This document summarizes discussions from a conference session on food security in Arab countries following the Arab Spring uprisings. It presents three main findings: 1) Growing unemployment, inequality, and food insecurity were key economic factors that contributed to unrest in Arab countries. 2) Studies found that food insecurity is correlated with increased risk of conflict in Arab countries. Countries that are highly dependent on food imports and vulnerable to international food price volatility face higher risks. 3) An analysis of Yemen's uprising estimated that the economic crisis increased food insecurity and child malnutrition. Fully recovering from the development losses could take 5-10 years unless policies accelerate growth and increase public spending on nutrition programs.

1. Beyond the Arab Spring
Improving Food Security and
Resilience to Conflict
28th International Conference of Agricultural Economists
Rafain Convention Center, Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil
August 18-24, 2012

2. The ‘Arab Spring’ and After
 Dec. 2010: Self-immolation of a young
vegetable vendor in Tunisia
 Spring 2011: Protests in the quest for
more freedom, dignity and justice in
several Arab countries
 2012: Four longstanding autocratic leaders (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia,
Yemen) have been ousted after varying degrees of violent turmoil.
 Causes of the unrests run deep and have accumulated over time.
A combination of political, sociological and economic factors
triggered the uprisings.
 Key economic factors include growing unemployment (especially
among the population aged 25-39), rising inequality and high food
insecurity.

3. Outline of the Session
Objective:
Initiate and inform the debate on key challenges and opportunities
for achieving food security and preventing conflict across the Arab
World.
Presentations:
1. Policies and Investments for Poverty Reduction and Food
Security—by Perrihan Al-Riffai
2. Does Food Security Matter for Transition in Arab Countries?—by
Jean-Francois Maystadt
3. Growth and Food Security Impacts of Yemen’s Uprising and
Scenarios for Transition—by Olivier Ecker

4. Policies and Investments for Poverty Reduction
and Food Security in the Arab World
C. Breisinger, O. Ecker, P. Al-Riffai and B. Yu

5. Growth, Poverty and Food Security
Economic growth does not trickle down to the poor in Arab
countries as much as it does in the rest of the world
Government spending as a share of GDP is the highest in
the region among all world regions, but, does not translate
into spending effectiveness and efficiency
Poverty–food security nexus one of the key development
challenges facing Arab countries
Macro and micro food security present a serious challenge
for the region

6. GDP Growth, Incidence of Poverty and
Child Undernutrition
Source: Breisinger C., O. Ecker, P. Al-Riffai and B. Yu. 2012. Beyond the Arab Awakening: Policies and Investments for Poverty Reduction and Food
Security. IFPRI Food Policy Report. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

7. Macro and Micro Level Food Security
Source: Breisinger C., O. Ecker, P. Al-Riffai and B. Yu. 2012. Beyond the Arab Awakening: Policies and Investments for Poverty Reduction and Food
Security. IFPRI Food Policy Report. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

8. Macro Food Insecurity
Source: Breisinger C., O. Ecker, P. Al-Riffai and B. Yu. 2012. Beyond the Arab Awakening: Policies and Investments for Poverty Reduction and Food
Security. IFPRI Food Policy Report. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

9. Micro Food Insecurity
Source: Breisinger C., O. Ecker, P. Al-Riffai and B. Yu. 2012. Beyond the Arab Awakening: Policies and Investments for Poverty Reduction and Food
Security. IFPRI Food Policy Report. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

10. Selected Policies for a Food Secure Arab
World
For countries with micro level food insecurity, focus on
supporting job creating growth for the poor and improving
social services
Growth led by the manufacturing rather than the agricultural sector is pro-poor and
is associated with reducing child undernutrition
For countries with macro-level food insecurity, encourage
exports to finance food imports and the agricultural sector in
countries with potential
Agriculture to play important role in poverty reduction in countries with large
agricultural potential as agriculture continues to serve as a social safety net sector
especially in times of crisis

11. While these selected policies apply for many
Arab countries, strategies and investments have
to be country-owned and adopted to country
and sub-national levels.

12. Does Food Security Matter
for Transition in Arab Countries?
J.-F. Maystadt, J.-F. Trinh Tan and C. Breisinger

13. “How is it that countries in the Middle East and North Africa could
face explosions of popular grievances despite, in some cases,
sustained high growth and improvement in social indicators?”
(World Development Report 2011 on Conflict, Security and Development)
Conflicts in the Arab World

14. The Arab World at a Crossroad
• “Power vacuum” : Particularly at risk
• But no determinism … also opportunities
Major causes of conflicts and which
preventive measures?
How best to accompany such political
transition?

