SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Early Warning Systems
         and
    Systems Safety
       Dr. Ioannis M. Dokas
Cork Constraint Computation Centre
      University College Cork
EWS: The Definition Problem

• A universally accepted definition of an early
  warning system does not yet exist. Probably
  one never will.
 (Source: http://ccb.colorado.edu/warning/report.html )
Some Facts on EWS
• Many descriptions / definitions
• There is a great variety of designs – development
  approaches
• In many domains
  –   Energy
  –   Medicine
  –   Currency crises
  –   Military
  –   Crisis Management
  –   Environment
Some Facts on EWS
Resembling Concepts
• Many resembling concepts
  – EW models
  – EW indicators
  – Accident precursors
Why This Trent?
• The need of being proactive to accidents and
  disasters is getting bigger
• Better tools allow us to imagine that it is
  feasible to prevent accidents and better adapt
  to disasters
Types of Definitions
• Focused on:
  – Aim
  – How EWS are used in practice
  – Functions
  – Components
Domain: Business Intelligence
• Strategic EWS
• The aim of a competitive EWS is to support
  the proactive strategic management of the
  business. It is composed of an iterative three
  part approach that starts with the Risk
  Identification, continues with Risk Monitoring
  and ends with the Management Action
Domain: Drinking Water
• EWS is an integrated system for monitoring
  analyzing interpreting and communicating
  monitoring data, which can then be used to
  make decisions that are protective of public
  health and minimize unnecessary concern and
  inconvenience to the public
•   Technologies and Techniques for Early Warning Systems to Monitor and Evaluate Drinking Water Quality,
    US EPA
Domain: Drinking Water
• EWS are used to detect any sudden
  deterioration in the quality of the source
  drinking water supply either just before the
  water goes into the distribution system or
  some distance upstream.
•   International Life Science Institute (Brosnan 1999)
Domain: Drinking Water
• An ideal EWS
     –   (1) exhibits warning in sufficient time for action,
     –   (2) provides affordable cost,
     –   (3) requires low skill and training,
     –   (4) covers all potential threats,
     –   (5) identifies the source,
     –   (6) demonstrates sensitivity to quality changes at regulatory levels,
     –   (7) gives minimal false positive or negative responses ,
     –   ( 8) exhibits robustness,
     –   (9) allows remote operation, and
     –   (10) functions year-round.
•   International Life Science Institute (Brosnan 1999)
Dictionary Definition
• A system or procedure designed to warn of a
  potential or an impending problem.

  – Note: The only action is to warn
UN Framework for EWS
                  (Natural Hazards)




                              Source : UN - ISDR
Third International Conference on Early Warning 27-29 March 2006 Bonn, Germany
EWS = Process Control Loop
• Are Sensors EWS?
• Are EW indicators EWS?
Perceptions of EWS
            • A



            • B



            • C
Alert Systems vs EWS
• Feedback :
   • Comparison between
      actual and target values
      (Alert Systems)

• Feedforward:
   • Detection of possible
      disturbances coming
      from the environment
      (e.g. EWS for Natural
      Phenomena)
   • Detection of possible
      disturbances or
      precondition of failures
      coming from the
      controlled process
      (Metasystemic control
      and EWS)
Disturbances Coming From the Environment
• http://www.hewsweb.org/hp/
Proactive Metasystemic Control

• Need to “enter” in to the lower hierarchical
  levels of the controlled process
• Identify the feedback control loops which
  form the controlled process
• Define how the feedback control loops can fail
Proactive Metasystemic Control
• Level 0




• Level 1
Metasystemic EWS
• Example: EWS for Drinking Water Treatment
  Plants in the Republic of Ireland
• (Brief description will be given at the end of the
  presentation)
• BUT!!! One Moment Please
• What Metasystemic realy means?
• ORGANISATIONS
Organizations
• Organizations = complex systems
  – A collection of hierarchical structured feedback
    loops
• Interact with the environment
• To accomplish a purpose (or a hierarchy of
  purposes)
• Top purpose: Maintain existence
• Adapt and evolve
Cybernetics
• The science of control and communication in
  complex, dynamical systems (Wiener, 1948)

• The science of the emergence and design of
  order (Malik, 2001)

• The science of effective organization (S. Beer,
  1974)
Complexity
• Structural: Number of components in a system
  or the number of combinations one must
  consider in making decisions.
• Dynamic: Arise from the interactions among
  agents in time. (Sterman, 2000)
Emergence
• Emergent properties are properties of the
  ‘whole’ not possessed by any of the individual
  parts making up this whole.
• Example: Safety
Viability
• Viability = The ability to maintain a separate
  existence (Beer, 1979)
• An organization should aim at viability beyond
  survival – i.e., a viability which transcends
  mere maintenance of a given identity
  (Schwaninger 1993, 2001b)
Variety
• Variety = Measure of Complexity

• The number of different states or modes of
  behaviour a certain system can adopt
  (Schwaninger, 2006)
Elements of a Viable System
• Operations
• Management / Metasystem
Law of Requisite Variety (R. Ashby)
• Only variety can destroy/absorb variety




                      Reality: Ve > Vo > Vm
                      Ideally: Ve = Vo = Vm

             Basic Elements of the VSM model (S. Beer)
Principals of Organization (S. Beer)
Managerial, operational and environmental varieties diffusing through an institutional
system, tend to equate; they should be designed to do so with minimum damage to
people and cost.

The four directional channels carrying information between the management unit, the
operation, and the environment must each have a higher capacity to transmit a given
amount of information relevant to variety selection in a given time than the originating
subsystem has to generate it in that time.

