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SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER
CYBERSECURITY AND
NETWORK RESILIENCE
Technical assessment of cybersecurity
Inherent to most control system networks today is the design
perspective that programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and the
network infrastructure interconnecting them operate in a secure
environment sealed from malicious attackers. In practice, these
industrial control systems are often connected to other networks
that also allow remote access through open networks or the
Internet. Considering the possible impact of failures and the
criticality of these systems, vulnerabilities call for action.
Verification and testing of control system software
with Marine Cybernetics services
Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testing of control system software has been shown to improve
the safety of offshore operations and to reduce downtime. This successful approach can be
complemented with the verification of cybersecurity to treat safety and security together
and to secure the integrity of control systems.
MARITIME
The first step towards securing control systems is to make sure
they are designed and operated according to recognized inter-
national standards and recommendations, such as the ISO 27000
series, the NOG 104 guidelines, the NIST 800 or the IEC 62443
set of standards for industrial automation.
In addition, testing and probing these networks for possible
vulnerabilities and for robustness under high traffic loads are
DNV GL – Maritime, Brooktorkai 18, 20457 Hamburg, Germany; Phone: +49 40 36149 0, www.dnvgl.com/mcs
© DNV GL 05/2016 ID: 1020752 Design: Maritime Communications
important in order to verify that the implementation of the
design is safe, secure and carried out in accordance with the
documentation.
The competence of DNV GL within control systems and IT
architectures is beneficial when examining critical parts of
control system networks. Our tests aim to reveal vulnerabilities,
regardless of whether they can only be exploited by a highly
skilled malicious attacker, a determined hacker or a disgruntled
employee, or can be caused by a hardware or software failure.
Network resilience
Control system networks often receive attention when operations
are disrupted by unexpected and intermittent failures. Assess-
ment of these networks can evaluate the current observable
quality, and it can be repeated to gain insight into degradation
of equipment and connections at a defined interval.
Tests can actively provoke failures, for example by generating
specially tailored network traffic, or encompass passive measure-
ments. The aim of taking passive measurements is to gather
snapshots of the current status of the network. These snapshots
can then be used as reference points when the measurements
are repeated at a later point in time. The types of communication
media we target are ethernet-based networks, typically serving
human machine interfaces (HMI), historians, various servers,
operator stations and controllers, as well as fieldbuses providing
connectivity to sensors and actuators in the field.
The overall scope of cybersecurity and network resilience
testing from DNV GL covers:
■■ Stress and robustness testing
■■ Penetration testing and testing of network segregation
■■ Screening running services, patches and firmware
■■ Authentication weaknesses
■■ Portable media security
■■ Known and unknown vulnerabilities
■■ Traffic anomalies
■■ Degradation of networked equipment
Today, an integrated approach for handling software and software
updates is essential. Combining HIL and cybersecurity testing
increases safety and security in the maritime and offshore
industry. As threats to cybersecurity continue to increase in
number and appear from unexpected new angles, a novel
methodology is required to secure safe operations at sea. Not
all tests, however, can be integrated into tools and be automated.
The experience of a tester, such as one from the DNV GL
Marine Cybernetics services team, is vital to the discovery and
investigation of specific holes in cyber defence.
CONTACT
Mate J. Csorba
Principal Specialist
Phone: +47 486 03 646
E-mail: mate.csorba@dnvgl.com

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network resilience 2016-04_web

  • 1. ©xxx SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER CYBERSECURITY AND NETWORK RESILIENCE Technical assessment of cybersecurity Inherent to most control system networks today is the design perspective that programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and the network infrastructure interconnecting them operate in a secure environment sealed from malicious attackers. In practice, these industrial control systems are often connected to other networks that also allow remote access through open networks or the Internet. Considering the possible impact of failures and the criticality of these systems, vulnerabilities call for action. Verification and testing of control system software with Marine Cybernetics services Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testing of control system software has been shown to improve the safety of offshore operations and to reduce downtime. This successful approach can be complemented with the verification of cybersecurity to treat safety and security together and to secure the integrity of control systems. MARITIME The first step towards securing control systems is to make sure they are designed and operated according to recognized inter- national standards and recommendations, such as the ISO 27000 series, the NOG 104 guidelines, the NIST 800 or the IEC 62443 set of standards for industrial automation. In addition, testing and probing these networks for possible vulnerabilities and for robustness under high traffic loads are
  • 2. DNV GL – Maritime, Brooktorkai 18, 20457 Hamburg, Germany; Phone: +49 40 36149 0, www.dnvgl.com/mcs © DNV GL 05/2016 ID: 1020752 Design: Maritime Communications important in order to verify that the implementation of the design is safe, secure and carried out in accordance with the documentation. The competence of DNV GL within control systems and IT architectures is beneficial when examining critical parts of control system networks. Our tests aim to reveal vulnerabilities, regardless of whether they can only be exploited by a highly skilled malicious attacker, a determined hacker or a disgruntled employee, or can be caused by a hardware or software failure. Network resilience Control system networks often receive attention when operations are disrupted by unexpected and intermittent failures. Assess- ment of these networks can evaluate the current observable quality, and it can be repeated to gain insight into degradation of equipment and connections at a defined interval. Tests can actively provoke failures, for example by generating specially tailored network traffic, or encompass passive measure- ments. The aim of taking passive measurements is to gather snapshots of the current status of the network. These snapshots can then be used as reference points when the measurements are repeated at a later point in time. The types of communication media we target are ethernet-based networks, typically serving human machine interfaces (HMI), historians, various servers, operator stations and controllers, as well as fieldbuses providing connectivity to sensors and actuators in the field. The overall scope of cybersecurity and network resilience testing from DNV GL covers: ■■ Stress and robustness testing ■■ Penetration testing and testing of network segregation ■■ Screening running services, patches and firmware ■■ Authentication weaknesses ■■ Portable media security ■■ Known and unknown vulnerabilities ■■ Traffic anomalies ■■ Degradation of networked equipment Today, an integrated approach for handling software and software updates is essential. Combining HIL and cybersecurity testing increases safety and security in the maritime and offshore industry. As threats to cybersecurity continue to increase in number and appear from unexpected new angles, a novel methodology is required to secure safe operations at sea. Not all tests, however, can be integrated into tools and be automated. The experience of a tester, such as one from the DNV GL Marine Cybernetics services team, is vital to the discovery and investigation of specific holes in cyber defence. CONTACT Mate J. Csorba Principal Specialist Phone: +47 486 03 646 E-mail: mate.csorba@dnvgl.com