Reporte BID: Public-Private Collaboration on Productive Development Policies in Argentina

IDB WORKING PAPER SERIES No. IDB-WP-478
Public-Private
Collaboration on
Productive Development
Policies in Argentina
Roberto Bisang, Andrea González, Juan Carlos Hallak, Andrés López,
Daniela Ramos, and Ricardo Rozemberg
March 2014
Inter-American Development Bank
Institutions for Development Sector

Public-Private Collaboration on
Productive Development Policies in
Argentina
Roberto Bisang, Andrea González, Juan Carlos Hallak, Andrés
López, Daniela Ramos, and Ricardo Rozemberg
2014

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Public-private collaboration on productive development policies in Argentina / Roberto Bisang, Andrea
González, Juan Carlos Hallak, Andrés López, Daniela Ramos, and Ricardo Rozemberg.
p. cm. — (IDB Working Paper Series ; 478)
Includes bibliographic references.
1. Public-private sector cooperation—Argentina. I. Bisang, Roberto. II. González, Andrea. III. Hallak,
Juan Carlos. IV. López, Andrés. V. Ramos, Daniela. VI. Rozemberg, Ricardo. VII. Inter-American
Development Bank. Competitiveness and Innovation Division. VIII. Series.
IDB-WP-478
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Public-Private Collaboration on Productive Development
Policies in Argentina
Roberto Bisang (UBA-UNTREF), Andrea González (UDESA), Juan Carlos
Hallak (UDESA-CONICET), Andrés López (CENIT/UNTREF), Daniela
Ramos (CENIT/UNTREF), and Ricardo Rozemberg (UNSAM)
Abstract
This study discusses four cases of public-private collaboration (PPC) in the
design and implementation of productive development policies (PDP) in
Argentina. We find that PPCs have contributed to the success of most of the
studied PDPs by facilitating information sharing and creating coordination
devices that have improved the diffusion, transparency, and resilience of the
policies and a more effective use of public funds. We also identify conditions
that seem to be critical for a successful PPC. These conditions include the
previous acquaintance and existence of trust relationships among the agents
involved in the PPC, the alignment of their objectives and interests, and the
emergence of clear leaderships in the private and/or in the public sectors. The
stability of the PPCs, in turn, depends on the availability of public funding
and the creation of formal governance mechanisms, while it is threatened by
large disparities in the size, interests, and capabilities among the different
private-sector agents involved in the collaboration.
JEL Classifications: O25, H11, L56, L8, L6
Keywords: Productive development policies, Public-Private collaboration,
Argentina, Industrial policy, Economic development, institutions

1. Introduction
The design and implementation of productive development policies (PDPs) pose challenges
for policymakers, especially in emerging economies. Although pervasive market and
coordination failures pave the way for policy intervention, adopted instruments have often
been less successful than expected since policymakers usually lack important pieces of
information, they generally do not have access to rigorous evaluations of current and previous
programs, and public-sector capacity is frequently weak. Moreover, there are often
coordination problems between different agencies or levels of government. The emergence of
rent-seeking and free-riding behaviors, agency captures, and corruption also explains the
negative outcomes. The lack of resilience of public policies in light of frequent staff changes
in the public sector and cyclical fiscal crisis also hinders the effectiveness of PDPs.
Public-private collaboration schemes (PPCs) may help to alleviate some of the factors
that lead to problems in the design, implementation, and monitoring of PDPs, insofar as they
may facilitate information exchange and coordination among the various agents involved,
address some government failures, generate more transparency, and contribute to the
resilience of those policies. PPCs may range from informal consultations with the private
sector to the full involvement of the latter in the policy design, execution and monitoring
stages, including schemes such as the participation of the private sector in advisory and
supervisory bodies, technological and productive alliances, deliberation councils, and others.
In recent decades, Argentina has implemented a large and variegated number of PDPs,
in the context of different economic regimes. After the dismantling of the import substitution
regime, PDPs became less significant, and during the 1990s they were mostly aimed at
solving market failures under a horizontal approach. Following the economic crisis of 2001,
PDPs regained their relevance (in an international scenario which is also more friendly with
the adoption of PDPs). Not only were new horizontal instruments created and resources
allocated to existing ones often increased, but some new sectoral and targeted policies were
launched.
In spite of a sort of PDP renaissance, PPC schemes are still not very common (Baruj et
al., 2009). These authors point out that the weak interaction between the public and the
private sectors is to some extent the result of the instability of institutions and policies, as well
as of authorities and public agents. This discourages the development of linkages and
networks and erodes mutual confidence and consensus, because all agents assume that once
policy makers leave their posts, the policy framework will return to where it began. Moreover,
these relationships often depend on personal relationships, and there are no formal or
1

institutional channels to develop them properly. Public agencies tend to act in an isolated
fashion and are often reluctant to engage with the private sector, especially because of the risk
of being captured by private interests. Finally, private sector representatives often lack the
technical and professional staff to promote and implement any kind of PPC, and business
associations are often more prepared to lobby the government than to cooperate in order to
design, implement, and monitor PDPs.
In recent years, however, several cooperative initiatives have emerged. In addition to
the cases analyzed in this research, the small and medium enterprise (SME) policies of the
City of Buenos Aires, the clusters program sponsored by the Undersecretary of Industry,
some initiatives of the National Agency for Science and Technology Promotion (ANPCYT),
and the cases of the wine industry in Mendoza and the rice sector in Concepción (Sánchez et
al., 2011), among others, include some sort of PPC.1 The Competitiveness Forums launched
in 2003 by the Secretary of Industry are another example of a PPC. Nine chains were selected,
and all of the agents involved (from the public and private sectors and academia) were called
to debate the main competitiveness problems affecting each chain and to develop strategic
plans to address them. These were meant to be forums for the exchange of information and a
tool for coordinating actions among all the different actors related to a production chain.
However, the software and information services (SIS) sector was the only case in which a
strategic plan was effectively designed and concrete actions were proposed (Gutman et al.,
2006).
Devlin and Moguillansky (2009) and Ross Schneider (2010) provide analyses of PPC
cases, highlighting the successes and failures and distilling lessons aimed at improving the
efficacy of these arrangements. From the discussion and evidence gathered in those papers,
the following factors emerge as conditions favoring the success of PPCs:
• Strong support of government leaders
• Stability over time
• Limited number of participants in the deliberation and governing bodies
• Representation of all the relevant parties involved
• Existence of a professional and meritocratic civil service
• Competent technical staff
• Effective representation of business
• Adequate frequency and duration of interactions
1 Devlin and Moguillansky (2009) discuss Fundación ExportAr and the (recently dissolved) National Investment
2

3
• Appropriate monitoring routines.
Notwithstanding these lessons, it is not easy to develop metrics that can measure the
impact of the PPCs. As stated by Ross Schneider (2010), a possible metric would be whether
the council promotes the desired policy outcome in greater quantity and quality than would be
expected without public-private cooperation. However, it is difficult to establish the
appropriate counterfactual for the baseline, and it is also difficult to separate the impact of the
PPC from that of the policy itself. Another possible metric is the contribution of business-government
cooperation to the quality of policies and policymaking. This is also somewhat
problematic, as it is difficult to measure the quality of policy making through objective
indicators. Given these drawbacks, it is not surprising that there are few evaluations of the
impact of PPCs.
In spite of the difficulty of establishing adequate metrics, a cost-benefit approach may
be useful to understand the impact of the PPCs. Participating in these arrangements implies
costs in the form of time spent in meetings. The government may incur costs associated with
ceding part of its decision-making authority, and the private sector may divulge information
that it would prefer to keep secret. Only if the benefits associated with participation in PPCs
(e.g., solving specific problems faced by the various stakeholders) outweigh these costs will
there be incentives for agents to participate in them. However, benefits could accrue through
rent seeking, which points to the need to establish institutional arrangements that minimize
the scope for such behavior.
This study aims to contribute to the debate on the role of PPC in PDPs through a
detailed analysis of four case studies in Argentina.2 The case studies presented below include
a brief account of the sector or activity to which the PDP is applied, a description of the PDP,
and a characterization of the PPC mechanisms involved. It also presents analysis aimed at
generating knowledge about, among others, the following questions:
• What are the conditions that may favor or deter the emergence of PPC mechanisms?
• What incentives and monitoring mechanisms are in the PDP?
• What is the degree of involvement and authority of the public and the private sectors?
• What are the characteristics of the public agencies involved? (e.g., flexibility,
bureaucratic quality, isolated high-level areas, stability of key public servants, etc.).
2 There are a few available studies on the subject in Argentina. Bisang et al. (2009) analyze private-public
networks in the agriculture sector. Lengyel and Bottino (2010) study the emergence of partnerships in the
agricultural machinery and biotechnology industries. McDermott and Corredoira (2010) discuss the case of the
wine industry in Mendoza.

