compliance?
Webinar - Electrical Arc Flash Hazards - Is your company in compliance?Webinar - Electrical Arc Flash Hazards - Is your company in compliance?
Webinar - Electrical Arc Flash Hazards - Is your company in compliance?
Leonardo ENERGY
 
Arc Flas presentation doc 2 rev b
Arc Flas presentation doc 2 rev bArc Flas presentation doc 2 rev b
Arc Flas presentation doc 2 rev b
chabchoub Mohamed
 
MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF ARCS IN M.V. SWITCHGEAR
MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF ARCS IN M.V. SWITCHGEARMITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF ARCS IN M.V. SWITCHGEAR
MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF ARCS IN M.V. SWITCHGEAR
Power System Operation
 
Maurice Kariuki
Maurice KariukiMaurice Kariuki
Maurice Kariuki
Maurice Kariuki
 

Similar to Line Protection.pdf (20)

Brosur Fluke Insulation Resistance Testing. Hubungi PT. Siwali Swantika 021-4...
Brosur Fluke Insulation Resistance Testing. Hubungi PT. Siwali Swantika 021-4...Brosur Fluke Insulation Resistance Testing. Hubungi PT. Siwali Swantika 021-4...
Brosur Fluke Insulation Resistance Testing. Hubungi PT. Siwali Swantika 021-4...
 
Arc flash q
Arc flash qArc flash q
Arc flash q
 
IRJET- Implementation and Automation of Air Blaster
IRJET- Implementation and Automation of Air BlasterIRJET- Implementation and Automation of Air Blaster
IRJET- Implementation and Automation of Air Blaster
 
POC To Product: 8 Key Processes in Design Path
POC To Product: 8 Key Processes in Design PathPOC To Product: 8 Key Processes in Design Path
POC To Product: 8 Key Processes in Design Path
 
Polyfuse.
Polyfuse.Polyfuse.
Polyfuse.
 
RAMS Tech Paper
RAMS Tech PaperRAMS Tech Paper
RAMS Tech Paper
 
Presentation department of space by jmv lps
Presentation department of space by jmv lpsPresentation department of space by jmv lps
Presentation department of space by jmv lps
 
Presentation department of space by jmv lps
Presentation department of space by jmv lpsPresentation department of space by jmv lps
Presentation department of space by jmv lps
 
Commscope-Andrew L44R
Commscope-Andrew L44RCommscope-Andrew L44R
Commscope-Andrew L44R
 
Asco Safety Systems Solenoid Valve Selection Guide
Asco Safety Systems Solenoid Valve Selection GuideAsco Safety Systems Solenoid Valve Selection Guide
Asco Safety Systems Solenoid Valve Selection Guide
 
FEEDER PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM EARTH FAULT, SHORT CIRCUIT AND OVERLOAD FAULTS
FEEDER PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM EARTH FAULT, SHORT CIRCUIT AND OVERLOAD FAULTSFEEDER PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM EARTH FAULT, SHORT CIRCUIT AND OVERLOAD FAULTS
FEEDER PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM EARTH FAULT, SHORT CIRCUIT AND OVERLOAD FAULTS
 
Eds coordination system protectives device ppt
Eds coordination system protectives device pptEds coordination system protectives device ppt
Eds coordination system protectives device ppt
 
Nfpa 70 E
Nfpa 70 ENfpa 70 E
Nfpa 70 E
 
Arc Flash Calculations What Does It All Mean
Arc Flash Calculations What Does It All MeanArc Flash Calculations What Does It All Mean
Arc Flash Calculations What Does It All Mean
 
Unit 9 loto pwr_pt
Unit 9 loto pwr_ptUnit 9 loto pwr_pt
Unit 9 loto pwr_pt
 
Data and Power Isolation (Design Conference 2013)
Data and Power Isolation (Design Conference 2013)Data and Power Isolation (Design Conference 2013)
Data and Power Isolation (Design Conference 2013)
 
Webinar - Electrical Arc Flash Hazards - Is your company in compliance?
Webinar - Electrical Arc Flash Hazards - Is your company in compliance?Webinar - Electrical Arc Flash Hazards - Is your company in compliance?
Webinar - Electrical Arc Flash Hazards - Is your company in compliance?
 
Arc Flas presentation doc 2 rev b
Arc Flas presentation doc 2 rev bArc Flas presentation doc 2 rev b
Arc Flas presentation doc 2 rev b
 
MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF ARCS IN M.V. SWITCHGEAR
MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF ARCS IN M.V. SWITCHGEARMITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF ARCS IN M.V. SWITCHGEAR
MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF ARCS IN M.V. SWITCHGEAR
 
Maurice Kariuki
Maurice KariukiMaurice Kariuki
Maurice Kariuki
 

More from ChadWood16

17thEdition.ppt
17thEdition.ppt17thEdition.ppt
17thEdition.ppt
ChadWood16
 
cable sizing.ppt
cable sizing.pptcable sizing.ppt
cable sizing.ppt
ChadWood16
 
Electrical and Magnetic force fileds.pdf
Electrical and Magnetic force fileds.pdfElectrical and Magnetic force fileds.pdf
Electrical and Magnetic force fileds.pdf
ChadWood16
 