15. Arab Exceptionalism?
Collier and Hoeffler 2004 (CH04)
• ‘Opportunity’ (per capita income, economic growth) matters, not
‘Motivation’ (‘grievance’)
Sorli et al. (2005) : 1960-2000
• No MENA specific effect : “Conflict is quite well explained by a
general model of civil war” (p.160)
Shortcomings:
• Reduced sample of countries (excl. e.g. Mauritania, Djibouti, Somalia,
Sudan)
• No Fixed Effect (Djankov and Reynal-Querol, forthcoming REStat)
• Predictive power 30% lower compared to SSA
• Replication with updated data points to “Arab Exceptionalism”

16. Main Empirical Model
𝑃(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜙 𝑡 + 𝜂 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜑 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐴𝑟𝑎𝑏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
 Economic growth is the only robust finding in CH(04)
 Arab exceptionalism is confirmed!
 Where the growth is coming from? (‘Opportunity’)
 Sectoral growth, Youth bulges
 Better proxy for natural resource dependency (e.g. oil)
 Where the growth is going to? (‘Motivation’)
 Inequality
 Micro and Macro Food Security Indicators, given high
food import dependency
 Political dimension? (‘Polity’)

17. Beyond Collier-Hoeffler Framework
Regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable
Model
GDP growth (t-1) -3.757*** -6.259*** -3.539* -4.644*** -8.644***
[0.980] [1.429] [1.877] [1.85] [1.850]
GDP growth (t-1)*Arab+ 5.919*** 4.409 3.056 3.056
[1.978] [2.784] [4.091] [4.091]
Child stunting (t-1) 0.0522**
[0.0233]
Child stunting (t-1)*Arab+ 0.307***
[0.0992]
Child mortality (t-1) -0.001
[0.003]
Child mortality (t-1)*Arab+ 0.001
[0.006]
Food Insecurity Index (t-1) -0.0107*
[0.00566]
Food Insecurity index (t-1)*Arab+ 0.0294**
[0.0125]
Time dummies incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Country Fixed Effects incl. incl. incl. incl. incl.
Observations 1,474 1,474 630 412 1,219
Incidence ofmajor intrastate conflict
Logit fixed effect

18. Other Correlates
 ‘Motivation’ : Gini coefficient is uncorrelated to conflicts but
known to poorly capture time-varying sources of grievances
 ‘Opportunity’
 Sectoral growth does not matter
 Youth bulges (share of urban male aged 15-24 over the
urban (or male) population aged > 15) : Positive relationship
 Oil, gas, ores and minerals exports to GDP or dependency
(>40%) . Oil dependency increases conflict at a global level
but has the opposite effect in the Arab world
 ‘Polity’
 Economic and political discrimination against minorities
increase conflicts but not specifically for Arab countries
 Past transitions to full democracy and autocracy reduce the
risk of conflicts but not in a stronger way in the Arab world

19. The Arab Food Security Channel
For the sample restricted to the Arab world, 2SLS-FE model points
to the vulnerability of food net importers to changes in food
international prices or food insecurity and in turn, to the risk of
conflict
𝑃 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜙 𝑡 + 𝜂 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜙 𝑡 + 𝜂 𝑃𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑊𝑖,𝑗 + +𝛽 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
Where
𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = Macro or Micro Food Security Indicators
𝑃𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑗 (beef, maize, rice and wheat)
𝑊𝑖,𝑗 = Net food imports
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 = Past economic growth and peace duration
The high dependence on food imports, combined with high and
volatile world market prices, argued to be one factor contributing
to the Arab Awakening (Zurayk 2011; Harrigan 2012, The
Economist 2012)

20. The Arab Food Security Channel
Regression (2) (4) (6) (8)
Dependent variable
Model
Peace duration 0.003 -0.0099*** -0.005*** -0.005***
[0.006] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.196 -0.312 -0.178 -0.184
[0.213] [0.283] [0.163] [0.195]
Child stunting 0.0420***
[0.016]
Child mortality 0.011***
[0.004]
Macro Food 0.011***
Insecurity [0.004]
Macro Food 0.013**
Insecurity [0.006]
incl. remittances
Country Fixed Effects incl. incl. incl. incl.
Time dummies incl. incl. incl. incl.
Observations 433 246 685 685
Number of countries 22 22 22 22
F-test 2.731** 4.603*** 5.335*** 4.484***
Underid test 15.23*** 13.76*** 17.14*** 8.819**
P-value Hansen test 0.52 0.24 0.66 0.46
F-test on excl. IV 10.83*** 6.85*** 7.74*** 3.99**
Root MSE 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.26
Incidence of major intra-state conflicts
FE2SLS

21. Conclusions
1) Transition to democracy is welcomed but the transition
period is risky
2) Food insecurity matters for conflicts in the Arab world
Limitations:
1. Not a paper on the Arab Awakening : only valid for major
conflict events
• Need to understand the dynamics of public protests and
violence in the Arab countries, with a special focus on
food security and food policies
2. Cross-country analysis misses the heterogeneity
• Country case studies