• Which are the characteristics of the private partners? (e.g., legitimacy, existence of prior
consensus on relevant policy issues, technical capabilities, etc.).
• Have PPCs contributed to the improvement of the quality and the outcomes of PDPs? If
4
so, how? If not, why not?
• Has the PPC generated other positive impacts beyond those originally envisaged? Has
it, for example, become a platform for identifying new challenges and opportunities?
• What is the cost-benefit balance of participating in PPCs as perceived by public and
private sector participants?
• Did rent-seeking and free-riding behaviors emerge? If not, what mechanisms were
employed to prevent them?
• How is the PPC expected to develop in the near future?
The methodology employed includes analysis of data from secondary sources (official
statistics, surveys, websites, publications, etc.) and interviews with the key agents involved in
each case, which aimed to collect information on the following subjects:
• What were the problems faced before the PPCs were launched?
• What factors led to the establishment of the PPCs?
• Was the PPC directly associated with the PDP, or did it emerge during the PDP’s
implementation?
• What were the institutional arrangements chosen, and why? What types of issues are
discussed in the context of the PPC?
• How did the public sector reorganize in order to adapt to the PPC?
• Does the PPC help the government gain access to valuable information from the private
sector?
• Has the PPC led to the emergence of permanent public-private networks that may
transcend the original objective of the PPC?
• What actions were taken, if any, to improve the resilience of PPCs?
The evidence gathered from the case studies will bring out common features that may
lead to the success (or failure) of the PPC, as well as idiosyncratic features related to the
objectives, actors or specific arrangements adopted in each case. The result of this analysis is
presented in the final section, along with lessons learned that may be applied to other sectors
and regions in order to increase the effectiveness of PPC schemes.

2. Empleartec: Human Capital for the Software and Information
Services Sector
2.1. The Problem
Argentina has become a significant player in the software and information services (SIS)
sector within the region. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Argentina was
the major Latin American exporter of SIS in 2010. After the 2001-2002 crisis, the SIS sector
gained momentum, helped initially by the devaluation of the peso, which fostered exports,
and then by the economic recovery, which led to rapid growth in the domestic market. Annual
revenues grew from US$830 million to US$3 billion between 2003 and 2011, while exports
rose from US$170 million to US$790 million, and employment increased from 19,000 to
64,000 employees, according to data from the Software & IT Services Chamber of Commerce
(Cámara de Empresas de Software y Servicios Informáticos, CESSI). According to the
Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security (MTEySS), between 1998 and 2011, the
SIS sector had the highest employment growth rate in Argentina’s economy.
The sector’s vibrant performance was reinforced by some specific PDPs. In 2003, the
Ministry of Economy created the SIS Competitiveness Forum, with the aim of initiating a
debate on the policies needed to improve competitiveness in the sector. The SIS forum led to
the Strategic Plan for Software and Information Services 2004-2014, which identified
challenges and opportunities and defined concrete actions to be carried out. Officials from the
national, provincial and municipal governments, as well as representatives from the private
sector and academia (Gutman et al., 2006), participated in the Forum. Subsequently, in 2004,
two laws promoting the SIS sector were passed. Law No. 25.856 established software
production as an industrial activity subject to possible tax exemptions, favorable credit terms,
and other concessions. Law No. 25.922 granted tax benefits to SIS companies and created a
Software Industry Promotion Fund (FONSOFT) aimed at financing R&D expenditures in
SMEs, universities, and research centers. Furthermore, many Argentine provinces are offering
their own tax benefits to SIS companies wishing to invest in their territories (e.g. the city of
Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Tucumán).
All studies dealing with export competitiveness and investment attraction in the SIS
industry highlight the fact that access to skilled human resources is a key factor in this sector
(Meyer, 2007; Doh et al., 2008; Nyahoho, 2010). Access to human capital is not only
important from the point of view of knowledge, but has also a major impact on costs.3
3 Direct and indirect labor costs amount to more than 70 percent of total costs in the SIS sector in Argentina
(OPSSI, 2012).
5

Although Argentina's educational system has been, to date, a source of competitive
advantage in the SIS sector, increasing labor demand derived from the rapid growth of the
sector has led to fierce competition for scarce human resources. In fact, there is broad
consensus on the fact that the most important obstacle for further growth in the SIS sector is
labor supply restrictions, which generate skilled labor shortages and wage pressures (OPSSI,
2010).
OPSSI (2010) estimates that in the past 13 years, the number of new students enrolled
in graduate and postgraduate programs in informatics has been stable at an average of 22,500
entrants. Since only some 15 percent of new entrants graduate, there are only about 3,000 new
IT professionals annually. In turn, employment in this sector increased at a rate of 6,000 jobs
per year in recent years (Figure 1). This gap is even wider given the fact that approximately
50 percent of graduates do not work in software and computer service firms, but rather in
other sectors, in the government, in other institutions, or are self-employed.
Figure 1. Employment in the SIS Sector and Students, Graduates and Freshmen in
IT-related Degrees (1996-2008, 2001=100)
6
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Workers
Total
enrollment
Degrees
granted
Freshman
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: OEDE-MTEySS and Secretary of University Policy.
The lagging supply of IT workers is due mostly to the lack of interest in the field on
the part of young people. Although this is a problem in many Western countries, there could
also be specific factors at stake in Argentina. López and Ramos (2008) point to flaws in
secondary education, such as poor performance in mathematics and science in Argentine
schools, as measured by Program for International Students Assessments (PISA) test scores.
This may deter students from entering into IT-related careers. Another factor, according to

these authors, may be imperfect information about labor market conditions, which leads to a
flawed perception about the growing demand for IT professionals.
2.2. The Program
2.2.1 Background
In order to try to solve the labor force bottleneck, the government and the private sector have
been taking actions to provide training opportunities in the IT sector and IT-related programs
of study (López et al., 2010). These policies are often launched and managed in public-private
cooperation schemes, which was to some extent a legacy of the intense interaction between
the government and the private sector in the Competitiveness Forum as well as in the
development of the Strategic Plan for the sector and the enactment of laws designed to foster
the development of the industry.
The key private actor in this cooperation is CESSI, created in 1990. Today, CESSI
brings together more than 350 companies and institutions representing 80 percent of revenues
and over 85 percent of the employment in the sector. Twenty-five regional and provincial
organizations representing the software sector in their jurisdictions are also affiliated with
CESSI (thus, another 400 firms are indirectly associated to CESSI).
At the end of 2005, CESSI and the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
launched the InverTI en vos (Invest in Yourself) program, aimed at promoting the new
employment and educational opportunities in IT-related fields among high school students.
Scholarships programs were also launched. The Becas Bicentenario grants scholarships to
students wishing to enter into priority fields, including many IT-related ones. Another
program is the PNBTIC (Programa Nacional de Becas para Carreras de Grado en Área TICS),
which grants scholarships to students in IT-related fields of study.
Between 2004 and 2006, there were two relatively large training programs in
operation: the +Mas Plan (sponsored by Microsoft, co-funded with the MTEySS, and jointly
organized with CESSI) and the Entertech Plan (sponsored by Oracle and Sun, with the
participation of MTEySS and CESSI). More than 3,500 people were trained in these programs.
A second version of the Entertech Plan was launched in 2008, which trained 1500 people. In
2007 the InverTI en Vos program trained 800 people. Oracle, CESSI, and the MTEySS
managed it. Some provinces also took action to promote IT-related studies.
There are no evaluations of the impact of these programs. Although some of them may
have surely helped to alleviate the scarcity of qualified human resources, from the above
7

analysis it would appear that they failed to make a significant change in the labor supply for
this industry.
2.2.2 Case Presentation
The most ambitious training initiative adopted in this sector in Argentina’s history is the
scholarship plan initially known as Control F/A, currently called Empleartec. This initiative is
jointly managed by the MTEySS through its program called Formación Continua (continuous
training) in conjunction with CESSI and some leading private firms (Cisco, Microsoft,
Oracle, IBM, Red Hat, and local firms such as Calipso, Globant, Snoop, and G&L Group).
The MTEySS, with the support of the World Bank and the United Nations
Development Programme, launched the Formación Continua program in 2007. The MTEySS
co-finances the program. Control F/A is one of the four largest programs of the 40 such
initiatives currently managed by the MTEySS. These programs are mainly aimed at young
people who have difficulty finding employment or who are unemployed, but they are open to
anyone over 18. In fact, as unemployment rates have been falling, the content of the
Formación Continua program itself gradually changed, and now focuses more on upgrading
job skills rather than entry into the labor market.
The launching of the Control F/A program was a natural follow-on to the previous
collaborative experiences between CESSI, the MTEySS, and some private SIS firms. The first
stage of the program included CESSI and five large SIS firms (Microsoft, Oracle, Sun, Cisco
and IBM.)4 Later, other firms, universities and software poles and clusters were incorporated.
Today, in addition to the abovementioned local and foreign firms, 16 poles and clusters and
14 universities and other educational organizations are involved in the program.
When the program began, its purpose was to train human resources in some specific
areas defined by the five original sponsoring firms. The training was mostly on the
proprietary technologies of those firms and it made use of teaching materials already available
through the Control + F scholarships.5 Later, at the request of the MTEySS, the scope of the
courses was expanded to include more technologies, including free and open source programs
and applications, and the Control+A scholarships were created with the aim of providing
basic training in the IT area, specifically, digital alphabetization.
4 According to those interviewed for this research, this is the first case in which these giant IT firms worked
together in a training program (although they work individually on similar training plans with governments in
other countries).
5 The courses offered under this modality aim at granting technical and functional training in areas such as
computer programming, databases and operating systems administration, software development for mobile
applications, videogames, ., web page design, software project management, ERP implementation, software
testing, and others.
8

