1) The document discusses database management and security considerations for electronic-enabled aircraft. It covers topics like aircraft communication standards, system models, integration of avionics with wireless technologies, security threats and requirements. 2) Some key vulnerabilities discussed include corruption of software assets during electronic distribution and wireless sensor network security. Challenges addressed include ensuring power efficiency, low latency, and traceability in wireless networks. 3) The document provides an overview of database and security issues and recommends approaches like digital signatures, key management, and addressing impacts on safety, to enable secure operation of electronic aircraft systems.

1. DATABASE MANAGEMENT FOR
SECURED OPERATION OF
AIRCRAFT
Presented by:
Bikram Kumar Sinha
Roll - 173010015
Guide:
Prof. Shashi Ranjan
Kumar &
Prof. Arnab Maity

2. Communication standards
■ Aircraft to aircraft (A2A) communication
■ Aircraft to infrastructure or ground (A2I) communication

3. System model of E-enabled Aircrafts
• Airplane information assets distribution system
Information assets consist :
- Loadable software (e.g., electronic
flight bag, weather reports, navigation
databases)
- Health data (i.e., diagnostics, tag
data, wireless sensor)
- Data for traffic control
(e.g., traffic beacons)

4. Continued…
Different off board systems communicating with in-aircraft network

5. Avionics integration with wireless technologies
■ Above figure shows the avionics integration with wireless technologies, like:
- Global positioning system (GPS)
- Passive tags
- Sensors
- Access points of 802.11
Aircraft to infrastructure communications (A2I) can be linked through a broadband satellite if the
aircraft is in-the-air or an 802.11 link when it is on the ground

6. System andTrust Speculations
■ Appropriate assignment and management of access benefits at each object
■ Appropriate management and proper protection of all passwords, cryptographic and
quantities of security
■ Airlines have to manage software configuration of their fleet correctly and reliably
comprising the list of software, their updates and the latest versions of software for
each aircraft model

7. Aircraft Security Standards
■ In-aircraft Networking
- Use of Ethernet for in-aircraft networking
- Use of personal wireless device onboard
■ Electronic Distribution of Software
- Airplane software certification
■ Air Health Management
- Use of passive RFID tags on board with passwords
■ AirTraffic control
- ADS-B standards & applications for traffic beacons

8. Threats of Security
Adversaries can harmAIADS for own gain and for getting unwarranted safety issues that can cause
delays in flight, cancellations and can create anxiety in passenger during the flight, contributing to
the added threats in airline business.
Major threats to the AIADS assets:
• Corruption of Asset
• False Alarm
• Late Detection
• Asset Sensitivity
• Asset Unavailability
• Repudiation

9. Requirements for Security
The AIADS have to meet up with these essentials to keep safe distributed assets from the
mentioned threats:
■ Integrity : Identity of the asset has to be verified
■ Source Authenticity : Preventing inculcation of corrupted assets
■ Authorization : Entity having access should be examined
■ Confidentiality : Unauthorized access to assets must be prevented
■ Early and Correct Detection : Manipulation identification at earliest
■ Availability :Available at time for meeting up the airline needs
■ Traceability : All deeds executed must be logged in a proper format
■ Non-repudiation : Related at least with one of the authorized entity

10. Threats which can be mitigated by the requirements of security:

11. Related System Constraints

12. AddressingVulnerabilities ofWSN
■ Mitigation of Channel Jamming
■ Secure Routing
■ Secure LocationVerification
■ Robustness to Sensor Capture

13. AddressingVulnerabilities in EDS
■ Utilization of Hardware Redundancy and onboard software
Contents of loadable software may be altered by adversary with the non-arbitrary bit
substitutions, which makes the corrupted software able to pass the error check and makes it
loadable at the destination
■ Use of Metadata for Digital Signatures
Loadable software may be incompatible across different software versions and aircraft models.
The adversary may try to exploit this vulnerability and prevent or delay the A2I distribution of
signed software updates to an airplane as well as divert signed software

14. Major Challenges inWireless-Enabled
AHM
■ Providing Power Efficient Solutions forWSN and RFIDTags
■ Ensuring Low End-to-End Path Latency inWSN
■ ProvidingTraceability under DataAggregation inWSN
■ AccommodatingWSN Membership Dynamics
■ Impact ofActive RFIDTags onAirworthiness

15. Challenges in E-enabled Airplane Security
■ Enabling the Use of Digital Signatures
■ EnablingGlobal OnboardVerification of Signatures
■ Impact of Key and Certificate Management onAirlines
■ Impact of Security on Safety
■ High Assurance for AIADSApplications
■ SecuringWireless Networked Control ofAirplane

16. References
■ C. Wargo and C. Dhas, “Security considerations for the e-enabled aircraft,” Proceedings of Aerospace Conference, 2003.
■ Krishna Sampigethaya, Radha Poovendran, and Linda Bushnell “Secure Operation, Control and Maintenance Future E-enabled Airplanes” Network Security Lab (NSL), EE Department, University of
Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, USA
■ H. Bai, M. Atiquzzaman, and D. Lilja, “Wireless sensor network for aircraft health monitoring,” in Proceedings of Broadband Networks (BROADNET), 2004, pp. 748–750.
■ R.Harman,“Wirelesssolutionsforaircraftconditionbasedmaintenance systems,” Proceedings of Aerospace Conference, 2002.
■ R. Robinson, M. Li, S. Lintelman, K. Sampigethaya, R. Poovendran, D. von Oheimb, J. Busser, and J. Cuellar, “Electronic distribution of airplane software and the impact of informationsecurity on
airplane safety,” in Proceedings of the InternationalConference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security (SAFECOMP), 2007.
■ J. Pawlicki, J. Touzeau, and C. Royalty, “Data and communication security standards in practice,” in http://www.ataebiz.org/forum/2006 presentations/StandardsInPractice All.pdf, 2006.

17. ThankYou