Wherever the information carried on a channel capable of distinguishing a given variety
crosses a boundary, it undergoes transduction; the variety of the transducer must be at
least equivalent to the variety of the channel.
Elements of a
Viable System
          MetaSystem
• S1 – Implementation
• S2 – Co-ordination
• S3 – Internal Control
   – S3* Audit
• S4 – Intelligence and
  Development
• S5 – Strategy – Policy -
  Ethos
EWS in Organizations

• 3 Types
  –Strategic
  –Operational
  –Meta-systemic
EWS In Organizations
• “Hard” and “Soft” EWS
  – Coherence (Hitchins, 2007)
     • A soft system does not have a clear, singular purpose:
       instead, it may have many, conflicting purposes,lack
       synergy, etc.
     • A hard system would have a clear, singular purpose,
       and would have all the parts within that system
       contributing towards that singular purpose
  – Technology (Hitchins, 2007)
     • ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ refer not to the coherence of the
       system in question, but to the predominance or
       otherwise of technology in the system.
Metasystemic EWS Do Exist!
• Have the form of safety procedures - periodic
  reports - internal regulations
• Existing Metasystemic EWS = Soft EWS
• However. There are not any hard
  metasystemic EWS
• Types of Problems
AXIOM
  NO PROBLEM – NO EWS


P = Si - Sr
Causal Factors of Problems
• External
• Internal
TYPES OF PROBLEMS




S. French et al. (2009) Decision behaviour, analysis and support
The Cynefin Framework
• A sense making framework that helps to
  categorise problems based on the nature of
  the relationship between cause and effect into
  five contexts.




           http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7oz366X0-8
“Performance Meter” of EWS
Domain: Drinking Water
• An ideal EWS
     –   (1) exhibits warning in sufficient time for action,
     –   (2) provides affordable cost,
     –   (3) requires low skill and training,
     –   (4) covers all potential threats,
     –   (5) identifies the source,
     –   (6) demonstrates sensitivity to quality changes at regulatory levels,
     –   (7) gives minimal false positive or negative responses ,
     –   ( 8) exhibits robustness,
     –   (9) allows remote operation, and
     –   (10) functions year-round.
•   International Life Science Institute (Brosnan 1999)
Early Warning
• The expression ‘early warning’ is used in many fields
  to mean the provision of information on an emerging
  dangerous circumstance where that information can
  enable action in advance to reduce the risks involved
  (Basher, 2006 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 364, 2167–2182 doi:10.1098/rsta.2006.1819)
Signal – Sign - Alert
• Signal: It needs a transmitter (Measurable – A
  strong signal)
• Alert: A verified event which denotes that a
  “system level hazard” has occurred
• Sound signal vs Weak Signal
Types of Signals
• Those that are beyond our perception
• Those that are within our perception but
  unrecognised by our mental models
• Signals recognised by our mental models that
  we use to modify our behaviour.
Bryan Coffman, “Weak Signal Research”
http://www.mgtaylor.com/mgtaylor/jotm/winter97/wsrintro.htm
Weak Signal
• A development about which only partial
  information is available at the moment when the
  response must be launched, if it is to be
  completed before the development impacts on
  the firm. (Ansoff, 1984)

• A weak signal is a factor for change hardly
  perceptible at present but which will constitute a
  strong trend in the future (Michelle Codet).
Filters of Weak Signals (I. Ansoff)
• A weak signal has to pass three different filters
  to have an impact




• Strategic EWS
EWS Justification Model
Causal Factors
• Safety of Systems / Organisations
Safety
• Safety is an emergent property of systems that
  arises when system components interact with
  each other within a larger environment (Leveson)
• Safety is a control problem (Leveson, Rasmusen)
• Safety is a dynamic non event (Weik)
  – a stable outcome produced by constant adjustments
    to system parameters. To achieve stability, change in
    one system parameter must be compensated for by
    changes in other parameters, through a process of
    continuous mutual adjustment.
Hazards and Accident
• Hazard: a state or set of conditions of the
  system that together with other conditions in
  the environment will lead to an accident
• Accident: undesired and unplanned events that
  result in a loss
Accident Models
• Provide descriptions of the conceptual
  elements needed to explain the phenomenon
  of accidents.
  – sequential,
  – epidemiological and
  – systemic
Sequential
• The sequential models
  explain accidents as the
  result of a sequence of
  “root cause” events
• Social or historical
  background of an individual
   drive individual to make
  an error  leads to an
  unsafe act or condition
  leads to an accident and
  an injury.                    http://www.ekdrm.net/e5783/e17327/e24075/e27357/
Common Types of Events
• Component failures, human error, or energy-
  related event
• The basic accident model for common hazard
  analysis
  – FTA, FMECA, Event Trees, etc.
Limitations of Hazard Analysis Based
       on the Sequential Model
• Social Factors
• Organizational factors
• Software
• Human error
• Adaptation
Epidemiological
• The epidemiological models explain accidents
  with a set of factors, some of which are
  obvious and some are latent.
Systemic
• The systemic models view accidents as the
  result of dysfunctional and in some cases
  unexpected interactions between system
  components.
• A Prototype Metasystemic EWS
SCEWA Project
• A 5 year research project (800K Euros)
• Begun January 2008
• Goal: To design and develop a prototype web
  based early warning system for water
  treatment plants
• Aim: To support a Proactive Risk Management
  Strategy
Drinking Water Quality in Ireland
• Failures in meeting drinking
  water standards
• Boil water notices
• Sever consequences
  – More than 200 lab-tested cases
    of cryptosporidiosis in Galway
• A third of all public water
  supplies in Ireland are
  vulnerable (EPA report)
Drinking Water Safety
• “Safe water” means that potential harmful
  substances, depending on their nature and
  characteristics, are either absent from the
  water or their quantities falls below safety
  standards
• Standards are updated periodically
The Role of EWS
Safety: The Basic Concept
• Knowledge of how accidents occur
• From which threats a system must be protected
  from
• Safety is considered as emergent property of the
  system (interaction among components may
  produce hazardous behaviours that are
  previously unidentified)
• Monitoring of hazards (physical, chemical,
  microbial, radiological agents) only is not enough
Approaches for Safe Drinking Water
• Multiple Barrier Approach
• Water Safety Plans
• Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points