Currently, free training courses covering 40 different technological areas and levels
are offered in the city of Buenos Aires, the Greater Buenos Aires and another 21 cities in 14
provinces. The courses are funded by the MTE&SS. They are mostly are 80 hours long and
official certificates are delivered to students who pass them. So far, $32 million
(approximately US$7 million) have been transferred from the MTEySS to run the program.
Since its launching in mid-2012, some 21,000 people have been trained. As part of the
program, 43 institutions received 12 sets of state-of-the-art hardware equipment to install or
improve computer labs where training courses are offered.
A recently launched stage of the program (renamed Empleartec in 2012) aims to train
30,000 people between 2012 and 2014. Besides including new thematic areas and placing
more emphasis on digital alphabetization,6 this new phase will train teachers and professors in
the use of IT and will promote the use of IT technology in the fields and courses that grant
teaching degrees in Argentina. It will also establish linkages with other IT-related public
programs and will gradually align the contents of the courses with the human capital
requirements identified in other private-public partnerships in this sector (e.g., Strategic
Industrial Plan 2020, run by the Ministry of Industry).
The Empleartec Program has five phases. The first includes basic planning, based on
an analysis of the demand for skills and the available supply of courses and knowledge in
different areas. CESSI invites its members and other partners to take part in the program, and
a more detailed demand-supply analysis is made to determine the courses, the locations where
they can be given, and the institutions able to teach them. A plan is then presented to the
MTEySS. Once the proposal is approved, a framework protocol is signed between MTEySS
and CESSI and specific agreements are signed with firms and educational institutions.
Advertising campaigns are then launched and beneficiaries are selected.
CESSI selects the beneficiaries and then checks them with the universities, clusters,
poles, and other educational organizations (“efectores” in the program’s terminology) and the
sponsoring firms, based on the parameters previously defined with the MTEySS. People who
complete the courses receive an official certification issued by the MTEySS and are entered
into a database accessible online to people needing to hire personnel trained in the areas
covered by the program. The Network of Employment Offices of the MTEySS also helps
graduates find jobs and propose prospective students. Students evaluate the quality of the
courses and educational institutions and provide feedback to CESSI.
6 All in all, digital alphabetization finally contributes to expand the market for IT firms.
9

The MTEySS and CESSI jointly define goals every six months, and disbursement of
funds is subject to their accomplishment. The MTEySS verifies the actual delivery of the
educational services and monitors the evolution of the program through a follow-up system in
which its regional Employment Offices also take part.
The division of labor within the program is as follows: CESSI a) designs the program
and presents it to the MTEySS; b) coordinates the design and implementation of the courses
jointly with the firms, institutions, and universities participating in the program; c)
administers the funds received from MTEySS; and d) monitors program performance and
outcomes.
The roles of the sponsoring firms are: a) proposing the areas where knowledge and
demand-supply gaps exist; b) determining the institutions that will give the training courses
and when and where are they to be given; c) ensuring the quality of the courses and the
teaching (in most cases, these firms define the course content and provide the teaching
materials, while in others this is responsibility of the educational organizations).
The educational organizations and clusters that provide the training give the courses
and provide the infrastructure and logistics. Instructors are paid by the hour, and the program
pays the “efectores” for the use of their facilities.
As the most representative SIS sector business association, CESSI operates as
coordinator of the program on behalf of the private sector and serves as the interface with the
MTEySS. Besides financing the program, MTEySS’s role is mainly oversight. That is, it
ensures that the design and aims of the program are aligned with their own policy objectives,
supervises its implementation, helps disseminate employment opportunities among those
trained, and includes them in databases where employers can look for prospective employees.
Although the original target audience of the Formación Continua program was young
people who could not find employment, in practice, it was clear from the start that the Control
F Scholarships were aimed at students who had at least completed high school, including
those who already had work experience in the sector or who were employed in the IT field.
According to some of those interviewed for this study, the average quality of the courses may
have been rising. Basic IT courses are also given, as well as courses that allow students to
enter relatively rapidly into the labor market by mastering certain technologies.
There was a learning process during the implementation of the plan. The composition,
background, and interests of the students were not known a priori, so the firms and the
implementers (“efectores”) had to adjust the nature and content of the courses in order to meet
10

the needs of the target audience. According to some of those interviewed, this process helped
improve the courses and better define their audience.
An adaptation and learning process also occurred within the organizations involved in
the program. The MTEySS had to adapt in order to work with a sector that employs people
with higher educational credentials than the average of its other sectoral partners. Thus, at the
beginning of the program, there was some reluctance in some areas of the Ministry, especially
in its regional offices. CESSI, the SIS firms and the universities also underwent an adaptation
process aimed at including in their training plans people with employment problems and/or
with poor educational backgrounds.
Other lessons emerged during the evolution of the program that are now reflected in
new commitments and aims included in the new phase of the program. The MTEySS wants
the firms to adapt their manuals to make them more effective and pedagogical,7 and also aims
to do a better job of monitoring teachers’ skills. It has even incorporated an expert in
curriculum. The MTEysSS has also asked CESSI to make a technological adaptation of a
software program that helps blind people to use computers and has installed a new lab aimed
at running 3D simulation programs that will be used in the training programs of other sectors.
Officials from MTEySS indicated that around 65 percent of the students trained under the
Control +F program found employment or increased their wages after completing the courses.
Although the program trained people not working in the SIS sector or who were unemployed
and improved the capacity of people already acquainted with IT technologies, there is no
single measure of the success of the program. In any case, when one compares the number of
people trained (and the number projected in the new phase) with the total number of people
employed in the sector, the program has the potential to have a major impact on the SIS labor
market. The renewal and expansion of the program is a sign that both the private and the
public sectors have a favorable view of its outcomes.
2.3 Case Analysis
2.3.1 Trust and Previous Relationships
The existence of prior linkages among all of the agents involved facilitated the creation and
implementation of this program. Moreover, the need for trained personnel had been
extensively discussed in many arenas, including the Sectoral Competitiveness Forum, and
was identified as the main obstacle for progress in the SIS sector in Argentina. All of the
agents that participated in the launching of the program had already been involved in training
7 The international firms use the same manuals employed in other parts of the world where they organize similar
courses.
11

plans that were their direct precursors. This generated a valuable learning process about the
supply and demand side of the training market in this sector.
2.3.2 Profile of the Private Sector Representatives
CESSI is a relatively young business association, and the profile of its members and directors
is different from the average Argentine business association insofar as they are mostly
academics who work in a sector in which technical change is rapid and the need to be aware
of global business trends is more pressing than for the average Argentine firm. This could
help to explain why CESSI has been so active in launching initiatives aimed at addressing the
challenges faced by the sector (i.e., lack of skilled personnel, access to finance and foreign
markets, incrementing R&D activities, etc.). Today, CESSI is widely acknowledged as
representing the interests of the SIS sector, a status it earned through its actions and initiatives.
The MTEySS officials interviewed for this study stated that CESSI was the most dynamic
business association among all those with whom they had worked on sectoral training
programs.8
2.3.3 Incentive Scheme
The main incentive for the private sector is the prospect of training human resources, a need
felt by firms of all sizes and segments within the SIS industry. Costs are low and are mainly
borne by CESSI, which assigns part of its staff to manage the program, and by private firms,
which also assign staff and provide contents of the courses at little or no cost. Firms
participating in the program have no monetary incentive to do so, although in some cases the
courses teach technologies developed and sold by them (hence contributing to expanding their
markets). Universities and clusters receive funding for their teachers and state-of-the-art
equipment, which allows them to consolidate institutionally.
2.3.4 Governance, Management, and Operation
The private sector has broad involvement and ample authority both at the design and the
implementation stage. CESSI, jointly with sponsoring firms, defines course objectives and
content and invites universities and clusters to participate. The rationale behind the division of
labor is that the private sector knows what skills are needed (which often change rapidly as a
result of technical progress), and the institutions design high-quality courses and provide
materials and content based on their technical knowledge. The government has access to
8 According to MTEySS officials, in the industrial sectors, trade unions (which do not exist in the SIS sector) are
often more interested in promoting training activities than employers’ associations.
12