OverCurrent(1).pdf
OverCurrent(1).pdfOverCurrent(1).pdf
OverCurrent(1).pdf
ChadWood16
 
Lecture 12 Overcurrent Protection.pdf
Lecture 12 Overcurrent Protection.pdfLecture 12 Overcurrent Protection.pdf
Lecture 12 Overcurrent Protection.pdf
ChadWood16
 
187787508-Over-Current-Earth-Fault-Setting-Calculations.pdf
187787508-Over-Current-Earth-Fault-Setting-Calculations.pdf187787508-Over-Current-Earth-Fault-Setting-Calculations.pdf
187787508-Over-Current-Earth-Fault-Setting-Calculations.pdf
ChadWood16
 
CH4_Transfo_Mesure(SP).pdf
CH4_Transfo_Mesure(SP).pdfCH4_Transfo_Mesure(SP).pdf
CH4_Transfo_Mesure(SP).pdf
ChadWood16
 
CH3_MALT_Reseaux(2016-01-20).pdf
CH3_MALT_Reseaux(2016-01-20).pdfCH3_MALT_Reseaux(2016-01-20).pdf
CH3_MALT_Reseaux(2016-01-20).pdf
ChadWood16
 
CH2_.pdf
CH2_.pdfCH2_.pdf
CH2_.pdf
ChadWood16
 

More from ChadWood16 (9)

17thEdition.ppt
17thEdition.ppt17thEdition.ppt
17thEdition.ppt
 
cable sizing.ppt
cable sizing.pptcable sizing.ppt
cable sizing.ppt
 
Electrical and Magnetic force fileds.pdf
Electrical and Magnetic force fileds.pdfElectrical and Magnetic force fileds.pdf
Electrical and Magnetic force fileds.pdf
 
OverCurrent(1).pdf
OverCurrent(1).pdfOverCurrent(1).pdf
OverCurrent(1).pdf
 
Lecture 12 Overcurrent Protection.pdf
Lecture 12 Overcurrent Protection.pdfLecture 12 Overcurrent Protection.pdf
Lecture 12 Overcurrent Protection.pdf
 
187787508-Over-Current-Earth-Fault-Setting-Calculations.pdf
187787508-Over-Current-Earth-Fault-Setting-Calculations.pdf187787508-Over-Current-Earth-Fault-Setting-Calculations.pdf
187787508-Over-Current-Earth-Fault-Setting-Calculations.pdf
 
CH4_Transfo_Mesure(SP).pdf
CH4_Transfo_Mesure(SP).pdfCH4_Transfo_Mesure(SP).pdf
CH4_Transfo_Mesure(SP).pdf
 
CH3_MALT_Reseaux(2016-01-20).pdf
CH3_MALT_Reseaux(2016-01-20).pdfCH3_MALT_Reseaux(2016-01-20).pdf
CH3_MALT_Reseaux(2016-01-20).pdf
 
CH2_.pdf
CH2_.pdfCH2_.pdf
CH2_.pdf
 

Recently uploaded

Unit-III-ELECTROCHEMICAL STORAGE DEVICES.ppt
Unit-III-ELECTROCHEMICAL STORAGE DEVICES.pptUnit-III-ELECTROCHEMICAL STORAGE DEVICES.ppt
Unit-III-ELECTROCHEMICAL STORAGE DEVICES.ppt
KrishnaveniKrishnara1
 
Textile Chemical Processing and Dyeing.pdf
Textile Chemical Processing and Dyeing.pdfTextile Chemical Processing and Dyeing.pdf
Textile Chemical Processing and Dyeing.pdf
NazakatAliKhoso2
 
132/33KV substation case study Presentation
132/33KV substation case study Presentation132/33KV substation case study Presentation
132/33KV substation case study Presentation
kandramariana6
 
Question paper of renewable energy sources
Question paper of renewable energy sourcesQuestion paper of renewable energy sources
Question paper of renewable energy sources
mahammadsalmanmech
 
The Python for beginners. This is an advance computer language.
The Python for beginners. This is an advance computer language.The Python for beginners. This is an advance computer language.
The Python for beginners. This is an advance computer language.
sachin chaurasia
 
Literature Review Basics and Understanding Reference Management.pptx
Literature Review Basics and Understanding Reference Management.pptxLiterature Review Basics and Understanding Reference Management.pptx
Literature Review Basics and Understanding Reference Management.pptx
Dr Ramhari Poudyal
 
2008 BUILDING CONSTRUCTION Illustrated - Ching Chapter 02 The Building.pdf
2008 BUILDING CONSTRUCTION Illustrated - Ching Chapter 02 The Building.pdf2008 BUILDING CONSTRUCTION Illustrated - Ching Chapter 02 The Building.pdf
2008 BUILDING CONSTRUCTION Illustrated - Ching Chapter 02 The Building.pdf
Yasser Mahgoub
 
TIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUE FOR COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
TIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUE FOR COMMUNICATION SYSTEMTIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUE FOR COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
TIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUE FOR COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
HODECEDSIET
 
Recycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part III
Recycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part IIIRecycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part III
Recycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part III
Aditya Rajan Patra
 
Engine Lubrication performance System.pdf
Engine Lubrication performance System.pdfEngine Lubrication performance System.pdf
Engine Lubrication performance System.pdf
mamamaam477
 
Modelagem de um CSTR com reação endotermica.pdf
Modelagem de um CSTR com reação endotermica.pdfModelagem de um CSTR com reação endotermica.pdf
Modelagem de um CSTR com reação endotermica.pdf
camseq
 
KuberTENes Birthday Bash Guadalajara - K8sGPT first impressions
KuberTENes Birthday Bash Guadalajara - K8sGPT first impressionsKuberTENes Birthday Bash Guadalajara - K8sGPT first impressions
KuberTENes Birthday Bash Guadalajara - K8sGPT first impressions
Victor Morales
 
New techniques for characterising damage in rock slopes.pdf
New techniques for characterising damage in rock slopes.pdfNew techniques for characterising damage in rock slopes.pdf
New techniques for characterising damage in rock slopes.pdf
wisnuprabawa3
 
International Conference on NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning an...
International Conference on NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning an...International Conference on NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning an...
International Conference on NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning an...
gerogepatton
 
Embedded machine learning-based road conditions and driving behavior monitoring
Embedded machine learning-based road conditions and driving behavior monitoringEmbedded machine learning-based road conditions and driving behavior monitoring
Embedded machine learning-based road conditions and driving behavior monitoring
IJECEIAES
 
学校原版美国波士顿大学毕业证学历学位证书原版一模一样
学校原版美国波士顿大学毕业证学历学位证书原版一模一样学校原版美国波士顿大学毕业证学历学位证书原版一模一样
学校原版美国波士顿大学毕业证学历学位证书原版一模一样
171ticu
 
CHINA’S GEO-ECONOMIC OUTREACH IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND FUTURE PROSPECT
CHINA’S GEO-ECONOMIC OUTREACH IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND FUTURE PROSPECTCHINA’S GEO-ECONOMIC OUTREACH IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND FUTURE PROSPECT
CHINA’S GEO-ECONOMIC OUTREACH IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND FUTURE PROSPECT
jpsjournal1
 
Recycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part II
Recycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part IIRecycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part II
Recycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part II
Aditya Rajan Patra
 
Optimizing Gradle Builds - Gradle DPE Tour Berlin 2024
Optimizing Gradle Builds - Gradle DPE Tour Berlin 2024Optimizing Gradle Builds - Gradle DPE Tour Berlin 2024
Optimizing Gradle Builds - Gradle DPE Tour Berlin 2024
Sinan KOZAK
 
Advanced control scheme of doubly fed induction generator for wind turbine us...
Advanced control scheme of doubly fed induction generator for wind turbine us...Advanced control scheme of doubly fed induction generator for wind turbine us...
Advanced control scheme of doubly fed induction generator for wind turbine us...
IJECEIAES
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Unit-III-ELECTROCHEMICAL STORAGE DEVICES.ppt
Unit-III-ELECTROCHEMICAL STORAGE DEVICES.pptUnit-III-ELECTROCHEMICAL STORAGE DEVICES.ppt
Unit-III-ELECTROCHEMICAL STORAGE DEVICES.ppt
 
Textile Chemical Processing and Dyeing.pdf
Textile Chemical Processing and Dyeing.pdfTextile Chemical Processing and Dyeing.pdf
Textile Chemical Processing and Dyeing.pdf
 
132/33KV substation case study Presentation
132/33KV substation case study Presentation132/33KV substation case study Presentation
132/33KV substation case study Presentation
 
Question paper of renewable energy sources
Question paper of renewable energy sourcesQuestion paper of renewable energy sources
Question paper of renewable energy sources
 
The Python for beginners. This is an advance computer language.
The Python for beginners. This is an advance computer language.The Python for beginners. This is an advance computer language.
The Python for beginners. This is an advance computer language.
 
Literature Review Basics and Understanding Reference Management.pptx
Literature Review Basics and Understanding Reference Management.pptxLiterature Review Basics and Understanding Reference Management.pptx
Literature Review Basics and Understanding Reference Management.pptx
 
2008 BUILDING CONSTRUCTION Illustrated - Ching Chapter 02 The Building.pdf
2008 BUILDING CONSTRUCTION Illustrated - Ching Chapter 02 The Building.pdf2008 BUILDING CONSTRUCTION Illustrated - Ching Chapter 02 The Building.pdf
2008 BUILDING CONSTRUCTION Illustrated - Ching Chapter 02 The Building.pdf
 
TIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUE FOR COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
TIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUE FOR COMMUNICATION SYSTEMTIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUE FOR COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
TIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUE FOR COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
 
Recycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part III
Recycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part IIIRecycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part III
Recycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part III
 
Engine Lubrication performance System.pdf
Engine Lubrication performance System.pdfEngine Lubrication performance System.pdf
Engine Lubrication performance System.pdf
 