                 Monitoring and Control




Raw Water                                 Drinking Water
The Socio-Technical System

         POLICIES,
    STRATEGIC DECISIONS,
    CONTROL MECHANISMS




      HUMAN ACTIVITIES
Stakeholders
Use Case
                 PROACTIVE
                  SYSTEM
                  WARNING
LA               SLIGO WTP
                   SLIGO

      WWW

HSE




EPA
Selected Methods and Technologies
•   Domain Specific Modelling
•   Software as a Service
•   Bayesian Belief Networks
•   Hidden Markov Models (under development)
Domain Specific Modelling Language
• Users develop models using a graphical language
  which has specific syntax and semantics
• Based on the graphical models executable code is
  generated
Example

                    Water Service Authority



Hazard
Analyst                  State Agency
Understanding the Domain
• IDEFØ model (Integration Definition for Function Modeling)




                                                               74
Meta-model
•Eclipse EMF Ecore to perform metamodeling
•Java Persistence API (JPA) annotation for object-
relational mapping approach.




                                                     75
The Editor




                 M2T transformation using XPand




• The code is executed with the SMILE BBN
  engine
                                                  76
Technologies
• Eclipse’ GMF has been adopted to build the core
  architecture,
 • Which consists of two frameworks:
    • For Metametamodeling Model-based Eclipse Modeling
       Framework (EMF) technology based upon a subset of
       the Object Management Group standard (OMG).
    • Graphical Editing Framework for graphical editor
       creation.
 • Other Technologies used are UML2 Tools, OCL, XML
   Schema definition
 • To provide persistency we have used Teneo, Hibernate.
Code Generation
• For code generation openArchitectureWare platform
  is integrated in which M2T transformation is
  performed using Xpand.

• Further Technologies to be integrated
  • PostgreSQL
  • Apache Tomcat
  • Eclipse Rich Client Platform (RCP)
  • Eclipse Rich Ajax Platform (RAP)
A SaaS Approach for Socio-technical EWS

•Multi-users scattered all over the country
•Users run the software using a Web browser
•No extra hardware, software nor plug-in
•No upfront license fees required! Pay as you go!
•Easy to update
•Leverage the economy of scale Cost Efficient
SaaS Details
• Several Tenants:
  – Water Service Authorities
  – WTP personnel
  – Health Service Executive (HSE)
  – Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
  – Drinking Water Laboratories
• User inputs and sensor data are considered as
  evidence for the BBNs (SMILE Engine)
• The BBN result represents our updated belief
  about the occurrence of a system hazard in
  each WTP
Technologies Used
• Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP and PostgreSQL.
• PHP 5.2 was used as the server scripting language
  while Apache 2.2 was our Web
• PostgreSQL 8.3 because provides a native support for
  XML and a build-in query mechanism based on Xpath
  1.0.
• Postgre SQL 8.3 exports the result of a query to an
  XML document and check the well-formedness of an
  XML document such as XMLPARSE and
  XMLSERIALIZE.
Expert Catalogue
Definition of a WTP
Status Update by Auditors
State Agencies View
Laboratory View
Hazard Level Estimation
(Accessible in all views)
Metasystemic EWS
• “Typical EWS” provide inputs
• Users provide inputs (e.g. Audit reports, Warning
  signals, Change of working conditions)
• Monitoring for the concurrency of signals/events
  indicating shift from a safe system state
• The mechanism detecting the deterioration of
  safety is based on Systemic Accident models
Metasystemic EWS
• The output is not a forecast
• It raises a flag (warnings) when deterioration
  of safety has been detected
• The stakeholders who form the governance
  model of safety in the system are “tenants” of
  the socio-technical EWS
• A socio-technical EWS is a socio-technical
  system (it may fail, like the reference system,
  due to the same general processes)
Thank you


  Dr. Ioannis M. Dokas
e-mail: i.dokas@4c.ucc.ie

More Related Content

Viewers also liked

Tohoku earthquake case study
Tohoku earthquake case studyTohoku earthquake case study
Tohoku earthquake case studyRuth1618
 
VESDA
VESDAVESDA
29174_01_VESDA-E_VEP_Overview
29174_01_VESDA-E_VEP_Overview29174_01_VESDA-E_VEP_Overview
29174_01_VESDA-E_VEP_OverviewPutri Verninda
 
Implementing Hot and Cold Air Containment in Existing Data Centers
Implementing Hot and Cold Air Containment in Existing Data CentersImplementing Hot and Cold Air Containment in Existing Data Centers
Implementing Hot and Cold Air Containment in Existing Data Centers
Schneider Electric
 
1_VESDA Intro_7_Reasons_final
1_VESDA Intro_7_Reasons_final1_VESDA Intro_7_Reasons_final
1_VESDA Intro_7_Reasons_finalPutri Verninda
 
JAPAN Earthquake & Tsunami - March 2011
JAPAN Earthquake & Tsunami - March 2011JAPAN Earthquake & Tsunami - March 2011
JAPAN Earthquake & Tsunami - March 2011
Emerito Razon
 

Viewers also liked (6)

Tohoku earthquake case study
Tohoku earthquake case studyTohoku earthquake case study
Tohoku earthquake case study
 
VESDA
VESDAVESDA
VESDA
 
29174_01_VESDA-E_VEP_Overview
29174_01_VESDA-E_VEP_Overview29174_01_VESDA-E_VEP_Overview
29174_01_VESDA-E_VEP_Overview
 
Implementing Hot and Cold Air Containment in Existing Data Centers
Implementing Hot and Cold Air Containment in Existing Data CentersImplementing Hot and Cold Air Containment in Existing Data Centers
Implementing Hot and Cold Air Containment in Existing Data Centers
 