information that otherwise would be very costly to gather. The MTEySS has access to funds
that are not available to the private sector, can set up proper monitoring mechanisms, and has
a wide network of agencies that can help disseminate the program and foster the insertion of
trained personnel into the formal labor market. Universities and other implementing agencies
have contacts with potential students and with the instructors.
2.3.5 Capture, Rent Seeking, and Free Riding
Although the program includes courses that train people in proprietary technologies created
and/or owned by sponsor firms, the fact that the program is open to participation from all
private firms reduces the risk that the program will be captured by a small group of firms
which could use it to reinforce the use of their proprietary technologies at the expense of other
firms. Even some open-source technologies, such as Linux, are part of the program. Likewise,
although it would appear that large firms would benefit the most from this program since they
are the largest labor demanders, the alleviation of the labor supply bottleneck favors all kinds
of firms, since it reduces wage pressures and staff turnover. Moreover, some sponsor firms,
such as Oracle, Microsoft, or Red Hat, are seldom interested in recruiting people trained
under this program for their Argentine affiliates. Their major incentive is to train human
resources that could use their technologies. That is, they are more interested in expanding
their market share than expanding their work force in Argentina. In summary, although the
SIS sector is largely heterogeneous in terms of firm size, specialization, strategies, and
objectives, the concern about the lack of trained human resources is broadly shared, which
lends legitimacy to this type of program. Thus, rent seeking and free riding do not appear to
be associated with this program.
2.3.6 Resilience
This PPC experience has been ongoing for many years and has been renewed until 2014. This
is a testament to the resilience of the program, even in the presence of big changes in the labor
market in Argentina. This resilience has been favored by the legitimacy and capabilities of the
private actors involved, as well as by the continuity of senior management in the MTEySS
and the creation of a specialized section within the Ministry managed by a professional
structure, which deals exclusively with this kind of programs.
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2.3.7 Learning
A learning process has taken place during the evolution of the program. It has to do not only
with the adaptation process that occurred within the public and the private sectors, but also
with the emergence of new developments included in the new phase of the plan. These new
elements are aimed at improving the alignment of the program’s activities with the training
needs of the local markets as well as generating some externalities that could benefit other
sectors or some disadvantaged groups of the population.
3. Fashion Design
3.1 Introduction
The international competitiveness of differentiated products largely hinges on their design
features, as these enable the incorporation of value added and contribute to achieving a better
positioning in high-end segments of the international market. Product design plays a crucial
role in the fashion industry. Over the past decade, part of Argentina’s garment industry has
gradually introduced design management as a systematic activity at firms, driving remarkable
transformations in their business practices. At the same time, apparel consumers in Argentina
have started to recognize original design. These recent shifts buttress a potential for export
growth that was not present a decade ago.
This case study describes the PPC between the National Industrial Technology
Institute’s Textile Research and Development Center (INTI Textiles) and Pro-Tejer
Foundation (Pro-Tejer) to promote fashion design. This collaboration includes a study entitled
“Argentine Design Map” (henceforth, the Map), a program called “Street Design Circuits”
(henceforth, SDC), and the “Signature Fashion National Design Survey” (“the Survey”).
3.2 Argentina’s Fashion Design Phenomenon
The Argentine fashion design phenomenon started in the 1990s and consolidated in the 2000s.
At present, undergraduate design programs—graphic, fashion, and textile design—rank
among the top ten public university programs, with the largest enrollment in the area around
Buenos Aires (MECyT, 2005). In the 2000s, design increasingly became a key competitive
factor in the apparel industry. Business startups launched by some 20 fashion designers with a
university degree and the efforts made by large garment marketers (brands) raised design
awareness among Argentine consumers.
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Argentine designers entered the country’s traditional clothing market with their own
brands in 2001 (Saulquin, 2006). These designers offer high value-added products on a small
scale and are known as “signature fashion designers.” Initially, their products were sold at
multi-brand stores located in Buenos Aires’ commercial hubs, such as the trendy Palermo
neighborhood. Some have grown sufficiently large to have their own stores in the leading
shopping malls. According to the Survey (Marino et al., 2011), 200 firms manufacture
signature design garments in Argentina. Ninety percent of them have annual sales below
US$400,000, while 30 percent export their clothes, primarily to Latin America, Italy, and
Spain. For 5 percent of them, exports account for 80 percent of their output.
A large number of Argentine fashion brands have established themselves in the local
market. Increasingly, brands view design as a key strategic component of their business and
change their organizational, marketing, and production practices to incorporate design
management as a systematic activity. Brands have professionalized their design capabilities.
Some have incorporated designers to their payroll to help them develop their brand image.
Others have also introduced original design in the styles they offer. Some brands have allied
themselves with signature designers to create original designs for specific products lines. A
feature that characterizes Argentina’s fashion market is the number of local brands. While in
other Latin American countries familiar consumer brands are largely international, in
Argentina most renowned brands are domestic (Saulquin, 2008).
Consumers’ greater appreciation for original design and the growing design
professionalization of local brands has propelled the international dissemination of
Argentina’s fashion industry. National brands have successfully expanded across Latin
America, opening stores and building regional franchises. In turn, signature designers have
ventured into the U.S. and Japanese markets, selling their garments at specialty design stores.
More Argentine brands and signature designers now participate in international fashion shows.
These transformations have led to a new three-category segmentation of the market—mass
market, brands, and signature designers—depending on the degree of originality and
sophistication of the products’ designs. While common in developed countries, this
categorization is rare in Latin America, where apparel markets are only divided into two
segments: mass market and brands. Firms competing in Argentina’s mass market segment
typically copy or adapt styles designed and marketed in developed countries, leveraging their
Southern Hemisphere location to follow trend-setting countries counter-seasonally.
Argentina’s garment exports have recorded steady growth since 2000. Totaling US$87
million in 2010, these exports were primarily shipped to South America. The volume of
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garment imports is considerably larger, reaching US$328 million in 2010. China, Peru, and
Brazil are the leading sources of imports. In 2005, Argentina’s government established a non-automatic
import license scheme to protect the domestic industry. This protectionist policy
became substantially more stringent in the second half of 2011.
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3.3. Case Description
3.3.1 Organizations
Pro-Tejer
Pro-Tejer is a non-governmental organization created to provide a political forum for the
defense of Argentina’s textile and apparel industry. It stands out among traditional business
associations because it promotes a comprehensive view of the textile value chain.9 It was
founded in 2003 by a 38-member board. Aldo Karagozian, TN&Platex’s10 owner and Pro-
Tejer’s chairman from its inception to 2007, organized the founders. They came from
companies all along the textile value chain and from a variety of organizations—such as
universities, one research institute (INTI), and one labor union—related to the sector. Pro-
Tejer’s founding board intended to build an advocacy platform to represent the local textile
and fashion industry before Argentina’s government and public opinion after its chain became
fragmented in the 1990s. Pro-Tejer soon became the industry’s leading representative,
championing policies that enhance the sector’s competitiveness but particularly lobbying for
trade protection. While this organization encompasses the entire industry, not all sub-sectors
are equally represented or view it as representing their interests. In particular, thread mills
weigh more heavily and wield considerably more power than designers and brands. Pro-Tejer
is managed by an executive director, which currently relies on two outside advisors and a staff
with professionals in economics, business administration, and communications.
Promoting design in the textile and apparel industry was one of Karagozian’s main
goals. Pro-Tejer’s initial leadership viewed design as an essential driver for the industry’s
development and international competitiveness, building initiatives with public sector
agencies, private firms, and universities. The organization’s key move to foster design was its
collaboration with INTI Textiles. In its early years, a few founders who primarily represented
thread mills and fabric manufacturers established Pro-Tejer’s policies. This did not hinder
9 The textile value chain encompasses fiber producers, thread mills, fabric manufacturers, garment manufacturers,
designers, brands, and supply vendors.
10 TN&Platex is Argentina’s largest cotton fabric producer and exporter.