Modelagem de um CSTR com reação endotermica.pdf
Modelagem de um CSTR com reação endotermica.pdfModelagem de um CSTR com reação endotermica.pdf
Modelagem de um CSTR com reação endotermica.pdf
 
KuberTENes Birthday Bash Guadalajara - K8sGPT first impressions
KuberTENes Birthday Bash Guadalajara - K8sGPT first impressionsKuberTENes Birthday Bash Guadalajara - K8sGPT first impressions
KuberTENes Birthday Bash Guadalajara - K8sGPT first impressions
 
New techniques for characterising damage in rock slopes.pdf
New techniques for characterising damage in rock slopes.pdfNew techniques for characterising damage in rock slopes.pdf
New techniques for characterising damage in rock slopes.pdf
 
International Conference on NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning an...
International Conference on NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning an...International Conference on NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning an...
International Conference on NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning an...
 
Embedded machine learning-based road conditions and driving behavior monitoring
Embedded machine learning-based road conditions and driving behavior monitoringEmbedded machine learning-based road conditions and driving behavior monitoring
Embedded machine learning-based road conditions and driving behavior monitoring
 
学校原版美国波士顿大学毕业证学历学位证书原版一模一样
学校原版美国波士顿大学毕业证学历学位证书原版一模一样学校原版美国波士顿大学毕业证学历学位证书原版一模一样
学校原版美国波士顿大学毕业证学历学位证书原版一模一样
 
CHINA’S GEO-ECONOMIC OUTREACH IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND FUTURE PROSPECT
CHINA’S GEO-ECONOMIC OUTREACH IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND FUTURE PROSPECTCHINA’S GEO-ECONOMIC OUTREACH IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND FUTURE PROSPECT
CHINA’S GEO-ECONOMIC OUTREACH IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND FUTURE PROSPECT
 
Recycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part II
Recycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part IIRecycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part II
Recycled Concrete Aggregate in Construction Part II
 
Optimizing Gradle Builds - Gradle DPE Tour Berlin 2024
Optimizing Gradle Builds - Gradle DPE Tour Berlin 2024Optimizing Gradle Builds - Gradle DPE Tour Berlin 2024
Optimizing Gradle Builds - Gradle DPE Tour Berlin 2024
 
Advanced control scheme of doubly fed induction generator for wind turbine us...
Advanced control scheme of doubly fed induction generator for wind turbine us...Advanced control scheme of doubly fed induction generator for wind turbine us...
Advanced control scheme of doubly fed induction generator for wind turbine us...
 

