The FAA is pursuing strategic efforts to advance simplified vehicle operations (SVO) through research and development partnerships. Automation is seen as the next step to enhance safety by reducing loss of control accidents, which are still the largest cause of fatal accidents. Past partnerships with NASA and industry that developed technologies like GPS and glass cockpit displays are credited with major safety improvements. The FAA's approach involves specific, targeted R&D to solve safety issues and plan for the future in a step-wise manner focused on aircraft, airmen, and integration. Purposeful partnerships that test innovations can yield real-world safety benefits. The presentation outlines the FAA's vision and plans to continue progressing aircraft automation safely through a methodical

1. Federal Aviation
Administration
FAA Strategic Efforts for
The Next Leap in Aviation –
Simplified Vehicle
Operations R&D
Presentation to: GAMA SVO Meeting
Prepared by: Wes Ryan, FAA
Small Airplane Standards Branch
Date: November 28, 2018

2. 2
• Automation is the next logical step in using
technology to enhance safety - increase access
to safe, personal aviation
• Loss of control fatal accidents are still our
largest remaining root cause - appropriately
done automation can fix this
• Past collaborative R&D partnerships
NASA/Industry led to huge improvements - GPS,
Glass Displays, ADS-B (CFIT greatly reduced)
• We continue to do specific, targeted, step-wise
R&D to solve this issue and plan for future
Situation

3. 3
Continuing on a 10+ Year Path
Airspace
Aircraft
Airmen
Pilot Functions
1st Focus
On Aircraft
Automation
Displays/Controls
3rd Focus
On Integration
Automation
UTM
2nd Focus
On Trajectory Automation CFIT, GCAS, DAA, ACAS
Trajectory
Management

4. 4
Purposeful Partnerships = Success
AGATE Started New Ideas That
Became Reality
Moving Map GPS, Synthetic
Vision, ADSB, etc.
“Immeasurable” Safety Benefits

5. 5
Evolution vs. Revolution
Expected pilot workload/role impacts displays
30+ yrs old 15+ yrs old
1990’s
5+ yrs old
SVO?
2020’s
4th Generation Displays

6. 6
Use Innovation To Enhance Safety
History of bringing new technology safely into service
– GPS, ADS-B, Glass Displays, Envelope Protection, AOA
Transformational Flight & Automation Concepts are the
Next Logical Progression/Evolution in Technology/Safety
– Innovation from UAS will work into Small Aircraft, Future UAM,
Part 25
– Culture in FAA is Shifting to Risk-based Innovation & Safety
Must Foster Innovation While Addressing Current
Challenges
– Further UAS Integration
– Greater Automation
– UAM and SVO
Use Methodical Approach
– Low risk introduction 1st
– Build to Higher Risk Uses
Future?

7. 7
We Must Press On! What’s Next?

8. 8
Purposeful Path/Methodology
Evolution vs. Revolution (Need Systems Thinking)
– Company Business Models Don’t Match FAA Safety Model
– Methodical Introduction - Proven Safety Benefits from R&D
Certification Challenges/Methodologies
– Technical Maturity of Automation vs. Company Expectations
– Operational Integration & Human/Machine Teaming
Vision, Steps, Path? (Aircraft, to System, to ATC)
Low Risk to High Risk (Safety Risk, Financial, Time, Certification, Infrastructure, etc.)
Aircraft ATC/NAS

9. 9
Actively Planning Future
• Look Ahead to part 23 in 5-20+ Yrs
• Encourage New, Safer Designs
While Reducing Cert Cost
• Improving Access - Reduced Need
for Training/Skill - Virtual CoPilot
• Transform entry level GA airplanes
& transportation for 21st century
• Risk Based Decisions &
Performance Driven Requirements
• Allow Automation of Tasks as
Technology is Proven to be Safe
Enough Based on Data

10. 10
Flight Controls & Simplified Ops
Working R&D for 10+ years to bring
affordable augmented flight path
control to GA
– Modern sensors, actuators, processors
enabling new systems – UAS provide safe
prototyping
– Real Results - Envelope Protection
Autopilots – Certified and in flight for 5+
years
– Targeting Simplified Vehicle Operations –
“Pilot on the loop” simplified flight –
Reduce pilot error
Methodical Buildup from Component to
Full System Level R&D Projects
Feeding Policy
– Yielding Real-World Test Results and
MOC
– AOA, Advanced Autopilots, Full Flight
Path Management, Resilient Automation,
“EZ-Fly” system being tested at Embry
Riddle.
Airspace
Aircraft
Airmen

11. 11
Step-Wise R&D = Specific Results
• Simple Sensors (AOA, AHRS, etc)
• Used for stall prevention (Hundreds Installed)
• Sensors Used in Digital Two-Axis Autopilots
(Now the Norm in GA, working on Retrofit)
• Dynamic Algorithms - Self Checking and Monitoring
• Autopilots with Envelope Protection
(Several Certified Systems)
• Run-Time Assurance – Resilient Autonomy
• Self Monitoring, Bounded, Automation Systems