1_VESDA Intro_7_Reasons_final
1_VESDA Intro_7_Reasons_final1_VESDA Intro_7_Reasons_final
1_VESDA Intro_7_Reasons_final
 
JAPAN Earthquake & Tsunami - March 2011
JAPAN Earthquake & Tsunami - March 2011JAPAN Earthquake & Tsunami - March 2011
JAPAN Earthquake & Tsunami - March 2011
 

Similar to Dokas Issil2011

Falling objects: Engaging the ”man-in-the-loop” to achieve real safety improv...
Falling objects: Engaging the ”man-in-the-loop” to achieve real safety improv...Falling objects: Engaging the ”man-in-the-loop” to achieve real safety improv...
Falling objects: Engaging the ”man-in-the-loop” to achieve real safety improv...
E.ON Exploration & Production
 
Reducing Accident in OG Industry.pdf
Reducing Accident in OG Industry.pdfReducing Accident in OG Industry.pdf
Reducing Accident in OG Industry.pdf
DianValarbi
 
Cusp what is it how are we going to cause the next infection liza_deb
Cusp what is it how are we going to cause the next infection liza_debCusp what is it how are we going to cause the next infection liza_deb
Cusp what is it how are we going to cause the next infection liza_debasiu4quality
 
Moser lightfoot pmc2012pres
Moser lightfoot pmc2012presMoser lightfoot pmc2012pres
Moser lightfoot pmc2012presNASAPMC
 
Effective Use of Environmental Monitoring Data Trending
Effective Use of Environmental Monitoring Data TrendingEffective Use of Environmental Monitoring Data Trending
Effective Use of Environmental Monitoring Data Trending
Institute of Validation Technology
 
Using Oracle's Empirica Topics to Document Your Signal Management Process
Using Oracle's Empirica Topics to Document Your Signal Management ProcessUsing Oracle's Empirica Topics to Document Your Signal Management Process
Using Oracle's Empirica Topics to Document Your Signal Management ProcessPerficient
 
Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model and Team Syntegrity Process
Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model and Team Syntegrity ProcessStafford Beer’s Viable System Model and Team Syntegrity Process
Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model and Team Syntegrity Process
RSD Relating Systems Thinking and Design
 
Expert systems
Expert systemsExpert systems
Expert systems
Dr. C.V. Suresh Babu
 
Week 11 12 chap11 c-2
Week 11 12 chap11 c-2Week 11 12 chap11 c-2
Week 11 12 chap11 c-2Zahir Reza
 
Expert system
Expert systemExpert system
Expert system
Sayeed Far Ooqui
 
1The Nature of SuccessClass SeventeenREVIEW!!!!.docx
1The Nature of SuccessClass SeventeenREVIEW!!!!.docx1The Nature of SuccessClass SeventeenREVIEW!!!!.docx
1The Nature of SuccessClass SeventeenREVIEW!!!!.docx
vickeryr87
 
lecture2-intro-of-CPS.pdf
lecture2-intro-of-CPS.pdflecture2-intro-of-CPS.pdf
lecture2-intro-of-CPS.pdf
MahendraShukla27
 
IS-Risk-Management-Lecture-2.pdf
IS-Risk-Management-Lecture-2.pdfIS-Risk-Management-Lecture-2.pdf
IS-Risk-Management-Lecture-2.pdf
AbdulrafiiMohammed
 
Critical systems specification
Critical systems specificationCritical systems specification
Critical systems specificationAryan Ajmer
 
Module -3 expert system.pptx
Module -3 expert system.pptxModule -3 expert system.pptx
Module -3 expert system.pptx
SyedRafiammal1
 
Tools for credible decision making in marine ecosystem-based management;
Tools for credible decision making in marine ecosystem-based management;Tools for credible decision making in marine ecosystem-based management;
Tools for credible decision making in marine ecosystem-based management;
Mark Dickey-Collas
 
Systems Theory Lecture
Systems Theory LectureSystems Theory Lecture
Systems Theory Lecture
johannabishop
 
Improving cyber security using biosecurity experience
Improving cyber security using biosecurity experienceImproving cyber security using biosecurity experience
Improving cyber security using biosecurity experience
Norman Johnson
 
Expert systems from rk
Expert systems from rkExpert systems from rk
Expert systems from rk
ramaslide
 

Similar to Dokas Issil2011 (20)

Falling objects: Engaging the ”man-in-the-loop” to achieve real safety improv...
Falling objects: Engaging the ”man-in-the-loop” to achieve real safety improv...Falling objects: Engaging the ”man-in-the-loop” to achieve real safety improv...
Falling objects: Engaging the ”man-in-the-loop” to achieve real safety improv...
 
Reducing Accident in OG Industry.pdf
Reducing Accident in OG Industry.pdfReducing Accident in OG Industry.pdf
Reducing Accident in OG Industry.pdf
 
Cusp what is it how are we going to cause the next infection liza_deb
Cusp what is it how are we going to cause the next infection liza_debCusp what is it how are we going to cause the next infection liza_deb
Cusp what is it how are we going to cause the next infection liza_deb
 
Moser lightfoot pmc2012pres
Moser lightfoot pmc2012presMoser lightfoot pmc2012pres
Moser lightfoot pmc2012pres
 
Effective Use of Environmental Monitoring Data Trending
Effective Use of Environmental Monitoring Data TrendingEffective Use of Environmental Monitoring Data Trending
Effective Use of Environmental Monitoring Data Trending
 
Using Oracle's Empirica Topics to Document Your Signal Management Process
Using Oracle's Empirica Topics to Document Your Signal Management ProcessUsing Oracle's Empirica Topics to Document Your Signal Management Process
Using Oracle's Empirica Topics to Document Your Signal Management Process
 
Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model and Team Syntegrity Process
Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model and Team Syntegrity ProcessStafford Beer’s Viable System Model and Team Syntegrity Process
Stafford Beer’s Viable System Model and Team Syntegrity Process
 
Expert systems
Expert systemsExpert systems
Expert systems
 
Week 11 12 chap11 c-2
Week 11 12 chap11 c-2Week 11 12 chap11 c-2
Week 11 12 chap11 c-2
 
Expert system
Expert systemExpert system
Expert system
 
1The Nature of SuccessClass SeventeenREVIEW!!!!.docx
1The Nature of SuccessClass SeventeenREVIEW!!!!.docx1The Nature of SuccessClass SeventeenREVIEW!!!!.docx
1The Nature of SuccessClass SeventeenREVIEW!!!!.docx
 
Soft Systems Methodology
Soft Systems MethodologySoft Systems Methodology
Soft Systems Methodology
 
lecture2-intro-of-CPS.pdf
lecture2-intro-of-CPS.pdflecture2-intro-of-CPS.pdf
lecture2-intro-of-CPS.pdf
 
IS-Risk-Management-Lecture-2.pdf
IS-Risk-Management-Lecture-2.pdfIS-Risk-Management-Lecture-2.pdf
IS-Risk-Management-Lecture-2.pdf
 
Critical systems specification
Critical systems specificationCritical systems specification
Critical systems specification
 
Module -3 expert system.pptx
Module -3 expert system.pptxModule -3 expert system.pptx
Module -3 expert system.pptx
 
Tools for credible decision making in marine ecosystem-based management;
Tools for credible decision making in marine ecosystem-based management;Tools for credible decision making in marine ecosystem-based management;
Tools for credible decision making in marine ecosystem-based management;
 
Systems Theory Lecture
Systems Theory LectureSystems Theory Lecture
Systems Theory Lecture
 
Improving cyber security using biosecurity experience
Improving cyber security using biosecurity experienceImproving cyber security using biosecurity experience
Improving cyber security using biosecurity experience
 
Expert systems from rk
Expert systems from rkExpert systems from rk
Expert systems from rk
 

More from LUCA School of Arts

Ideas on future of Crisis Information Management
Ideas on future of Crisis Information ManagementIdeas on future of Crisis Information Management
Ideas on future of Crisis Information Management
LUCA School of Arts
 
GIS, Mash-Ups and Geographic Standards
GIS, Mash-Ups and Geographic StandardsGIS, Mash-Ups and Geographic Standards
GIS, Mash-Ups and Geographic Standards
LUCA School of Arts
 
Crisis Information Management: A Primer
Crisis Information Management: A PrimerCrisis Information Management: A Primer
Crisis Information Management: A Primer
LUCA School of Arts
 
Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System
Global Disaster Alert and Coordination SystemGlobal Disaster Alert and Coordination System
Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System
LUCA School of Arts
 
Tony Zhang
Tony ZhangTony Zhang
De groot talk_iscram drr
De groot talk_iscram drrDe groot talk_iscram drr
De groot talk_iscram drr
LUCA School of Arts
 
Janie desjardins study presentation
Janie desjardins study presentationJanie desjardins study presentation
Janie desjardins study presentationLUCA School of Arts
 
Iscram presentation beckyjay harrington
Iscram presentation beckyjay harrington Iscram presentation beckyjay harrington
Iscram presentation beckyjay harrington LUCA School of Arts
 

More from LUCA School of Arts (20)

Presentation 082311
Presentation 082311Presentation 082311
Presentation 082311
 
Ideas on future of Crisis Information Management
Ideas on future of Crisis Information ManagementIdeas on future of Crisis Information Management
Ideas on future of Crisis Information Management
 
GIS, Mash-Ups and Geographic Standards
GIS, Mash-Ups and Geographic StandardsGIS, Mash-Ups and Geographic Standards
GIS, Mash-Ups and Geographic Standards
 
Crisis Information Management: A Primer
Crisis Information Management: A PrimerCrisis Information Management: A Primer
Crisis Information Management: A Primer
 
Joanne Ho Wildfire Prediction
Joanne Ho Wildfire PredictionJoanne Ho Wildfire Prediction
Joanne Ho Wildfire Prediction
 
Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System
Global Disaster Alert and Coordination SystemGlobal Disaster Alert and Coordination System
Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System
 
Tony Zhang
Tony ZhangTony Zhang
Tony Zhang
 
Dimitri de fré (belgium)
Dimitri de fré (belgium)Dimitri de fré (belgium)
Dimitri de fré (belgium)
 
Linda bo
Linda boLinda bo
Linda bo
 
stefan moellmann issil2011
stefan moellmann issil2011stefan moellmann issil2011
stefan moellmann issil2011
 
Ansell sensemaking lecture
Ansell sensemaking lectureAnsell sensemaking lecture
Ansell sensemaking lecture
 
Kailash Gupta Research
Kailash Gupta ResearchKailash Gupta Research
Kailash Gupta Research
 
De groot talk_iscram drr
De groot talk_iscram drrDe groot talk_iscram drr
De groot talk_iscram drr
 
Adolf labakiscram2011
Adolf labakiscram2011Adolf labakiscram2011
Adolf labakiscram2011
 
Janie desjardins study presentation
Janie desjardins study presentationJanie desjardins study presentation
Janie desjardins study presentation
 
Adam intro issil2011
Adam intro issil2011Adam intro issil2011
Adam intro issil2011
 
Jiang jingui summer school
Jiang jingui summer schoolJiang jingui summer school
Jiang jingui summer school
 
Mohammad moshtari
Mohammad moshtariMohammad moshtari
Mohammad moshtari
 
Jiang jingui summer school
Jiang jingui summer schoolJiang jingui summer school
Jiang jingui summer school
 
Iscram presentation beckyjay harrington
Iscram presentation beckyjay harrington Iscram presentation beckyjay harrington
Iscram presentation beckyjay harrington
 

Recently uploaded

Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingRemoving Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Aftab Hussain
 
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge GraphGraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
Guy Korland
 
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and SalesThe Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
Laura Byrne
 
Microsoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdf
Microsoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdfMicrosoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdf
Microsoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdf
Uni Systems S.M.S.A.
 