Line Protection.pdf

  • 1. Protection Coordination Serge Beauzile Chair IEEE FWCS Ch i P & E S i t Chair Power & Energy Society serge.beauzile@ieee.org June 10 2014 June, 10, 2014 8:30 -12:30 Florida Electric Cooperatives Association Florida Electric Cooperatives Association Clearwater, Florida
  • 2. Seminar Objective • Distribution Circuit Protection – Fuse to Fuse Coordination – Recloser to Fuse Coordination – Breaker to Recloser Coordination • Transmission Line Protection Distance Protection – Distance Protection – Pilot Protection Schemes – Current Differential Protection Current Differential Protection 2 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 3. Art & Science of System Protection • Not an exact science, coordination schemes will vary based on: schemes will vary based on: – Company Philosophy Company Philosophy – Protection engineer preference – System requirements 3 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 4. C di ti D i Coordinating Devices Basic concept: All protective devices are able to Basic concept: All protective devices are able to detect a fault do so at the same instant. If h d i th t d f lt t d If each device that sensed a fault operated simultaneously, large portions of the system would be de-energized every time a fault needed g y to be cleared. This is unacceptable. A properly designed scheme will incorporate time A properly designed scheme will incorporate time delays into the protection system, allowing certain devices to operate before others. 4 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 5. C di ti D i Coordinating Devices Timing of device operation is verified using time Timing of device operation is verified using time- current characteristics or TCCs – device response curves plotted on log-log graph paper. Devices have inverse TCCs. They operate quickly for large magnitude overcurrents, and more slowly g g , y for lower-magnitude overcurrents. Operating time is plotted on the vertical axis and Operating time is plotted on the vertical axis, and current magnitude is plotted on the horizontal scale. 5 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 6. C di ti D i Coordinating Devices 100 Four different TCCs h th 10 are shown on the left. Device “D” is the fastest to 1 Time in Seconds operate, and device “A” is the slowest. 25 0.1 A B C D For a given current value, the operating ti b f d .25 sec 10,000 1000 10 100 0.01 100,000 D time can be found. 3 kA Current in Amperes 6 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 7. Coordinating Devices g In this example, A l l 100 Device A is clearly faster than Device B for low (400-700 A) 10 Uncertain Coordination ( ) fault currents. Device B is clearly Time in Seconds 1 Device B is clearly faster for high (>1000 A) fault t b t i th 0.1 A currents, but in the 700-1000 A region, timing is uncertain. 100 10 0.01 100,000 10,000 1000 B g 1 Current in Amperes 7 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 8. Coordinating Devices Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse 100 Minimum Melt 10 Average Melt + tolerance 1 Time in Seconds Total Clear 0.1 Average Melt + tolerance + arcing time Curves are developed at 25ºC 100 10 1000 00,000 0,000 0.01 Curves are developed at 25ºC With no preloading 10 1 Current in Amperes 8 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 9. Coordinating Devices Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse 100 In this example, the red 10 TCCs represent the downstream (protecting) fuse, and the blue TCCs 1 Time in Seconds represent the upstream (protected) fuse. 0.1 The protected fuse should not be damaged by a fault in the 100 10 1000 ,000 ,000 0.01 y protecting fuse’s zone of protection. 1 100, 10, Current in Amperes 9 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 10. Coordinating Devices Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse 100 Four factors need to be 10 considered: 1. Tolerances. 1 Time in Seconds 2. Ambient temperature. 0.1 p 3. Preloading effects. 100 10 1000 0,000 0,000 0.01 4. Predamage effects. 1 100 10 Current in Amperes 10 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 11. Coordinating Devices Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse 100 Consideration of these 10 four factors can be quite involved. 1 Time in Seconds Practically, the “75% Method” can be used: the maximum clearing 0.1 g time of the protecting link shall be no more than 75% of the 100 10 1000 ,000 ,000 0.01 minimum melting time of the protected link. 1 100 10 Current in Amperes 11 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 12. Coordinating Devices Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse Expulsion Fuse to Expulsion Fuse 100 Minimum melting time of 10 protected link at 5 kA is 0.3 seconds. 1 Time in Seconds Total clearing time of the protecting link at 5 kA is 0.22 seconds. 0.1 0.22 < 0.3 × 75% = 0.225, so coordination is 100 10 1000 0,000 0,000 0.01 assured for current magnitudes ≤ 5 kA. 100 10 Current in Amperes 12 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 13. Utility Distribution Feeders y Multiple Feeder Segments Segments are defined as sectionalizable pieces of a feeder that can be automatically or manually separated from the rest of the feeder separated from the rest of the feeder. Segments are delineated by reclosers, fuses, sectionalizers or switches sectionalizers or switches. Two primary concerns: number of customers per d l segment and time to isolate segment. 