12. 12
Step-Wise R&D – Cont’d
• Derived AOA to Provide Safety for Measured
Systems – AIAA Paper Presented January 2017
• Dynamic and Adaptive Algorithms – ASTM Std.
• Self-Checking and Adaptive Autopilots and
Flight Control Systems
• Bounded Behavior of Complex System to
Meet Certification Expectations
• Seek Augmented/Automated Flight Path Control
• EZ-Fly “Fly-by-Wire”, but designed for full
control of aircraft and complete stability
• Auto-land and Auto-takeoff Coming Soon

13. 13
Future Vision for Innovation/Safety
Integration of UAS Will Also Mature Key
Technology Enablers
– Application Will Improve Access To Personal Aviation
– Attract More Pilots – Automation Will Simplify Flight
Shared Integration & Future “Traffic
Management”
– UTM Concepts Will Continue To Mature
– Build to Manage all Trajectories Leveraging UAS Tech
Prompt Agility Of Airworthiness/Collaboration
– Part 23 Rewrite, Industry Standards Development,
Others
Related R&D Must Quickly Feed Policy: Key
Enablers – Electric Propulsion, 4D Flight Path
Control, Automation

14. 14
ASTM AC 377 Strategic Efforts
• Moving from Aircraft to System/NAS Level
• Discussing Automation Strategies Across All Aviation – GA,
UAS, Future Air Taxi, Transports
• Focusing on “Pillars of Automation”
• We don’t dictate design, but several key attributes for safety
• Independence/Partitioning
• Run Time Assurance and Self Monitoring
• Robust/Modular Architecture – Testability & Certification
• Dynamic Consistency Checks – System Behavior
• Fail-functional Design Mentality – No Human Backup

15. 15
Can Automation Really Replace The Pilot
AND Controller Tasks Safely?
– Immeasurable Pilot X-factor, Contingencies
– Relate to Mission/CONOP Tasks Specifically
• Aviate, Navigate, Communicate - Pilot
• Locate, Separate, Communicate - ATC
Future Automated Passenger-Carrying
Aircraft
– How do we manage their integration in NAS
– Operational Requirements Must be Considered -
Part 61, Part 91, etc.
– Human Factors for ATC and Pilot/Monitor
– Role of Monitor on Ground vs. Automation on Board
Challenges

16. 16
Enablers/Barriers – Data is Key
• Confluence of
Technology & Demand -
The Time is Right
• Societal – Reliance on
Technology/Automation
• Regulatory – Innovation
Center vs. Risk Aversion
• Partnerships Provide Safe
Data Collection
• Data to Counter Zero Risk
Mentality & “Removal of
All Uncertainty” ie 10E-14

17. 17
R&D & Collaborations Yield Data
Continue FAA Sponsored R&D
– Aircraft and Flight Path Level Results
UAM - Grand Challenge
– Advance Maturity of UAM Aircraft/Applicants
– Leverage Combined Expertise of NASA, FAA, Industry
UAS Integration - SIO – System Integration
Operationalization
– Large UAS Initiative under UAS in NAS program
– Detect and Avoid and NAS Integration Technology Demonstrations
Automation - Resilient Autonomy – DOD, NASA, FAA
– Prove Specific Architecture Can Safely Automate Critical Tasks
– Robust Autonomy for UAS and Manned Aircraft
– Run-time Assurance – Key to Safe Automation With Less Human
Involvement
– Dynamic Consistency Checks (Avoid Issues like 737 Max)

18. 18
Supporting Slides

19. 19
S
e
p
t
e
m
b
e
r
2
0
0
7
Can’t Take Another 20+ Years
• Balanced, risk-based approach paid off –
display technology had timely cert
• Need Similar Timely R&D for Means of
Certifying New Control Schemes for the
Aircraft and Integration into Airspace
AGATE – 1990’s GA Panel Today
SVO?
GA Panel Today Future Panel?
Then
Now

20. 20
CICTT = CAST / ICAO Common Taxonomy Team
In USA, someone dies
from Loss of Control
every 2-3 days ( Average)
LOC-I = Loss of Control – Inflight
CFIT = Controlled Flight Into Terrain
SCF-PP = System Component Failure-Power Plant

21. 21
Why Is This So Exciting?
The “Model A Ford” of
The Next Gen GA Aircraft
Emerging Transformational
Flight Concepts

22. 22
Key To Augmented Flight Path
Control
1. Modular Software
Architecture
• Top down architecture hierarchy
with clearly specified interfaces
2. Functionally Partitioned
Modules
• Each module limited to a single
safety function
• Software isolation of Vehicle
performance modeling
3. Computational Agility
• Rapid assessment of vehicle
situational hazards with quick and
decisive mitigation of those
hazards