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing DaysClimate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Kari Kakkonen
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 5
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 5UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 5
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 5
DianaGray10
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...
GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...
GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...
Neo4j
 
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
ThomasParaiso2
 
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
sonjaschweigert1
 
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
BookNet Canada
 
Uni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdf
Uni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdfUni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdf
Uni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdf
Uni Systems S.M.S.A.
 
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR EventsMonitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Ana-Maria Mihalceanu
 
Secstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptx
Secstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptxSecstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptx
Secstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptx
nkrafacyberclub
 
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportEpistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Alan Dix
 
The Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform EngineeringThe Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform Engineering
Jemma Hussein Allen
 
SAP Sapphire 2024 - ASUG301 building better apps with SAP Fiori.pdf
SAP Sapphire 2024 - ASUG301 building better apps with SAP Fiori.pdfSAP Sapphire 2024 - ASUG301 building better apps with SAP Fiori.pdf
SAP Sapphire 2024 - ASUG301 building better apps with SAP Fiori.pdf
Peter Spielvogel
 
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1
DianaGray10
 
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FME
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FMEEssentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FME
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FME
Safe Software
 
Introduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
Introduction to CHERI technology - CybersecurityIntroduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
Introduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
mikeeftimakis1
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingRemoving Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
 
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge GraphGraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
 
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and SalesThe Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
The Art of the Pitch: WordPress Relationships and Sales
 
Microsoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdf
Microsoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdfMicrosoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdf
Microsoft - Power Platform_G.Aspiotis.pdf
 
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing DaysClimate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 5
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 5UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 5
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 5
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdf
 
GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...
GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...
GraphSummit Singapore | Enhancing Changi Airport Group's Passenger Experience...
 
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
 
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...
 
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
 
Uni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdf
Uni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdfUni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdf
Uni Systems Copilot event_05062024_C.Vlachos.pdf
 
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR EventsMonitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
Monitoring Java Application Security with JDK Tools and JFR Events
 
Secstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptx
Secstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptxSecstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptx
Secstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptx
 
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportEpistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI support
 
The Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform EngineeringThe Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform Engineering
 
SAP Sapphire 2024 - ASUG301 building better apps with SAP Fiori.pdf
SAP Sapphire 2024 - ASUG301 building better apps with SAP Fiori.pdfSAP Sapphire 2024 - ASUG301 building better apps with SAP Fiori.pdf
SAP Sapphire 2024 - ASUG301 building better apps with SAP Fiori.pdf
 
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1
 
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FME
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FMEEssentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FME
Essentials of Automations: The Art of Triggers and Actions in FME
 
Introduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
Introduction to CHERI technology - CybersecurityIntroduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
Introduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
 