13 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 14. Utility Distribution Feeders y Number of Customers per Segment The number of customers per segment has a major impact on reliability indices. As the number of segments per feeder increases, reliability can also be adversely impacted, and y y p construction cost will increase. A ti i t t b ht t d t i th An optimum point must be sought to determine the best segment size. 14 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 15. Utility Distribution Feeders Utility Distribution Feeders Present and Future Load Requirements Even the best load forecasts are full of errors. You must continuously monitor your fuse coordination due changes in the load. coordination due changes in the load. It is impossible to predict everything, so versatility is the key. 15 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 16. Coordination Goal 1. Maximum Sensitivity. 2. Maximum Speed. 3. Maximum Security. 4. Maximum Selectivity. 16 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 17. Basic Coordination Strategy gy 1. Establish a coordination pairs. 2. Determine maximum load of each segment and the pickup of all delayed overcurrent devices. 3. Determine the pickup current of all instantaneous current of all instantaneous overcurrent devices, based on short-circuit studies. 4 D t i i i 4. Determine remaining overcurrent device characteristics starting from the load and moving to g the source. 17 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 18. 18 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 19. 19 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 20. 20 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 21. 21 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 22. 22 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 23. Fuse Peak Load Capability IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile 23
  • 24. 24 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 25. 25 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 26. 26 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 27. 27 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 28. 28 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 29. Fuse Blow Vs. Fuse Save Fuse Blow Vs. Fuse Save • Fuse Blow – Eliminates Instantaneous trip of the breaker or recloser Eliminates Instantaneous trip of the breaker or recloser (1st) by having the fuse blow for all permanent and temporary faults. – Minimizes momentary interruptions and increases SAIDI Minimizes momentary interruptions and increases SAIDI. Improves power quality but decreases reliability. • Fuse Save • Fuse Save – Minimizes customer interruption time by attempting to open the breaker or recloser faster than it takes to melt the fuse fuse. – This saves the fuse and allows a simple momentary interruption. 29 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 30. Fuse Blow FUSE is BLOWN Lateral experiences Lateral experiences sustained interruption 30
  • 31. Fuse Blow Fuse Blow – Used primarily to minimize momentary interruptions (reduces MAIFI) – Increases interruption duration (SAIDI) – Very successful in high short circuit areas – More suitable for industrial type customers having very sensitive loads 31 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 32. Fuse Save Entire Feeder trips Momentary occurs FUSE is SAVED FUSE is SAVED 32 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 33. Fuse Save Fuse Save – Minimize customer interruption time Reduce SAIDI – Reduce SAIDI – Increase MAIFI – May not work in high short circuit areas – May not work in high short circuit areas – Work well in most areas – Not suitable for certain industrial Not suitable for certain industrial customers that cannot tolerate immediate reclosing – Works best for residential and small commercial customers 33 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 34. Both (Fuse Save & Fuse Blow) ( ) • Many utilities use both schemes for a variety of reasons reasons – Fuse Blow for high short circuit current areas and Fuse Save where it will work. – Fuse Save on overhead and Fuse Blow on underground taps. – Fuse Save on rural and Fuse Blow on urban Fuse Save on rural and Fuse Blow on urban – Fuse Save on stormy days and Fuse Blow on nice days. F S i it d F Bl – Fuse Save on some circuits and Fuse Blow on others depending on customer desires 34 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 35. Fast Bus Trip IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile 35
  • 36. SEL-351S SEL 351S Protection and Breaker Control Relay Relay 36 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 37. Modern Microprocessor Relay Protection and Breaker Control Relay Extremely versatile, many applications Most commonly used on distribution feeders Communicates with EMS system (DNP 3.0 Protocol) Key element of “Substation Integration” Provides many “traditional” features Provides new capabilities 37 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 38. SEL-351S Protection and Breaker Control Relay Protection Features: P f t l t 18 diff t t ti f ti Performs at least 18 different protection functions. = 38 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 39. SEL-351S Protection and Breaker Control Relay Protection Features: B U d lt (27) Bus Undervoltage (27) Phase Overvoltage (59P) G d O lt (59G) Ground Overvoltage (59G) Sequence Overvoltage (59Q) O f (81O) Overfrequency (81O) Underfrequency (81U) 39 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 40. Modern Microprocessor Relay Protection and Breaker Control Relay Protection Features (continued): Ph Di ti l O t (67P) Phase Directional Overcurrent (67P) Ground Directional Overcurrent (67G) S Di ti l O t (67Q) Sequence Directional Overcurrent (67Q) Instantaneous Phase Overcurrent (50P) I t t G d O t (50G) Instantaneous Ground Overcurrent (50G) Instantaneous Sequence Overcurrent (50Q) (50Q) 40 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 41. SEL-351S Protection and Breaker Control