Intro to CogSci: Embodiment 2

Amodal versus perceptual symbols
Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
(some) Empirical Evidence
Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2
grounding language in embodiment
Kristína Rebrová
Kristína Rebrová Cognitive science paradigms: Embodiment 2

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Contents
1 Amodal versus perceptual symbols
2 Categorization
3 Cognitive Semantics
4 (some) Empirical Evidence

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Amodal Symbols ... again
internal (cognitive) structure does not resemble the perceptual
states from which it originates

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
The mind IS embodied
nature of the (human) mind is largely determined by the form
of the (human) body
cognition arises from bodily interactions with the world
cognition shares (neural) mechanisms with perception, action
and introspection
cognition is embedded in its environment
amodal symbols represent knowledge (descriptive knowledge)

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Perceptual Symbol Systems (Barsalou,1999)
Perceptual symbols resemble (are a subset of) perceptual
states from which they originate
Simulation
a core form of computation in the brain
reenactment of perceptual, motor and introspective states
acquired during experience
as experience occurs, the brain captures the states across
modalities and integrates them with a multimodal
representation stored in memory

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Eﬀect of changing the reference
Transforming a word or an amodal symbol fails to produce an
analogous transformation in reference, whereas transforming a
perceptual simulation does.

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Categorization
Lakoﬀ’s “Woman, Fire and Dangerous Things: What
categories reveal about the mind.”
Categorization is one of the most basic ability of living beings.
Even amoeba categorizes the things into food and nonfood.
Animals categorize food predators, possible mates, members of
their own species, etc.
Why do we need categorization?
reducting complex rich sensory input
generalization, prediction
How do we form concepts and categories?

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Categories are no closed containers
classic story:
defining features (individually necessary and jointly sufficient
features)
Boolean membership - clear-cut boundaries
prototype theory:
family resemblances (Wittgenstein, 1953)
Fuzzy sets (Zadeh,1965): a degree of membership
prototypicality: some members are more typical of a category
than others
Rosh(1973): Prototypes of a category are the clearest cases of category
membership defined operationally by people’s judgment of goodness of
membership in the category

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Color categorization
Eleanor Rosch: research in New Guinea
Dani language, only 2 color terms
Mili = dark& cool (black, green, blue)
Mola = light& warm (white, red, yellow)
primary colors (basic color terms of English) are
psychologically real even if they can’t name them
focal colors = prototypes, i.e. best examples
are learned more readily
mutual agreement among speakers
basic level categories

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Color categorization
Berlin and Kay (1969): basic color terms in a language name
the universal set of basic color categories
there exists a smallest ﬁnal set of simple words with which the
speaker can name any color
properties: monolexemic, general, psychologically salient,
common and generally known
theory supported appr. 20 years later by the results from the
World Color Survey
why are color categories universal?
fyziology of the eye - the shape of perceptual color space(s)
(Jameson a D’Andrade, 1997)
properties of daylight (Yendrikhovskij, 2001; Shepard, 1992)
social negotiation (Steels & Belpaeme, 2005)

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Basic level categories

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Basic level objects (Rosch, 1976a)
categories within taxonomies of concrete objects are structured such
that there is generally one level of abstraction at which the most
basic category cuts can be made
I saw a [mammal | dog | greyhound] sitting on the porch
short words, most commonly used labels
the ﬁrst terms to be learned by children and ﬁrst to appear in a
language (sooner than sub- and superordinates)
gestalt perception: the highest level at which category members
have similarly perceived overall shapes
motor programs: the highest level at which a person uses similar
motor actions for interacting with category members.
knowledge structure: the level at which most of our knowledge is
organized

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Cognitive Semantics
e.g. Lakoff & Johnson(1980), Lakoff (1987), Langacker
(1987), Lakoff and Johnson (1999), Talmy (2000), ...
semantic structure is conceptual structure
conceptual structure is embodied
meaning representation is encyclopaedic
meaning-construction is conceptualisation

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Language comprehension is embodied
a sentence can evoke an imagined scene and resulting inferences

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Embodied inferences
syntax is not independent of semantics
The scientist walked into the wall.
The hobo drifted into the house.
The smoke drifted into the house.

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Image schemas
Johnson (1987), Lakoﬀ (1987)
recurring structures within our cognitive processes which
establish patterns of understanding and reasoning
formed from our bodily interactions, from linguistic experience,
and from historical context
Boundary
Contact
Container

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoﬀ and Johnson, 1980, 1999)
Classical theories viewed metaphors as novel or poetic linguistic
expressions outside the realm of ordinary everyday language.
Metaphor has is in many cases central to understanding the
meaning of many abstract concepts.
Many concepts that are important to us are either abstract or
not well-deﬁned in our experience (emotions, thoughts, time,
etc.)
We need to mediate access to them through the concepts that
we understand more clearly (spatial orientation, objects, etc.)

