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Electronic identification
This document discusses proposals for a national electronic identification (e-ID) scheme in Bulgaria. It begins by outlining some of the main challenges with the current fragmented system, where each institution has its own authentication methods. The document then proposes a new national e-ID system that would define common participants like an identity provider and use standards like TLS. It examines legal frameworks and technical architectures, covering topics like identity cards, anonymous identification, and privacy concerns. Examples from other countries like Austria, Estonia, and Germany are analyzed for their solutions and limitations. The goal is an open and usable e-ID system that enables secure online access to public and private services.
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Electronic identification
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- 2. Vanity slide • Adeveloper • http://blog.bozho.net • http://techblog.bozho.net • http://twitter.com/bozhobg • E-government adviser to the deputy prime minister of Bulgaria
- 3. Main terms • PKI(Public Key Infrastructure) • smartcard • HSM (Hardware Security Module) • Primary register (primary data administrator) • IdP (Identity Provider) • SP (Service Provider)
- 4. E-identification • Identification, identity •е-identification vs digital signature • online and offline identification • administrative services • e-banking (online, ATM) • travel
- 5. Problem • fragmentation • PIN,PIC, passwords • every institution has its own method • low security level • plaintext (PIN/PIC) • password storage problems
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- 8. But anyway… • Regulation910/2014 of EP • Law for e-identification • (now in Bulgarian parliament) • mandatory, non-exclusive e-identification scheme • ordinance for applying the law • will include technical details
- 9. The law • identifyingnatural persons • and legal persons through their legal representatives • doesn’t define medium or storage • defines participants • center for e-identification (IdP) • administrator of e-identity (Ministry of Interrior, consulates, other)
- 10. The law- users’perspective • e-identifier (e-id) on • separate card • national id card (after 2017, opt-out; qualified digital signature - opt-in) • mandatorily accepted by all public administration websites • usable by the private sector
- 11. What can youdo with it? • inquiries and reports • taxes due • administrative acts • insurance status • requesting e-services • travel • е-banking? • ...
- 12. Administrators of e-identity Thelaw - architecture e-id register MI Consul Other Centers for e-identification MTITC Други register of administrators register of centers eid <-> national ID (considered personal data) PKI
- 13. Use-cases • Use-case 1:identifying on a government website • Use-case 2: identifying and providing data about the person in real time • identification + authorization • public sector - healthcare, tax authority • private sector – banks, online shops
- 14. Use-cases • Use-case 3:anonymous identification (with the purpose of recurrent recognition) • public transport, any website • Use-case 4: access to citizens’ data in background mode • not related to e-id • currently this is done by nightly database replication across administrations
- 15. Inquiries • ...to theIdP • is the person over 18? • does he live in city X?
- 16. Existing solutions • Austria •Estonia • Germany • Idemix • U-Prove • …
- 17. Austria • java applet •mobile id (sms, HSM) • ssPIN (sector identifier) • generated on the client
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- 19. Austria - problems •usability • Java - no-go • security • applet is vulnerable • ssPIN replay • sms authentication • MITM, phishing • hash in SMS
- 20. Естония • certificate • fullname • national identifier • TLS clientAuth • http://open-eid.github.io/ • National identifier -> X-Road -> data
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- 22. Estonia - problems •no Identity Provider? • mobile-ID using a custom SIM • privacy
- 23. Germany • only contactlesssmartcard • desktop applicaiton • incl. manual pseudonym management • activating the reader
- 24. Germany - problems •expensive readers • usability (activation) • small penetration • losing your card => losing all sector IDs
- 25. IBM, Microsoft • Anonymouscredentials • Idemix • attributes, domain pseudonym • slow, no revocation, bad usability with cards • U-Prove • attributes • no revocation, bad usability with cards
- 26. Anonymous credentials • applicabilityfor national e-id schemes? • …all institutions require the national identifier anyway • attributes should not be on the card • usability • manual pseudonym generation • using specific software • need for knowledge of basic concepts: attributes, anonymity, etc.
- 27. STORK • EU-wide e-identification •SAML • Federated identification • PEPS (Pan-European Proxy) = IdP = Center for eid • terrible client-side implementation of the pilot project
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- 29. Bulgarian eid: concept •open source from day 1 • open standards • TLS clientAuth • oauth-like authorization • sector identifier • sha512(encrypt(identifier + sectorKey, privateKey))? • lost card=lost of sector identifier • generated by IdP (using its private key)?
- 30. On the card •only eid (UUID?) • all other data – taken from primary registers • blood type • key-pair • dual interface chip?
- 31. identifies requires clientAuth Use-case 1,2 Citizen IdP SP e-id register Primary registers opens redirect (sp_id) redirect (token) verifies national ID verifies data (2)
- 32. Use-case 3 • onlycitizen and Service Provider • Direct clientAuth • Only eid, no other data is transferred • We must think of the flow of circumventing the IdP
- 33. Usability • no javaapplets or ActiveX • if possible, no additional software • one-time installation if needed • browser add-ons / pkcs11 module / root certificate • no special UI • usability problems -> operational IdP problems • Smartphones – with NFC?
- 34. …the government wantsto track me!
- 35. No ...but we don’ttrust the government, therefore we take measures.
- 36. Privacy • the governmentalready has everything • properties, companies, cars, addresses, relatives, heirs, etc. It can also track us by our mobile phone • i.e. “privacy” concerns: • access to our data by the private sector • data access allowed by law vs allowed by citizen • tracking actions by the government (public transport usage, ATM withdrawals, etc.)
- 37. Privacy - how •sector identifier • usability vs security, manual management • attack: 1. request sectorId 2. request eid. 3 link • atomic inquries to the IdP • in the future: encrypting our data in the primary registries? • citizen control over their data and history of access to it
- 38. Big Brother isnot the telescreen – the telescreen can be broken ot stopped. Big Brother is that which prevents us from stopping the telescreen.
- 39. Abuse? • measures dependingon the use-case • smartcard (nobody can impersonate you) • 2-factor authentication • sms • mobile app • biometrics?
- 40. Abuse? (2) • hardwarekeypad card readers • ...or biometric sensors • NFC security (ICAO) • cancellation period • note: eid vs qualified signature • revoking a lost certificate
- 41. Feedback • experts’ participation •we need feedback • stay tuned and follow the implementation (GitHub) Comments are welcome: b.bozhanov@government.bg
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