Relay Protection Features (continued): Ti Ph O t (51P) Time Phase Overcurrent (51P) Time Ground Overcurrent (51G) Ti S O t (51Q) Time Sequence Overcurrent (51Q) Directional Neutral Overcurrent (67N) I t t N t l O t (50N) Instantaneous Neutral Overcurrent (50N) Time Neutral Overcurrent (51N) 41 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 42. SEL-351S Protection and Breaker Control Relay Breaker Control Features: S h i Ch k (25) Synchronism Check (25) Automatic Circuit Reclosing (79) TRIP/CLOSE Pushbuttons Enable/Disable Reclosing Enable/Disable Reclosing Enable/Disable Supervisory Control 42 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 43. SEL-351S Protection and Breaker Control Relay Other Features: E t R ti d R di Event Reporting and Recording Breaker Wear Monitor St ti B tt M it Station Battery Monitor High-Accuracy Metering F lt L t Fault Locator 43 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 44. SEL-351S Protection and Breaker Control Relay 44 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 45. • Advantages of microprocessor relays • Advantages of microprocessor relays ƒ Extremely flexible ƒ Have many different elements (UF, UV, Directionality, etc…) ƒ One relay can protect on zone of protection One relay can protect on zone of protection ƒ Inexpensive and require much less maintenance ƒ Alarm if they fails and don’t need calibration ƒ Provide fault information ƒ Provide oscillography and SER data ƒ Can provide analog data to SCADA • Disadvantages of microprocessor relays ƒ Can be very complex to program due to given flexibility R i t i i t R l T h i i ƒ Require more training to Relay Technicians ƒ Require more training to Relay Engineers 45 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 46. Relays Relays • Basic relay settings: ƒ Phase overcurrent elements must be set above maximum ƒ Phase overcurrent elements must be set above maximum possible loads ƒ Ground overcurrent elements must be set above maximum anticipated unbalanced loads p ƒ Must be coordinated with downstream protective devices ƒ Under Frequency elements must be set according to the predetermined set point • TAGGING ƒ NORMAL mode – 2 reclosing attempts g p ƒ WORK mode – HOT LINE TAG ƒ COLD mode 46 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 47. Relay Curves Relay Curves 100 10 1 S e c o n d Moderately Inverse Inverse Very Inverse 0.1 d s Very Inverse Extremely Inverse 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 Multiple of Pick Up Multiple of Pick Up 47 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 48. Very Inverse Curve Time Dial Very Inverse Curve Time Dial 100 0.29s In this example 10 p Multiple of Pickup = 3. TD = 0 5 Time = 0 3s 1 SECONDS TD=0.5 TD=2 TD=6 TD = 0.5 Time = 0.3s TD = 2 Time = 1.1s TD = 6 Time = 3.4s TD = 15 Time = 7.0s 0.1 TD 6 TD=15 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 Multiples Of Pick Up Multiples Of Pick Up 48 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 49. Very Inverse Curve Time Dial Very Inverse Curve Time Dial 100 0.29s In this example, Pi k 600 A 10 Pickup = 600 A. Fault Current = 1800 A. TD = 0.5 Time = 0.29s 1 SECONDS TD=0.5 TD=2 TD=6 T 0.5 Time 0. 9s TD = 2 Time = 1.16s TD = 6 Time = 3.48s TD = 15 Time = 8.72s 0.1 TD 6 TD=15 Pickup = 900 A. Fault Current = 1800 A. 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 Multiples Of Pick Up TD = 0.5 Time = 0.69s TD = 2 Time = 2.78s TD = 6 Time = 8.33s TD = 15 Time = 20 8s Multiples Of Pick Up TD = 15 Time = 20.8s 49 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 50. Pickup Current of Delayed Ground OC Devices p y Source Side Load Side Single Phase to Ground Fault Primary Backup IMU<IPU<I MIN Fault g IMU = Maximum Unbalance 50 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 51. Pickup Current of Delayed Phase OC Devices p y Source Side Load Side IML<IPU<Imin Ø‐Ø Fault Phase to Phase Fault IML = Maximum Load 51 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 52. Typical Pickup Setting TB > TR + CTI CTI = Coordination Time Interval (Typically 0.2-0.5sec) Recloser Ct ratio 600:1 Breaker Ct ratio 240:1 IPU = 1 A IPU = 3.75 A IPU Primary= 600 A IPU Primary= 900 A 52 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 53. 53 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 54. Trip Logic TR OC + PB9 + 51P1T + 51G1T * (LT6 + LT7) + (50P3 + 50G3) * LT7 + (50P2 + 50G2) * SH1 TR = OC + PB9 + 51P1T + 51G1T * (LT6 + LT7) + (50P3 + 50G3) * LT7 + (50P2 + 50G2) * SH1 OC: OPEN COMMAND (SCADA TRIP) PB9: FRONT PUSH BUTTON 51P1T: PHASE TIME OC ELEMENT 51G1T: GROUND TIME OC ELEMENT LT6: TAGGING IS IN NORMAL MODE LT7: TAGGING IS IN WORK MODE 50P2/50P3: PHASE INSTANTANEOUS OC ELEMENT 50G2/50G3: GROUND INSTANTANEOUS OC ELEMENT SH1: RECLOSING SHOT #1 (FIRST RECLOSE ATTEMPT) CTR = 600.0 INSTANTANEOUS ENABLED ONLY AFTER FIRST RECLOSE ATTEMPT 50P2P = 2.5 (1500 AMPS PRIMARY) 50G2P = 1 6 (960 AMPS PRIMARY) 50G2P 1.6 (960 AMPS PRIMARY) INSTANTANEOUS ENABLED ONLY DURING WORK/HOT LINE TAG 50P3P = 1.35 (810 AMPS PRIMARY) 50G3P = 0 50 (300 AMPS PRIMARY) NORMAL UNBALANCE GROUND CURRENT ~20 TO 30 AMPS 50G3P = 0.50 (300 AMPS PRIMARY) – NORMAL UNBALANCE GROUND CURRENT ~20 TO 30 AMPS 54 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 55. 55 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 56. 56 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 57. 57 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 58. SEL-351S History Summary (HIS Command) Sample output: 58 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 59. SEL-351S Sequence of Events Recording (SER) Sequence of Events Recording (SER) 59 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 60. SEL-351S Metering Data (MET Command) Sample output - Metering Data (MET): 60 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 61. SEL-351S Metering Data (MET Command) Sample output - Metering Demand (MET D): 61 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 62. SEL-351S Metering Data (MET Command) Sample output - Metering Energy (MET E): 62 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 63. SEL-351S Metering Data (MET Command) Sample output - Metering Max/Min (MET M): 63 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 64. Differential Relays Protection of a Delta‐Wye Transformer I I I I I A B a b Ia 52 52 Ib Ia‐Ib Ia Ia Ia‐Ib Ib‐Ic Ia‐Ib Ib‐Ic Ia B C b c 52 52 Ic Ib‐Ic Ic‐Ia Ib Ic Ib Ic Ic‐Ia Ic‐Ia Ib Ic Ia‐Ib Ia‐Ib R R OP OP Ia‐Ib I I Ic‐Ia Ib‐Ic R R R R OP OP Ic‐Ia Ib‐Ic Ib‐Ic Ic‐Ia Power System Protection -64- Ralph Fehr, Ph.D., P.E. – October 28, 2013 R R