Dokas Issil2011

  • 1. Early Warning Systems and Systems Safety Dr. Ioannis M. Dokas Cork Constraint Computation Centre University College Cork
  • 2.
  • 3. EWS: The Definition Problem • A universally accepted definition of an early warning system does not yet exist. Probably one never will. (Source: http://ccb.colorado.edu/warning/report.html )
  • 4. Some Facts on EWS • Many descriptions / definitions • There is a great variety of designs – development approaches • In many domains – Energy – Medicine – Currency crises – Military – Crisis Management – Environment
  • 6. Resembling Concepts • Many resembling concepts – EW models – EW indicators – Accident precursors
  • 7. Why This Trent? • The need of being proactive to accidents and disasters is getting bigger • Better tools allow us to imagine that it is feasible to prevent accidents and better adapt to disasters
  • 8. Types of Definitions • Focused on: – Aim – How EWS are used in practice – Functions – Components
  • 9. Domain: Business Intelligence • Strategic EWS • The aim of a competitive EWS is to support the proactive strategic management of the business. It is composed of an iterative three part approach that starts with the Risk Identification, continues with Risk Monitoring and ends with the Management Action
  • 10. Domain: Drinking Water • EWS is an integrated system for monitoring analyzing interpreting and communicating monitoring data, which can then be used to make decisions that are protective of public health and minimize unnecessary concern and inconvenience to the public • Technologies and Techniques for Early Warning Systems to Monitor and Evaluate Drinking Water Quality, US EPA
  • 11. Domain: Drinking Water • EWS are used to detect any sudden deterioration in the quality of the source drinking water supply either just before the water goes into the distribution system or some distance upstream. • International Life Science Institute (Brosnan 1999)
  • 12. Domain: Drinking Water • An ideal EWS – (1) exhibits warning in sufficient time for action, – (2) provides affordable cost, – (3) requires low skill and training, – (4) covers all potential threats, – (5) identifies the source, – (6) demonstrates sensitivity to quality changes at regulatory levels, – (7) gives minimal false positive or negative responses , – ( 8) exhibits robustness, – (9) allows remote operation, and – (10) functions year-round. • International Life Science Institute (Brosnan 1999)
  • 13. Dictionary Definition • A system or procedure designed to warn of a potential or an impending problem. – Note: The only action is to warn
  • 14. UN Framework for EWS (Natural Hazards) Source : UN - ISDR Third International Conference on Early Warning 27-29 March 2006 Bonn, Germany
  • 15. EWS = Process Control Loop
  • 16. • Are Sensors EWS? • Are EW indicators EWS?
  • 17. Perceptions of EWS • A • B • C
  • 18. Alert Systems vs EWS • Feedback : • Comparison between actual and target values (Alert Systems) • Feedforward: • Detection of possible disturbances coming from the environment (e.g. EWS for Natural Phenomena) • Detection of possible disturbances or precondition of failures coming from the controlled process (Metasystemic control and EWS)
  • 19. Disturbances Coming From the Environment • http://www.hewsweb.org/hp/
  • 20. Proactive Metasystemic Control • Need to “enter” in to the lower hierarchical levels of the controlled process • Identify the feedback control loops which form the controlled process • Define how the feedback control loops can fail
  • 21. Proactive Metasystemic Control • Level 0 • Level 1
  • 22. Metasystemic EWS • Example: EWS for Drinking Water Treatment Plants in the Republic of Ireland • (Brief description will be given at the end of the presentation)
  • 23. • BUT!!! One Moment Please • What Metasystemic realy means?
  • 25. Organizations • Organizations = complex systems – A collection of hierarchical structured feedback loops • Interact with the environment • To accomplish a purpose (or a hierarchy of purposes) • Top purpose: Maintain existence • Adapt and evolve
  • 26. Cybernetics • The science of control and communication in complex, dynamical systems (Wiener, 1948) • The science of the emergence and design of order (Malik, 2001) • The science of effective organization (S. Beer, 1974)
  • 27. Complexity • Structural: Number of components in a system or the number of combinations one must consider in making decisions. • Dynamic: Arise from the interactions among agents in time. (Sterman, 2000)
  • 28. Emergence • Emergent properties are properties of the ‘whole’ not possessed by any of the individual parts making up this whole. • Example: Safety
  • 29. Viability • Viability = The ability to maintain a separate existence (Beer, 1979) • An organization should aim at viability beyond survival – i.e., a viability which transcends mere maintenance of a given identity (Schwaninger 1993, 2001b)
  • 30. Variety • Variety = Measure of Complexity • The number of different states or modes of behaviour a certain system can adopt (Schwaninger, 2006)
  • 31. Elements of a Viable System • Operations • Management / Metasystem
  • 32. Law of Requisite Variety (R. Ashby) • Only variety can destroy/absorb variety Reality: Ve > Vo > Vm Ideally: Ve = Vo = Vm Basic Elements of the VSM model (S. Beer)
  • 33. Principals of Organization (S. Beer) Managerial, operational and environmental varieties diffusing through an institutional system, tend to equate; they should be designed to do so with minimum damage to people and cost. The four directional channels carrying information between the management unit, the operation, and the environment must each have a higher capacity to transmit a given amount of information relevant to variety selection in a given time than the originating subsystem has to generate it in that time. Wherever the information carried on a channel capable of distinguishing a given variety crosses a boundary, it undergoes transduction; the variety of the transducer must be at least equivalent to the variety of the channel.
  • 34. Elements of a Viable System MetaSystem • S1 – Implementation • S2 – Co-ordination • S3 – Internal Control – S3* Audit • S4 – Intelligence and Development • S5 – Strategy – Policy - Ethos
  • 35. EWS in Organizations • 3 Types –Strategic –Operational –Meta-systemic
  • 36. EWS In Organizations • “Hard” and “Soft” EWS – Coherence (Hitchins, 2007) • A soft system does not have a clear, singular purpose: instead, it may have many, conflicting purposes,lack synergy, etc. • A hard system would have a clear, singular purpose, and would have all the parts within that system contributing towards that singular purpose – Technology (Hitchins, 2007) • ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ refer not to the coherence of the system in question, but to the predominance or otherwise of technology in the system.
  • 37. Metasystemic EWS Do Exist! • Have the form of safety procedures - periodic reports - internal regulations • Existing Metasystemic EWS = Soft EWS • However. There are not any hard metasystemic EWS
  • 38. • Types of Problems
  • 39. AXIOM NO PROBLEM – NO EWS P = Si - Sr
  • 40. Causal Factors of Problems • External • Internal
  • 41. TYPES OF PROBLEMS S. French et al. (2009) Decision behaviour, analysis and support
  • 42. The Cynefin Framework • A sense making framework that helps to categorise problems based on the nature of the relationship between cause and effect into five contexts. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7oz366X0-8
  • 44. Domain: Drinking Water • An ideal EWS – (1) exhibits warning in sufficient time for action, – (2) provides affordable cost, – (3) requires low skill and training, – (4) covers all potential threats, – (5) identifies the source, – (6) demonstrates sensitivity to quality changes at regulatory levels, – (7) gives minimal false positive or negative responses , – ( 8) exhibits robustness, – (9) allows remote operation, and – (10) functions year-round. • International Life Science Institute (Brosnan 1999)