23. 23
Safety Systems

24. 24
Process for Certification
Conceptual
Design
Requirements
Definition
• Process
Orientation
• Pre-Project
Guidance
• Familiarization
Briefing
• Top Level Safety
Requirement
• Potential Policy
Items to Address
• Airspace
Integration
Challenges
Compliance
Planning
Implementation
Post Certification
Activities
• UAS Conceptual
Design*
• CONOP*
• Risk Classification*
• Certification Plan*
• Conformity
Inspection Plan
• Preliminary TCBM
• ORA*
• Proposed
Certification Basis *
• Acceptable Means
of Compliance
• Detailed Method of
Compliance
• FAA Involvement
• Applicant’s
Responsibility
• Oversight and
Delegation*
• Conformity
• Interim TCBM
• ATO/AFS
Coordination*
• Compliance Data
Generation
• Compliance
Substantiation
• Compliance Finding
• Type Inspection
Report
• Data Retention
• Required
Documents at
Delivery
• TC Holder Info
• Continued
Airworthiness
• ICA Changes
• Post Certification
Evaluation
Red Items = Steps Where NASA Resilient Autonomy Will
Focus
* Denotes items that are specific to UAS Type Certification, or items that
are tailored for UAS certification

25. 25
Notional Steps for Certification of
Automation
Identify the aircraft, its intended use, and area of operation
Identify the functions that are expected to be automated without human backup
Evaluate risks and severity of those risks based on that CONOP (What if
document) (SORA)
Evaluate mitigations for those risks and whether they are by design, operational
limitation, or geographic/airspace limitation
Evaluate the integrity/assurance needed for the risk mitigations that are by
design
Create certification requirements for the design aspects, and pass fail for those
requirements for showing compliance
Identify functions, definition of expected performance of that function, pass/fail
evaluation criteria for the function, and a means to test that functionality to verify
reliability, accuracy, availability, and what happens if it fails. (contingencies
without human intervention)
From pass/fail and expected performance for function/design features, identify
cert/safety requirement and means to test to show it has been met.
Collect data, and demonstrate compliance by test, inspection, analysis

26. 26
Define By Mission Task Elements
• Identify what the
aircraft is going to do
(Concept of
operation/mission) and
break into mission
elements
• Identify tasks
automation is intended
to do for each mission
element
• Identify expected
behavior and pass/fail
criteria for the
automated functions
• Create mission task
element testing
procedures to
validate/verify proper
function and behavior
1
2
3 5
4
6
7
Task Description Behavior Pass/Fail MOC
1.a Pre-flight Condition for
Safe Flt
Configuratio
n
Insp
1.b Built In Test System Ready Sys
Parameter
Limits
Test
1.c Flight Plan Flt Route As Intended Test
……..

27. Federal Aviation
Administration
27
Conceptual
Design
Safety Assessment(SRP4761)
Identify aircraft level functions to be
certificated (included piloted and/or
autonomous)
Decompose Aircraft level functions
into system item functions.
Identify system safety requirements
Apply JARUS SORA
Guidance
Production
Concept:
Aircraft,
CONOP
(AC 21.17 Section
10)
Aircraft/System(
s)
Function
Development
Development
of System(s)
Architecture
System(s)
Implementati
on
Implementatio
n
&
Verification
Design and Development
Task at Hand
Decompose
Aviate,
Navigate, and
Communicate
Apply one or the other
Can this be met under current
14 CFR Rules
Software & Hardware
Conceptual
Design
Requirements
Definition
Compliance
Planning
Implementation
Post Certification
Activities
Process Steps for Certification

28. 28
Need Methodical Approach for Automation
We have a history of finding ways to bring new
technology into the National Airspace System safely
– Need for balance regarding FAA rigor vs. safety
improvement
– Collaborating with NASA, industry, academia on
supporting R&D and policy development
Developing “Assured” Automation
– Bounded Behavior – Safe limitations of authority and
expected outcomes – architecture is key – human
intention is built in by bounded behavior
– Fault Tolerant, Fail-Safe – Continue to function after a
failure
Logically reduce/replace functions of pilot/controller
– Deconstruct functions of the pilot and controller to
design automation (GCAS and ACAS for Spiral 1)
(Spiral 2 will be more)

29. 29
Humans/Machines
Trading Roles
Workload/Integrity
of
Function
Human
Function
Time
Automation
Function
Pilot
Mitigates
Risk
Automation
Mitigates
Risk
Automation
Replacing Humans
Automation May do
More Than Human
Capability
What Will Residual
Future Roles Be?
Velocity of Change Human as Safety Monitor
Current
Systems
Future
Systems
Future Safety Gain?
Reduced Pilot Error/Operational Error