  • 65. Distance Relays y Protection Features – Four zones of distance protection – Pilot schemes – Phase/Neutral/Ground TOCs Phase/Neutral/Ground IOCs Power System Protection -65- Ralph Fehr, Ph.D., P.E. – October 28, 2013 – Phase/Neutral/Ground IOCs
  • 66. Distance Relays y Protection Features ‐ continued – Negative sequence TOC – Negative sequence IOC – Phase directional OCs – Neutral directional OC – Negative sequence directional OC – Phase under‐ and overvoltage – Power swing blocking – Out of step tripping Power System Protection -66- Ralph Fehr, Ph.D., P.E. – October 28, 2013
  • 67. Distance Relays Control Features Control Features B k F il ( h / t l ) – Breaker Failure (phase/neutral amps) – Synchrocheck – Autoreclosing Power System Protection -67- Ralph Fehr, Ph.D., P.E. – October 28, 2013
  • 68. Distance Relays Metering Features Metering Features F lt L t − Fault Locator − Oscillography − Event Recorder − Data Logger − Phasors / true RMS / active, reactive and apparent power, power factor and apparent power, power factor Power System Protection -68- Ralph Fehr, Ph.D., P.E. – October 28, 2013
  • 69. Distance Relays Zones of Protection Zone 2 X Line Impedance (Line A) Zone 1 Zone 2 1 2 3 Line Impedance (Line A) Zone 2 Z 3 1 2 3 1 Line A A1 A2 Zone 1 Zone 3 3 4 1 2 Bus 1 Bus 2 Normal Load Distance Relay at Bus 1 R Zone 1 – fastest (80% of line) 2 Normal Load to protect Line A Zone 3 Zone 2 – slower (120% of line) Zone 3 –(backwards Use in Pilot Protection for current 4 Reversal logic) Power System Protection -69- Ralph Fehr, Ph.D., P.E. – October 28, 2013
  • 70. Zone 3 Zone 2 Zone 2 Zone of Protection ∆t Zone 1 Zone 1 Zone 2 ∆t ∆t ∆t 1 2 4 3 Zone 1 Zone 1 Zone 1 Zone 3 Zone 2 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 1: Under reaches the remote line end Typically 0.7 Z1L to 0.9 Z1L With no intentional time delay. Z 2 O h th t li d T i ll 1 2 Z Zone 2: Over reaches the remote line end Typically 1.2 Z1L with definite time delay. Zone 3: Over reaches the longest adjacent line i h d fi i i d l h Z 2 with definite time delay greater than Zone2. 70 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 71. Unconventional Zone 2 & Zone 3 Settings Zone 2 Zone 1 Zone 2 ∆t Long Line Short Line Be Mindful when Applying General Rules 71 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 72. Step Distance Relay Coordination Exercise Setting the relay at breaker 3 protecting Circuit 2. Set the Zones of Protection. The maximum expected load is about 600A. CTR = 1200:5 or 240:1 PTR = 600:1 CTR 1200:5 or 240:1 PTR 600:1 72 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 73. Distance Relay Coordination Exercise Circuit 2 & Circuit 5 Impedances Circuit 3 & Circuit 6 Impedances Z1 = 35.11 83.97˚ Ω primary Z0 = 111.58 81.46˚ Ω primary Z1 = 17.56 83.72˚ Ω primary Z0 = 53.89 81.56˚ Ω primary Circuit 1& Circuit 4 Impedances Z1 = 35.21 83.72˚ Ω primary Z0 = 187.80 81.56˚ Ω primary 73 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 74. Distance Relay Coordination Exercise Zone 1 Reach = 0.8 * (35.11 83.97˚) Ω primary Zone 1 Reach = 28.09 83.97˚) Ω primary Z 2 R h 1 2 * (35 11 83 97˚) Ω i Z 2 R h 42 13 83 97˚) Ω i Zone 2 Reach = 1.2 * (35.11 83.97˚) Ω primary Check Zone 2 reach does not overreach = Circuit 2 Impedance + (Zone 1 of Circuit 3) or (Zone 1of Circuit 6). General rule = protected Circuit Impedance + Zone 1 of the Shortest Circuit past the protected circuit. Zone 2 Reach = 42.13 83.97˚) Ω primary p p p p Check for Zone 2 Overreach = 35.11. + (0.8 * 17.56) = 49.16 Ω primary Zone 2 Reach = 42.13 < 49.16 no overreach Zone 4 Reach = 52.55 83.35˚) Ω primary Zone 4 Reach = (35.11 83.97˚) + (17.56 83.72˚) ( Ω primary) 74 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 75. Primary / Secondary Impedance Relay Input 75
  • 76. Relay Input Zone 1 Reach = 28.09 Ω x 240 = 11.24 Ω secondary 600 Zone 2 Reach = 42.43 Ω x 240 = 16.97 Ω secondary 600 Zone 4 Reach = 28.09 Ω x 240 = 21.02 Ω secondary 600 76 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 77. Overcurrent Supervision Setting Criteria 1) Find the lowest Ø – Ø fault seen by relay 3 for a remote end bus (4 10 5 11) Set above (maximum load) and 60% of min fault. Zone 1 Phase Fault detector: for a remote end bus (4, 10, 5, 11). Zone 2 Phase Fault detector: Set above (maximum load) and 60% of min fault. 1) Find the lowest Ø – Ø fault seen by relay 3 for a remote end bus (6, 12). ( , ) Zone 4 Fault detector same as Zone 2 Repeat same process for Ground Fault detector. 77 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 78. Current Infeed IL =0.5 A ZL =2 Ω IR =1 A ZR =1 Ω IT =0.5 A ZT =1 Ω Actual Impedance from L to the Fault is 3Ω Apparent Impedance = EL I L Apparent Impedance = ( IL x ZL) + (IR x ZR) IL Apparent Impedance = 4Ω 78 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile
  • 79. Thank You Thank You 79 IEEE/ FECA Protection Coordination June 2014 Serge Beauzile