efforts to promote fashion design at first, but, later, it curtailed their continuity, as these
initiatives did not bring any financial gains to these two sub-sectors.
INTI Textiles
INTI is the nation’s foremost industrial technology public research institute. It was created in
1957 as an independent institute to conduct industrial technology-applied research and
outreach programs to enhance Argentina’s industrial competitiveness. INTI Textiles is the
center that promotes textile and apparel industry development, serving also as a technological
benchmark for the industry. Since its inception in 1967, INTI Textiles has provided a number
of services, including lab tests and training on textile and apparel manufacturing technologies,
that effectively transfer knowledge and technology to firms, building trust-based relationships
among individuals serving at both ends. Approximately 70 percent of INTI Textiles’ funding
comes from their own services, while the remaining 30 percent comes from INTI’s budget.
Labor relations at INTI are characterized by long-standing job stability. In fact, INTI Textiles’
director and deputy director have served in those positions for over 20 years.
In 1997, INTI Textiles formulated a long-term strategy based on the promotion of
fashion design, despite INTI’s resistance. In pursuit of this strategy, INTI Textiles gradually
introduced specific services for garment manufacturers, designers, and brands, refocusing its
traditional operations. In 2001, it created a Trends Observatory (henceforth, the Observatory),
which reports on international fashion and trends, researches Argentina’s fashion design
identity, disseminates Argentine signature designers’ work in the domestic market, and trains
apparel manufacturers, designers, and brands. Since 2007, the Observatory has also conducted
research on Argentina’s fashion design identity. To this end, it surveys emerging trends in
Argentina and crafts the “Argentine Design Map.” This map identifies fashion “signature”
designs across the nation, their designers, and, finally, the productive processes used to
manufacture garments. INTI Textiles has become remarkably well known as an expert in
fashion design among industry players.
The organization of INTI provides a great deal of autonomy to its various research and
development centers. INTI Textiles is a mixed organization, with private firms joining by
paying a monthly fee. By 2011, the center had 182 associates. Industry representatives, who
are part of an executive committee of 12 members, share decisions on the center’s planning
and follow-up activities. They represent three industry chambers, one business association,
and eight large and medium-sized companies. Private sector engagement favors information
exchanges that shed light on the sector’s needs.
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3.3.2 Public-Private Collaboration
Since 2005 INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer have come together on a number of collaborative
initiatives to develop Argentina’s textile and apparel industry. This study focuses on those
specifically oriented to the promotion of design, particularly the Street Design Circuits (SDC)
program, conducted from 2007 to 2011, and the Survey, carried out since 2010. A related
initiative is the “Argentine Design Map,” (hereafter the Map) begun in 2007 and still
underway.
Street Design Circuits
The most important collaboration endeavor between INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer was the
Street Design Circuits (SDC) program, intended to advance their common goal of positioning
Argentina as a fashion design hub. The organizations’ shared vision came in the wake of the
Map, which identified signature designs featuring originality, innovation, and a unique
identity, and the creators of those designs. The SDC program was created to disseminate this
phenomenon and to educate the general public on fashion design, raising awareness about the
value it adds to national products. To these ends, the program organized one-day tours around
urban design circuits. Circuit layouts were mapped to showcase the fashion design offerings
found in stores located in specific areas.11 Since the program’s inception in 2007, 22 such
events were carried out, with 95 percent of them organized in 2007–2010 and the last one
taking place in 2011.
The idea for the program surfaced in a day-long brainstorming session held by
members of both institutions to come up with plans for joint efforts to support Argentina’s
fledgling local identity fashion design, boosting its visibility. The program’s scheme and
name were crafted at that meeting.
Each institution took up specific roles and brought distinct resources to the PPC. INTI
contributed its knowledge of local designers. Pro-Tejer provided funding to support specific
activities, such as staffing events and the logistics needed to approach designers to invite them
to join the program, as well as contacting local media to advertise the program.
Since its inception, program tours were funded with contributions from several
sources. The ongoing programs required a disbursement ranging from US$10,000 to
US$20,000. Pro-Tejer provided a large share of the funding. The resources required to
organize the program in every city came from partnerships with local institutions. The
11 INTI Textiles currently records 20 design circuits in Argentina.
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funding scheme initially designed by both INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer counted on
contributions from companies and other organizations that would serve as sponsors, but this
scheme failed to prove fruitful. Only TN&Platex, managed by Karagozian, provided financial
support for all program editions, and only seven other textile companies occasionally
supported the program financially. As a result, they resorted to agreements with local
institutions in the cities where the program was carried to help them cover event expenses.
Pro-Tejer ceased to fund the program in late 2010. The program’s first edition took place in
Palermo, a Buenos Aires neighborhood boasting a large designer density, and the city’s
Ministry of Culture was a strategic partner. This government agency engaged in the program
since its first edition, providing financial support for all the events conducted in the city. The
only program event conducted in 2011 took place in Salta with the support of that province’s
local government.
Overall, the goals of the program were accomplished. These goals included
disseminating signature designers’ work, legitimizing the value of original design work in the
eyes of the consumer, and raising awareness about the magnitude of this sector in Argentina.
Notably, the program managed to successfully and broadly disseminate Argentine fashion
design in the local market, fostering a consumer culture that appreciates Argentina’s original
design, building networks that bring signature fashion designers together, putting the design
phenomenon on the public agenda, and promoting Argentine fashion design internationally.
While it is impossible to quantify the extent to which the program influenced the
development of a consumer culture that values design, we believe its impact was substantial.
First, several signature designers have come together on a number of joint initiatives. Second,
signature designers and brands have started forging alliances to develop specific product lines.
These partnerships enable brands to reposition their corporate images, explicitly associating
themselves with design and originality in consumers’ minds. In turn, these alliances help
signature designers disseminate their work to broader audiences, benefiting from press
coverage that is usually unavailable to them. Third, some signature designers with long track
records have begun to serve as advisors on collection development and brand image for
domestic brands. Fourth, signature designers have grown closer to thread mills, which have
started to cater to their smaller-scale needs.
Networks of signature designers have been created as a result of this program. As
designers from several cities were able to showcase their work, they came together to
organize business and productive ventures. While the creation of these networks was not a
specific program goal, INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer supported designers’ spontaneous
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initiatives and designed projects to enhance them. One of the main such events in terms of
duration, organization, and resource requirements is Las cosas del quehacer. In 2010, the
Observatory started this project to provide a forum for signature design in Argentine, inviting
signature designers from Argentina’s provinces to join in to discuss fashion design in the
country. Starting in 2011, the SDC program lost momentum within INTI Textiles-Pro-Tejer’s
PPC, while Las cosas del quehacer has grown into a new PPC, albeit without Pro-Tejer’s
financial support.
Inserting Argentina’s design phenomenon into the public agenda has led to the
creation of programs intended to incorporate design into manufacturing companies’
operations at the national, provincial, and city levels. In addition, public agencies have
increased their interaction. An initiative that engages a number of public and private
organizations is the Argentine Design Map runway during Buenos Aires Fashion Week (BAF
Week). In 2012, two such events were held, featuring eight signature designers from
Argentine provinces. INTI Textiles served as runway show curator, organizing participating
firms’ presentation with the support of many other agencies.
The Signature Fashion National Design Survey
As a result of the successful management and execution of both the Map and SDC programs,
INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer chose to move forward on their collaboration, embarking on a
nationwide signature fashion design survey. The purpose of this survey is to create a tool to
quantify and characterize the emerging fashion design phenomenon. The first survey was
conducted in 2010 and was used as the basis for a study entitled “Signature Fashion Design in
Argentina.” This study includes an assessment of signature fashion production and an
economic impact analysis. The survey was revised and conducted again in 2011. While in
2010 the sample included 150 designers, a year later this number had increased to 200.
The idea for this initiative came from the interaction of an INTI Textiles member and
a Pro-Tejer official who had worked on the SDC program and had decided to enroll together
in a graduate program in international culture and communication management. For the final
paper in one of their courses, they chose to work together on Argentina’s signature fashion
design phenomenon, specifically addressing the lack of quantitative information on it.
Both INTI and Pro-Tejer support this survey with additional contributions. INTI
Textiles has provided its signature fashion designers’ database and a dedicated team of
Observatory members. Pro-Tejer supplies institutional support and dissemination efforts. The
goal of this program—to produce metrics that characterize and quantify the activity of
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signature fashion designers—has been accomplished. The dissemination of survey findings
and its vast recognition among relevant public agencies have been among the most
outstanding outcomes achieved by this public-private collaboration. This has favored the
visibility and institutionalization of the segment in the public sector.
3.4 Case Analysis
3.4.1 Incentive Scheme
In addition to Aldo Karagozian’s potentially idealistic interest in promoting design in
Argentina’s textile and apparel industry, a key incentive for his proactive involvement—as
both Pro-Tejer’s founder and first chair—in this PPC was the potential benefits it might bring
to Pro-Tejer’s positioning in the eyes of the public. Promoting design through specific actions
such as the Map, the SDC program, and the Survey strengthened Pro-Tejer’s public image.
This endeavor differed from the traditional protectionist lobbying efforts that business
associations in the textile industry had been known for in the past, as it highlighted the
benefits of integrating the textile chain. A driver that fueled Pro-Tejer’s initial commitment to
promoting design was the recognition awarded by foreign specialists to Argentine design
during the foundation’s early institutional missions abroad. Eventually, Pro-Tejer’s claims for
a protectionist legitimized more protective policies turn taken by Argentina’s national
government towards the manufacturing sector. As a result, Pro-Tejer lost interest in
supporting the SDC program. Pro-Tejer stopped funding the program but continued to
collaborate with INTI Textiles in promoting design with initiatives like the Map and the
Survey, as well as sponsoring BAF Week’s runway show.
In addition, Pro-Tejer’s officials might have envisioned that the development of a
strong and internationally recognized local fashion industry, and the ability to sell its products
in foreign markets would imply a higher demand for their companies’ products. However, this
potential may have ceased to encourage them when, eventually, signature fashion designers’
business ventures proved of limited volume.
INTI Textiles’ incentives to engage in this PPC revolved around the fact that this
collaboration largely fitted in with its long-term strategy to promote fashion design in
Argentina. This strategy was set in 1997 by INTI Textiles’ leadership, despite the opposition
of top officials and other R&D centers at INTI. We think that the fact that INTI Textiles’
heads made this strategic decision and stuck to it despite INTI’s initial reluctance is partially
explained by their job stability and professionalism, the partial autonomy of this public
21