22. Growth and Food Security Impacts of Yemen’s
Uprising and Scenarios for Transition
C. Breisinger and O. Ecker

23. Food Insecurity – Conflict Relationship
 Conflict aggravates household food insecurity.
 Urban households are particularly vulnerable.
 For food security of the individual household, the presence of
conflict in the neighborhood seems to matter more than the direct
experience of conflict.
Coef. Std. Err.
Exposure to conflict
Household 1.100 0.233
Neighborhood 3.399 0.484
Round -0.081 0.020
Log likelihood -392.2
Observations 1,303
No. of HHs 95
Food insecurity—conflict fixed-effects logit model
Source: Based on data from the UNICEF Social Protection Monitoring Survey
(14-round panel) from Sana’a (urban), Al-Hodeidah (urban) and Amran (rural)0
10
20
30
40
50
60
26 30 34 38 42 46 50
HH exposed to conflict (%)
HH food insecurity (%)
Food insecurity and conflict, July - Dec. 2011

24. The Economic Shock of the Uprising
 Even before the 2011 uprising, economic growth was sluggish, and
food insecurity and malnutrition widespread.
 Collier (2007) estimates that one year of civil war reduces a
country’s growth rate by 2.2% globally. For Arab countries, the
average GDP per capita loss may be even higher, estimated at 3.5%
(ESCWA 2010).
Source: Based on data from the Gallup World Poll.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2007 2009 2011
Confidence in national government (%)
Growth in local economy expected (%)
Satisfaction with standard of living (%)
Perceptions on political and economic conditions
 Yemen’s economy was hit hard
in 2011:*
• GDP contracted by about 11%.
• Gov. spending fell by 12%, and
transfers to households by 23%.
• Remittances declined by 10%.
→ Impact on food security?
* Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.

25. Macro-Micro Modeling Framework
Factor markets
Commodity markets
Foreign markets/
countries
Public sector/
government
Human/physical capital
Productivity/technology
Urban/
Rural
Farm/
Nonfarm
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Economic production HH incomes
Production Consumption
Wages, rents,
profits
Foreign trade
Foreign aid
Taxes
Spending
and market
policies
Foreign
investment
Taxes and
social policies
Public
investment and
macro policies
Private
investment
IFPRI Dynamic CGE Model Nutrition Models*
Parametric estimation:
N = f(Y, P, Z)
Response
(coefficient
estimates)
Prediction
Expenditure
change
(‘shock’)
Nutrition outcomes
* Reduced-form model for HH calorie consumption and child nutritional status

26. Estimation Results
 The recession in 2011 strongly
affects growth and food security in
the medium term.
 Even if the economy bounces back
to pre-crisis growth rates in 2013
onwards, it takes five years to catch
up development losses.
 Chronic child malnutrition
increased, too (although it is less
responsive than calorie deficiency).
25
30
35
40
2010 2015 2020
Slow transition
Accelerated transition
Stagnation
Baseline (no uprising)
Prevalence of calorie deficiency (%)
Source: Based on data from national statistics, the 2005/06 Household Budget
Survey, and others.
-10
-5
0
5
10
2010 2015 2020
Slow transition
Accelerated transition
Stagnation
Non-hydrocarbon growth (%)
Calorie
deficiency
Child
stunting
Slow transition -0.078 -0.011
Accelerated transition -0.175 -0.032
Stagnation 0.040 0.011
Growth semi-elasticities (2013-2020)

27. Conclusions
 If no action is taken and political turmoil continues, Yemen is likely
to suffer for years to come from low growth.
 To make up for the lost half-decade, policies and investments for
growth acceleration is urgently needed.
 This will require additional public spending of between USD 5.4
and 11.3 billion over the next eight years, depending on the
spending efficiency.
 In addition, direct nutrition and health interventions are necessary
to bring down child malnutrition rates and prevent further losses in
productivity and growth potential of the next generation.
 Yemen has a comprehensive food security strategy in place, but its
implementation is still outstanding.

28. Summary of the Session and Ways Forward
IFPRI MENA Team

29. Key Messages
1. Food insecurity is a major challenge in the Arab World at
both the macro and micro level.
2. Food insecurity and the risk of conflict have been related in
the recent past and throughout the Arab Spring.
3. Country-specific food security strategies are key for
development and peace.

30. Work in Progress
 Arab Spatial – Mapping Food Security and Development
 Papers:
 The Double Burden of Malnutrition and the Role of Food
Subsidies in Egypt
 Extreme Weather and Civil War in Somalia: Does Drought
Fuel Conflict through Livestock Price Shocks?
 Improving Resilience to Conflict among pastoralist population
in Sudan: Understanding the climate-conflict nexus
 Analyzing the Nutritional Impacts of Economic Policies in
Yemen: A Macro-Micro Modeling Framework

31. Research Dissemination
IFPRI MENA Website:
http://www.ifpri.org/book-6959/ourwork/researcharea/middle-east-and-north-africa
We acknowledge financial support from IFAD, EU, World Bank, and GIZ.