  • 45. Early Warning • The expression ‘early warning’ is used in many fields to mean the provision of information on an emerging dangerous circumstance where that information can enable action in advance to reduce the risks involved (Basher, 2006 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. 364, 2167–2182 doi:10.1098/rsta.2006.1819)
  • 46. Signal – Sign - Alert • Signal: It needs a transmitter (Measurable – A strong signal) • Alert: A verified event which denotes that a “system level hazard” has occurred • Sound signal vs Weak Signal
  • 47. Types of Signals • Those that are beyond our perception • Those that are within our perception but unrecognised by our mental models • Signals recognised by our mental models that we use to modify our behaviour. Bryan Coffman, “Weak Signal Research” http://www.mgtaylor.com/mgtaylor/jotm/winter97/wsrintro.htm
  • 48. Weak Signal • A development about which only partial information is available at the moment when the response must be launched, if it is to be completed before the development impacts on the firm. (Ansoff, 1984) • A weak signal is a factor for change hardly perceptible at present but which will constitute a strong trend in the future (Michelle Codet).
  • 49. Filters of Weak Signals (I. Ansoff) • A weak signal has to pass three different filters to have an impact • Strategic EWS
  • 52. • Safety of Systems / Organisations
  • 53. Safety • Safety is an emergent property of systems that arises when system components interact with each other within a larger environment (Leveson) • Safety is a control problem (Leveson, Rasmusen) • Safety is a dynamic non event (Weik) – a stable outcome produced by constant adjustments to system parameters. To achieve stability, change in one system parameter must be compensated for by changes in other parameters, through a process of continuous mutual adjustment.
  • 54. Hazards and Accident • Hazard: a state or set of conditions of the system that together with other conditions in the environment will lead to an accident • Accident: undesired and unplanned events that result in a loss
  • 55. Accident Models • Provide descriptions of the conceptual elements needed to explain the phenomenon of accidents. – sequential, – epidemiological and – systemic
  • 56. Sequential • The sequential models explain accidents as the result of a sequence of “root cause” events • Social or historical background of an individual  drive individual to make an error  leads to an unsafe act or condition leads to an accident and an injury. http://www.ekdrm.net/e5783/e17327/e24075/e27357/
  • 57. Common Types of Events • Component failures, human error, or energy- related event • The basic accident model for common hazard analysis – FTA, FMECA, Event Trees, etc.
  • 58. Limitations of Hazard Analysis Based on the Sequential Model • Social Factors • Organizational factors • Software • Human error • Adaptation
  • 59. Epidemiological • The epidemiological models explain accidents with a set of factors, some of which are obvious and some are latent.
  • 60. Systemic • The systemic models view accidents as the result of dysfunctional and in some cases unexpected interactions between system components.
  • 61. • A Prototype Metasystemic EWS
  • 62. SCEWA Project • A 5 year research project (800K Euros) • Begun January 2008 • Goal: To design and develop a prototype web based early warning system for water treatment plants • Aim: To support a Proactive Risk Management Strategy
  • 63. Drinking Water Quality in Ireland • Failures in meeting drinking water standards • Boil water notices • Sever consequences – More than 200 lab-tested cases of cryptosporidiosis in Galway • A third of all public water supplies in Ireland are vulnerable (EPA report)
  • 64. Drinking Water Safety • “Safe water” means that potential harmful substances, depending on their nature and characteristics, are either absent from the water or their quantities falls below safety standards • Standards are updated periodically
  • 65. The Role of EWS
  • 66. Safety: The Basic Concept • Knowledge of how accidents occur • From which threats a system must be protected from • Safety is considered as emergent property of the system (interaction among components may produce hazardous behaviours that are previously unidentified) • Monitoring of hazards (physical, chemical, microbial, radiological agents) only is not enough
  • 67. Approaches for Safe Drinking Water • Multiple Barrier Approach • Water Safety Plans • Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points Monitoring and Control Raw Water Drinking Water
  • 68. The Socio-Technical System POLICIES, STRATEGIC DECISIONS, CONTROL MECHANISMS HUMAN ACTIVITIES
  • 70. Use Case PROACTIVE SYSTEM WARNING LA SLIGO WTP SLIGO WWW HSE EPA
  • 71. Selected Methods and Technologies • Domain Specific Modelling • Software as a Service • Bayesian Belief Networks • Hidden Markov Models (under development)
  • 72. Domain Specific Modelling Language • Users develop models using a graphical language which has specific syntax and semantics • Based on the graphical models executable code is generated
  • 73. Example Water Service Authority Hazard Analyst State Agency
  • 74. Understanding the Domain • IDEFØ model (Integration Definition for Function Modeling) 74
  • 75. Meta-model •Eclipse EMF Ecore to perform metamodeling •Java Persistence API (JPA) annotation for object- relational mapping approach. 75
  • 76. The Editor M2T transformation using XPand • The code is executed with the SMILE BBN engine 76
  • 77. Technologies • Eclipse’ GMF has been adopted to build the core architecture, • Which consists of two frameworks: • For Metametamodeling Model-based Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) technology based upon a subset of the Object Management Group standard (OMG). • Graphical Editing Framework for graphical editor creation. • Other Technologies used are UML2 Tools, OCL, XML Schema definition • To provide persistency we have used Teneo, Hibernate.
  • 78. Code Generation • For code generation openArchitectureWare platform is integrated in which M2T transformation is performed using Xpand. • Further Technologies to be integrated • PostgreSQL • Apache Tomcat • Eclipse Rich Client Platform (RCP) • Eclipse Rich Ajax Platform (RAP)
  • 79. A SaaS Approach for Socio-technical EWS •Multi-users scattered all over the country •Users run the software using a Web browser •No extra hardware, software nor plug-in •No upfront license fees required! Pay as you go! •Easy to update •Leverage the economy of scale Cost Efficient
  • 80. SaaS Details • Several Tenants: – Water Service Authorities – WTP personnel – Health Service Executive (HSE) – Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) – Drinking Water Laboratories • User inputs and sensor data are considered as evidence for the BBNs (SMILE Engine) • The BBN result represents our updated belief about the occurrence of a system hazard in each WTP
  • 81. Technologies Used • Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP and PostgreSQL. • PHP 5.2 was used as the server scripting language while Apache 2.2 was our Web • PostgreSQL 8.3 because provides a native support for XML and a build-in query mechanism based on Xpath 1.0. • Postgre SQL 8.3 exports the result of a query to an XML document and check the well-formedness of an XML document such as XMLPARSE and XMLSERIALIZE.
  • 84. Status Update by Auditors
  • 88. Metasystemic EWS • “Typical EWS” provide inputs • Users provide inputs (e.g. Audit reports, Warning signals, Change of working conditions) • Monitoring for the concurrency of signals/events indicating shift from a safe system state • The mechanism detecting the deterioration of safety is based on Systemic Accident models
  • 89. Metasystemic EWS • The output is not a forecast • It raises a flag (warnings) when deterioration of safety has been detected • The stakeholders who form the governance model of safety in the system are “tenants” of the socio-technical EWS • A socio-technical EWS is a socio-technical system (it may fail, like the reference system, due to the same general processes)
  • 90. Thank you Dr. Ioannis M. Dokas e-mail: i.dokas@4c.ucc.ie