institution from short-term political swings, and its trust-based relationships with private-sector
officials who turn to this institute for technological advice.
The PPC with Pro-Tejer to promote fashion design provided an opportunity for INTI
Textiles to rise as a nationwide authority in fashion design. The initiatives carried out with
Pro-Tejer awarded INTI Textiles greater visibility and recognition at INTI, as well as among
other public agencies and Argentina’s designer community. Its greater visibility inside INTI
strengthened INTI Textiles’ autonomy from its parent organization’s leadership. Its newfound
recognition among public agencies and fashion designers enabled INTI Textiles to broaden its
Observatory services and enhance its self-sustainability.
3.4.2 Relationships
Prior interpersonal relationships between INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer members proved
instrumental for the PPC. The people who started it had already established a personal
connection, forged as a result of the technical advice services provided by INTI Textiles to
TN&Platex over the years. Their personal relationships were based on mutual trust and
respect. INTI Textiles officials had also built similar ties with other Pro-Tejer founders. An
example that illustrates these ties is their relationship with Susana Saulquin, an Argentine
expert on fashion sociology who participated in the creation and early management of UBA’s
Textile and Fashion Design program. Back then, Saulquin, also a founding member at Pro-
Tejer, provided advice to INTI Textiles. Hence, a first hypothesis to explain the creation of a
favorable forum for the surge of ideas may point to the existence of former inter-personal,
trust-based relationships among the members of these institutions. These bonds supported a
fast decision-making process that facilitated the design and execution of shared initiatives. A
mutual knowledge of how the people involved in the PPC worked enabled participants to
confidently assign specific roles to execute these initiatives.
By 2002, Saulquin had noticed an emerging Argentine fashion trend-setting
phenomenon (Saulquin, 2006). This view was shared by Karagozian and Patricia Marino, the
head of INTI Textiles, who, from their respective positions promoted local design with a
number of efforts intended to link manufacturers and designers to drive the creation of
products with a unique identity. The participation of Karagozian, Marino, and Saulquin in the
early commissions set up at Pro-Tejer to work on potential strategies led to the identification
of design as the key to enhancing the international competitiveness of Argentina’s apparel
industry.
The initiatives launched as part of this PPC are characterized by symmetric
engagement of both the private and the public sectors in their vision, design, and execution.
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INTI Textiles’ and Pro-Tejer’s leadership shared a common view about the relevance of
Argentina’s design phenomenon and the need to make it more visible, coming together to
design a research study on Argentina’s design identity, the SDC program, and the Survey.
While both the research study and the Survey had been co-managed since their creation, the
SDC was managed jointly in its early years (2007-2010), and INTI Textiles alone oversaw its
last edition in 2011.
3.4.3 Monitoring Mechanisms
These PPC initiatives lack any formal monitoring mechanisms to evaluate outcomes and
impact. The backbone of trust and respect that supports the relationships between managers at
the two institutions made this collaboration possible, despite the absence of formal monitoring
mechanisms. Within each institution, however, standard monitoring procedures control the
actions of employees. At Pro-Tejer, for example, after each SDC event, the staff involved in
its co-management reported to the Board, accounting for all expenses.
3.4.4 Public and Private Sector Features
We believe INTI Textiles’ ability to plan and execute this PPC may be largely attributed to its
top officials’ stability and professionalism. The organization’s head and vice-head have made
a professional career within INTI as sector specialists and have a strong sense of belonging to
the institution. Thus, they enjoy the respect of a professional staff in an organization with a
culture that places a high value on technical expertise. In addition, this center’s directors
might be endowed with uncommon leadership abilities as well as outstanding strategic vision
and motivation. In fact, their success in accomplishing their unit’s strategic goals has been
recently rewarded with appointments to higher managerial positions at INTI, heading the
Marketing and Development Departments, respectively.
Pro-Tejer’s management also displayed salient personal features that might help
explain their willingness to engage in this PPC and their ability to lead their organization in
support of this collaboration. In particular, both Pro-Tejer’s chairman and its executive
director at the time this PPC was built demonstrated conviction and motivation in fostering
the professionalization of design in Argentina’s textile and apparel industry. The executive
director also had a professional stature that is rare in Argentine business associations. He
recently served as the Province of Buenos Aires’ deputy minister of production and, later, as
National Under-Secretary of Foreign Trade. His assistant was recently appointed to manage
the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Design Center’s Fashion Office. The question remains what
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drives the committed dedication of capable and motivated people in specific public areas and
private organizations.
3.4.5 Funding
Funding was the primary hurdle for the continuity of some of these PPC initiatives. Early on
in this collaboration, both organizations shared an interest in promoting design. However,
how important this goal proved for each one of them changed over time. INTI Textiles
remained unwaveringly committed to all three ventures—the Map, Street Circuits, and the
Survey—while Pro-Tejer lost interest in the SDC program, shifting its financial support to
other initiatives of interest to its members. As a result, there were changes in the budget
granted to the program that eventually led to its interruption. INTI Textiles and Pro-Tejer did
not receive any additional funding from INTI or any other public agency. Neither did they
build a stable funding scheme that would have enabled the program to continue.
3.4.6 Learning
As a result of this PPC, Pro-Tejer and INTI Textiles learned how to design, execute, manage
and assess programs shared and orchestrated with other public and private organizations to
tackle fashion design challenges. The Map and SDC programs enabled INTI Textiles to
identify specific areas for potential interventions to promote design and educate consumers,
brands, and designers. This experience also helped to professionalize the Observatory’s team,
training its members to curate, design, and manage projects. Finally, this PPC brought new
opportunities and alternatives to gather information on production issues and on local market
consumer traits. As a result, the ability of INTI Textiles to diagnose this industry is enriched,
as it can complement the information it collects from its traditional sources.
3.4.7 Free-riding and Rent-seeking Behaviors
The Map, Street Circuits, and Survey initiatives do not feature any grants or mechanisms that
may affect market prices. As a result, instances of rent seeking are less likely to arise. In fact,
no such instances have been found. In turn, a free-riding issue is present in the case of Pro-
Tejer, which is common in most business associations. While PPC costs are only footed by
participants, its benefits trickle down to all industry players. In the case of the SDC program,
an additional free-riding problem emerges: designers and brands—supposedly the primary
beneficiaries of this initiative—are not grouped in any organization that represents them, and
most of them do not recognize Pro-Tejer as their advocate. Designers and brands drew
24

benefits from this program without taking part in its organization or contributing any funding.
It comes as no surprise, then, that Pro-Tejer eventually decided to discontinue its financial
support of the program.
4. Networking and PPC: the Experience of Sugar Cane in
Tucumán
Public-private collaboration in the sugar cane industry in Tucumán was focused on tackling a
wide range of diseases and other problems that affected sugar cane yields. The poor
performance in the primary stage had negative consequences over the whole network devoted
to producing sugar, pulp, and paper and bio-fuels. The strategy chosen was to develop new
disease-free varieties, reproduce them using modern techniques, and disseminate them
through commercial channels in order to enable farmers to replace the old crops and increase
yields. To achieve these results, significant technological and economic requirements had to
be met, which led to the need to establish a PPC scheme.
4.1. Sugar Cane Production
Currently, sugar cane production is based on tailor-made hybrid plants suitable for specific
climate and soil conditions. Other factors, such as bacteria, fungi, and others, affect crop
yields. Many live inside the original plant and only disappear if the new seedling is free of
such diseases. As a result, local capacity to cope with these conditions is a key competitive
factor.
Sugar crop production through conventional processes (using seedlings) allows an
average of five harvests; hence, a plant replacement is needed every five or six years. To
access the seedlings, farmers have two options: i) develop their own hybrid varieties, produce
seed and seedlings; or ii) buy them from a vivarium (specific companies devoted to produce
or reproduce new hybrid seedlings). Producing seedlings by crossing varieties of sugar cane is
a complex process; its control and development require possessing a wide range of varieties
and germplasms, equipment, and large storage areas, such as plant nurseries. In addition,
skilled personnel (geneticists, breeders, and experts in field work) are also necessary for
success. Modern biotechnology tools, such as molecular markers, are used to shorten the
innovation process. Additionally, genetically modified sugar cane varieties resistant to
selected herbicides and/or tolerant of some insects are being developed.
The production of new seedlings is thus a high-technology activity subject to
economies of scale that requires long development times (around a decade) and have low
25

chances of success. One new variety demands almost 100,000 initial cross-fertilization events.
Different goals—higher sucrose content, more robust roots to support bigger plants, or
specific resistance to some diseases—trigger the development of new hybrid varieties, but
they are always related to the objective of increasing productivity.
In Argentina, farmers (from small ones to those that integrate primary production with
industrial facilities) purchase seedling from vivariums to carry out the production process.
Industrial facilities obtain sugar or anhydrous alcohol; the main scrap from the first crushing
process (bagasse) is usually used to make paper, and today, anhydrous alcohol is frequently
converted into bio-ethanol. Other sugar waste materials are used as raw material for several
industries. As a result, a dense network arises which depends on the primary stage (sugar cane
crop). This network currently faces strong local and international demand pressures, in view
of the emergence of the biofuels industry.
The production of sugar cane in Argentina reaches almost 20 million tons yearly and
covers around 330,000 hectares. Domestic sugar production exceeded 1.9 million tons in
2010. More than 75 percent was targeted to the domestic market.
The province of Tucumán is the largest sugar cane producer of Argentina. It covers:
• 75 percent of the national area devoted to this crop and over 2/3 of sugar cane
26
production;
• 15 of the 25 crushing mill facilities; and
• Over 90 percent of sugar cane farmers.
Sugar cane production is crucial for Tucumán’s economy, contributing almost 33 percent of
the province’s GDP. This has historically been both a strength and a weakness for the
province. The main problem is that a small economy with a highly concentrated productive
structure is highly dependent on the international price fluctuation of its main staple. As a
result, booms and busts cycles emerge with high social, political and economic costs.
4.2. The PPC: Design and Case Analysis
4.2.1 The Problem
Serious competitiveness problems have historically affected the sugar industry in Tucumán.
Before the PPC was established, productivity levels were 30 percent lower than the
international average. The concern for productivity further increased due to the emergence of
new significant demand sources for sugar cane, such bioethanol, and the increasing
competition for land from other crops, such as berries, lemon, sorghum, maize, and soybean.