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Affection is Warmth
Subjective Judgment: Affection
Sensory-Motor Domain: Temperature
Example: They greeted me warmly.
Primary Experience: Feeling warm while being held
affectionately.

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Important is Big
Subjective Judgment: Importance
Sensory-Motor Domain: Size
Example: Tomorrow is a big day.
Primary experience: As a child, important things in your
environment are often big, e.g., parents, but also large things
that exert a force on you

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Knowing is Seeing
Subjective Judgment: Knowledge
Sensory-Motor Domain: Vision
Example: I see what you mean.
Primary Experience: Getting information through vision

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Time is Motion
Subjective Judgment: The passage of time
Sensory-Motor Domain: Motion
Example: Time ﬂies.
Primary Experience: Experiencing the passage of time as one
moves or observes motion

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Embodiment and Cultural variance
Núñez & Sweetser (2006)
speakers of Aymara face the past and
have their backs to the future
Nayra = past (eye, sight, or front)
Q”ipa = future (behind, back)
Q”ipüru = tomorrow = q”ipa + uru
(some day behind one’s back)
every language has a system of markers
which forces the speaker to pay attention
to some aspects of the information being
conveyed and not others

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Grounded cognition
grounded = anchored in the physical world (embodied +
embedded)
embodied: agent has a body that provides direct sensations
and allows actions
embedded: situated in an environment that provides stimuli
language is grounded in perception and action as well !

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Mental imagery
functional-equivalence hypothesis, supported by
many cognitive psychologists (Farah, Finke,
Kosslyn, Shepard, Rumelhart,...)
visual imagery as functionally equivalent to
visual perception
shared neural substrates
mental rotations (e.g. Shepard, Metzler, 1971)
image scaling (Kosslyn, 1975, 1976)
image scanning (Kosslyn, Ball, Reiser, 1978;
Pinker, 1980)

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Mirror Neurons
motor neurons with perceptual properties (visual, auditory)
facilitate (mediate) understanding
understanding of the actions “from the inside”
(e.g. Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010)
empathy, mind-reading (Gallese et al., 2004)
originally discovered in monkeys, recently conﬁrmed in humans

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Motor Resonance
partial activation of motor circuits without producing motor
activity
triggered by various modalities: visual, auditory, linguistic
might provide us with a simulation mechanism -
understanding, prediction, empathy
EEG mu-rhytm
dominant frequencies in the 8–13 and 15–25 Hz bands (alpha
like)
typical for motor rest
desynchronizes/supresses not only when subject produces, but
also observes action
ﬁrst indirect evidence of mirror neurons in humans
(Cohen-Seat et al.,1954; Gastaut and Bert,1954)

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Motor Resonance
the more closely the observed action maps onto the observer’s
own motor repertoire, the more accurate will be the observer’s
prediction of the course and the result of the action
conclusions (see van der Wel et al., 2011)
motor preparation enhances the performance in perceptual
tasks
stimulus-response compatibility (facilitation of reaction on the
basis of congruence with the stimulus)
ideomotor action: involuntary movement that tends to arise
when observing another’s performance
influence of familiarity: self-actions vs. actios of others
influence of proficiency: more skilled individuals - better
judgement (but only for moving percepts)
influence of praxis: Triton effect example

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Grounding language in action: neural evidence
Pulvermueler et al. (2001): hearing/reading action verbs
produces somatotopic activation in the primary motor cortex
EEG study, movement vs. lexical decision task
kick (leg), pick (arm), lick (face)

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Grounding language in action: behavioral evidence
Glenberg and Kashak (2002): comprehending a sentence that
implies action in one direction interferes with real action in the
opposite direction
John gave you a pizza. You gave a pizza to John.
Also with abstract transfer sentences (Glenberg et al., 2008)
Mary told you a story. You told a story to Mary.
Works also with rotation movement: Zwaan and Taylor (2006)
John increased the speakers volume. Mary opened a jar of
pickles.

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
Embodiment effects
Activating elderly stereotype causes people to walk slowly and
to perform lexical decision slowly (Dijksterhuis and Bargh
2001)
Engaging the smiling musculature produces positive affect
(Strack et al. 1988)
Standing upward and stretching arms helps to gain
self-confidence, watch Amy Cuddy’s Ted talk:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4386jSnFEU

Categorization
Cognitive Semantics
The end
Thank you for your attention
kristina.rebrova@gmail.com

Intro to CogSci: Embodiment 2

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