Several chronic diseases adversely affected productivity. This problem was further
aggravated by the persistence of inefficient producers with outdated technological practices
and the failure to eliminate bad agricultural routines, such as the practice to burn the
remainder of yearly crops, increasing soil erosion and spreading ash in surrounding urban
areas. As a result, the network suffered a typical negative externality, which affected the
“sugar cane club” based in Tucumán.
The lack of raw materials to feed new and modern industrial facilities was an obstacle
in catching up with modern technologies that could put them to better use. Today, the
industrial sector works with a more complex production function, and the imperative to match
the quantity and quality of raw material flows with a rational use of installed capacity is
stronger than before (production coordination problem).
But even when stakeholders know what the problems are and what technical solutions
could solve them, individual actions are not the way to deal with them. Farmers and industrial
producers have neither the scale needed to develop new, disease-free varieties nor the
technical capacity and skilled human resources to tackle complex scientific problems.
Additionally, the long time period involved in innovation processes whose probability of
success is low and highly uncertain, in a context where intellectual property rights cannot
always be guaranteed, (appropriation problem) make it difficult to achieve pure “market
solutions.”
4.2.2 Goals of Public-Private Collaboration
The goal of PPC was to increase the productivity of the sugar cane crop in Tucumán by
developing and disseminating new technologies and seed varieties and solving other problems
affecting the network. The outline of the strategy to reach these goals involved the
development of new hybrid varieties adapted to local conditions, and subsequently to multiply
them in order to obtain seedlings under well-designed scientific protocols and appropriate
agricultural procedures and finally to distribute them to farmers to replace the existing plants.
The private sector undertook the new venture in close collaboration with a small group
of well-trained researchers in modern biotechnology who worked in a local R&D institution.
The program was implemented with the participation of all institutions and stakeholders in the
sugar cane network: the Agriculture Experimental Station Obispo Colombres (EEAOC), the
local government, and private companies. There was no master or strategic plan, but rather a
series of specific projects with clear objectives. The role of the different actors is illustrated in
the next chart.
27

Figure 2. Sugar Cane Network in Tucumán
Baby
plant
4.2.3 The Public Sector
The provincial public sector is concerned with the sugar cane network, as this activity is one
of the main engines of the local economy and its fluctuations often have severe social impacts.
In addition, the provincial government has fiscal constraints and relatively few skilled
personnel. Therefore, the Ministry of Production found the PPC to be a powerful tool of
public policy. Simultaneously, a specific tax on sugar cane producers (farmers and industrial
companies) to support EEAOC activities has existed since the creation of the institution, and
the tax rate was recently increased.
The EEAOC is an old R&D institution, created in 1909 to solve technological
problems related to local crops and agribusiness activities. It is a self-governing institution
directed by a chairman and supported by a private board composed of local companies
involved in sugar and citrus fruit production that use the EEAOC’s services and pay the
abovementioned tax, and a technical team. CEOs of the main sugar-producing companies are
part of the EEAOC’s board and they are deeply involved in its day-to-day affairs.
Board members serve on an ad honorem basis, which facilitates a commercial and
technical approach to the decision-making process. Administrative practices, which are
commonly used in the private sector, are normally employed in the management of EEAOC
affairs (i.e., resource allocation by project, results monitoring plus process monitoring, annual
reports, etc.). The board establishes the goals of R&D activities, developing long-term plans,
and monitors the operational and financial plans in weekly meetings. The governance scheme
28
Viverum
Local
Government
Vertical
Integrated
Famers
Small
Sugar
cane
producer
Mills
EEAOC
sugar
ethanol
Others
tax
InstituST
tiosn
Knowledge
and
technology
flux Financial
flux

includes a technical director who is elected through a public contest and who has four
assistants, corresponding to: i) agricultural research and technology; ii) industrial research and
technology; iii) special disciplines and, iv) administration and services.
The EEAOC is financed by contributions from the provincial agribusiness sector,
through a tax set at 0.03 percent of the first sales of sugar cane in Tucumán. The tax is
collected directly by the institution, which reports monthly to the provincial government. The
provincial government has also supported the institution at different times with contributions
for infrastructure and operational needs. Other funds come from agreements with the
productive sector, subsidies for national and international competitive projects, and fees
charged for its own productive and technical services. The most recent budget shows that
around 90 percent of income is derived from taxation and the remainder from other sources.
The total budget in 2010 was $45 million (approximately US$12 million).
The EEAOC has some 430 people on its payroll. Its composition reveals that the
institution is intensive in highly skilled personnel: 201 are university professionals (including
technicians, interns, and support staff). Fourteen have master's degrees, 18 are Ph.D.s, and
four are in specialized fields. Thirty-seven people are currently enrolled in post-graduate
studies. The EEAOC fosters these and other educational and training activities and
encourages all non-professionals to complete their secondary studies.
The organizational structure has a matrix framework, which is the result of several
years of operation and reshaping. This structure enabled the new research team (focused on
modern biotechnology) to integrate easily into the old research groups.
4.2.4 Private Sector—Vivarium Companies
Vivarium companies, or nurseries, are devoted to the production, distribution, and sale of
seeds (or seedlings) of sugar cane and other species. They are small and medium-sized
companies that dominate the technology of maintaining and transplanting plants and
providing advice on agriculture procedures. In Tucumán, there are 20 such companies, which
have commercial relationships with over 5,000 sugar cane producers and are also connected
to public R&D institutes, which supply them with seeds and technologies. The EEAOC
provides seedlings to vivariums at subsidized prices.
These companies are committed to selling only to producers located in Tucumán, but
sometimes their sales areas go beyond the provincial boundaries. Operating under commercial
rules—better quality, more sales, more profit—they spread the new technology embodied in
new varieties of sugar cane plants.
29

4.2.5 Crushing Mills, Energy and Pulp-paper Companies
In Argentina, there are about 25 sugar mills that transform sugar cane cuts into various
products. Whereas in Salta and Jujuy their manufacturing process is integrated (the mills
control the whole production process), the Tucumán model consists of a network in which
mills are fed by small farmers. Independent farmers produce about 65 percent of the sugar
cane. The contractual relationship between farmers and mills consists of a base price and
additional percentages based on quality.
There are 15 mills that manufacture sugar cane in Tucuman, four of which account for
over 70 percent of total production. These four companies produce sugar, pulp and paper,
energy and anhydrous alcohol. Recently, they started to set up large bio-ethanol facilities to
cope with the increasing demand.
4.2.6 The PPC Experience
The PPC process began at the beginning of 2000, when the EEAOC Board suggested the need
for a plan aimed at improving sugar cane productivity. At that time, yields in the province of
Tucumán were about 45 tons per hectare, significantly lower than world averages, and were
even below those recorded in other Argentine provinces.
Until the early 2000s, conventional plant breeding developed sugar plant varieties.
Since that time, the EEAOC hired professionals trained in biotechnology who had obtained
doctoral and postdoctoral degrees abroad. These scientists came back to Argentina in the mid-
1990s as part of a scientist repatriation program, and they had experience in designing
biotechnology applications in crops such as strawberry.
While the Board had initially proposed purchasing a gene resistant to certain diseases
and introducing it into the varieties that EEAOC already possessed, the technicians suggested
a different approach, based on developing new disease-free varieties. This was the approach
chosen. The process was supported by the managers of the EEAOC, the biotechnology team,
and the private board, or Steering Committee. Weekly EEAOC board and staff meetings were
held. Considering EEAOC’s budget constraints, additional requests for funding were granted
by private contributions or by the provincial Ministry of Production. There was broad
consensus among producers, EEAOC technicians, political authorities, and other members of
the cane sugar network on the objectives. The strategy, developed through the PPC process,
included five steps:
30

1. Develop new hybrid varieties well adapted to local conditions.
2. Employ crop seedling using modern biotechnology techniques under the strict control of
31
the EEAOC.
3. Transfer subsidized seedlings to the pre-existing commercial network.
4. Enlarge the research program to develop new varieties of transgenic plants of sugar cane
in order to establish a platform for future development in sugar and other crops.
5. Replace infected plants with the new ones.
The PPC was based on the following division of labor: producers would contribute to
the development of the program through a specific/local tax, collected and allocated
by the EEAOC under the supervision of a public-private board. Actions would be taken
according to a well-designed technical program with a clear commercial target. The results
(subsidized seedlings) would be disseminated using the pre-existing commercial network.
Farmers would replace old varieties with the new ones following the five-year cycle and
increase their yields. Hence, the PPC is based on technical action (generation and diffusion of
new technologies) by the EEAOC and the creation of incentives for the private sector
designed to increase productivity and profits.
During the process, the EEAOC had several ways to detect the needs and requirements
of current and potential users. These included suggestions and requests from members of the
Board; procedures and studies undertaken by the technical committees; customer surveys that
revealed their problems and needs; consultations and interaction with the provincial and
national governments; requirements of sugar mills; suggestions received from the productive
sectors; and meetings and workshops attended by advisers, consultants, and leading
producers.
4.2.7 PPC Performance
A decade after the network was established over 60 percent of the old varieties had been
replaced for new ones. The first impact was the drop in reported episodes of diseases. Reports
by EEAOC show an 80 percent decline in the incidence of RSD disease, which led to strong
costs reductions.

Figure 3. Incidence of RSD Disease in the Total Crop (percent of hectares infected)
32
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: Castagnaro (2011).
In addition, sugar cane production in Tucuman is currently over 1.1 million tons per year
compared to an annual average of 800,000 tons from 2000 to 2005. Finally, yields increased
over 3 percent yearly, representing an increase from 52 tons per hectare between 2000 and
2005 to 65 ton between 2006 and 2010. As a result, local productivity is reported to be 7.8
percent above the global average.
Figure 4. Average Yield of Sugar Cane in Tucumán 1990-2010 (tons by hectares)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Source: Castagnaro (2011).

Other achievements of the PPC include the following (EEAOC, 2012):
• The recent release and registration in the National Seed Registry (INASE) of four new
varieties that present outstanding production characteristics
• Agronomic studies aimed at improving sugar cane yields
• Generation of recommendation tables regarding the contribution of nitrogen and
phosphorus fertilization and the widespread use of liquid fertilizers and bio fertilizers
• The use of satellite images to estimate the acreage and production of raw material in the
33
preharvest stage
• The development of a technique for harvesting sugar cane without burning, in order to
promote a more environmentally friendly production system
• Engineering design of bagasse drying equipment in pneumatic conveying
• Development and registration systems for different purposes: balance calculation mass
and energy of an evaporation and heating system, mass balance calculation schemes
applied sugar cooking, and optimization of the sequencing of the work of cooking pans
• Creation and enhancement of different labs, equipped with the latest instruments and
well-trained teams12
Additionally, the PPC alliance is beginning to work on other crops, using a similar
model. The projects are designed to handle several genes (resistant to herbicides and/or
tolerant to insects) to be introduced into well-performing local varieties of sugar cane. Other
projects are dealing with soybean and maize using the same technique, considering that some
key genetic patents are due to expire in 2014. Additionally, the sugar cane experience
revealed the necessity to set up a technological company under EEAOC control to capture the
ongoing benefits and to handle the commercialization of new biotechnological events.
4.3. Conclusions and Lessons
The problem that triggered the PDP was the low average yield of sugar cane. This was related
to the presence of diseases that generated negative externalities affecting the entire network.
The development of new varieties required significant amounts of funding, had high technical
thresholds, and implied long innovation processes under conditions of uncertainty. This
situation induced the key actors in the network to cooperate.
12 One of these labs has been chosen by PepsiCo for sugar analysis for all of Latin America.

Private and public institutions engaged in a PPC process that was not based on a
conventional strategic plan. Personnel engagement and mutual trust were basic conditions in
such a process. Managers who had a broad view of the business knew what was happening in
international markets and were aware of the importance of a scientific approach to tackle
production problems. R&D institutions had sound knowledge of genetics and biotechnology
and were aware of the need for a commercial approach to the problems within the sugar cane
network.
The heart of the strategy was to work together toward a common, overarching goal, to
which specific goals were added. The components were private companies (especially larger
ones), the provincial Ministry of Production, and the EEAOC. The strategy had three key
elements: i) concurrent interests of public and private organizations; ii) solutions had to be
found in new technological developments, iii) the PPC incorporated the pre-existing
institutional and productive network in order to bridge scientific discoveries and innovation.
The previously accumulated skills available at EEAOC were combined with modern
biotechnology, which led to the need to restructure the organizational framework. An open-mind
perspective included company managers’ willingness to address issues related to non-price
competitiveness factors. Finally, the private sector’s capabilities and approach enabled
an easy communication with the public sector engaged in R&D activities.
Regarding incentives, the private sector presence in the EEAOC’s management was
crucial in ensuring the appropriate allocation of specific funds. Incentives for private
companies producing sugar cane are associated with productivity and profits. Vivariums
profit from the benefits associated with selling disease-resistant varieties. For the public
sector, the program became a powerful tool of public policy, since the success of the program
could reduce the cyclical social and political problems originating in the sugar cane network.
Additionally from the EEAOC perspective, the PPC partially solves budget constraints and
reinforces its social role, through the sale of new varieties and of other services, nationally
and internationally. The PPC is based on strong pressures from private operators involved in
the monitoring of expenditures and the progress of the projects and strict independence in the
development of technical activities. The private monitoring model is more relevant with
respect to results than process. Finally, the PPC experience prompted EEAOC and other
stakeholders to develop and launch a biotechnological platform (with capacity to handle its
own varieties and genes) applied not only in sugar cane but also in other relevant crops, such
as soybean and maize.
34

5. Buenos Aires Emprende: a PPC that Fosters Entrepreneurship
5.1. Characteristics of the Sector
There is growing consensus that entrepreneurial activity can strongly contribute to
diversifying the economy, creating employment, promoting social mobility, and opening up
new opportunities for professional success and the emergence of innovation. In recent years,
the number of people willing, interested, and able to create new businesses has risen sharply.
In this context, the creation of new firms and the strengthening of young companies are core
issues on the policy agenda. Argentina, and particularly the city of Buenos Aires, are
emblematic of this trend.
Although nascent entrepreneurship could be a source of productivity improvement and
employment, new firms face great difficulties in becoming established and surviving.
Informational asymmetries and uncertainty give rise to market failures or inefficiencies that
require measures to stimulate information exchange and facilitate the recognition of
opportunities (Bartelsman et al., 2003; Boadway and Trenblay, 2003; Hwang and Powell,
2005; Naudé, 2010; Kantis et al., 2011). Moreover, apart from the attitude of the entrepreneur
and the perception of opportunities, the emergence of new firms depends on many factors,
including macroeconomic stability, the regulatory framework, access to information, financial
support, opportunity costs vis a vis expected returns from other activities, and others. In
addition, the social assessment of the entrepreneur, attitudes toward risk, the presence of role
models, the availability of education, the culture, and the existence of an ecosystem able to
support entrepreneurs are factors that have an impact on the emergence of the vocation to
undertake new businesses (Kantis and Federico, 2007). Conceptually, entrepreneurship
involves a wide variety of institutions, from educational system to financial markets,
including sociological considerations, family ties, cultural background, macroeconomic
institutions, and regulatory frameworks (Baumol, 1990; Boettke and Coyne, 2003).
Public sector intervention can help solve many of the failures of the entrepreneurial
system and expand the base of entrepreneurs by eliminating barriers to entry.
Notwithstanding, controversy abounds concerning how it should be promoted (Hwang and
Powell, 2005).13
13 The existence of multiple factors affecting entrepreneurship has policy implications. For instance, with respect
to the behavioral issues related to entrepreneurship, its promotion might require a national program of social
awareness to foster social qualities, such as the need for achievement motivation and propensity to take risks,
and probably should be focused on the educational system. With respect to financial matters, the best policies
would most likely be those aimed at breaking the vicious circle of lack or capital, savings and investment
through the infusion of venture capital to stimulate business startups (Hwang and Powell, 2005).
35

This section analyzes a PDP launched by the Undersecretary of Economic
Development of the City of Buenos Aires aimed at fostering entrepreneurial activity. The
program, called Buenos Aires Emprende (BAE), constitutes an interesting case of institutional
innovation that includes a public-private collaboration (PPC) scheme to enhance the
entrepreneurial ecosystem.
According to international standards, Argentina exhibits a relative high entrepreneurial
activity rate. The social consideration of entrepreneurs has evolved positively in the last 10
years (Endeavor - Prosperar, 2009) and entrepreneurial activity has risen notably, first in the
1990s with the emergence of ITC companies and then in the last decade due to the emerging
opportunities created by the devaluation of the currency and economic growth. As a
consequence, the country has experienced unprecedented growth of entrepreneurial activity
that has caught the attention of policy makers, academics, and entrepreneurs (Kantis et al.,
2005). In this context, there is a wide variety of programs aimed at fostering entrepreneurship,
both at the national and at the provincial levels, not surprisingly showing some degree of
duplication of effort and beneficiaries and the consequent misallocation of resources.
In the case of the City of Buenos Aires, it exhibits a high potential to promote
entrepreneurial activity due to the existence of an educated and skilled labor force,
appropriate physical and communication infrastructure, a big and sophisticated market,
availability of services, international reputation and a growing network of incumbent
institutions (non-governmental organizations, private and public universities, local
governments, incubators, etc.) dedicated to entrepreneurship. Moreover, the interest on the
part of policy makers to promote entrepreneurship in the city has gone hand in hand with this
trend and, contrary to the old policies, which were mainly targeted to vulnerable groups and
“entrepreneurs by necessity,” the new ones are focused on rapid growth startups, innovative
firms, and knowledge-intensive projects.
Until 2000, there was no clear strategy to foster entrepreneurship in Buenos Aires. The
most relevant initiatives were PROMIPYME, oriented to providing technical support and
micro credits to necessity entrepreneurs, and PRUEVE, aimed at disseminating
entrepreneurship among secondary students. In 2000, the new government triggered the
launching of more entrepreneurial policies through the creation of the Metropolitan Center for
Design and the first incubator of technology-based firms, BAITEC. It is remarkable that the
programs were not discontinued with the change in government in 2007. On the contrary,
most entrepreneurial initiatives were deepened and new programs were created. To date, this
36

unusual situation has strongly favored the learning process among the public agents and
institutions involved.
5.2. The Program
5.2.1. Characteristics of the PPC
Buenos Aires Emprende was launched in 2008. The initiative was part of a set of policies
aimed at fostering entrepreneurship. The institutional innovation departed from the fact that,
in the past, pro-entrepreneurial PDPs suffered from information failures that led to a limited
scope of interventions and the underutilization of budgetary funds. In other words, public
agencies had serious difficulties capturing potential beneficiaries, entrepreneurs lacked
information about the existence of support programs, and non-governmental organizations
had scant capacity to recruit and assist entrepreneurs due to the shortage of funds, human
resources, and capacity. As expected, interactions and networks were also limited.
The underlying idea of the new institutional arrangement is that the PPC can improve
the efficiency and efficacy of policies, promote the development of networks and linkages,
foster the emergence of new institutions, and strengthen existing ones. The program is based
on three main objectives: i) to multiply the scope and impact of public policies related to
simprove capacity and processes within the public sector and promote better utilization of
financial and human resources. To achieve these goals, the initiative is based on the idea of
intermediation or outsourcing of public policies to private-sector sponsoring institutions,
which are expected to mediate between the government and the entrepreneurs. But, the
interest in the program lies in the innovations in terms of its execution, insofar as it aims to
generate a denser network of information, cooperation, and linkages between agents in the
city’s entrepreneurial eco-system.
The group of sponsoring institutions comprises a variety of non-governmental
organizations—public and private universities, professional chambers, and non-profit
organizations dedicated to business and entrepreneurial affairs—with varying degrees of
experience and capabilities. They are expected to disseminate the program among potential
beneficiaries, assist entrepreneurs in the elaboration of their business plans by providing
technical support, and present, together with the entrepreneurs, the projects to be evaluated by
the public authority.
37

Reporte BID: Public-Private Collaboration on Productive Development Policies in Argentina

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